

THE INSECURITY DILEMMA

THE INSECURITY DILEMMA

National Security of
Third World States

edited by
Brian L. Job

Lynne Rienner Publishers · Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

ISBN 978-1-55587-267-0 (hc : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-58826-359-9 (pb : alk. paper)

Printed and bound in the United States of America



The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
 Introduction	
<i>Brian L. Job</i>	1
 Part 1	
The Insecurity Dilemma: Theory and Practice	
1 The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World	
<i>Brian L. Job</i>	11
2 International Theory and War in the Third World	
<i>K. J. Holsti</i>	37
 Part 2	
The State, State Building, and Security	
3 The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective	
<i>Mohammed Ayoob</i>	63
4 The Security Dilemma in Africa	
<i>Robert H. Jackson</i>	81
 Part 3	
Domestic and External Strategies to Attain Security	
5 Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization	
<i>Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt</i>	97

6	Arms Imports, Arms Production, and the Quest for Security in the Third World <i>Keith Krause</i>	121
7	Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and the GCC <i>Amitav Acharya</i>	143
Part 4		
Third World Security in a Restructured International System		
8	Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective <i>Barry Buzan</i>	167
9	A New Role for Middle Powers in Regional Conflict Resolution? <i>Fen Osler Hampson</i>	191
10	The Superpowers and Third World Security <i>S. Neil MacFarlane</i>	209
	<i>References</i>	231
	<i>About the Contributors</i>	251
	<i>Index</i>	253
	<i>About the Book</i>	257

Tables

2.1	Intellectual Apparatus for Studying War	41
6.1	World Arms Deliveries, 1963–1988	125
6.2	Number of Third World States with Selected Weapons Systems, 1950–1985	125
6.3	Number of Weapons and Weapons Systems by Region	126
6.4	Number of Arms Delivered to the Developing World, by Region and Weapon Type, 1973–1977 and 1983–1987	132
6.5	Operating Costs as Percentages of Military Budgets	135

Acknowledgments

The authors of this volume came together in March 1990 to consider security problems in the Third World at a small conference organized by the Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. At these meetings, commissioned papers were read and subjected to lively and intense critical scrutiny, largely led by the invited discussants: John Chipman (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), Joel Migdal (University of Washington), David Dewitt (York University), and Paul Marantz (University of British Columbia). These colleagues in particular, along with the external reviewer for Lynne Rienner Publishers, deserve mention for their pointed and constructive advice to individual authors and to the editor.

Financial support for this project from three institutions is gratefully acknowledged. Funds to underwrite the organization of the conference were obtained through grants from the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and from the Military and Strategic Studies Program, Directorate of Public Policy, Canadian Department of National Defence. Operating expenses during the editorial phase of the project were covered by the Institute of International Relations, a unit of the Faculty of Graduate Studies at UBC. The opinions expressed in the volume should not be viewed as representing the aforementioned institutions or their officials.

Special thanks are owed to three persons associated with the institute: Arif Lalani, for his efforts in organizing the original conference that gave rise to this volume, and Caroline Welling and Zahra Jenab for their editorial work leading to the final book manuscript. Their hard work has greatly facilitated the publication of this volume, and their good humor has made working on this project most enjoyable. It is also a pleasure to acknowledge Mark Zacher, who in his roles as colleague and as the director of the institute has provided this project with intellectual and institutional support.

Brian L. Job

Introduction

Brian L. Job

With the beginning of the 1990s, it is necessary to further rethink and reexamine the national security problems of Third World states. Events over the last several years have more radically altered the international security arena than any since the establishment of the parameters of the post-World War II security framework. What, for instance, are to be the consequences of the end of the Cold War for Third World countries? Does the new relationship between the superpowers portend a withdrawal from the Third World? If so, will this lead to a decline in local and regional disputes in the Third World now that these disputes will no longer be ideologically defined and supported by the superpowers or their proxies? Are the notable instances of peaceful settlement of enduring disputes, such as the Iran-Iraq War and the Angola conflict, and the transitions from autocratic to more democratic governments, such as in Latin America, the key indicators of a trend to a less contentious Third World security environment?

Or, alternately, are these positive developments to be countered by other, less attractive omens concerning security and peace in the Third World? While the conflicts noted above have ended in the last several years, the record of turmoil and death in Third World conflicts continues apace—the most spectacular example, of course, being the Gulf War of 1990–1991. At the beginning of 1990, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 1990: chapter 10) recorded some thirty ongoing major armed conflicts in the Third World, many being intractable disputes between groups with long-standing ethnic, economic, and political grievances. (Significantly, this catalog did not include the estimated seventy-five or more armed conflicts not meeting the criteria for major disputes.) Little has occurred to stem the accumulation of weaponry and the expenditure of scarce resources on weapons and security forces. Expensive and dangerous arms races continue. Removal of superpower influence, variously effective as an exacerbating or inhibiting factor, may have simply opened the way for Third World regional powers to assert themselves and for local and communal grievances

to come to the fore. In this sense, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the ensuing war, and the exacerbated turmoil of the Kurds may be harbingers of the future.

Perhaps above all, conditions of personal security for Third World citizens remain bleak. In numerous countries regimes seek to secure themselves against opposition by employing repressive tactics against their own peoples (Sivard, 1991:18). In others the state does not have the institutional capacity to provide minimal conditions for the personal well-being of the citizens. In general, therefore, the evidence concerning Third World security is mixed, the prospects for the future indeterminate. We need a better understanding of the problems confronting Third World states, of the ways they will be affected by changes in the overall international security configuration, and how they in turn will affect this configuration through their own actions. This volume takes steps to address these questions. The authors represented here are essentially interested in theoretical and conceptual matters. They seek to challenge the ways in which Third World conflict and security are thought about within the standard theoretical frameworks of international relations.

Organization of This Volume

This volume is organized in four sections. The two chapters in the first section set the stage by posing general questions and advancing lines of argument to be explored with more specific attention to concept, strategy, geographic region, or type of state by later authors. Thus, in Chapter 1, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," the basic parameters of the insecurity dilemma are established. In contrast to circumstances of the "security dilemma"—the primary metaphor of traditional international security thinking—for the prototypical Third World country, there is no popularly accepted notion of singular "national security" that needs to be maintained against external threats. Of primary concern is the contention for security by various actors (e.g., regime holders, communal groups) within the borders of the state. In paradoxical fashion, the norms of the contemporary international system operate to preserve the Third World state from territorial extinction, again in contrast to the traditionally envisaged international security dilemma. In the remainder of this chapter, particular facets of the insecurity dilemma are explored more carefully—the central relationship that analysts have identified between the insecurity dilemma and the "weak state," the insecurity dilemma as a phenomenon exclusive to the Third World, the manner in which dilemmas of insecurity influence the so-called security strategies adopted by states and regimes, and the consequences of the restructuring of the international system for the insecurity dilemmas of the Third World.

Chapter 2 is K. J. Holsti's essay "International Theory and War in the Third World." Holsti addresses the question: Can we profitably employ the concepts and intellectual perspectives developed to study war in the Eurocentric international system to gain understanding of the conflicts in the Third World? He is led to conclude not only that the etiology of post-1945 war is substantially different than that of pre-1945 international conflict, but also that the theories and approaches found in the standard international relations, peace studies, and security studies literatures are inadequate and inappropriate. Holsti argues that it is necessary to rethink traditional realist frameworks that focus upon states as actors, sovereignty, balance of power and hegemony, security from external threats, and war as the fundamentals of the national security problematic. Such frameworks do not address the contemporary nature of the Third World, where threats to national security have internal rather than external manifestations, where the regime rather than the state is most frequently being challenged, and where conflicts arise from the irreconcilable demands of ethnic, religious, or national community aspirations.

Parts 2, 3, and 4 respectively explore different dimensions of the insecurity dilemma of Third World states: Part 2, the concept of the state as an object and actor; Part 3, the strategies adopted by states (read regimes) in their search for security; and Part 4, the international context of Third World security.

Thus, in Part 2, Mohammed Ayoob (Chapter 3) and Robert Jackson (Chapter 4) examine the nature and prospects of the Third World state. Ayoob accepts as given "the pervasiveness of insecurity" in the Third World, which he ascribes to the lack of unconditional legitimacy both for Third World state structures and regimes. This security predicament is intractable due to the history and process of state making in the Third World, and to the manner in which the system of states has historically and contemporaneously impinged upon this process. Ayoob undertakes a comparative analysis of the process of state making as revealed in the history of the European system. He presents arguments as to how and why Third World state making, and accordingly security conditions, are similar to and distinct from those of the traditional European states.

Ayoob lays the groundwork for Chapter 4, Robert Jackson's treatment of "quasi-states," entities embodying extreme forms of the circumstances and processes described by Ayoob. Jackson proceeds from the paradox presented by the continued existence of the subset of states in sub-Saharan Africa. These "quasi-states," while lacking the physical and functional capacity to provide for their own external security, nonetheless continue to exist—in effect having their security guaranteed through collective agreement and behavior patterns among themselves and in their relationships with nonregional actors. However, by not being subject to the demands and

requirements of providing national security vis-à-vis the external world, these same states (regimes) appear unconstrained in violating the conditions of internal security for the majority of their populations. Jackson argues that this results in the inversion of the Hobbesian notion of a social contract between the state and its citizens for the provision of security. Jackson, therefore, exposes the roots of the insecurity dilemma in fundamental contradictions between the notions of national security in the philosophical traditions of international relations and the behaviors of many actors operating in the name of national security in the Third World. He then goes on to discuss the ways in which national security theorists must begin to come to terms with these issues, both in their abstract thinking and in policy considerations.

Part 3 contains three chapters on the security strategies adopted by authorities in Third World countries. In essence, the question being asked is "Why is it that these political and military leaders adopt policies that very often appear discordant with the apparent security needs of the population and with the available resources?" More directly stated: If Third World security managers are not irrational, as they probably are not, what then is the logic underlying the strategies of militarization seen in many of their countries? Barnett and Wendt (Chapter 5) as well as Krause (Chapter 6) focus on militarization; Acharya (Chapter 7) looks at regionalism as a tool of domestically focused security policy.

Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt explore why the preponderance of Third World states adopt strategies of dependent, capital-intensive militarization, as opposed to autocratic and labor-intensive strategies. Their central argument is that the economic and geopolitical structures of the international system have a determining impact on the nature of militarization in Third World states. Two systemic factors are seen as crucial: the role of the Third World in the historical development of the capitalist world economy, and the nature of sovereignty of Third World states. Barnett and Wendt discuss how militarization strategies based on import substitution and export promotion have been attempted, especially by semiperipheral Third World states, only to see the extent of their dependence sustained, if not in fact increased.

In Chapter 6, Keith Krause concentrates on arms transfers and arms production, examining these from a global and structural perspective. While accepting that the Third World has become much more militarized during the last two decades, Krause goes on to challenge the notions that (1) trends of militarization will continue in a linear fashion; and (2) the linkages between militarization and Third World security, internal and external, are as dysfunctional as generally assumed. Krause presents evidence to suggest that the market for arms is stabilizing and becoming saturated, and that arms distribution is highly uneven and hierarchical. He makes parallel assertions regarding arms production by Third World states. In

theoretical terms, he argues that what we are witnessing is the search of states, in a self-help system, to place themselves suitably within the international hierarchy, given their security concerns and their capacities to satisfy these through domestic and external means. In part because of the stabilizing effects of these phenomena, Krause sees less deleterious consequences of this process for Third World security than some have claimed.

Regionalism, as seen in the establishment of regional organizations, and its relationship to the pursuit of national security by Third World states is the subject of Amitav Acharya's analysis in Chapter 7. In the immediate post-World War II world, many Third World countries viewed regionalism as an important strategy for addressing their security problems. Organizations such as the OAS, OAU, and Arab League have been regarded as motivated by concerns for collective security in the face of extraregional threats and by desires for intraregional dispute settlement. Acharya argues that these traditional understandings of the linkage between the motive forces for regionalism and national security are too narrow. In his chapter, he compares the cases of two newer regional groups, ASEAN and the GCC. While in a superficial sense both can be seen as resembling traditional regional organizations, Acharya goes on to demonstrate that it is the shared interests of the regimes in power—their interest in self-preservation, their perception of common internal enemies, their sharing of common values—that motivated the formation and operation of ASEAN and the GCC. He further demonstrates that external events both inside and outside of these regions come to be viewed in light of their implications for domestic challenges to regimes.

The three individual authors in Part 4 engage in speculation about the systemic context of Third World security for the Third World over the next decade. Rather than focusing upon the nature of the system as a whole, each chapter treats the perspective of a different set of actors. Buzan considers regional security complexes and their potentially renewed role in the future system; Hampson considers the middle powers; MacFarlane considers the traditional superpowers and their revised attitudes and ambitions toward the Third World.

In his book *People, States, and Fear*, Buzan (1983a) laid the groundwork for much of the current thinking on security and the Third World. In this volume, he explores and extends the idea of the regional security complex, examining the history of the emergence of security complexes in the Third World and the way the contemporary pattern of complexes relates to the structure of the international system. Buzan argues that a focus on regions and regional players is necessary to understand the interplay between states and the international system. As nodes in the system, security complexes not only define intense and relatively durable local patterns, but also serve to guide and shape the impact of larger external powers on these local patterns.

In the light of what he views as the decentralization of the international security system, Buzan sees that indigenous patterns of regional security will be increasingly important features of the system in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, he draws attention to the directions and developments he foresees for particular regional complexes.

In Chapter 9 Fen Hampson addresses the proposition that middle powers will have a new role to play in international politics, notably in international mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Third World regional conflicts. Although some foresee a stronger linkage between superpower disengagement and middle-power settlement of regional conflicts, Hampson argues that any such optimism must be significantly tempered in light of both the highly contingent, albeit successful, role they have played in the past (especially in the Gulf conflict) and the nature of the protracted conflicts in the Third World. Hampson discusses the need to carefully define and redefine the concept of the "middle power" in the contemporary international environment. He reviews the record of middle-power mediation in post-World War II conflicts, with a somewhat skeptical eye to the likely role of middle powers in future Third World security problems.

S. Neil MacFarlane addresses the impact of changing superpower relations on Third World security in Chapter 10. In particular, he assesses the possibilities and implications of superpower condominium for the Third World and its attendant security problems. His basic argument proceeds along the following lines: In the Cold War era, the combination of ideological and geopolitical globalism of superpower rivalry dictated competition in the Third World for political influence, military position, and prestige. For Third World states, this competition contained both advantages, in terms of giving them greater access to arms and influence, and disadvantages, in terms of increasing the proliferation of weaponry and the frequency and destructiveness of conflicts in the Third World. However, MacFarlane sees a change in the cyclical bipolar dynamic underlying superpower involvement in the Third World—a dynamic driven largely through alterations in Soviet perceptions of global politics and their interests and capabilities for power projection abroad. Some degree of superpower condominium vis-à-vis the Third World may be emerging, as evidenced by superpower coordination in the Gulf and more recently in regard to a possible Israeli-Arab settlement. However, this apparent partnership may be rapidly evolving toward an effective US dominance as the domestic situation in the Soviet Union continues to disintegrate, eroding Soviet international influence. If the Soviet Union is indeed no longer a major player in Third World security matters, does this suggest the complementary withdrawal of the United States from activism abroad—in effect leaving a broader stage for Third World players themselves—or does it presage a more unilaterally active United States in Third World affairs, unimpeded by the constraints of

Soviet counterinfluence? In effect, with this final essay, the volume concludes at a time when the dimensions of answers to these questions are only beginning to emerge in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the culmination of the process of reform in the Soviet Union begun by Gorbachev, and the US reconsideration of what it intends as a New World Order.

PART 1
THE INSECURITY DILEMMA:
THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World

Brian L. Job¹

It is increasingly taken for granted that the world is a secure place for First World states and their citizens. With the demise of the Cold War, writers and policymakers alike are celebrating the end of war, the decay of repressive regimes, and a safer world of democracies (Gaddis, 1989; Mueller, 1988). However, the same cannot be said for and by the majority of the world's population, i.e., those living in the Third World. The record reveals more than twenty wars ongoing, thousands being killed, and millions living under repressive governments, many of which, in the name of security, turn the machinery of the state against their own peoples (Sivard, 1991; SIPRI, 1990). While a series of events, such as the ending of the Afghanistan, Angolan, and Iran-Iraq conflicts, provides signs of decreasing armed conflict and death in the Third World, the stark contrast between the First World and the Third World remains evident. Such contrast was only heightened by the recent Gulf war—a conflict in which First World combatant casualties were less than 400, while in excess of 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed and an unknown number of noncombatants were victims of the war or its aftermath (*Globe and Mail*, Toronto, May 30, 1991).

This being said, it must also be noted that appreciation of the nature and magnitude of the security dilemmas of Third World states underwent substantial change during the last decade. In part, this arose from greater attention to what was going on in the Third World, i.e., attention to, among other things, the cumulated catalog of wars, civil violence, and destruction in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America (Sivard, 1991; SIPRI, 1990; Holsti, 1991). With this attention came the realization that the Third World had become the exclusive arena of conflict in the postwar system. The preponderance of casualties and devastation from conflict were inflicted upon Third World peoples, even in those wars where the forces of First World states were actively engaged themselves. But, as Holsti argues in the present volume, it is not simply the numbers that are distinctive about this record. In terms of their causes, participants, methods of fighting, victims, and results,

the post-1945 array of Third World conflicts does not accord with the accepted notions of international war, which are grounded in the historical experience of Western states.

Scholars and policymakers seeking to explain these Third World security-related phenomena found themselves frustrated. For the latter, whatever logic of national security was operating in conflicts such as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and the Iran-Iraq War, for example, it was not embraced and understood by those in Washington, London, Paris, Ottawa, or Moscow. For scholars, the traditional concepts and theories of international relations theory, articulated in the central premises of realist thinking—territoriality, sovereignty, nation-statehood, nonintervention, and separation of domestic and foreign policy—proved inadequate to the task at hand. Internal-external, domestic-international distinctions make little sense in situations where penetration and intervention by other states and groups is the norm, rather than the exception.

First Steps in Rethinking Third World Security

The incongruity of the reality of security in the Third World, as juxtaposed against the premises of most scholarship in security studies, began to be pointed out in the 1980s. Barry Buzan (1983a), in his volume *People, States, and Fear*, can be credited with what was probably the first and certainly the most sustained and penetrating critique of the logic of national security and international strategic studies. He and others thereafter began to focus on the security dilemmas of the Third World (e.g., Kolodziej and Harkavy, 1982; Thomas, 1987; Rothstein, 1986; Azar and Moon, 1988; Ball, 1988; Ayoob, 1989).

Three key lines of argument emerged in these and associated writings: First, as Buzan pointed out, is the problem of the “weak state.” The traditional sense of national security implied relationships between a population (viewed as a nation) and its government, state institutions, and officeholders (perceived to be legitimate), and the capacity of the state to protect against external threats arising in an anarchic international system. However, in the Third World the basic parameters of this national security equation or social contract relationship are seldom satisfied. The model Third World state is instead a “weak state,” i.e., an entity lacking both social cohesion and state capacities (Buzan, 1983a:65–69). Consequently, the security dilemma for the typical Third World state arises in meeting internal rather than external threats, and for typical Third World citizens could well involve seeking protection from their own state institutions.

Second is the paradox of static territorial borders. Given that the weakness of Third World states is largely due to protracted contention among rival communal groups, and given that existing arbitrarily determined

boundaries serve to exacerbate such divisions and conflicts, the rationalization of state borders to achieve more coherent nation-state units (largely as the results of conflicts) would, in principle, have appeared to present a solution—as it did in the Western European statemaking experience (Tilly, 1975). However, there have been no signs of such a process in the post-1945 world; in fact, just the opposite is true. Not a single Third World state disappeared from the map (Migdal, 1988:6), while over a hundred came into existence. In essence, the postwar norms of the First World and the norms subsequently developed by the Third World, as expressed in forums such as the United Nations and the OAU (Organization of African Unity), operated to prevent adjustment and reorganization of the configuration of Third World states (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986).

Third is the recognition of the impact of the post-World War II, Cold War security order on the Third World. In part this is engendered by the dramatic restructuring of the superpowers' bilateral relationship during the last five years. Thus, the decade of the 1980s exhibited a remarkable ebb and flow of superpower activity in the Third World, beginning with the war in Afghanistan and the "low-intensity" conflicts in Angola and Nicaragua, amplified by the Reagan administration's further assertions in Central America and the Middle East, and ending with superpower rapprochement and devolution of their Third World entanglements (see MacFarlane, 1990). For four-plus decades the international system had operated under the influence of the superpowers, creating a security environment of pervasive penetration. Analysts took different viewpoints concerning the nature and duration of the effect that superpower management had, and continues to have, on the Third World security environment. For Buzan (1991: chapter 5), for instance, regional security complexes and the indigenous conflict patterns within them were "overlaid" by the global designs and competition of the East and West core security communities. The result was a curious admixture of enhancement/provocation and of inhibition/insulation—enhancement of the incidence and severity of some conflicts (e.g., Angola), inhibition of others (e.g., limitations on Mideast conflicts), and insulation of others (e.g., submersion of the nascent rivalries of South Asia). A diminution of superpower influence and interest in the Third World would accordingly result in the reemergence of the security patterns of preexisting regional security communities. But for other analysts such reasoning is seen as deficient. By concentrating on short-term impacts, which were essentially symptomatic conditions, more deeply rooted, long-term, structural relationships were being ignored (Walker 1988)—relationships that despite recent events would not alter substantially unless and until dramatic restructuring of North-South security patterns, perhaps on the order of those taking place in Eastern Europe, were to occur.

In tandem with these more theoretically oriented writings came a growing body of empirical, descriptive work, much of it concentrating on the

apparent manifestations of Third World security problems, i.e., regional conflicts and regional conflict management (e.g., Buzan and Rizvi, 1986; Ayooob, 1986), the militarization of the Third World (e.g., Ball, 1988), superpower interests and involvement in the Third World (e.g., Litwak and Wells, 1988), and the rise of ethnic and religious movements challenging the established state order.²

Security in and of Third World States

A common theme emerges from this thinking about Third World security, namely that Third World states must cope and function within a unique and particularly troublesome security environment—a condition that we shall characterize as an “insecurity dilemma.” In this chapter I raise for consideration several themes and questions regarding the insecurity dilemma with two purposes in mind: (1) to articulate concerns regarding clarity and coherence, especially as they relate to demarcating further work in this area; and (2) to set the stage for the chapters that follow in this volume—chapters in which authors with particular interests and expertise consider in greater detail aspects of the questions raised here. Some preliminary clarifications are necessary. These have to do with security, with distinguishing the various actors involved in the Third World security environment, and with establishing the contrast between the traditional concept of the “security dilemma” and the “insecurity dilemma” confronting Third World states. Particular facets of the insecurity dilemma are then focused upon in more detail: the central relationship that analysts have identified between the insecurity dilemma and the “weak state,” the insecurity dilemma as a phenomenon exclusive to the Third World, the manner in which dilemmas of insecurity influence the so-called security strategies adopted by states and regimes, and the consequences of the restructuring of the international system for the insecurity dilemmas of the Third World.

Security: A Contested Concept

Having labeled security as a “contested concept,” Buzan (1983a:6) goes on to argue that the attempt to provide a precise definition is fruitless. Accordingly, rather than taking on this task directly, most authors proceed by attaching several delimitations to what they mean by “security” and then moving on.³ My purpose in persisting to raise the issue is twofold: to identify four primary dimensions of contention that arise in considerations of security, and to indicate how one’s study of security in the Third World context is affected depending on the choices made on these dimensions.

First of all, the unavoidable normative dimension to security leads to contention on both theoretical and practical bases. Security concerns

perceptions of well-being of individuals and collectives and of the assurance of the “core values” central to the self-definition of communities (see Lippman and Wolfers, as cited in Buzan, 1991:16–17). Consequently both the participant and analyst in affairs of security inevitably confront troublesome issues: judgments about the objectivity of perceptions, about the sufficiency of conditions of well-being, about the precedence of collective versus individual claims to protection or rights. Such questions cannot, for instance, be avoided when considering whether or not a secessionist group has a valid claim or whether or not the state, citing the need to fend off an external threat to its existence, acts to effectively diminish the security of individuals within its borders. Different societies privilege different components of their life—witness the contention between the proponents of liberal democracy and proponents of collectivist, Marxist principles. And different actors within the same environment will assume radically divergent definitions of “national security.”

Thus, the second dimension of security, inescapably intertwined with the first, hinges on the issue of “whose security?” In principle, four or more distinct securities may be at issue simultaneously: the security of the individual citizen, the security of the nation, the security of the regime, and the security of the state. For a society composed of communal groups, with distinctive ethnic or religious identifications, their perceived securities may also be at stake, making the interplay and competition among the various players even more complex and unresolvable.

In this and subsequent chapters, the terms state, regime, and nation will be distinguished as follows. The term “state” has two contexts for reference, an external and an internal. In the former context, states are the actors in the international system, each with a distinct territorial base and exercising sovereignty. In its internal context, the state is usually equated with the set of institutions that organizes, regulates, and enforces interactions of groups and individuals within its territorial confines. It is the state, in the Weberian tradition, that holds the right to maintain and exercise coercive force to maintain order and to settle disputes. But, when the agencies and bureaucracies of the state are ill-defined, or proceed separately or in competition, e.g., when the military acts to displace the legislature, distinctions become complicated. The locus of the state and the coherence of its functional capacities at any point in time may be very tenuous notions. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish the state from the regime, where “regime” refers to the small state of persons who hold the highest offices in the set and/or are the elite that effectively command the machinery, especially the coercive forces, of the state.⁴ The preservation, i.e., the security, of the regime will perforce involve differing notions of threat and response than those entailed in the security of the state. Finally, there is the nation—a collective of persons whose self-identification on the basis of common ethnicity, language, race, and historical experience is viewed as the basis for

the expression of legitimate political identity and power. Simply sorting out the various national/communal actors with their contending definitions and demands for their security presents great difficulties in many Third World situations, e.g., in Lebanon, Peru, or Sri Lanka. What is of primary concern for the analyst is to avoid making assumptions that the security interests of state, regime, and nation are congruent and harmonious.

The third dimension of the security concept concerns its substantive scope and content. Security can be defined as involving some or all social, economic, political, military, and physical (including ecological and environmental) concerns. Further complications are brought to bear by debating whether the long- or short-term considerations of these sectoral components of security deserve priority. For most analysts in the security studies field, the matter is relatively straightforward. Security is about political-military threats in the short term; and, in general, the authors in this volume explicitly or implicitly adopt this perspective.

Defining security more broadly, for example, to involve long-term environmental issues such as demographic trends or climatic change, is seen by some writers as diluting the essential nature of the concept. For these analysts, all such security concerns, if they actually do come to matter, will boil down to short-term political-military considerations (see, for instance, Ayoob, in this volume). However, note should be made of writers such as Thomas (1987a) who argue the especial relevance of environmental factors, economic productivity, demographic trends, and strategic resource supply and demand for affecting and creating conditions of security in the Third World. As environmental conditions deteriorate to the point where populations cannot support themselves, as food supplies become weapons in conflicts (e.g., in Ethiopia), and as conflicts create large flows of refugees across international borders (e.g., in Southeast Asia or in the Gulf)—in effect, as direct or indirect manipulation of environmental and demographic factors become aspects of the security strategies of state leaders—analysts will be required to broaden their substantive scope and theoretical frameworks accordingly.

Indeed, the fourth dimension of contention concerning the concept of security is that of theoretical perspective. This may be the most consequential dimension, because by positioning themselves within a theoretical framework, writers are automatically provided with answers to the issues raised on the other three dimensions. One such paradigm—the realist/neorealist paradigm—has dominated the field of security studies.⁵ Through the assumptions of realist international theory, the contentions and contradictions of the security interests of individuals, nations, regimes, and states are resolved (see Holsti, this volume). Peoples within territorial boundaries are viewed as having singular national identities, which are in turn fostered by the institutions of the state. That is, they are nation-states. Regimes are regarded as legitimate agents for the

national interest. A functional social contract operates with citizens ceding rights and resources to the state in return for protection and order in their lives (see Jackson, this volume). In the international milieu, these nation-states interact according to principles of territoriality, sovereignty, and nominal equality. Under this rubric, "national security" refers to the security of the nation-state, i.e., an externally focused interest derived from the presumption of a unified, self-identifying, and ordered society within the state's borders.

The Security Dilemma

The primary metaphor utilized within the realist paradigm to describe the security problematic of nation-states is the "security dilemma" (per Jervis, 1978). Operating in conditions of anarchy, states, by seeking to advance their *individual* national securities (through policies of arming, deterrence, and alliance), create and sustain an international environment of decreased relative security for themselves and for the collective of states. The security dilemma, therefore, hinges on the external threat conditions that states experience and on the results of their efforts, as unitary state actors, to meet these threats. To the extent that such circumstances actually coincided with the conditions of the post-World War II world—the national security state mentalities of the United States and the USSR, the nuclear arms race, and superpower control over spheres of influence—the security dilemma concept provided a concise and satisfactory benchmark for students of international security.

The Insecurity Dilemma

However, when we turn to consider the internal and external circumstances of contemporary Third World states, the security dilemma metaphor and underlying logic do not hold up to scrutiny. In at least four key ways, the premises of the security dilemma are violated:

1. Within the borders of the state, there is often no single nation, i.e., a socially cohesive society. Instead, there are usually a variety of communal groups contending for their own securities and for supremacy over their competitors.
2. The regime in power, therefore, usually lacks the support of some significant component of the population, because the regime represents the interests either of a particular ethnic or social sector, or of an economic or military elite that has taken control. In all instances, the result is an absence of perceived popular legitimacy to the existence and security interests of the regime.

3. The state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide peace and order, as well as the conditions for satisfactory physical existence, for the population.
4. The sense of threat that prevails is of internal threats to and from the regime in power, rather than externally motivated threats to the existence of the nation-state unit.

In these circumstances (see Bobrow and Chan, 1988, for another such listing), there is, therefore, no singular notion of national security and no dominant externally oriented security dilemma for the typical Third World country. Instead, there exist competing notions of security advanced by the contending forces within society. The state itself is at issue in most conflicts. National security has to be seen as distinct from state security and regime security, with each component of society competing to preserve and protect its own well-being. What results in such a contentious environment is better characterized as an *insecurity dilemma*, i.e., the consequence of the competition of the various forces in society being (1) less effective security for all or certain sectors of the population, (2) less effective capacity of centralized state institutions to provide services and order, and (3) increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention, and control by outside actors, be they other states, communal groups, or multinational corporations. Thus, sovereignty for Third World states implies neither equality of Third World states nor effective capacity of state institutions to provide security or well-being for their populations.

Note that there are two contrasting conditions that compose this insecurity dilemma: first, an internal predicament in which individuals and groups acting against perceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create an environment of increased threat and reduced security for most, if not all, others within the borders of the state; and second, a resulting paradox regarding the external security environment. The paradox is that internal security contention, while effectively undermining the state's capacity and weakening its ability to meet external threats, does not make the state more vulnerable to the primary threat of the anarchic international system, i.e., the threat of territorial encroachment or extinction. As discussed earlier, the norms and responses of the contemporary international community protect states from such threats and results (witness the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), despite their lack of capacity and failure to achieve any national consensus. Thus, the assumptions of the traditional security dilemma metaphor are violated—states are preoccupied with internal rather than external security, and weak states have a guaranteed existence in what is supposedly an anarchic international environment.

Offering the insecurity dilemma concept as a metaphor for the Third World state security problematic does not imply that its conditions describe

the empirical situation of all Third World states, any more than the traditional security dilemma conditions are empirically represented in the circumstances and behavior of all states in the Western European-based international system. Clearly there are non-Third World states to which aspects of the insecurity dilemma apply regarding their internal security climate; similarly there are Third World states who find themselves, especially in regional contexts, within classic security dilemma situations (see Buzan, this volume). However, for general descriptive purposes and for purposes of constructing theoretical propositions regarding the security relations of Third World actors, the insecurity dilemma metaphor is a useful concept—especially because its phraseology provokes a contrast to the traditional security dilemma terminology.

As noted earlier, the characteristics of the security picture of Third World states were increasingly brought to attention in writings of the 1980s. In this volume as well, the theoretical (see chapters by Holsti, Jackson, and Ayoob) and empirical (see chapters by Buzan, Acharya, Krause, and Barnett and Wendt) components of the insecurity dilemma are further developed. With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter is taken up by considering several key questions that relate to the insecurity dilemma, to Third World circumstances, and to changes in the international environment. The first question concerns what appears to be the critical relationship between the existence of weak states and the insecurity dilemma.

The Weak State—The Crux of the Insecurity Dilemma?

The diagnosis commonly agreed upon by analysts as a central feature of the Third World states' insecurity dilemma is the "weak state" syndrome. In simplistic terms, the troubles of Third World states arise because they do not possess the qualities of "strong states"—essentially the characteristics of the Western, democratic, industrialized nation-states. But such thinking is obviously too stereotypical. In empirical terms, the Third World is composed of an array of states, exhibiting enormous variation in their economic, social, and political conditions. In theoretical terms, there is no single understanding of the "weak state" concept. Digging just beneath the surface reveals that the literature on Third World security shares these inconsistencies and conceptual uncertainties. As will be shown below, the "weak state" label is utilized by a range of scholars whose individual referents for the term are quite divergent, necessitating further theoretical reflection on the determinants and consequences of this term. Similarly, if one looks to analysts who have adopted a more inductivist, descriptive route, i.e., attempting to create descriptions or typologies of Third World states based on their attributes or their security behaviors, the results are confusing and less than satisfactory.

The Weak State

To start out, let us for the moment somewhat arbitrarily focus upon three authors. In the course of their works, Caroline Thomas, Barry Buzan, and Joel Migdal regard the "weak state" as a central explanatory theme. Beneath the surface similarity of their use of the "weak state" phrase are quite differing assumptions and understandings about the nature of the Third World and its security problems.

Caroline Thomas (1989:182), following the thinking of Michael Mann (1984:188ff), associates state strength/weakness with the institutional capacities of the state. She distinguishes two forms of state power: despotic power and infrastructural power. Despotic power is arbitrary power, exercised through force, to impose rule upon civilians. Infrastructural power refers to the level of sophistication, effectiveness, and reach within the state's territorial domain of the state institutions (i.e., bureaucracies) that provide or exact resources from citizens. A state can be "weak," that is, deficient, in one or both of these types of capacities. For a strong state, however, having effective infrastructural power will obviate the need to exercise more than a modest degree of its coercive power.

Thus there is a developmental theme in Thomas's argument as well (although not as prominent as in Mann's work [1984:190–191]). States beginning with little despotic and infrastructural power will seek to develop the former capacities first—necessary for the consolidation of the state vis-à-vis internal and external competitors—before going on to develop infrastructural and service-oriented capacities. However, in practice many states become locked into this preliminary status, i.e., with strong despotic and weak infrastructural powers, as a quasipermanent condition. Either because they prefer this status quo or, more usually, because they are unable to move beyond the raw exercise of coercion to compliance through more peaceful means, regime powerholders sustain themselves through this imbalance of state despotic and infrastructural powers. The weakness of the state, therefore, hinges upon the paradox that the more the regime attempts or needs to exercise the coercive machinery of the state, the more directly repressive the regime's actions against its competitors in the internal security arena, the more obvious is its "weakness."

For Buzan (1991:65), the "institutional expression of the state" is only one of the three components of the state, the other two being the "idea of the state" and the "physical base of the state." Buzan emphasizes that, while there are critical minimal requirements of size and population and of institutional capacity for an entity to qualify as a state in the system, the crux of the relationship between national security and the state rests in the less tangible realm of how and why people identify with the "idea of the state" articulated and represented by those in power. "Weak states," therefore, have

as their principal distinguishing feature . . . their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government. . . . Weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation. (Buzan, 1983a:67)

It should be noted that Buzan also uses the term “weak power” in his considerations with regard to external, interstate comparisons. A “weak power” is one that lacks economic and military capability in relative terms vis-à-vis the other states in the system (Buzan, 1983a:66). A weak power lacks effective institutional capacities and is not able to efficiently mobilize its potential natural and human resources. Buzan’s notions of state and power strength/weakness and security are, therefore, rich and complex. However, having dissected the concept of the state into its various components, it becomes at times a bit difficult to “put things back together again,” i.e., to be precise about how and why certain combinations of circumstances arise and/or if these are germane to the idea of the weak state and national security. It remains unclear, for instance, as to how Buzan regards states that present divergent combinations of strength across his three dimensions, e.g., a state that is weak in terms of institutions and ideas, as opposed to one that has strong (coercive) institutions but a weak ideational character.⁶

Joel Migdal provides a counterpoint to both of these discussions. In looking at state/society relations, Migdal essentially reverses the direction of attention from how states affect and transform society to how it is that societies tolerate, facilitate, or permit the state to develop. A strong state, for Migdal (1988:xvii), is defined in terms of state capacity, i.e., “the ability of state leaders to use the agencies of the state to get people in the state to do what they want them to do.” But there are very few of these strong states in the Third World; only the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Israel, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam qualify for Migdal (1988:xvi).⁷ Given the weblike nature of Third World societies, the state *per se* is unlikely to emerge as a strong competitor for loyalty and resources in competition with social organizations such as families, clans, MNCs, domestic enterprises, tribes, and patron-client dyads. Fundamental conflicts within what Migdal describes as the “melange of social organizations” constituting Third World societies, mitigate against the emergence of the prototypical Western nation-state.

Albeit that Migdal eschews direct consideration of the security issues, his thinking appears particularly relevant to analysis of the insecurity dilemma and the weak state. Migdal sees a basic duality emerge in the development of state/society relations. On the one hand, the state with relative ease can gain strength in penetrating societies, deploying coercive force, and extracting resources; but, on the other hand, sectors of society can and do respond by frustrating the state’s attempts to effect goal-oriented social

changes, i.e., more permanent alteration of social relations, shaping of national identity, and establishment of efficient appropriation through state bureaucracies. The frequent result of such attenuated state development is a state/society standoff—the state ends up with substantial coercive force largely to protect the existence and privilege of the elite holding office at the expense of the bulk of society.

Migdal goes further to point out that regime holders, in this situation preoccupied with their short-term security and frustrated in their longer-term agendas, often engage “a pathological set of relationships between top state leadership and its agencies” (Migdal, 1988:207). In other words, components of the regime begin to compete within the state, playing off one agency against the other to avoid being deposed from within. Frequently, the regime will create counterbalancing military or police forces to ensure itself a loyal source of power at all times. The resulting impact upon the citizenry, however, can be disastrous.

With Buzan, Thomas, and Migdal we have therefore several views of the weak Third World state. Four dimensions of state strength have been identified: (1) power potential in terms of the resources that could be extracted and the population that could be mobilized; (2) infrastructural capacity and service delivery; (3) coercive capacity in its military and police forces; and (4) national identity and social cohesion. However, as noted, these three authors, as well as others, relate these dimensions to characteristics of the different actors within the Third World security environment (state institutions, the nation, the regime, communal groups, the population) in different manners. Buzan, in talking about a weak state, focuses on national identity and social cohesion, thus contrasting national security from state (i.e., regime) security. Thomas separates the coercive and noncoercive institutions of the state but does not make regime/state distinctions. In the sense that Thomas sees a state (regime) trapped in a situation where the coercive tools available to it can sustain its short-term existence but not solve its long-term problems, she is in accord with Migdal. However, in other ways, Migdal draws a quite different picture of society by implication of the logic and prospects of security relations within the Third World state. He, for instance, very carefully avoids any developmental logics. From a theoretical perspective, he rejects modernization theses; from a practical point of view, he sees conditions of stasis and frustration. Weak states are less the issue than are strong societies. A strong society in the Third World context is most likely one with sharp lines of communal demarcation and a coterie of forces challenging those of the state (regime). The insecurity dilemmas of Third World states are basically unresolvable as long as the various factions within society are able to compete effectively as security providers. For Migdal, then, “national security” is an ephemeral, if not almost inapplicable, concept for most of the Third World environment.

Typologies and Maps

The slipperiness of the concept of the weak state is, in part, inherent in the phenomena being discussed. That is, "as we move down the spectrum towards the weak end, the referent object for national security gets harder to define" (Buzan, 1991:104). This has led Rothstein and others to argue for the merits and the necessity of accompanying work on Third World state-security conditions that is empirically based—in other words, to proceed with "mapping exercises" that facilitate comparison and the development of conceptual frameworks (Rothstein, 1986:3). However, experience in this regard is proving that while it is a relatively straightforward matter to catalog the conditions, events, conflicts, and casualties occurring across the Third World, or to detail the circumstances of single case studies, it has been difficult to get beyond this point. Certainly, grand generalizations about the Third World have proven inappropriate. There are too many states in too many different circumstances to be lumped together. But the question remains then as to how to classify and categorize these units and their security conditions effectively so as to recognize common patterns and to facilitate explanation, especially of the weak-state syndrome.

Three different sorts of analyses should be noted. The first is simply the cataloging of conditions that apply to the phenomena in question. These are, in other words, lists of symptoms, each symptom displayed by one or more identified Third World states. Thus, Buzan (1988a; 1991:100) provides a list of expected conditions for a weak state, with the implicit notion that weaker or stronger states will exhibit more or less of these circumstances, respectively (see also Bobrow and Chan, 1988:54–59). The value of such an enterprise is in demonstrating the empirical scope and/or in clarifying the manner in which a concept is employed in the writer's argument.

The second sort of analysis makes a tentative step towards explanation by organizing states according to their attributes and examining the resultant categorizations for identifiable patterns of security-related behavior. A good example would be Chan and Bobrow (1988), who divided up Third World states according to straightforward criteria of economic size, population, and military spending in order to see if similarly positioned states exhibited common security syndromes. Accordingly, they colorfully labeled countries as Achievers, Goliaths, Davids, or "weak." But, particularly with regard to the "weak" countries—the preponderance of Third World countries—there was little evidence that communalities of capabilities had much to do with common security results. In a similar vein, Rothstein (1986), looking to discover relationships between security and military expenditure, categorized some eighty-nine states according to governmental effectiveness, regime legitimacy, and level and type of perceived threat. He too concluded that few if any generalizations were possible. And finally, while adopting the same general approach, Sivard's (1991:18–19) presentation of the relationship between the existence of a military

government and the occurrence of state repression (or state terror) against the population should be noted.

As is apparent in all three of these examples, the value of such large-sample, attribute-behavior logic studies is in the identification of general patterns of relationships, and recognition within these patterns of small subsets of states that display peculiar or interesting characteristics (as in Chan and Bobrow's use of the Achiever, etc., type of states). However, the overall payoff of these studies is limited to preliminary "brush-clearing" sorts of operations.

Most analysts instead proceed from a behavior-to-attribute logic. Thus, the third and more common type of study involves the designation of a security condition or conditions of interest, the subsequent identification of a relatively small number of states exhibiting these behaviors, and finally an attempt to discern the common attributes or background characteristics that could explain these states' similar security policies or outcomes. There is a concentration of such studies concerning the militarization of Third World states, where the acquisition of particular types or quantities of weapons immediately sets small subsets of states apart for special attention. Recently, for example, Michael T. Klare (1990), focusing on the war-making capacities of states, identified the subset of eighteen "highly militarized" Third World states. Even more selective in their focus would be studies such as Spector's (1990), on nuclear weapons proliferation in the Third World, or Nolan's (1991), on ballistic missile proliferation.

Several comments then about this work and the advance of understanding about the insecurity dilemma: Initial empirical attempts to create typologies and maps of the Third World security landscape have proved interesting but so diverse that little cumulation has taken place. Furthermore, much of the result of this work has been to narrow attention to subsets of states that exhibit the most extreme behavioral traits, i.e., the outliers in terms of the dependent variable (security). But the isolation of factors that determine these outcomes, factors underlying the insecurity dilemma and weak-state syndrome within Third World states, remains poorly understood.

State Building and the Third World State

One reaction to the problem of the weak state is to simply say that it will go away, that is, that these conditions represent a stage in the development of the Third World states from which stronger states will, in the natural course of state building, emerge in time. In other words, is what we are viewing in the Third World a process of painful but progressive resolution of authority and identity problems likely to promote peaceful, nation-state denouements?⁸ How one resolves this question depends on the answers accepted on a set of related questions: (1) What is the relevance of the experience of Western, industrialized states for the state-building process in the Third World? (2) Is

the European state-building process, however understood, likely to be repeated in the Third World?—i.e., does the Third World constitute a unique environment in this regard? (3) Is the weak state solely a phenomenon of Third World experience, i.e., can and will non-Third World states become weak states with incumbent insecurity dilemma conditions?

Concern regarding the first query has prompted a reexamination, by people otherwise interested in the Third World, of the European state-building experience. These investigations have led to two interesting conclusions: First of all, events in European history are now understood to belie the nation-state model of national identification, peaceful assimilation, nationalism, popular and legitimate government, and national security. In fact, the typical Western European experience most always involved the painful transition from state to nation (rather than the reverse, as often assumed), within a bloody history of elimination of political contenders, forced assimilation, and repressive consolidation of authority in the hands of the most efficient. Thus, while the nation-state was the final result, the process involved has come to be seen as much more violent and top-down than was commonly acknowledged (see especially Tilly, 1975; and also Ayoob, this volume). Ultimately, it was the state, with its territorial definition of political power and its role as internal and external security provider, that emerged dominant over contending economic, communal, and political forces within society.

Turning from the first to the second query, with notions of the benign qualities of European statebuilding having been largely repudiated, perhaps contemporary Third World experience may still be explained, or (for some writers) explained away, by citing this background. That is, given that the West European process was a bloody, largely top-down process—generally similar to what appears to be happening in the Third World—does this mean that weak-state troubles in the Third World will resolve themselves? To answer affirmatively means that one assumes that efficient and effective forces will emerge through struggle; national identities will be forged through directed assimilation; and ultimately relatively secure nation-states will be the model form of the Third World state as well (see, for instance, Herbst, 1989). In short, to quote Ayoob (1991:265), “time is, therefore, the crucial variable in explaining the difference” in the security circumstances of today’s Third World as opposed to its modern states.

However, to suggest that time alone will bring a resolution is a line of argument that is disturbing and branded as simplistic for many analysts, who warn against the dangers of ahistorical analogizing from fifteenth- to eighteenth-century Europe to twentieth- and twenty-first-century Africa and Asia. In critical ways, the existence and security context of the contemporary Third World is unique. Factors such as the colonial experience of Third World states have no equivalent in European experience. While the European great powers intervened in and manipulated the domestic and foreign policies of

their less powerful European counterparts, was this equivalent to the economic and political dominance exercised by the superpowers in the last forty years? Although subject to a variety of interpretations, the role of the Third World in the global economy is viewed by most as a unique historical circumstance. The freezing of territorial boundaries and the *ex cathedra* creation of units with effectively only quasi-sovereign status are both also seen as the distinctive results of the post-World War II state-creation process. Distinct too is the pervasive presence and influence of the media and global communication networks transmitting information, raising popular expectations, and building stereotypical visions in First and Third World minds. A matter of some debate is the relative extent and impact of great-power influence from one century to the next.

The majority of Third World states came into existence in the aftermath of World War II, as a result of the combination of the decline of European colonial powers, the realization of the principle of self-determination, and the creation of international organizations that recognized these countries and the causes of those seeking independence. In retrospect, there were significant contradictory aspects to this era and atmosphere of liberation and state creation. What happened was that Third World states were given their existence but denied the prerequisites for their long-term internal and external well-being. While the norms of the post-1945 system demanded restructuring to guarantee political independence for new states, there was no corresponding assumption of individual or collective responsibility on the part of established states for the restructuring of the new system members on economic, or for that matter social and ethnic, dimensions. In a perverse fashion, Third World states found themselves trapped within the artificial boundaries inherited from the colonial era. These territorial definitions could not be altered, because both First World and later Third World interests coalesced around the notion that to allow redefinition would undercut the established order—e.g., the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The result was the creation of many quasi-sovereign states, i.e., states possessing the nominal features of statehood but lacking the functional capabilities thereof, including the capacity to ensure internal security for its population (see Jackson, this volume).

As a consequence, the inviolability of Third World states in a formal sense has to be contrasted to their permeability in a practical sense. The territorial borders of the state do not serve as barriers to communal movements, to media and communication, to intervention or insurgency, and to legal and illegal trafficking. The principle of nonintervention is often invoked only as a convenience by other states seeking to influence the nature of the state's regime and its security policies. The practical consequences of this inviolability/permeability paradox are obvious, but the consequences for theoreticians are just beginning to be explained in a careful and systematic way (see, for instance, Ayooob, 1991; Buzan, 1991; both also in this volume).

Until several years ago, therefore, the consensus response to our third query would have been that the weak state was a creature of the Third World. However, the dramatic events in the "Second World" during the last several years force a rethinking of such a conclusion. The disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe as well as of the Soviet Union itself have resulted in a resurgence of nationalistic aspirations, the renewal of long-sublimated ethnic tensions, the rejection of colonial-like authority structures, and a shrinking of the effective capacities (especially infrastructural) of centralized authorities. The problems of the newly "independent" East European states and of entities such as the Baltics and republics within the Soviet Union echo those found in the Third World: factional communal violence, decayed or nonexistent infrastructural capacities, security forces with confused loyalties, and direct and indirect external penetration. In other words, these are the symptoms of the prototypical "weak states" identified earlier. Indeed, significant additional complications are presented in the Soviet-East European situation, because what in essence is involved is not only the withdrawal of a "colonial" power from its former empire, but also the collapse of the colonial power itself. Furthermore, in this case, unlike the declining European colonial powers, the power in question possesses and will continue to possess superpower capacities in terms of its nuclear arsenal.

Most every writer in the security studies field was, understandably perhaps, caught off guard by the effects of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika. (Again Buzan is worth noting [1983a], who in the early 1980s was already writing that the Soviet Union displayed key characteristics of a weak state.) However, consideration of the future security orders for a restructured New Europe is now imperative (see, for example, Mearsheimer, 1990; Snyder, 1990; van Evera, 1990/91; and Ullman, 1991). For those concerned with the Third World, these issues again raise the relevance of past European experience and the uniqueness of the Third World security problematic vis-à-vis that of Eastern Europe.

Consequences of the Insecurity Dilemma for Security Strategies of Third World States

State building is a long-term phenomenon. Any single regime is likely to effect little overall impact on the state-building process unless it embarks on a path of social revolution and/or extraordinary coercion and repression. States (more appropriately, regimes) are preoccupied with the short term; their security and their physical survival are dependent on the strategies they pursue for the moment. Consequently, it is rational for regimes to adopt policies that utilize scarce resources for military equipment and manpower, to perceive as threatening opposition movements demanding greater public debate, and to regard as dangerous communal movements that promote

alternative identifications and loyalties. Often the choice is presented to and by regimes as one entailing a trade-off between the advantages and hopes of prosperity under conditions of order and the disadvantages of unregulated "democracy" and disorder (see Archarya, this volume). In the course of their strategizing, regimes (often beleaguered within their own societies) become susceptible to the proffering of influence and arms by great and regional powers. Gaining enhanced security for themselves, albeit at the expense of pursuing a dictated foreign or domestic policy or of engaging in repression of their own peoples, is an acceptable bargain for many Third World state elites.

There has, however, been relatively little systematic attention to the question of Third World states' security strategies. This does not mean that there has been little written about arms transfers or conflicts or repression of citizens in Third World countries. However, few analysts have systematically considered the logic of perceived threats, constraints, and opportunities that lead to Third World security managers making the choices that they do. Instead, regime holders are often characterized according to a pair of stereotypes: Either they are labeled as puppets, as irrational, and as weak and inefficient; or they are viewed as strong, rational (albeit for perverse ends), efficient, and with complete control over the substantial coercive powers of the state. There is a tendency, as Migdal (1988:xvi) points out, for studies to "too facilely assume that those at the pinnacle of politics can effectively repress or transform the rest of society." One can often find wildly conflicting statements about regime strength and regime weakness made about the same security policies in the same state, e.g., Saddam's control over Iraq, or the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Analysts need to place themselves more directly within the context and point of view of Third World state security managers and, having done so, to consider the matter of strategy choices on the basis of the resource-constraint menu that a Third World leader perceives. Gaining an appreciation of the insecurity dilemma from the perspective of the regime does not necessitate acquiring a corresponding approval of the means and results of the security policies. It is likely, however, to reveal that officeholders in Third World states are not irrational, insofar as their short-term, even longer-term, interests are structured by the environment in which they find themselves.

Briefly consider three of the general types of security strategies often adopted by Third World regimes: (1) militarization, i.e., developing and arming substantial military/police forces; (2) repression and state terror, i.e., attempting to destroy the perceived "enemy within"; and (3) diversionary tactics, i.e., finding and provoking external enemies to distract attention from the situation at home.

It is the vision of a state regime destroying its own citizens that strikes observers as the most incongruous and ultimately counterproductive of security strategies. Yet according to observers, a substantial portion of Third World regimes, both military and nonmilitary, consciously and

systematically undertake repression against significant sectors and numbers of their populations (see Sivard, 1991:18–19 for a summary presentation). Human rights agencies, and in turn scholars, have devoted much work and attention to case studies of specific regimes, such as Chile, Ethiopia, Argentina, and Guatemala. But there has also been preliminary comparative and analytical work on typologies of terrorist regimes, the “success” of repressive strategies, and the relationship of economic development and other characteristics to the propensity to adopt repression (see Stohl and Lopez, 1986; Stohl and Duvall, 1988). On the basis of this more systematically comparative work, a better understanding of the logic of a resistance-repression security strategy is emerging. Note the conclusion of a recent study by T. David Mason and Dale Krane (1989:177), who incidentally present a striking characterization of the insecurity dilemmas a regime faces within the weak state:

This leads us to the question of why a regime, itself composed of supposedly rational individuals, would pursue a policy of escalating repression if such measures are ultimately counterproductive. We argue that the conditions of structural dependence characterizing these regimes leave them without the institutional machinery, economic resources, or political will to address opposition challenges through more accommodative programs of reform. Thus, escalating repression is perpetuated not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent alternatives.

The second common security strategy is to focus upon external enemies, the trick here, of course, being to try to create a common national concern and to mobilize support around the state (i.e., regime) and its efforts against this threat. This has been labeled the “scapegoat strategy,” with the term “diversionary theory of war” applied to the argument that wars are caused by such strategies (see Levy, 1990). While evidence to support such scapegoating as a significant cause of interstate wars *per se* is mixed (the Falklands/Malvinas conflict being a good example, however), this conclusion is less important for our purposes than the fact that regimes regularly attempt to foment perceptions of external enemies in order to justify their internal security policies, especially the buildup of military forces. The perpetuation of “the enemy” as a security threat to the nation can, in fact, become central to the entire rationale of the state—North Korea being a prime example. For its regime and for others whose countries are located within regional security complexes fraught by long-standing territorial or ethnic complaints, as in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, there are almost constant opportunities to call upon such externally oriented grievances in order to sustain their security apparatuses and thus their own longevity.

In a significant number of Third World states, the military is the effective wielder of power in the regime. It is not surprising, therefore, to

find that the accumulation of weaponry and the spending of large amounts on the military, paramilitary, or police forces of the state is common to many countries. And, accordingly, the phenomena of militarization and associated militarism are well documented, with substantial descriptive work having been done on the arming of the Third World and on the role of the military in the governing of the Third World (see Ball, 1988; Klare, 1990; and Krause, this volume). For our purposes, a somewhat different sort of question needs to be asked: given that militarization is the norm, why do regimes make the particular choices that they do about how to go about it? Why, for instance, are certain strategies of militarization, e.g., capital-intensive, dependent militarization, commonly adopted by Third World states when their resource base would appear to dictate a quite different approach? (See Barnett and Wendt, this volume.) Certainly, the notion of the weak state is involved here. Regimes are unwilling or unable to rely on labor-intensive militaries; they cannot count on the loyalty of the people, they are afraid of arming the masses. As a result, they become susceptible as willing or unwilling hostages to military elites or external actors guaranteeing short-term security in exchange for power and guns.

Finally, when considering the security strategy of Third World states, it is interesting to note the impossibility of separating internal and external notions of security both in theory and in practice. There several obvious manifestations of such external-internal linkages in security strategy. States seeking arms, for instance, can seldom afford them in the quantity and quality they desire and thus seek external supplies. But, the suppliers, especially the United States and USSR (but also, as the recent Gulf War demonstrated vis-à-vis France, Germany, and Britain), have provided military assistance to Third World regimes in exchange for influence over their domestic and foreign policies, often concerning their economic resources. In extreme circumstances, regimes become clients to the extent that they are solely dependent upon outside support, e.g., as has often occurred with the United States in Central America, or with the USSR in pre-1989 Eastern Europe.

There are other, in effect less obvious, varieties of security strategy that exhibit the fusing of internal and external concerns of regimes in power. One example (pursued by Acharya, this volume) is the creation and use of regional security organizations, i.e., nominally international entities, largely for the purposes of satisfying the internal security concerns of the state regimes involved. Like-minded ruling elites, usually conservative and traditional, seeking to foil forces of change and liberalization, realize a common interest and seek to coordinate their international efforts to this end. Whether or not this strategy is or can be successful in the longer term, in the face of the pressures of modernization, communication of ideas, and crossborder activities of communal groups, is problematic. However, for regimes preoccupied with their present security, this is another strategy to

buy additional time, with the hope that the contending forces within their societies will dissipate.

In a notable set of instances, regimes will exhibit all of the strategies noted above, i.e., extraordinary militarization, a political-military partnership, sustained myths about the enemies of the state, and the conduct of wars against these enemies within and without. One is likely to find in such states leadership personality cults, extreme militarism, and heightened forms of nationalism in which the fate of the nation may be tied to religious atonement. North Korea, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Chile (under Pinochet), and Argentina (under the generals) all have these traits. South Africa, too, is a prime example: Alexander Johnston's (1991) description of the white South African regime's security strategy of "Total Onslaught and Total National Strategy" serves as a benchmark for characterizing the whole set of such regimes. Johnston notes (1991:151) the regime's apocalyptic and holistic conception of security—a conception that involved

three characteristic fusions: firstly of peace and war; secondly of threats to territorial integrity and internal threats to the established order; . . . and thirdly of the 'national defence' and 'national security' roles of the military. (Johnston, 1991:152)

In institutional terms, this strategy found expression in the centralization of executive power, the entry of military personnel into primary positions of power, and a "National Security Management System" that coordinated all internal and external security policies of the regime.

Whether such states are identified by the label "national security states" or simply on the basis of the syndrome of behavioral characteristics they exhibit (e.g., Klare's [1990] "highly militarized" states), analysts have come to appreciate that they are centrally important to the understanding of Third World security, and thus deserve further systematic, *comparative* study.

The Security Dilemma and a Reconfigured International Security System

The security problematic of Third World states, therefore, has in many ways been created by other states and sustained by the international system. These other players, particularly the superpowers, have constantly made obvious that they possessed and wielded the military, economic, and political power required to advance their own short-term security interests at the expense of those in the Third World. Analysts focusing more upon longer-term, in effect structural, explanations of these phenomena have highlighted the rise of the world economy, the age of imperialism, and the post-World War II coupling of US economic hegemony and the Cold War as the determinants of the international security environment (see Barnett and Wendt, this volume). For

all concerned, however, regardless of their empirical or theoretical predilections, the events of the last several years serve as milestones. With the demise of the Cold War, the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe, the uniting of Germany and perhaps in turn of West Europe, and the possible collapse of the Soviet Union, the cornerstones of the post-World War II international security system have been rearranged or altogether removed. While certain parameters of a reconfigured security system for Europe are beginning to emerge, albeit tentatively, in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the implications of any such revised order for the Third World and its security dilemmas remain puzzling and less apparent. The events leading to and following the Gulf War of 1991 have in many ways exercised a more direct impact upon Third World countries and their security interests. However, the lessons of the Gulf War for Third World security in general are, to date at least, most ambiguous. One can, however, be certain about one thing: whatever the lessons of the Gulf War, and whatever the ultimate reconfiguration of Europe turns out to be, the international security order of the future will bear little resemblance to the basic features of the post-World War II order that established the context of the contemporary Third World.

This chapter closes, therefore, with some thoughts about several possible directions that a reconfigured international security order could take and their various consequences for the Third World security problematic.

As a first premise, it can be argued convincingly that the characteristics of post-World War II superpower involvement in the Third World will be changed. This is the case, regardless of whether one assumes that (1) the Cold War is over, and both superpowers will withdraw considerably from their Third World commitments, essentially leaving Third World regions to themselves and their regional security preoccupations; (2) the Cold War is over, and either some form of superpower condominium or multilateral regime will emerge to attempt to manage security problems in Third World venues; (3) the Cold War is over, but the United States as victor will sustain a directive influence in the Third World, i.e., as the power of the "New World Order"; or (4) the Cold War may be over, but superpower competition will reemerge, albeit with a Soviet Union of less effective global reach.

To date, and prior to the Gulf War, scenario 1 above has received the most attention. Thus MacFarlane (this volume), for instance, argues that the basic cycle of superpower involvement in the Third World has been broken. There is no underlying ideological drive remaining in this enterprise and, therefore, largely for reasons of economics for both the United States and the USSR, expensive commitments and wars in the Third World will be avoided. The evidence of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua all point in this direction. Within this "superpower withdrawal" perspective there are,

however, two separate views as to the consequences for the Third World of greatly diminished US and USSR involvement. First are those who view the superpowers as having imposed structures and limits upon Third World conflict and security competition that were in some senses beneficial or insulating in that they prevented wars, placed caps on the amounts and types of weaponry introduced into regional arenas, and sanctioned truce and cease-fire arrangements. But, in turn, withdrawal by the United States and USSR from their commitments and initiatives abroad will be accompanied by a rekindling of traditional regional and communal disputes in the Third World. These conflicts, proceeding without any restraining superpower hand, fueled by supplies of weapons obtained readily and without qualms by buyers or sellers, will be even more bloody and less resolvable than before. Elements of such a "reversion thesis" are found, for instance, in Ayooob (1991, and this volume) and in Buzan's (1991: chapter 5, and this volume) arguments on the likely reemergence of the dynamics of regional security complexes in the Third World.

Juxtaposed against this line of reasoning is one that emphasizes the other side of the picture of First World-Third World security relations, i.e., where the superpowers are viewed as having involved Third World peoples and states in wars not of their own making; of overloading client regimes with unnecessary, oversophisticated weapons; and of imposing artificial ideological definition to regional politics and interrelations. The retreat of the United States and USSR is, therefore, a boon to the prospects of a more secure Third World. Conflicts will be allowed to defuse themselves, perhaps for no other reason than states will be unable to afford their expensive, unsponsored rivalries. In the absence of superpower meddling, Third World states themselves, possibly activating their regional organizations, may be able to more effectively promote settlements to Third World disputes, e.g., in Central America.

Scenario 2 above proceeds from the same initial premise as scenario 1 but speculates that the superpowers, perhaps mindful of the potentially harmful consequences for them of explosive conflict and weapons proliferation in the Third World, will sustain attention on Third World security matters, channeling their interest either in bilateral (superpower condominium) attempts at security management or in multilateral agencies, such as a United Nations driven by superpower agreement in the Security Council. MacFarlane (this volume), for instance, hints at this possibility. One interpretation of the events of the Gulf War is that the United Nations played a strong role in orchestrating a common front of coalition states against Saddam Hussein and ultimately in the prosecution of the Gulf War itself. However, others have a much more skeptical or cynical interpretation, seeing the Gulf War as a unique set of circumstances that will not be repeated and/or seeing the United Nations as having been essentially manipulated, largely by the United States, to sustain an international order advantageous to

it, and incidentally probably to most other First World states and certain Third World states.

This line of reasoning leads to support for scenario 3, a scenario in which the United States assumes a role of world leadership in what President Bush has termed a New World Order. The parameters of this New World Order, however, remain very sketchy and perhaps simply overtaken by events in the Gulf and Eastern Europe. Others, however, are more skeptical, especially of the prospect of the United States exercising some benign or altruistic management role in its Third World dealings. For those who hold such views, the idea of a US world policeman implies business as usual in the arms trade, the support of client regimes in Central America and Asia, and basic inattention to the economic and social conditions throughout the Third World underlying the insecurity-dilemma syndrome. Conflicts in the Third World will not be resolved; the United States will intervene violently, as in Panama in 1990, to settle matters if they are seen to impinge on US domestic or foreign policy interests.

Scenario 4, i.e., a revitalized superpower competition over interests in the Third World perhaps has the least prospect of coming to pass. Even those characterized as pessimists vis-à-vis the prospect for progressive economic and political reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (see Mearsheimer, 1990), would foresee little likelihood that a more conservative, retrenching Soviet/Russian regime will not be so preoccupied with domestic matters as to preclude expensive Third World adventurism.⁹ However, such pessimists would probably remind us of the mischief that could be done by Soviet/Russian arms transfers, the possible coalition of hard-line Soviet/Russian and Chinese regimes to undertake Third World ventures, and the likelihood of specific intrusion into Third World conflicts in countries or regions, like the Gulf or Southeast Asia, that are both proximate and important to Soviet/Russian or Chinese interests.

Notes

1. For their helpful comments and criticisms, I am indebted to Michael Barnett and Deepa Khosla.

2. However, there was little prominence in this literature of Third World scholars voicing Third World viewpoints. This is gradually changing, but First World ethnocentrism regrettably remains entrenched in the community of security studies scholars (as seen, for example, in Walt's 1991 review of the "renaissance of security studies").

3. Presumably in response to readers of the first (1983a) edition of his work, Buzan's (1991:14-25) second edition contains both a catalog of other authors' definitions of security and further attempts to come to some resolution on this issue.

4. Speaking of a regime and its security interests in a singular sense may in some instances imply a unity that is unwarranted. Thus, individual officeholders

may see their security interests threatened by others within the same regime cohort. The results of such intraregime security contention are seen in coups and in the shuffling of junta members or politburo members. However, within the larger scheme of things, these security interests are narrowly defined and usually do not involve actions with larger societal impacts.

5. There have always been direct contenders to the realist paradigm, Marxism being perhaps the most prominent in the twentieth century. However, within the last two decades the premises of realism have been subject to substantial criticism and revisionism, including those of world-system theorists, and "constructivist" theorists (Onuf, 1989; Ashley and Walker, 1990). These will not be considered in our discussion, in large part, because they are not the perspectives adopted by the authors in this volume—the exception perhaps being Barnett and Wendt. However, as scholars within the realist tradition itself increasingly criticize the capacities of their own paradigm (see Holsti, this volume), the relevance and contribution of these alternative perspectives to the study of Third World security will become more germane.

6. I note that Alexander Johnston (1991) has recently raised similar concerns. In his article, Johnston goes on to explore the example of South Africa as a weak state.

7. While Migdal notes those cases he regards as strong states, he does not provide a detailed definition of the term, nor does he explicate precisely why his named states, in which there is some diversity, each qualify as strong states.

8. Certainly this question is seen as requiring a more sophisticated answer than was offered by the political development theorists of several decades ago with their modernization theses, or in the rhetoric of the ideologues of the Cold War, who argued the merits of socialist or democratic models of progress. But space prohibits an exploration of these themes in this chapter.

9. Later events of 1991 signal the breakup of the Soviet Union into a set of separate states. This presents the prospect of one or more nuclear powers within former union territory. Concerns also remain as to the goals and policies of an emerging Russian state, regarding both former republics and neighboring states in Asia. The term "Soviet/Russian" is used, therefore, as a shorthand reference to the indeterminate circumstances of the regimes and territories to be found within the former Soviet Union.

International Theory and War in the Third World

K. J. Holsti

Can we profitably apply to locales in the Third World the concepts and intellectual perspectives developed to study war in the Eurocentric international system and its Cold War progeny? Are our theories of international relations sufficiently catholic to help explain the security problems and concerns of Third World states? In analyzing their problems, do we simply apply concepts and approaches derived from the histories and experiences of Europe and the Cold War? To begin developing an approach to an answer, we need to present some facts about war since 1945.

1. With only four exceptions, all of the external use of armed force in international relations since the end of World War II has occurred in what we today commonly call the Third World. The exceptions include the British intervention in the Greek Civil War, Soviet armed interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

2. Of the 21,809,000 civilian and military casualties resulting from interstate wars and internationalized civil wars since 1945, only 176,000 perished in Europe. The remaining 99.2 percent were Third World victims (Sivard, 1989b).

3. A majority of the wars did not initially involve two or more regular armed forces of states. Most, in fact, were wars of national liberation, started initially as guerrilla and other forms of unconventional campaigning. These wars lacked the following conventional features of European wars: (1) a declaration of war; (2) the paraphernalia of regular armed forces (uniforms, a panoply of conventional weapons, the standard organizational units of armies—platoons, squads, regiments, divisions, and the like); and (3) strategic and tactical principles based on or copied from standard military manuals and operating procedures. Strategies and tactics were for the most part improvised. There are other significant differences, but these three at least indicate some important deviations from our standard conceptions of war.

4. A majority of the wars did not initially involve the traditional great powers, except where they were the possessors of colonial territories. The great powers frequently became involved *after* the start of hostilities (e.g., the United States in Vietnam), but the initial armed assaults were directed, except in the cases of anticolonial wars, against local authorities.

5. Of those wars which were not of the "national liberation" type, the majority began as "crises of domestic consensus," to use Coral Bell's term (Bell, 1985–1986:37). They started as various types of rebellions against central authorities. They were wars to alter domestic circumstances rather than to defend against external attack.

6. Of fifty-eight instances of armed combat since 1945 (Holsti, 1991: chapter 12), 52 percent had as one of their major sources the attempt to create nation-states. These were wars of national liberation, wars of national unification and/or consolidation (e.g., Vietnam, India-Goa), and wars of secession (Biafra, the Shan states in Burma). War has been a ubiquitous corollary of the birth, formation, and fracturing of Third World states. The great powers and some lesser ones have become involved in many of these armed combats, but the etiology of most wars of the post-1945 period had notable indigenous rather than exogenous roots. Many began as civil wars, only to become enmeshed in Cold War politics whereby, for a combination of strategic and ideological reasons, one side or the other was championed by the United States or the Soviet Union, and sometimes other European powers.

7. Notable in the roster of post-1945 war activity is the absence of wars between the great powers. The combat between the United States and China in Korea is a partial exception, but no period of history during the post-Westphalian period has failed to have as one of its main features wars between the great powers. Indeed, the history of international relations between 1648 and 1945 is primarily the history of the conflicts and peace arrangements of the powers. One of the statistical regularities of numerous studies on war is that the great powers are substantially more war-prone than are their smaller counterparts. Of the approximately 120 wars since the year 1500 involving great powers and other states, about half were wars exclusively between the great powers. Ten of them were general wars involving all or nearly all of the great powers; these ten wars account for nearly 90 percent of the casualties of the total great-power war list (Levy, 1983: chapter 4).

We thus have an anomaly arising from what appears to be a historical watershed in the year 1945. The systematic and theoretical study of war is largely based on the activities of the great powers over approximately the last 350 years. Our organizing concepts, theories of international relations, strategic analyses, and explorations of systemic change and of the role of war in those dynamics are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the patterns of

European and Cold War history. Yet, since 1945, most wars have not initially involved the historic or contemporary great powers, they were fought in areas commonly perceived as being located in the peripheries of the international system, and they had etiologies far removed from the major security concerns of those powers. Few analysts have stopped to ponder whether or not these facts and patterns are of any particular theoretical significance. Most theories and approaches to the study of war remain rooted in the European and Cold War experiences. The few exceptions (e.g., Harkavy and Neuman, 1987) support the generalization. The remainder of this chapter will suggest why this state of affairs is likely to hinder the development of high-quality scholarship on security problems and war in the Third World. This is not to argue theoretical irrelevance. But the relevance has to be demonstrated, not assumed. Some aspects of conflict in the Third World reflect processes and structures of other ages and locations. But there are novel elements as well. Several examples of works that fail to illuminate these problems, while claiming universal theoretical stature, will help make the point.

In a recent comprehensive survey of literature about the causes of war, Jack Levy (1989) cites 441 different authorities who have made major theoretical or empirical contributions to our knowledge of the subject. Of these, 417 were of identifiable nationality. Fully 86 percent of the studies cited were published by US authors; of the remaining 14 percent, 13.8 percent were European authors. Just *one* source of the entire 441 was authored by a resident of the Third World, in this case an Indian. Since Levy's entries are all in the English language, there is some natural distortion involved; no doubt there are numerous works, authored in Spanish, French, or other major languages, that escaped Levy's notice. But the fact that none of them is listed in what purports to be a review of *the* literature on the causes of war suggests that they have not entered the global community of scholarship. In other words, our scientific/empirical knowledge of and approaches to the war phenomenon remain rooted in the European and US experience. Several major theoretical treatises on war and its etiology echo the point.

Robert Gilpin's otherwise impressive *War and Change in World Politics* (1981) examines "hegemonic wars" that took place exclusively in Europe. His focus is not on war in general, but on those wars taking place in the context of a hierarchical international system headed by a hegemon. While the book has made a major theoretical contribution (though not without numerous points of controversy), it is clearly focused upon war as an institution that developed in the European context. The hegemonic wars (his list is also a matter of dispute) were clearly great-power wars, and they were fought by regular armies employing standardized organizational, command, and material components. Modelski's (1978) investigations into the "circulation of elites"—the rise and decline of the great powers—is similarly rooted in the European war experience.

The major theoretical effort by Kenneth Waltz (1979) is based on the conceptual apparatus developed initially by Jean Jacques Rousseau. Waltz's world of international relations, like that of Rousseau, is populated by the great powers. They are states existing in an environment of anarchy, all suffering more or less from the security dilemma—another concept formulated explicitly by Rousseau. The national security problematic for these states is external, and it derives from the intentions and capabilities of other great powers. The predatory practices of the European powers in the eighteenth century constituted the world of diplomacy that Rousseau described and attempted to explain, and which Waltz implicitly accepts. The only remedy for managing the security dilemma of each, according to Waltz, is to fashion balances of power. War is a recurring phenomenon in an international anarchy, and no amount of wishful thinking about a "community interest" or international institutions resolves the dilemmas emanating from sovereignty, anarchy, and the security dilemma.

As a final illustration, we can cite the pioneering work of Nazli Choucri and Robert North (1975). They develop a theory of national expansion arising from "lateral pressures" generated by phenomena such as increasing population, the demands for access to raw materials and markets abroad, and other dynamics associated with the processes of industrialization and modernization. Their theory's models are validated by data taken from the European powers in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While the fit between the models and the data is impressive, the book is basically a post hoc explanation of European historical trends. Readers who cast their gaze on the history of warfare since 1945 will see few of the patterns of the European past repeated in the Third World.

Standard Conceptual Apparatuses and the Study of War in the Third World

Let us examine several concepts constituting key assumptions of theories of international relations, strategic studies, and much of the peace studies literatures. We can then estimate to what extent they are adequate as descriptors, or as explanatory or outcome variables for the analysis of war and security in the contemporary Third World. The list in Table 2.1 is suggestive rather than exhaustive.

Actors

State. Modern empirical and theoretical studies of war follow the traditional legal definition of war as a condition of combat between the organized armies of two or more states. In a plethora of quantitative studies, war has been operationalized in terms of armed combat among two or more

Table 2.1 Intellectual Apparatus for Studying War

Organizing Devices	Concepts
1. Actors	State Great power
2. Explanations/contexts	International systems/structures Balance of power/degrees of polarity National attributes Decisionmaking
3. Outcomes	War Deterrence

regular armed forces, representing states, in which a minimum of 1,000 casualties result from the fighting. Although some analysts challenged the validity of the 1,000-casualty threshold, the other components or indicators of war remain substantially uncontested. The requirement that two or more states be at war results in a distinction between international wars and civil wars. For some purposes this analytical distinction is justified, but one of the hallmarks of post-1945 warfare has been the internationalization of wars whose origins lay essentially within the domestic domain of Third World states. One consequence of this bifurcation is that it is difficult to locate causes. The Vietnam War, for example, is often classified as an international war; yet it did not start as an international war unless one accepts the assumption that after 1954 Indochina comprised two separate states and that the Viet Cong were solely the agents of the North Vietnamese regime. And the Algerian war must be excluded from the list of international wars because Algeria was not legally a state when the war started.¹

The requirement of statehood for both parties to a war significantly reduces the actual incidence of armed combat in the post-1945 world—and coincidentally minimizes the numbers of casualties and the amount of physical destruction. Of the approximately 22 million casualties of armed action since 1945, about 8 million were the victims of combat between the organized armies of two or more states. The remainder resulted from wars of national liberation and internationalized civil wars. To exclude “national liberation” armies, “peoples’ armies,” and the like, on the grounds that they are not the organized armed forces of a sovereign and internationally recognized state, seriously diminishes the population of wars and thus restricts our capacity to understand the etiology of violence and the security problems of many Third World states.

When applied to many Third World countries, the state concept raises other theoretical problems. Kenneth Waltz, reflecting common usage of Eurocentric international relations analyses, argues that all states have similar functions, although their capacities to fulfill them vary (Waltz, 1979: chapter 5). His analysis of patterns of recurrence in international relations is based squarely on the principle of state similarity; states only differ in capabilities, and for purposes of international relations analysis these are usually understood as differences in power.

The problems of statehood in many parts of the Third World are, however, notably different or more complex than those found in the historic states of Europe or more generally, of the industrial world. Of particular importance are the fundamentally different ways in which states were born or created in the eighteenth as opposed to the late twentieth century. Aside from obvious matters such as government, flag, a UN mission, and some notion of territorial boundaries, in what ways are Nauru and the Netherlands, Bhutan and Britain, Afghanistan and Argentina, Papua New Guinea and Poland similar? Are not the vast differences between them of some significance in terms of those countries' security problems? Is it inconsequential that more than a few Third World states are little more than legal fictions, while the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, and dozens of such old "historic" states have been playing the games of international politics for two centuries or more? Can we talk about the national security problems of these fictions in the same way that we discuss them in relation to the traditional great powers? We will return to this problem later, but note for the moment that recent sociological analyses of the state—as an ensemble of institutions, mores, interests, and practices often captured by distinct social groups and distinct from the society at large (see Halliday, 1989)—are particularly relevant in informing the study of war and conflict in the Third World.

Great powers. Approaches to security problems are also biased in terms of the behaviors of the traditional great powers. Waltz (1979:73), for instance, explicitly considers his theory of international relations as one of great-power behavior. The implication is that non-great powers behave differently, or at least face different kinds of security dilemmas. Less explicitly, but no less emphatically, the general theories of Gilpin (1981), Bull (1977), Morgenthau (1948), Choucri and North (1975), Organski (1958), and many others concentrate on the trials, victories, defeats, and order-building exercises of the great powers. Many of the quantitative studies of war similarly concentrate on great-power war (Levy, 1982; Thompson, 1988).

The problem, of course, is that in the Third World there are few and perhaps no great powers, if by that term we mean a state that has the capacity, commitment, and entitlement to order the affairs of a continental region, if not the whole world. One can argue that in the regional context

Brazil, India, and China are great powers. That is a matter of arbitrary classification, but in terms of a European-like system of great powers, which most theories of international relations try to analyze, none—China sometimes excepted—is yet a member of the club. Most of the empirical studies of war do not classify any of these countries as a great power.

If, as many studies suggest, there are unique patterns and properties to great-power behavior, notably including their security concerns, then of what relevance are such findings in locales where there are no great powers? Now that the Cold War is at least in a state of abeyance, and as predictably an increasing number of security analysts and international theorists will turn their gaze to where the *real* problems of war exist, will it be appropriate simply to transfer our theoretical lenses and habits from one context to another?

Explanations/Contexts

International systems/structures. Most theoretical works on international relations employ systems or society of states concepts either as descriptors or as explanatory variables. Systems and societies imply a high degree of interconnectedness, and in the security sphere, interdependence. There can be no security dilemma, for example, unless states are aware of each other's activities; and in a system or society, awareness derives not solely from contiguity or even propinquity. States' security problems are defined primarily in terms of the intentions and capabilities of other states no matter where they are located within the system. The conventional wisdom is that since at least 1945 we have a single, global system encompassing over 160 states, myriads of transnational actors, and multiple forms of interaction between them. The specter of nuclear war constitutes a global rather than regional or national threat; the security interests of the great powers are globally defined; and the theory of collective security assumes that all states are equally involved in and perhaps responsible for the security of each. The UN Charter does not concede that a threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression can or should be solely of local concern. And the charter also assumes that such acts, as they were defined in 1945, would be similar to the aggressions of the 1930s. The concept of war embodied in that document is based on the European experience of war, not on the wars that have populated the agendas of the United Nations since 1945 (K.J. Holsti, 1991: chapter 10). The question arises: do we really have a single international system as far as security issues are concerned? Or would it make more sense to begin with the assumption that there are unique regional security systems that may or may not be linked in various ways to the great-power security system?

In the 1950s and 1960s a literature on subsystems and regions flourished (e.g., Brecher, 1963; Russett, 1967), but was concerned primarily with definitional questions and developing empirical indicators, not with exploring

the unique security problems within those subsystems. More recently, Barry Buzan (1983a; 1986; and in this volume) has turned his attention to the conceptual problems involved in defining regional security systems and identifying their linkages to great-power security concerns. This is an important first step because it acknowledges that there may be conflict patterns and processes unique to specific regions. Any study of the security problems of Third World states must start by concentrating on local conditions rather than assuming—as many Soviet and US policymakers and academics have long done—that the etiology of local conflicts can be attributed to the machinations of Cold War adversaries or ex-colonial powers.

One of the standard hypotheses in empirical studies of war is that the distribution of power in the system (concentrated, diffuse, polar, tight, loose, and hierarchical are the usual adjectives employed) has an affect on the incidence of war in that system. The theories and empirical evidence are largely contradictory, so no authoritative generalizations have emerged (see Sabrosky, 1985). But from our point of view, what is significant in these studies is that power is always measured in terms of the distribution of capabilities between a small set of actors, the great powers. This distribution of power serves as the context in which states formulate their policies, and in turn (in the theoretical works of Singer [1970], and other structural theories of international relations), that context is more or less determinative of the war activities of *all* states in the system.²

While we must remain aware of the ecological fallacy—explaining any particular war in terms of system characteristics—common sense leads us to query in what ways degrees of power concentration among the great powers should have had a direct affect on, for example, the war between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Ethiopia, or Argentina and the United Kingdom. There is some implausibility in systems-level (structural) explanations of variations in war incidence in the Third World. Systems concepts and the research agendas organized around them assume global unities and uniformities that do not exist in the real world.

Balance of power. One of the venerable concepts of international theory and strategic analysis is the balance of power. Indeed Waltz (1979) views it as the one genuine *theory* of international relations. Such theory comes in a number of versions, but there is little question that European statesmen since the mid-seventeenth century have been guided by its precepts. Why? Because it is the most obvious strategy for states facing an adversary with hegemonial pretensions. The alternative, bandwagoning (supporting the hegemon), has proven through experience to be the more dangerous and less successful strategy.

Hegemony has been one of the great historical problems of European diplomacy. Charles V; the Spanish-Austrian Hapsburg family complex of the first half of the seventeenth century; Louis XIV; Napoleon; possibly the

Germans in 1914; and in its most gruesome form, Hitler's vision for Europe (which was not nostalgic, but rather racial) were all great schemes for the organization of the continent and of one power's predominant position in it. Their ideas were obviously inconsistent with the continued existence of the Westphalian system of independent states. Those who went to war in the 1620s–1630s, 1702, 1798, 1914, and 1939 knew what the stakes were and acted according to the predictions of balance-of-power theory. It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, that the drives for hegemony were fueled by ideas, dreams, and aspirations, and not by some mystical or organic need for states to expand or die—as many neo-Darwinists and acolytes of Treitschke and Nietzsche argued in the late nineteenth century, and even later. The law of uneven economic development (differential growth rates of countries) is an observable and measurable historical phenomenon. But its consequence has not *always* been hegemony-seeking. For the balance of power to operate, there must be, first, the security dilemma caused by actual or potential state expansion, and, second, a power with hegemonic ambitions. But what if the potential hegemon remains benign? Or what if there is no potential or actual hegemon within a region?

Where in the Third World are the analogs to these European dreams and visions? In which areas has the law of uneven economic development led to hegemonic behavior? Are all regions of the Third World characterized by a balance of power? There are, of course, some possible examples: perhaps in Nasser's or Saddam Hussein's schemes of Arab unity? Ayatollah Khomeini's campaign for a transnational sectarian Muslim revolution and Iranian predominance in the Gulf region? Nkrumah's vague pronouncements on pan-African unity? There may be some resemblances between these examples and Europe's history, but the differences are more pronounced. India has a position approaching or approximating predominance in South Asia. But it has achieved that position through default (decolonization) and not through foreign conquest or plans for creating a "New Order" of the Napoleonic variety. Brazil is a leader in Latin America, but so far we see few echoes of Louis XIV, the Hapsburgs, or the Kaiser in Brazil's foreign policies toward its neighbors. Indonesia and Indochina are potential hegemonies of Southeast Asia, but to date their foreign policies—the "crush Malaysia" campaign being a possible exception—show few symptoms of hegemonic fever. Nor has Nigeria displayed them in Africa. Only in the Middle East is there a "grand tradition"—the successive Caliphates of Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo that unified the Arab world between the ninth and fifteenth centuries—that could animate a drive for hegemony. The tension between Arab nationhood and a system of sovereign Arab states continues to surface—most recently expressed in Saddam Hussein's unsuccessful bid for predominance—but elsewhere around the Third World the patterns of Europe's past are only rarely being repeated.

Theorists of international relations have taken some patterns of the

eighteenth- to twentieth-century European powers out of their historical and ideological contexts and given them a generic content. If the Hapsburgs, French, Prussians, Russians, and British all expanded through conquest and predation, then it is assumed that all powers, regardless of location, history, culture, and the like, must similarly expand. But for the most part, the pattern is not repeating itself. The generic is really historically conditioned. And so if there are few actual and potential hegemonies within the diverse regions of the Third World, what is the relevance of the balance of power as an explanatory theory? Do the actions of Saddam Hussein and the balance-type responses by states inside and outside the Gulf region in 1990–1991 validate a theory that is supposed to govern the relations of all states at all times? One could make a strong argument that Saddam's long-range goals and his Kuwait adventure were exceptional rather than typical of foreign policy behavior in the Third World both since 1945 and into the future.

National attributes and war. Systemic and structural explanations of war causation and incidence in the Third World have uncovered few patterns that bear similarities to those of the Eurocentric Westphalian system. The other main theoretical avenue guiding empirical research links the attributes of states/nations to variations in the incidence of war. What are the usual attributes employed? The most conventional are dichotomies based on power (great/small), levels of development (developed/developing), type of governmental system (open/closed), and size (large/small). Studies utilizing these categories have produced several findings of considerable significance; for example, great powers are significantly more war-prone than are small states and democracies do not war against each other (see also Rummel, 1968). But the point about these works is that they are based on data from countries that have been in the international system for a considerable period of time. While it is true that the great powers have been substantially more war-prone than other states over the last several centuries, it is significant that since 1945 the most war-prone state group includes India, Uganda, and Israel (Maoz, 1982), none of which is a great power. Such anomalies suggest that generalizations about war based on two or more centuries of Eurocentric data may not accurately characterize the actors and war-proneness of states in the post-1945 period.

What types of categories have been omitted in the research? The critical weak state–strong state continuum—measured by state capacity and social cohesion essential in any analysis of the security problems of many Third World countries—is notably absent (Buzan, 1983a). Also, questions deriving from ethnicity, religion, postcolonial characteristics, and the processes by which the Third World states came into existence are seldom included in contemporary quantitative studies of war. Below I will argue that such considerations are critical to an understanding of the etiology and character of armed combat in the Third World.

Decisionmaking. Yet another approach to the study of war isolates the important problems of misperception, faulty communication, "groupthink," bureaucratic politics, and other constraints on rational decisionmaking, especially in crisis situations (for a comprehensive review, see Ole R. Holsti, 1989:8–84). Many of the problems are generic to all types of decisionmaking organizations, but there may be some unique features. The literature on decisionmaking explicitly or implicitly employs models of highly complex organizational settings found typically in the major powers. Allison's (1971) trichotomy of rational actor, bureaucratic politics, and organizational procedure models comes from the United States. Alexander George's (1980) analysis of informational and other constraints on presidential decisionmaking is similarly based. Almost all of the case studies on crisis decisionmaking review well-known historical episodes such as 1914 or the Soviet-US confrontation over Cuba in 1962. Israel's war decisions have also been examined. There are only a few systematic and comparative studies of decisionmaking processes and outcomes in Third World crises (Stoessinger, 1978; Harkavy and Neuman, 1987).

But in the total universe of twentieth-century international crises, how typical are those that have been selected and examined exhaustively? Notable by their absence are case studies of national liberation movements' decisions to employ force, crises between minor states, and the bureaucratic procedures and information processes in numerous groups that have employed force in international relationships since 1945. The literature that explores the connection between decisionmaking and war remains US- and Euro-centric and ignores the cases that constitute the majority of post-1945 wars.

Outcomes

The problem of Eurocentrism is not confined only to the explanatory (independent variable) side of theories of war. The phenomenon to be explained—the dependent variable—is likewise a reflection of the European war experience and the Soviet-US relationship. Three outcomes in particular merit discussion: war, deterrence, and national security.

War. Since the origins of the European states system, war has been an institution in the sense that it has had a legal character; its practices have been guided by various norms, rituals, and etiquettes; and its participants have explicitly or implicitly agreed, at least until the twentieth century, on certain limitations on the forms of armed violence.

From the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, warring parties observed a number of formalities: declarations of war; rules of siege and naval combat; treatment of prisoners and wounded; rituals appropriate to surrender ceremonies; and the etiquettes, formats, and procedures surrounding the negotiation of peace settlements. Strategies and tactics were also standardized,

as were the organizational modalities of the war machines. Even the new members of the states system, such as Japan in the late nineteenth century, assiduously studied and copied Prussian and German general staff systems, strategic doctrines, and tactical principles. The war-making and -directing organizations of most states in the system were carbon copies of those that exemplified the leading edge of the military arts and organization.

War in the Third World offers a pronounced contrast to the institutionalized forms of combat in pre-1939 Europe. Its diverse formats and outcomes hardly warrant characterizing it as an institution. Wars of national liberation, for example, have been notably different from their eighteenth-century predecessors. Improvisation rather than imitation has been the rule, although some leaders of successful "peoples' wars" such as Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap have offered models incorporating certain common strategic principles, in particular those dealing with civilian-military relations. Rules of etiquette are notable by their absence. The European legal distinction between war and peace, as two separate states or conditions between nations, has not been carried forth into most Third World conflicts. Similarly, the old distinction between civilians and soldiers, so carefully nurtured by the Europeans in their internecine wars until the twentieth century, shows few signs of survival in Third World environments. Quite the contrary, in most wars in the Third World since 1945, military leadership has sought to blur the distinction because guerrilla-style warfare (the strategy of the weak) cannot succeed without civilian support. Many wars in the Third World have become politicized in a manner unknown to eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and many twentieth-century military theorists. The ideal war for Frederick the Great was one in which the civilian population was not even aware that a state of war existed. For Mao and many of his followers, the ideal war is one where civilians do the lion's share of the fighting. In contrast to the uniforms, highly differentiated ranks, parades, insignia, and other memorabilia of a highly institutionalized style of warfare, guerrilla fighters are notably nondescript. Their tactical principles require anonymity rather than notoriety; acts of heroism remain uncommemorated, at least until final victory is achieved.

The forms of warfare have also proliferated. In the eighteenth century, there were maneuvers, set battles, sieges, and naval engagements, all surrounded by rules, formalities, and etiquette. Today there are intifadas, various forms of "low-intensity conflict," guerrilla wars, a variety of terrorist actions, as well as more conventional battles. Most wars of the post-1945 period have featured several or all of these forms.

The means of terminating wars have also proliferated—or at least become more confused. A formal surrender ceremony, followed by a preliminary peace conference, and concluded through a final peace conference, was the normal end sequence in European wars. In contrast, many of the post-1945 wars have been characterized by a lack of formal surrenders.

Governments or rebel groups that can no longer sustain the war effort simply withdraw more or less ignominiously. The agenda of the United Nations is littered with conflicts that have had no formal negotiated outcome, but instead are in various stages of suspended animation. The fighting may have stopped, but the issues that gave rise to the conflict remain unresolved, and new circumstances may bring yet another round of war. Cyprus, Kashmir, the Arab-Israel problem, the plethora of "truces" in Lebanon, and the Polisario War, for example, find few counterparts in eighteenth- or nineteenth-century European diplomatic history (K.J. Holsti, 1990).

Until 1945, wars were instruments of change between powers. Their outcomes were authoritative, usually clear-cut and definitive, and sanctified through a formal peace treaty that authorized the winner to enforce its terms if necessary. Peace replaced war. Post-1945 wars have often led to internationally recognized change (particularly in anticolonial wars), but more often they have been inconclusive, their outcomes indeterminate, with no attending legitimacy or legal status. States of armed and psychological hostility, rather than peace, have been a frequent outcome.

The whole Clausewitzian conception of war—a conception reflecting a high degree of institutionalization—begins to break down in many Third World contexts. War is no longer considered merely an instrument of policy and a method of resolving disputes not amenable to other techniques such as diplomacy (Smith, 1990); it has also become a means of creating nationalism, politicizing a dormant population, mobilizing the masses for domestic political purposes, and fomenting social revolution. There have been conventional wars, to be sure, but a majority of wars in the Third World have had social-revolutionary, state-creation, and nation-building purposes, rather than the more limited functions of self-defense or obtaining prizes and spoils from neighbors. It is easier to fashion an authoritative outcome over a piece of territory than to reconcile fundamentally antagonistic social, political, and religious principles.

The changing functions and purposes of war are reflected in their duration. In the eighteenth century the average war lasted 3.7 years. In contrast, the figure since 1945 has increased to 7.6 years (K.J. Holsti, 1989:32), and there are many wars that have continued for more than two decades. These would include the war in Vietnam (1946–1975), Eritrea (early 1960s to 1991), and the PLO's campaign against Israel that began in the mid-1960s.

Can existing theories of war be sustained given these changes in the character of the phenomenon in question? Do we really know when a war in the Third World begins and ends? Are there ways to count casualties, when so many of them are civilians? Can we locate armies, military staffs, navies, and air forces in conditions of "low-intensity conflict"? For that matter, do we any longer know a war when we see one? What is the distinction, in the Third World, between a rebellion and a war? Is it still exclusively states that

go to war against each other? Our theoretical and empirical studies of war assume that there are answers to these questions. I doubt this is the case, because many of the features of war as an institution have changed almost beyond recognition. It is therefore difficult to define exactly what we wish to explain. The dependent variable has become amorphous.

Deterrence. Another major outcome of international relationships that commands theoretical and empirical attention is deterrence. The problematic underlying most of the strategic studies literature is under what conditions (e.g., force levels and deployments, strategic doctrines, declaratory policy, targeting, weapons systems, and arms control/disarmament), deterrence and stability will be maximized, maintained, or eroded. Since the survival of mankind depends upon some of the answers, the questions are hardly trivial. But to what extent are these questions relevant to the kinds of security problems many Third World countries face? Since a large portion of the wars in the Third World begin as domestic conflicts, perfecting deterrent systems against external adversaries is not the main challenge for many states. Although it is certainly relevant in some cases, as recent studies demonstrate (Huth and Russett, 1988). Furthermore, since the majority of Third World states do not possess nuclear weapons, most of deterrence theory which is generic to the great powers is not particularly germane. In fact, except for a few zones of the Third World, such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia (India and Pakistan), and Northwestern Asia (China, the USSR, and the potentially nuclear powers of the Korean Peninsula), approaches to and generalizations from the study of nuclear deterrence may be of limited applicability for examining the national security problems of Third World states.

In nonnuclear environments, we may expect to see novel forms of deterrence, some of which may deviate substantially from the rules of the nuclear game developed by the Soviet Union and the United States. Saddam Hussein's use of non-Iraqi civilian hostages after his annexation of Kuwait is one example. His threats of chemical weapon retaliation against another Israeli preemptive strike on Iraqi nuclear facilities is another. Presumably these kinds of deterrence strategies—essentially strategies for the “weak”—will provide lessons for other states in the Third World.

National Security

Others (see Buzan, 1983a) have dealt systematically and authoritatively with the concept of national security. We need only add that throughout modern European history and during the decades of the Cold War, the idea was formulated to express a set of problems raised by threats that were usually, though not exclusively, external to the state. Security was defined as a condition where external military threats and various forms of “nuclear

blackmail" against the self and allies/clients ("extended deterrence") could be minimized (see Huth, 1988).

However, in the Third World, many threats are internal rather than external, and there is not always agreement as to what constitutes the political unit whose security is being protected (see Buzan, 1989:23–27). As in Myanmar, Liberia, Sri Lanka, India, Sudan, Ethiopia, and elsewhere, it is "nations" (e.g., distinct language/ethnic/religious groups) that constitute the threat to the integrity of the postcolonial state. Equally salient are the threats these social sectors pose to each other. Communal actors frequently control the state, but unlike most industrial states, they do not command a monopoly of the legitimate and authoritative use of force. Other communal actors either seek to create their own state through secession, or to capture the state apparatus to provide themselves with the spoils of power and/or to terminate their insecure position as minorities. Tribalism in its many forms constitutes a major problem for the integrity of Third World states. To compound the problem, some Third World countries also contend with traditional external enemies, and therefore face continuing or potential threats from abroad. For them, the security problem is indeed complex, combining both domestic and external dimensions. Manipulation of the traditional means of defense such as deployments, obtaining arms sources, and the like, in many cases will be insufficient to cope with the complexities of these threats. Some states have sought to contract out solutions to their security problems, attempting to find others to solve them. Ethiopia, Angola, Sri Lanka, and the Seychelles are examples. Traditional Western solutions to security problems—through alliance strategies, nuclear deterrence, Rapallo-type guarantees, military buildups, or neutrality—are not always relevant to the kinds of threats many Third World nations face today.

Reassessing Contested Concepts: The State and Systems of States

The argument to this point suggests that the conceptual equipment and theoretical approaches developed to study war in the European states system and its Cold War progeny are inappropriate or incomplete for an analysis of war and security problems in the Third World. While theoretical statements, such as Rousseau's "security dilemma," and the balance of power are supposed to transcend time, location, and personality, I would argue that they are historically contingent, although broadly so. While Waltz's argument (1979: chapter 6), that states imitate each other and the state system reproduces itself, has substantial merit, this reproduction does not occur across all dimensions. In no context are these concepts and processes more different vis-à-vis "states" and "systems of states" than in the context of

the Third World. I argue that three aspects of these concepts require examination:

1. Not all states in the Third World context can be seen as unified actors, identified solely by the standard classifications of size, population, resources, and the like (see Higgot, 1988). More meaningful for the Third World—as it would be for seventeenth century Europe—is the weak state–strong state continuum developed by Buzan (1983a). In order to appreciate the importance of this continuum, we need to make a comparative historical analysis of the different modes of the birth of states, as between Europe in the sixteenth- to twentieth-century span, and in the Third World since 1945.
2. We need to examine, again comparatively, the changing significance of territoriality as the basis of the state.
3. Finally (although the list is hardly exhaustive), we should compare the dynamics of state and group interaction in different regions. While there are important security linkages between the Eurocentric system (basically, the industrial nations of the north) and the Third World regional systems, the latter have their own structures and dynamics, and operate with different sets of opportunities and constraints. Successive military failures by the French, British, Americans, and Soviets in the Third World demonstrate to what extent policymakers in those countries have failed to appreciate some of these critical differences.

We can now make some introductory comments on these three aspects of statehood and systems of states in the Third World.

The Birth of States

The old historic states and the new states of the Third World (setting aside for the moment the Latin American states) possess one common characteristic.³ Most of them were the progeny of the great historical transformation from the imperial style of political organization to the nation-state format. All of the Balkans, east and central Europe, the Baltics, and most of Italy were at one time inhabitants of the Ottoman, Russian, and Austrian empires. The Latin countries, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia derived from the Spanish and British empires. Most of the post-1945 states were similarly the products of the great transformation. But that is about as far as the similarities go.

The great powers of Europe have lineages traceable to medieval times. Through conquests, annexations, marriages, and wars, they became highly centralized, bureaucratically efficient, militarily powerful, and financially

capable political units—strong states—at least by the early eighteenth century, several of them considerably earlier. But three of the actors were also multiethnic, although contiguous, empires. As weak states, they did not survive the great waves of nationalism that swept over the Balkans, Italy, Germany, east and central Europe, and the Baltics throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Fifteen new European “succession” states emerged between the liberation of Greece in the 1820s and the confirmation of the Baltic states’ independence in 1918–1919. Several of them (Ukraine and Georgia) were reincorporated into the Soviet system by 1921–1922, but the remainder managed to survive at least until Stalin’s and Hitler’s onslaughts. Some that did not survive (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have re-emerged as independent states.

The process of state-creation in the nineteenth century was founded on the ideological principles of nationalism and democracy. These concepts were married under the doctrine of national self-determination, a doctrine that was systematically applied as the basis for state-creation in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The important point is that the *nations* of Greece, Romania, Finland, and the like existed psychologically, historically, and culturally long before they became states. They had unique ethnic, language, and sometimes religious configurations. To put it briefly, the basis of statehood for most European countries is a distinct nationality. The others, mostly the “old” states, rest secure on historic (inheritance, war, and marriage) foundations.

Most of the new European states had their own minorities: the Turks in Bulgaria and Greece, the Swedish-speaking population in Finland, the Hungarians in Romania, and the like. Recognizing that such minorities might present future domestic and international problems, the acts of state-creation in 1918–1919 usually included various constitutional guarantees for minority rights. These were not sufficient to prevent a number of important ethnic- or language-based conflicts from arising in the 1920s, but some of them were resolved peacefully and authoritatively (e.g., the Swedish-speaking group in Finland, and the various republics in Yugoslavia).

The norms surrounding the process of state-creation in Europe included democratic politics combined with the protection of minority rights. These norms provided the moral and legal foundations of state legitimacy. They were incorporated in various provisions of the League of Nations Covenant. The national liberation movements that employed them were not just *against* the imperial authority (except in the Ottoman Empire) but were also *for* democracy and self-determination.

The motives and sentiments underlying the post-1945 state-creation process were often different, and the problems more complex. For many of the territories, there was no single “nation” that sought liberation. The Europeans’ colonies overseas, as is well known, were defined in arbitrary ways that reflected the imperial powers’ interests and convenience rather than

any ethnic/linguistic and/or religious facts and cleavages. For many, there was no identifiable historic tradition that was coextensive with colonial boundaries. Burma, India, Nigeria, Sudan, and a host of others were geographical expressions, not real sociopolitical entities (the old French term for India, *les indes*, more appropriately expressed the realities of the subcontinent). All had national liberation movements of one type or another, but it is by no means clear on whose behalf they sought independence. Many of their leaders anointed themselves as the sole legitimate spokesmen of these movements, but there were no instruments applied to validate the claims. Anticolonialism was assumed to be tantamount to self-determination (K.J. Holsti, 1989:45).

The international community, through the United Nations, again applied the doctrine of self-determination but, unlike 1919, it did not articulate qualifications for statehood such as democracy and protection of minority rights. Even the traditional qualifications of capacity to govern, territorial control, and capacity to enter into international relationships, were often waived (Jackson, 1987) in favor of looser standards. Among the national liberation movements—some important exceptions aside—there were harder sentiments *against* colonialism than *for* democracy and communal cooperation.

The majority of the new states are composed of a multiplicity of ethnic/language/religious groups. Many do not even have a single majority group (Jorgensen-Dahl, 1975). The conglomeration of groups that make up many of the new states are far more complex and varied than anything found in the new European states of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some of the island states are exceptions to the rule, but even among some of the larger ones (e.g., the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka) there are numerically significant minorities that have felt more or less alienated from the majority.

Many new states have no history as distinct political units. Different communities try to coexist within the legal, internationally created category called the state. Usually, one community dominates, or is seen to dominate, the others. In other instances, a minority exercises predominant control over key sectors of the economy, resulting in intercommunal tensions. There are no pre-established mechanisms to monitor and manage intercommunal relations. Or if there are, as in Lebanon, the mechanisms have been rendered ineffective by differential population or economic growth rates. Political loyalties tend to remain primordial rather than national (Jackson, 1987; Giddens, 1987:267–276). All of these conditions confront governments that already suffer from debilitating political and economic problems. To them are added intercommunal strife, armed protests against government suppression, gross social inequalities, secession movements, and ethnically based rebellions. In these circumstances, the state apparatus must spend a disproportionate amount of time and energy brokering or mediating

deals between ethnic/linguistic/religious groups (Seth, 1989:37). In an unfortunate number of cases, even where good intentions come into play, they fail.

Minorities become restive and seek what the majorities have already achieved: a state of their own. And so we have armed struggles by the Shans, Karens, and Chin in Myanmar, the Sikhs and Kashmiris (among others) in India, the Bengalis in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), the Tamils in Sri Lanka, various groups in what is called Afghanistan, the Eritreans in Ethiopia, and so forth. It may not be an exaggeration to claim that outside of Latin America only a minority of Third World countries are socially integrated and able to govern effectively over a unified and reasonably disciplined citizenship. For them, the society-state nexus is close and based more or less on explicit or implied consent. Many others, however, are weak states struggling to cope with the facts of multiethnic and multilingual life.

Another type of weak state is characterized by a monopoly of power held by a narrow social sector (e.g., Guatemala and El Salvador). The relationship between the state and the population at large is primarily one of exploitation and suppression by the former and apathy or armed resistance by the latter. Other states, reproducing the characteristics of early European counterparts, are little more than protection rackets (Tilly, 1985). The weakness of these kinds of states is highly correlated with war. The most common source of their security dilemma is domestic, not external. Legal-territorial concepts of the state, cold wars, balances of power, deterrence, laws of war, and combat between regular armies—all the conceptual paraphernalia developed to analyze the war problematic in the European and US contexts—seem out of place or irrelevant in these weak states.

Territory and the State

In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, states were founded upon patrimonial rather than territorial principles. Many of the wars fought in the era resulted from quarrels over rights of succession, inheritances, marriages, and other foundations of claims to jurisdiction over political units. The kings, queens, and princes of the day were little concerned with territory as such, but rather with the numerous rights, privileges, and statuses that derived from or inhered in certain provinces, principalities, dukedoms, kingdoms, and the like. Contiguity was unimportant (e.g., Hapsburg fiefdoms stretched from Bohemia in the east to Spain in the west, often cut off by hundreds of miles of other patrimonies between them), and the rulers had not yet become acquainted with ideas of lineal frontiers.

In the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries, with the centralization of dynastic states, the significance of territory increased

dramatically. It was now seen more as a source of military manpower, tax revenues, and state security, and less as an element of rights and titles. The concept of lineal frontiers, encompassing a single contiguous political order, replaced older ideas of inheritances. Increasingly, territorial issues replaced dynastic issues as sources of war; in this milieu, frontiers began to take on pronounced strategic significance (K.J. Holsti, 1991: chapters 3–4).

In the nineteenth century, ethnic/religious and language distinctions increasingly became the source of the territorial definition of states. After World War I, there were a number of anomalies and these created significant diplomatic frictions and a few wars. But once they were sorted out through diplomacy (e.g., Finland, Sweden, and the Aaland [Åhvenanmaa] Archipelago) or war (e.g., the Vilnius dispute between Poland and Lithuania), a certain degree of territorial legitimacy emerged in Europe. Hitler sought to replace traditional Westphalian and more modern nationality-based concepts of territory with racial principles, but after World War II, most traditional boundaries were reestablished. The major exceptions were the Soviet Union's vast annexations during the war.

In today's western Europe, states are strong in the sense described above. Part of that strength derives from the broad consensus that the historically and ethnically based territorial limits of the countries are more or less sacrosanct. The legitimacy of the traditional frontiers has added inestimably to the peace of this region over the past forty-six years. Whether the new situation in east and central Europe will release revisionist territorial demands remains to be seen, but the general ethos in Europe would be strongly against disturbance of the territorial status quo.

In the Third World, the situation is somewhat similar, despite the significant discontinuities between territorial allocations and ethnic/language/religious distributions. Colonial boundaries were notoriously indifferent to such distributions, with multiethnic states the consequence. Yet, for the most part the new states have accepted their inherited boundaries with an almost amazing equanimity. The Organization of African Unity has set the norm for that continent: colonial boundary delimitations must remain unchallenged. There is a strong onus against opening up types of issues that could have demonstration effects, possibly turning Africa into a hotbed of war. In fact, there have been remarkably few militarized boundary disputes between states in the Third World. And where they have arisen (e.g., India and China, Libya and Chad) values other than territory drove the conflicts (e.g., control over strategic passes, and status, in the former; control over the presumed resources of the Aouzou Strip in the latter).

Control of territory (excluding certain strategic areas such as the Bekaa Valley), then, is declining in importance as a major object of competitive claims and military actions (Holsti, 1991: chapter 12). Israel's expansion into the Occupied Territories and Saddam Hussein's aggressions provide important exceptions to the generalization—but a strong case can be

made that they deviate from the general trend of declining conflicts over territory.

This whole area requires comparative research. The traditional national security problematic of most states in Europe was defined in terms of protecting specific pieces of real estate. This is not the premier security problem for most states in the Third World. Threats here are for the most part communally based, and frequently the community in rebellion is not located in a single, historically defined territory. Protection of territory is less the main task of national security policy than is protection of the state apparatus from various domestic challenges.

The Dynamics of Systems of States

The problem of state security is not static. Theorists of international relations recently have sought to explain the origins of the security dilemma and the rise and decline of hegemons in such concepts as the law of uneven economic development (Gilpin, 1981) or economic cycles (Modelski, 1978; Goldstein, 1988; Thompson, 1988). Security problems rise and decline as responses to other kinds of systemic and unit-level changes.

There are problems transferring these Eurocentric, dynamic theories of international relations to the Third World environment—not the least of which is that interpretations of the dynamics of European diplomacy are suspect on empirical grounds, including many problems of war and period identification (see Thompson, 1988). However, it is to the problem of hegemony that we must return, since it serves as a premier characterization and interpretation of the European historical record and as a major explanatory concept for both peace (“hegemonic stability”) and war.

Dynamic theories of war, or of great-power wars, depict a recurrence of drives for hegemony. However, I believe this reading of history is not substantiated by the facts. There is no doubt that certain historical figures, such as Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, and Hitler, did seek to organize Europe on principles other than those enshrined in the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster. But while there has undeniably been a process of rising and declining powers in Europe, such shifts have not always been accompanied by drives to hegemony.

Following the settlements of Utrecht (1713–1716), there was no hegemon in Europe until Napoleon. Similarly, Great Britain was no hegemon in relation to continental affairs throughout most of the nineteenth century (K.J. Holsti, 1992), and the passing of the baton from *imperial* hegemonic Great Britain to the United States in the twentieth century occurred in peaceful fashion. There never has been any *inevitable* movement towards hegemony among the European powers, although in many historical international systems there was a pattern of systems of independent states ending up in the multicultural empire form (see Watson, 1990). The problem

of hegemony originated and ended with historic personalities operating within a specific cultural context, and not through some recurrent behavior that automatically resulted from the law of uneven development or from the principle of anarchy.

If drives for hegemony were a regular consequence of growth rate differentials and anarchy, then we would expect to see them appear in the regional-states systems of the Third World. However, to date we see in the Third World few reproductions of assumed and debatable patterns in the European experience, although they may appear in the future. Scholarship on the war phenomenon in the Third World will suffer if we assume this vast and heterogeneous arena to be just an appendage or afterthought to some "central international system," or if we search only for recurrence and reproduction, rather than for new patterns and possibilities. We have to begin thinking in terms of two or more distinct international systems, linked in some ways, but having actors, dynamics, problems, and patterns of behavior that may be unique to each (K.J. Holsti, 1989:36–55). This is the direction pointed in the work of Buzan (1983a), and implied by Bull (1977).

Among the many problems of realism is the question of its universalism. Although deeply rooted in European and Cold War history, the main contemporary adumbrators of realism, such as Gilpin and Waltz, project the laws and regularities perceived in Western history as universal. Any system characterized by anarchy and the law of uneven economic development will automatically result in certain policy patterns (hegemony in the case of Gilpin, balance of power in the case of Waltz). Whether based on a reading of history (Gilpin) or analogies derived from economic markets (Waltz), their works—and many others—betray an assumption that all societies must play the same political/economic games that have been played in the Westphalian system and in its Cold War progeny.

This tendency to universalize from a particular historical narrative is particularly notable in the use of the system concept. Like units (e.g., states) conducting mutual transactions are sufficient to establish the presence of a system. But as Bull (1977:12–14) reminds us, there is a significant distinction between systems as mere interaction between units, and an international society. The latter involves consciously formulated rules and institutions reinforced by shared assumptions and values, as seen, for example, in the historic European *Repubblica Christiana* or its Westphalian successors. Many contemporary international theorists, under the sway of concepts such as interdependence and clichés such as the "global village," assume that the globalization of Western trade and politics has created universally shared values, institutions, and diplomatic games. While there may be tendencies in this direction, we must remain alert to the persistence and impact of indigenous and unique cultural practices of a local or regional nature. Thus Buzan, with his notion of intersecting "security complexes,"

convincingly argues that the cultural context (1983a:93–121) requires serious consideration in research on war and peace in the Third World. In this regard, one thinks, for example, of the unique importance of legalism in Latin America, the tradition of religious unity (but also sectarianism) in the Middle East, and the unique norms surrounding decisionmaking and conflict resolution in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

Conceptual analysis is a necessary step in developing the theoretical dimensions of war and security studies in the Third World. The literature of international relations has adopted over the years an inventory of concepts that has rendered communication and comparison relatively easy. But those concepts derived from a particular historical narrative in which the problems and activities of small states, nonstates, and regional systems either were not considered or were depicted as mere appendages of a central international system. The positivist stance of most research has also led to a search for recurrence and patterns that compare across eras and geographic domains, relegating the apparently anomalous to secondary or ignored status. In the Third World, many Western concepts remain contested. The events in Liberia in 1990—repeating similar events elsewhere in the Third World—demonstrate how our concept of the state, for example, has to be revised in other contexts (see Higgot, 1988). And the security problems of South Asia or the Gulf show the discontinuities between global systems perspectives and regional problems.

We also have to be alert to new types of behavior in regional contexts. The approaches of systems theories, basing theories and generalizations on analogies from mechanics and economics and their empirical content from Europe and/or the Cold War, must become more sensitive to cultural contexts. The law of uneven economic development, for example, may have had very different consequences in late nineteenth-century Europe than it will have, let us say, in future Latin America. The route to prosperity, as the defeated nations of World War II have demonstrated, can be achieved through many means, most of them not threatening to their neighbors. War is not an inevitable outcome of the rise and decline of states.

The preferred research strategy for developing general statements about the security problematics of Third World states will require close collaboration between scholars of international relations and area experts. The former will need to develop sensitivity to uniqueness and cultural contexts, and to examine carefully much of the conventional wisdom and conceptual apparatus of the field. The latter will have to become theoretically informed and sensitive to the intellectual advantages of comparison and generalization.⁴

There is much work to be done, and equally important, some intellectual habits to be undone.

Notes

1. The comprehensive and useful studies of war emanating from the Correlates of War project at the University of Michigan carefully delimit a category of "internationalized civil wars" to incorporate many of the ambiguous post-1945 armed contests (Small and Singer, 1982:51–53, 210–220). But that work stands in contrast to the majority.

2. It should be noted that there are some studies (see Thompson, 1988) in which the dependent variable is confined to great-power war. In these, system structures or economic cycles should therefore explain only this particular subset of wars.

3. Perhaps the states of Latin America fall into a category of their own.

4. One example of theorist–area expert collaboration that augurs well for the field of comparative foreign policy analysis is Wurfel and Burton (1990).

PART 2
THE STATE, STATE BUILDING,
AND SECURITY

The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective

*Mohammed Ayoob*¹

Writers on the Third World² tend to focus on the concept of development or its obverse, dependency, or a combination of the two, as in theories of “dependent development,” to explain the present problems and future direction of Third World polities (see Smith, 1985:532–561; Kohli, 1986; and Evans, 1979). However, both the development and dependency approaches shift the emphasis from politics to economics and sociology on the one hand and from state either to society (in the case of the development model) or to a world system primarily determined by economic factors (in the case of the dependency theorists) on the other. While the dependent development argument does bring the state back in as an explanatory factor, it does so with significant reservations.

Such intellectual assumptions underestimate the importance of political variables, above all the role of the state defined as “organizations controlling territories” (Skoçpol, 1985:8) and, therefore, possessing both a territorial and an institutional dimension.³ They also undervalue the role of the political elite in the ordering of the social life of particular communities and in the interaction that takes place between the various political communities constituting the international system. Moreover, they very inadequately treat the principal political activity in the Third World in the second half of the twentieth century, viz., state making—both in terms of territorial consolidation and institution building—and particularly with its two major dimensions, namely, “the autonomy of the nation-state against the encroaching dominance of the economic and political structure in the world and the internal integrity of the nation-state in the face of an emergent ideology of a participatory polity” (Kothari, 1988:123).

The argument for according primacy of place to political variables in the analysis of Third World societies—in particular the role of the state in shaping the social life of a community that it encompasses territorially, attempts to govern, and aspires to represent institutionally—is based on two fundamental considerations. First, the problems of social change and

economic development of each Third World entity have to be addressed primarily within the framework of a particular political community that is territorially and administratively encompassed in the state. Furthermore, they have to be addressed largely through the instrumentality of the institutional complex also known as the state. This is particularly true of the Third World, where it is generally recognized that, given the weakness of other structures, the state is often a major actor in the development realm (see Kohli, 1986). This does not mean that each Third World state can address, let alone solve, its problems of development in isolation from the rest of the international community. It does mean that the forces and pressures generated by a particular political community's external environment have to be mediated by, and filtered through, the physical boundaries as well as the institutions of the state which encompasses such a community.

Second, since development, defined as economic growth plus societal modernization, takes place within the confines of state boundaries, it interacts with, and is dependent upon, the level of security—the primary political value—enjoyed by the state and provided by it to its citizens. Development without security is at best a value that can be enjoyed only temporarily and may be easily lost in the face of mounting internal and external challenges that may threaten the very existence of a political community. Lebanon and Sri Lanka are the foremost examples of fruits of development that were frittered away because of inadequate attention being paid to the political dimension of state- and nation-building in the case of the former and the folly of attempting to foist a monoethnic state on a multiethnic society in the case of the latter. Events in these two countries reinforce Gabriel Ben-Dor's exhortation:

'Seek ye the political kingdom first'—not because it matters more, but because, in the lack of political order, no normal social development is possible. The state cannot replace society, but it must protect society. In the lack of political order, social and individual values are meaningless; they cannot be realized, nor can they be protected from assault, violence and chaos. (Ben-Dor, 1983:244)

State Making and Security

The above discussion leads one to conclude that state making, the political variable of primary concern to political elites and decisionmakers in Third World countries, must form the centerpiece of any paradigm we attempt to construct for the explanation of internal and external behavior of Third World states and regimes. Moreover, since much of the activity concerned with state making in the Third World is carried out under the guise of a search for security, the latter concept becomes fundamental to our understanding of Third World political behavior. Security has been deliberately used in this

chapter in a state-centric and therefore relatively restricted sense of applying to the security of the state—both in terms of its territory as well as its institutions—and of those who profess to represent the state territorially and institutionally. In other words, security/insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes. According to this definition, the more a state or regime falls towards the invulnerable end of the vulnerable-invulnerable continuum, the more secure it is. Other problems, whether economic or ecological, become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state institutions or regime survival. In other words, debt burdens or even famine do not become part of the security calculus for our purpose unless they threaten to have political outcomes that affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites.

Given the close connection between state making and security in the Third World, it can be postulated that the security of the Third World state is determined by two crucial factors, viz. (1) the history and process of state making in the Third World; and (2) the way in which the system of states has impinged upon this process, thereby providing it with some of its most distinctive characteristics. These two factors, interacting with each other, have shaped the contours of what one can call the security predicament of the Third World state. This predicament can be defined, therefore, as a state of affairs whereby the Third World state is faced with an all-pervading security problem that is basically insoluble in the short and medium term primarily for two reasons: (1) the demands of the state-making process and the societal responses that such demands generate put a tremendous load on the institutional machinery of the state, a load which the state is usually unable to handle effectively; and (2) the Third World state's lack of control over its international environment and, even more important, its inability to insulate its state-making process from international systemic pressures which usually complicate and often exacerbate the problems that accompany state making and nation building.

A basic assumption of this chapter is that it is this security predicament of the Third World state, born out of the interaction of the state-making process with the systemic pressures that simultaneously operate upon it, which determines to a large extent the broad strategies adopted by state elites that are operationalized in the form of state policies in nearly all spheres of state activity—political, diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. However, this conclusion about the overriding importance of the security factor to the political life of Third World states needs further elaboration to make the argument intellectually sustainable.

The predominance of the security factor in the social life of the Third World state, as well as the Third World leaderships' constant obsession with

it, is the result primarily of the dissonance between what Ali Mazrui has called "the defining characteristics" of any state, namely, "the twin principles of centralized authority and centralized power" (Mazrui, 1986:107). In the case of most Third World states, as in other states, coercive capacity is centralized to a substantial degree. This is a function of the accumulation of crude force by the postcolonial state apparatus which, thanks to the instruments of repression constructed by the colonial powers and improved upon by their native successors, is in terms of coercive power usually, though not universally, superior to that of most contending power centers within the state. However, the same does not apply to the concentration or centralization of authority, i.e., the legitimate right to use power, in the Third World state. Authority, unlike crude force, is a power center's right to rule which, in turn, is primarily a function of the perception on the part of a state's citizenry that both such capacity as well as its locus are legitimate and in accord with the dominant values and expectations of the state's population.

In most Third World states there are competing foci of authority, usually weaker than the state in terms of coercive capacity, but equal to or stronger than the state in terms of legitimacy (or the right to rule) as far as the perceptions of substantial proportions of the states' populations are concerned. These diverse sources of authority are the products partially of the continued existence of (usually colonially mediated) traditional authority structures and foci of loyalty. They have also resulted partially from deliberate colonial policy that had often included the bringing together of diverse ethnic elements within the administrative boundaries of the colonial protostate, the conscious exacerbation of ethnic divisions in order to sustain colonial rule, and, finally, the bequeathing of this ethnic patchwork as its parting legacy to the native inheritors of the colonial mantle. This is particularly true of Africa but is also demonstrated in the colonial and postcolonial experiences of many parts of Asia and the Middle East (see Migdal, 1988; and Gellar, 1973:384-426).

Irrespective of the specific circumstances of various Third World states, it is this dissonance between the loci of authority and of power which lies at the heart of the Third World state's security problematic, especially as it relates to the intrastate dimension of this problem. Such dissonance is most dramatically reflected in the threats of secession that many Third World states and their rulers face from ethnically and/or regionally based dissident elements within these states. Such threats, in many instances translated into overt insurgencies, form a much larger share of the total calculus of threats to the security of Third World states than do threats from outside their boundaries. It is no wonder, therefore, that the search for security is the overriding concern of Third World state elites, and the management of internal security problems their main objective, within their overall preoccupation with security (see, for example, Ayoob and Samudavanija, 1989:256-257).

Comparisons with Europe

Since state making is a process that can be compared over time and space and its main elements that are of universal significance can be isolated for analytical purposes, a comparison of the early crucial stages of this venture in Europe (where the earliest participants in the system of states were located), and the current attempts at state making in the Third World are feasible, in fact necessary, despite the differences in time and place. That there is a close connection between state making and the Third World state's security problematic is borne out merely by looking at the roots of the underlying causes of insecurity within Third World states. These include the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions, as well as regimes, inadequate societal cohesion, and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic, and political organization, all of which are related to the process of state making and its corollary, which appears later in time in terms of the European experience, nation building. Thus the problems of state making currently faced by the Third World states, e.g., resource extraction, institution building, and societal penetration, are basically the same that had to be overcome by the European states in order to make their existence secure both territorially and institutionally.

What strikes one most when one compares the Third World experience in state making with its European counterpart is the dimension of time over which the same process was, or, in the case of the Third World, is expected to be, completed. The time available to state makers in the Third World to complete the process not only of state making (in terms of building institutions capable both of penetrating society and extracting resources from it) but of nation building as well (in terms of the psychological identification of the citizenry with the state) is extremely limited when compared to that available to the early state makers of modern Europe. The two processes are telescoped together and shortened from centuries in the case of early modern European states to decades in the case of the Third World.⁴

Unfortunately, the Third World state cannot indulge in the luxury of prolonging the traumatic and costly experience of state making over hundreds of years à la Europe. That the process has taken centuries to complete in the case of the most developed European states is well recorded (see, for example, Strayer, 1970; and Tilly, 1975). That it was a violent and costly business is also well documented. For example, according to Charles Tilly, the authors of his edited volume

explicitly . . . agree that the building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor. Implicitly, they agree that the process could not have occurred without great costs. . . . The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state-building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building

differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities. . . . Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of strong states. (Tilly, 1975:71)⁵

It is worth pointing out here that historical literature has by now convincingly demonstrated that in almost all cases in Europe, with the possible exception of the Balkans, the emergence of the modern state was the precondition for the formation of the nation. The earliest modern states of Europe first became states before they became nations. Even in Germany and Italy core states (Prussia and Savoy respectively) preceded the creation of the German and Italian nations (though not necessarily of an embryonic national consciousness) and took the lead in the unification of Germany and Italy. Without the former the latter may never have found political manifestation or moved beyond the stage of expressing cultural and linguistic affinity.

Finally, Charles Tilly's conclusions (in his edited volume) about state making in Europe are worth reflecting upon particularly by those who tend to compare unfavorably the present condition of the Third World state with that of the responsive and representative state of contemporary Europe and North America. According to Tilly:

Our study of the European experience suggests that most of the transformations European states accomplished until late in their histories were by-products of the consolidation of central control. . . . For the most part, that experience does not show us modernizing elites articulating the demands and needs of the masses, and fighting off traditional holders of power in order to meet those needs and demands. Far from it. We discover a world in which small groups of power-hungry men fought off numerous rivals and great popular resistance in pursuit of their own ends, and inadvertently promoted the formation of national states and wide-spread popular involvement in them. (Tilly, 1975:633,635)

The evidence presented by Tilly and the coauthors of his volume make it amply clear that statemaking in Europe was not an enterprise undertaken with considerable premeditation but the end product of an evolutionary process, to which many political as well as social and economic factors—like changes in the mode of production and the emergences of new social forces—contributed. It was this evolutionary process that led to the emergence and consolidation of territorial entities under the centralized control of political institutions which maintained their institutional autonomy from the society that they governed.

In the case of the Third World, the attempt is to replicate this process but on the basis of a fixed timetable of ridiculously short duration and with a predetermined set of goals in view. The most important part of this process

has been the encapsulation of the historical experience of nation- and state-building into a few decades, compared with the centuries that European states took to complete the same process. Moreover, Western European states, which are regarded as models for the modern nation-state against which Third World states are measured, went through the process of nation-state-building in three near-distinct phases: (1) the establishment of the centralized, "absolutist" state at the expense of a feudal order that had begun to lose much of its economic and political utility (Anderson, 1974); (2) the welding together of the subjects of the centralized monarchy into a people with a common history, language, and, quite often, religion, thus leading to the evolution of a national identity and the transformation of the centralized monarchical state into a nation-state; and (3) the gradual extension of representative institutions (dictated by the necessity to co-opt into the power structure new and powerful social forces that emerged as a result of the industrial revolution) over the decades if not centuries.

In the Third World, these three sequential phases of the historical process of nation-state-building have been telescoped into one and drastically shortened in terms of the time required to complete them successfully. Fitting historical processes into timebound straitjackets is, however, a hazardous exercise. It distorts the process of natural evolution as well as raises hopes and fears regarding the achievement of the final goal that increase the load on the political system to such a degree that it is threatened with serious disequilibrium. It is this attempt to accomplish the task of nation-state-building in a drastically curtailed time frame that provides the major explanation for the degree of violence and insecurity plaguing most Third World states. It thus forms the central ingredient of the security problematic of the Third World state (see Ayoob 1991:257-283).

The Colonial Inheritance

This attempt at state making in a hurry has been made immeasurably more difficult, and the security predicament of the postcolonial state thereby made more acute, by the discontinuities and distortions introduced by colonialism into the process of state formation in what we now call the Third World. It is true that the colonial experience provided many Third World countries with protostates that could be used as jumping off points for the creation of postcolonial political orders. It is also true that without the colonial interlude non-European elites might not have become familiar with the notion of the modern nation-state to the extent that they are now, or been integrated so easily into the system of states that expanded out of its original European home.

However, the discontinuities and distortions introduced by the colonial process were equally, if not more, important to the future political evolution

of Third World countries and peoples. The first of these discontinuities was the creation of colonial administrative units, or protostates, by the imperial powers in near-total disregard of the populations' precolonial affinities and loyalties. Political and administrative boundaries drawn for purposes of colonial convenience arbitrarily cut across ethnic, tribal, religious, and linguistic ties, dismembered established political units, and joined more than one precolonial political entity into uneasy administrative unions. While Africa is the outstanding example of the arbitrary carving up of an entire continent by the European powers, Asia and the Middle East have not been immune to such arbitrariness. The arbitrary division of the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and their assignment to Britain and France ranks on par with the partition of Africa in the closing decades of the nineteenth century (see Polk, 1980:93–112; and Monroe, 1963). The legacy of that division haunts the Middle East to this day, not least in the form of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The second major distortion introduced by colonial rule was the result of the colonial powers' proclivity to use multiple "traditional" structures of authority in the colonies as instruments of rule that mediated between the colonial power and the colonized populace. This form of indirect rule, as Ali Mazrui has pointed out:

aggravated the problems of creating a modern nation-state after independence. The different groups in the country maintained their separate ethnic identities by being ruled in part through their own native institutions . . . different sections of the population perceived each other as strangers, sometimes as aliens, increasingly as rivals, and ominously as potential enemies. (Mazrui, 1986:112)

This was, however, only part of the story. Many of these so-called traditional authority structures used to mediate between the colonizer and the colonized were themselves the products of colonial rule, either through the revival and augmentation of precolonial political institutions which had often lost their authority and fallen into near-disuse, or the creation of what were essentially new institutions that were given traditional nomenclatures to provide them with a semblance of traditional legitimacy (see Migdal, 1988:97–141; Himmelstrand, 1973:427–467).

Furthermore, new ethnic solidarities were formed, largely as a result of the workings of the colonial process. Thus were introduced new definitions of communal identity determined by various factors including migration from rural to urban areas, links between Western education and upward social mobility, change from subsistence farming to cash-crop production, and increasing concentration of populations around areas of labor-intensive extractive and manufacturing enterprises. Also, the piecemeal introduction of representative government based on colonially devised formulas of communal representation tended to consolidate communal/ethnic solidarity and sharpen

intercommunal divisions. This has been particularly true in the case of Africa where, as Jeffrey Herbst has pointed out:

In many cases, what are today viewed as long-standing tribal differences only became apparent just before and after an independent African nation was created, at which time it suddenly became necessary for groups to organize on a broader basis in order to gain enough of a political presence to pressure for resources being allocated in the newly created capital city. (Herbst, 1989:680)

Even in India, where communal identities at the local level certainly predated the British Raj, it was during the colonial period that these identities were augmented and consolidated at the "national" level finally leading to the partition of the country in 1947 (Hassan, 1979; and Page, 1982).

The administrative and political unity imposed by the colonial protostate as well as the increase in the facility for intracolony communication provided by European technologies, from the railroad to the wire service, led communal identities, which were essentially local in terms of their defining characteristics, to take on a "national," i.e., all-colony, character. Minor controversies between Muslims and Hindus in remote towns in India now took on the character of conflicts between "Indian" Muslims and "Indian" Hindus. Similarly, local interactions in the Malayan hinterland between Chinese and Malay inhabitants were now elevated to the "national" level and portrayed (in Freedman's 1960 term) as "total relations" between the two communities. This was deleterious for the future of state making and nation building in the Third World, and, therefore, for the internal security of Third World states, because it rendered ethnic and communal conflicts all the more intractable and introduced greater rigidity into the framework of intercommunal relations after the departure of the colonial power.

This outcome was, to say the least, paradoxical because the same colonial structures also provided the framework for the future nation-state as well as, at least initially, technologies which started to knit the protostate together both physically and psychologically. The colonial experience was indeed a double-edged sword as far as the future of state making and nation building, and, therefore, of security in the Third World was concerned.

Postcolonial Societal Demands and State Making

The process of modernization, which continued, and in many cases accelerated, after decolonization—including urbanization, literacy, industrialization, internal migration, etc.—augmented the destabilizing consequences of the colonial legacy of politicized ethnic and communal identities. This, as Melson and Wolpe have pointed out, is characteristic of the early phase of modernization, which "far from destroying communalism,

in time both reinforces communal conflict and creates the conditions for the formation of entirely new communal groups" (Melson and Wolpe, 1970:1113). Furthermore, as Geertz has pointed out:

It is the very process of the formation of a sovereign civil state that, among other things, stimulates sentiments of parochialism, communalism, racialism, and so on, because it introduces into society a valuable new prize over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend. (Geertz, 1963:120)

The contrast with the colonial state is very stark; the latter was for the ruled "an alien imposition, to be accepted, certainly, and to be feared, cajoled and where possible exploited, but existing on a plane above the people whom it governed, and beyond any chance of control" (Clapham, 1985:19).

The accentuation of ethnic fissures as a result of the coupling of the colonial inheritance and the process of modernization and social change have led in several cases to the outbreak of separatist insurgencies demanding secession from the postcolonial state, thus posing the ultimate internal security threat to the structures of a number of Third World states. Indeed, the character of many Third World states encourages ethnic separatism. Most separatist movements, whether successful or not, result from the fact that while Third World societies are overwhelmingly multiethnic in their composition, many Third World state elites deny this reality and attempt to construct monoethnic states (in terms of control of power structures and resource allocation functions) dominated by a single ethnolinguistic or ethnoreligious group, e.g., the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka or the Thais in Thailand. Therefore, ethnicity often becomes politicized, and sometimes poses serious threats to the security of Third World states, as a result of the gross inequality in the sharing of political and economic power within most such states—an inequality that is frequently perpetuated by deliberate state policy (Brown, 1988:51–77; Brown, 1989:1–17).

As if all this was not enough, in the Third World the problem of state making, and therefore of state and regime security, is further complicated by the fact that there are two other factors at work in the developing countries during the process of state making—factors which were either absent or present in very weak form during the analogous stage of state making in Europe. These are: (1) the demand for political participation by the general populace of the state; and (2) the demand for welfare and for a more equal distribution of the economic pie. Together these two demands, even if not gratified or only partially gratified in the case of most Third World polities, put enormous burdens on many state structures that are barely able to perform the minimal tasks of statehood, viz., the provision of political order. Nonetheless, state elites in the Third World have to include both development and participation, in addition to calls for "national" security, as part of their legitimacy formula at least in terms of declaratory policy. This inclusion is

determined partially by the climate of international opinion and partially by domestic demands and leads to a situation that was described succinctly by Dankwart Rustow more than two decades ago:

In the mid-twentieth century, any serious claimant to power, regardless of his antecedents, associations, or intentions, will justify his claim by professing profound concern for national independence, for popular aspirations, for social justice and for economic development. (Rustow, 1967:16-17)

However, it has also complicated the task of Third World state makers by tremendously increasing the demands upon them and upon the states they are trying to build as compared to those made on the early state makers in Europe who could single-mindedly pursue their goal of accumulating power and extracting resources without being bothered about demands for political participation and economic redistribution. In short, state making in Europe, particularly during its early crucial stages, was not an enterprise conducted by political liberals or by advocates of the welfare state. But, in the second half of the twentieth century the existence of the notion of an ideal democratic welfare state all states must approximate, coupled with the communications revolution which makes Third World populations aware both of their political rights and of the exercise of such rights in the industrialized states, makes the task of Third World state makers immensely difficult. Satisfying popular demands can frequently run counter to the imperatives of state making. This is so because state making, as the European experience has demonstrated, is a rather unsavory task and often involves levels of coercion that are bound to be unacceptable in the context of political democracy.

The International System and the Security Predicament

The security predicament of the Third World state is the external and dramatic manifestation of these major problems of state making that inhere in the historical situation within which Third World political elites must operate. However, the state-making enterprise in the Third World is not conducted in an international vacuum; the workings and norms of the international system provide major inputs into this process. Unfortunately for Third World state makers, most of these inputs tend to exacerbate their security predicament rather than alleviate it.

The major difference in terms of the early European experience and that of the Third World in this context is the fact that the system of states evolved concurrently with the evolution of modern European states. The norms and rules of the system were in the process of formation themselves and, where present, were in embryonic form. In fact, the process of state formation in the early modern states of Europe started prior in time to the evolution of the

states system; without the former the latter could not have come into existence. Even those European states that evolved later had a much more equal relationship with the system of states in the sense that they influenced the evolution of the latter as much as it influenced their process of state building.

In the case of the Third World, on the other hand, state making is being undertaken in the presence of a well-established system of states whose norms and rules have been evolved and refined over centuries and the patterns of interaction within which have been firmly established. This constrains the state-making process in the Third World to a considerable degree and makes it far more dependent on the configurations of political, military, economic, and technological power in the now truly global international system than was the case with most European states at a comparative stage of their evolution.

Most directly, the security predicament of the Third World state is adversely affected by the workings of an international system in which the dominant powers within that system by and large consider the security concerns of Third World states as marginal to the security of the international system as a whole. This perception on the part of the major powers permits and, on occasion, encourages the proliferation of both intrastate and interstate violent conflict within the Third World. It is no wonder therefore, as Nicole Ball has pointed out, that "all interstate wars since the end of World War II have taken place in the Third World, although there have been industrialized country participants in some of these conflicts" (Ball, 1988:33; and Holsti, this volume). This is the result of the fact that, but for limited exceptions, Third World conflicts have not impinged in any major way on the stability of the central balance and, in the perceptions of the major powers' decisionmakers, are not likely to fundamentally affect that balance, whether bipolar or multipolar, in the foreseeable future.

International political contests, strategic competitions, and economic rivalries are conducted without much regard for the fallout effects of these sets of adversarial relationships on Third World security. Third World countries are often used as pawns in the "great game" being played by the major strategic and economic powers in the international system. In fact, it has been argued that during the heyday of the Cold War, superpower conflicts were exported to the Third World, whether as wars by proxy or as exacerbation of indigenous Third World conflicts by policies of military assistance and political support to local antagonists, partially in order to cool the political temperature around the core areas of perceived vital importance to the major powers (Gupta, 1971:125–126). This linkage of the security of Third World states and regions with international or systemic security has meant that insecurity and conflict in the Third World proliferated at the same time that the stability of the central balance prevented the outbreak of conflict between the two power blocs in Europe.

This state of affairs can be expected largely to continue despite the recent

changes in US-Soviet relations, the withdrawal of Soviet military power from Eastern Europe, and the anticipated decline in Moscow's interest and involvement in Third World affairs. The withdrawal of one superpower from arenas of conflict in the Third World may not, however, be an unmixed blessing. It may prompt the other superpower to act even more cavalierly as far as the security interests of Third World states are concerned and tempt it to intervene militarily if developments in certain regions of the Third World that it considers strategically important are not to its liking. Important Third World state elites, deprived of the presence of a balancing power that could in some measure neutralize the dominant superpower's interventionist proclivities, may therefore begin to feel more vulnerable and insecure. If this happens, such an escalation of insecurity will be reflected in their internal and external behavior patterns—witness the events in the Middle East in 1990–1991 leading to the Gulf War.

The workings of the international economy further augment the vulnerabilities and, therefore, the insecurity of Third World states. Robert Gilpin (1987:10) has identified the state and the market as the “two organizing principles of social life” in the contemporary world. If the Third World states individually and the Third World collectively are weak in relation to the first organizing principle, namely, the state, they are even weaker in relation to the functioning of the second, namely, the international market. It is this weakness, born out of technological and economic inferiority on the one hand and the rules of the liberal market on the other, that has given rise to the dependency critiques of the current international order (Gilpin, 1987:273–290). It has also led to what Krasner (1985) has termed “structural conflict” between the Northern and the Southern hemispheres.

These critiques and analyses, however, do not change the fundamental reality of Third World weakness vis-à-vis the industrialized world in relation to the workings of the international economy. This global asymmetry in the terms of interaction between North and South, produced by a combination of economic and technological weakness with military and political inferiority on the part of the Third World, not only adds to the psychological insecurity of the Third World state elites but also makes Third World state structures and regimes highly permeable to a large number of external actors, ranging from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (both dominated by the major industrial powers) through the advanced industrialized states, to the multinational corporations, which also have their headquarters securely located in the industrialized North. Such permeability detracts from the autonomy of the Third World state and makes it vulnerable to external pressures and influences, thus adding to its insecurity and increasing the saliency of its security predicament (Thomas, 1987: chapters 3 and 4). A great deal of the Third World states' decisionmakers' time and effort is devoted to countering these external pressures and

preserving their limited autonomy without much to show for all the effort they put into this task. The workings of the international economy, therefore, augment the hierarchical and stratified nature of the international system, which is a major contributing factor to the security problems that Third World states face.

International Norms and Third World Security

While on the one hand the hierarchical nature of the international system and the division of the world between primary and secondary actors has militated against Third World security, on the other hand, the crystallization of international norms has also in some cases adversely affected the security of the Third World state. One of these sets of norms relates to the inalienability of juridical sovereignty or statehood once achieved. While this has done much to preserve the existence of many Third World states that may otherwise have been inviable, it has also, paradoxically, added to the security predicament of the Third World state. This point can be understood only in the light of comparison with the European situation at a corresponding stage in its own history of state making.

In Europe, from the early modern period to the end of World War I, the creation of viable states was accompanied by the relegation of many others to the dustbin of history. European history shows that there were many states, like Burgundy, Bohemia, and Aragon, that could not successfully complete the task of state building, and many others like Poland, that lost and regained their independence several times. The elimination of states considered inviable, either because of their internal contradictions or because their existence did not suit great-power aspirations, was perfectly acceptable to the European international community virtually through the end of World War I. It is instructive to remember in this context that the number of political units in Europe fell drastically from five hundred in 1500 to twenty-five in 1900.

The international consensus on the alienability of juridical statehood began to change during the interwar period and crystallized after World War II in the context of the decolonization of Asia and Africa. Colonies, once granted independence, acquired the right to exist as sovereign entities even if many of them, especially in Africa, did not possess "much in the way of empirical statehood, disclosed by a capacity for effective and civil government" (Jackson, 1987:529). This has meant that many political entities in the Third World, which in an earlier day and age would have been considered inviable, have continued to flourish in a condition of juridical statehood. It has also meant that the new international norms, while they have protected the legal existence of all postcolonial states irrespective of their internal cohesiveness, have been unable to solve or even mitigate the

security problems that they face as a result of the contradictions inherent within the state-making process. In fact, these norms have made their security problems more acute by preventing the political demise of even the most inviable of these entities, like Lebanon, Cyprus, Uganda, or Chad. In other words, systemic norms have transformed what in an earlier age would have been the existential dilemma of such states into their security predicament. Since states, once established, have an open-ended guarantee on the part of the international system that their legal existence is assured, the traumas that they suffer in the process of translating juridical statehood into empirical statehood take on the garb of challenges to their security rather than threats to their existence.

A fundamental difference, therefore, between the European experience and that of the Third World states, as was stated earlier, relates to the existence of the system of states, with its rules regarding sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention, as a constraining factor in relation to the process of state making. This prevents the unrestrained interplay of the internal dynamics of particular states in the making, and rules out war as an instrument of change in the boundaries of states (of course, with limited exceptions—the latter proving the rule). It should be noted that while intervention does take place in the Third World by external great powers as well as by stronger Third World states in the affairs of the weaker ones, such intervention stops short of the elimination or dismemberment of target states. Moreover, when intervention does take place it usually tends to shore up the territorial status quo rather than alter it. This has been most evident in the case of Africa, whether in relation to the Nigerian Civil War, the Ethiopian-Somalian War, or the Libya-Chad conflict. The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was aimed as much at preserving the territorial integrity of that country as at ensuring Tamil autonomy. The Syrian military intervention in Lebanon has also had the maintenance of Lebanon's juridical statehood as one of its main objectives. The only two cases where external intervention has led to the alteration of postcolonial boundaries have been the break up of Pakistan in 1971 and the *de facto* division of Cyprus in 1974, the first aided by Indian arms and the second brought about by Turkish military intervention. The geographic separation between East and West Pakistan by 1,000 miles of Indian territory provided the principal reason for the breakup of that geographically absurd country. Turkey's status as one of the three guarantors of the postcolonial constitutional order in Cyprus, which the Greek extremists attempted to overthrow, provided the legal justification for Turkish military intervention that effectively divided the island into two political entities. But it is worth noting that no country other than Turkey has recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Both these instances were, however, unique and would be extremely difficult to replicate elsewhere in the Third World. In this sense they provide the exceptions that prove the rule.

Another set of international norms that has affected the security problematic of the Third World state is related to the demonstration effect of the existence of the modern representative and responsive states in the industrialized world, which set the standards for effective statehood by their demonstrated success in meeting the basic needs of their populations, protecting their human rights, redistributing income, and promoting and guaranteeing political participation. These norms of what is now considered not merely civilized but normal state behavior run directly counter to the set of norms that prescribes the inalienability of juridical statehood. They undermine the legitimacy of Third World states by prescribing standards and yardsticks of statehood in terms of the output functions of political systems that most Third World states will be incapable of meeting for many decades to come. Thus the two sets of norms work at cross-purposes, the first insisting on the juridical existence of even the most inviable states, and the second in demanding standards of effective and humane performance from the most fragile and weak polities, which are incapable of carrying out even the minimum function of maintaining political order. The interaction of these two sets of norms thus exacerbates the security predicament of the Third World state by not permitting it to exit from the system of states and by enforcing on it standards of "civilized" behavior that it is unable to meet. International norms, therefore, contribute to creating and augmenting internal discontent within Third World states by forcing all the diverse and dissatisfied elements within it from remaining within the boundaries of the postcolonial state and at the same time encouraging the same elements to make demands on the state that it cannot respond to with even a meager degree of success.

Conclusion

The security predicament of the Third World state is the product of the current historical juncture of various factors affecting the process of state making so as to intensify the sense of insecurity both for Third World states and for the regimes presiding over these state structures. The limited time period available to the Third World state to complete the task of nation-state building not only makes it extremely difficult but also tends to distort the process by encouraging simultaneous and often contradictory demands on the state's decisionmaking centers, so heightening the insecurity of state and regime that security has become an obsession with most state elites in the Third World.

The workings of and stratification within the international system augment the sense of insecurity among Third World state elites by making them dangerously vulnerable to external pressures and influences, and by reducing their autonomy in the arenas of both domestic and foreign policy. The consolidation of international norms virtually prohibiting the

relinquishment of statehood once achieved, while at the same time setting almost impossible standards of performance, feeds this insecurity syndrome by preventing the alienation of juridical personality even by states that are no more than caricatures of the original model, simultaneously encouraging domestic dissidence by delegitimizing many, if not most, Third World states in the eyes of their own citizens.

The immense problems created by the interaction between systemic pressures and those internal to the state-making process in Third World countries appear almost insurmountable for many Third World states, which have neither the luxury of solving them over a lengthy period of time nor of opting out of the struggle by relinquishing their juridical statehood. This is the basic cruel political dilemma that these states face, along with the societies they territorially encompass and attempt to govern, and it is a dilemma from which they can find no exit.

As has been stated earlier, this dilemma is most dramatically manifested as the security predicament of the Third World state because the challenges that emerge from the ongoing process of state making (and from the systemic pressures that are brought to bear on the Third World state during that process) pose major threats to the security of state boundaries, institutions, and regimes. This explains both the state elite's obsession with security and the determining influence this preoccupation with security has on all other arenas of policymaking as well as generally on the political life of the Third World state.

Notes

1. The author would like to thank Michael Barnett, Edward Kolodziej, and Stephen Krasner for their extensive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

2. The term "Third World" is deliberately used in this paper in a generic sense. This is justified on a number of grounds including the late entrance of Third World states into the system of states; the tremendous disparity in terms of technological, economic, and military power between the Third World collectively and the capitalist and socialist industrialized nations; and the continuing peripherality of Third World states in economic, political, and cultural terms to the international system. For details of this argument, see Ayoob (1989:67-79). Also, see Clapham (1985: chapter 1).

3. For a perceptive juxtaposition of the "national-territorial" and "institutional" definitions of the state, see Halliday (1987:215-229). Charles Tilly provides a good working definition of the state that encompasses both its territorial and institutional dimensions. According to him, "An organization which controls the population occupying a defined territory is a state *in so far as*: (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another" (Tilly, 1975:70).

4. The Latin American case appears to be somewhat different from that of the rest of the Third World because the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in South

America acquired political independence during the early decades of the nineteenth century. However, for a whole host of reasons, predominantly the importation of the economic and political culture of preindustrial Iberia, Latin American political development, including its tradition of state making and nation building, remained fossilized well into the twentieth century. The era of industrial society (in terms of its demonstration effect rather than its realization), with its model of a socially mobile population encompassed within a strong state structure presided over by a representative government, caught up with Latin America around the same time that it did with much of Asia, if not Africa. While the intervening century may have provided Latin American states the time to consolidate and legitimate state boundaries, their preindustrial social structures retarded other aspects of state making, above all those of societal penetration and societal cohesion. Thus, the acquisition of political independence relatively early in the game gave Latin American states only marginal advantages over their Asian and African counterparts in terms of accomplishing the twin tasks of state making and nation building and, therefore, of mitigating if not solving their security predicament. In any case, a Latin American lead over Asia and Africa of a little over a century is not much in relation to the length of time it took European states to complete their process of state making (see Wiarda, 1986:249–278).

5. Tilly's conclusions are borne out by Youssef Cohen et al., who argue that "The extent to which an expansion of state power will generate collective violence depends on the *level* of state power prior to that expansion . . . the lower the initial level of state power, the stronger the relationship between the *rate* of state expansion and collective violence" (Cohen, Brown, and Organski, 1981:905).

The Security Dilemma in Africa

Robert H. Jackson

The Ambivalence of National Security

The presence in fairly large numbers across sub-Saharan Africa of extremely marginal states that nevertheless manage to survive raises interesting questions about the theory of national security. That theory appears to be that sovereign states are protectorates of their populations and resources and that international relations turn on the security and survival of states. "Security is a value"—as Arnold Wolfers (1965:150) puts it—and international relations theory is a "theory of survival"—according to Martin Wight (1966). Security is a value because states are postulated suppliers or guarantors of domestic "political goods"—order, liberty, justice, welfare, and the like (Pennock, 1966). This is captured by the Latin expression: *Ubi bene, ibi patria*: "Where it is well with me, there is my country." National security is a means to safeguard such values: it is instrumental to the good life although it is not the good life itself. This makes it ambivalent, as I indicate below, because it is possible for national security to underwrite marginal states that do not and perhaps cannot provide their populations with political goods.

Contemporary international relations theorists are reluctant to look inside states and usually content to *postulate* independent statehood as inherently valuable. This is reasonable, as developed democracies can be termed "substantial domiciles." But what can "national security" possibly mean if a state does not provide or protect domestic political goods? What sort of security was afforded by the Warsaw Pact to the populations of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968? What domestic political goods were safeguarded by Ceausescu's Romania or Honecker's East Germany? What is the value of external security if it is not convertible into domestic safety and well-being? In sub-Saharan Africa there are numerous states—probably the majority—where this conversion is not made by the government and countless individuals must fall back upon other social

organizations—usually ethnic and kinship groups—for whatever safety and welfare they enjoy.

The existence not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world of ramshackle states under authoritarian governments of various ideological stripes poses difficulties for conventional security theory. “National security” is a contemporary Western and even US train of thought, carrying baggage in the shape of unstated presuppositions and values concerning independent statehood—and it is applicable to many countries only by determined stretching, twisting, and forcing. External security enabling privileged ruling classes to keep populations in servitude, want, and even fear is not exactly consistent with the value assumptions of national security theory. In short, since the theory postulates states that provide their populations with a domicile worthy of protection, its application to authoritarian and underdeveloped states raises conceptual difficulties. One might conclude that we should not apply the concept to such countries because it obviously does not fit. I believe we should apply it to learn more not only about their security dilemmas but also about the limitations of current national security theory.

The Logic and Language of Security

First we need to know what “security” can reasonably mean when applied to human relations, both interpersonal and international. This will be investigated by addressing the following questions: security in or of what, from what, for what, and by what means? Security or the lack thereof is a consequence of decisions: our own and those of others involved in relations with us. My approach consequently is that of liberal political theory, which interrogates the logic and language of the human condition and presupposes that human behavior, including international relations, is volitional—although rarely if ever unconstrained or cost-free. These questions are anything but new. Indeed, they go back at least to Hobbes (1946) who in the seventeenth century was preoccupied with issues of security and survival. I obviously cannot embark on an exegesis of Hobbes’s political theory but must be content with briefly considering a small part of it plus the recent work of a contemporary political theorist (Berki, 1986) who covers the same ground.

Insecurity or fear is for Hobbes a benchmark concept—a universal human passion—characterizing the “state of nature” and driving postulated rational people to shelter together in the commonwealth or state under a sovereign government. Security is the basic value of statehood and the main puzzle of political philosophy. Personal insecurity turns out to be the motivation for state building because the state of nature entails adverse circumstances which few can tolerate and most are driven to escape. In

Michael Oakeshott's (1975:36) restatement of Hobbes's central thesis, "man is a creature civilized by fear of death." The protectorate or state is established by the social contract, which concentrates a legitimate monopoly of force (the sword) in the hands of a sovereign henceforth responsible for defending his subjects from external and internal threats and whose restraining commands (laws) must be obeyed by the subjects as the necessary price of security. Those who disobey can justifiably be punished according to the law. Here is the classical model of the state as a security arrangement.

Berki focuses primarily on personal security, but his analysis also has application to national security. He begins with the negative concept of "insecurity" which, like other negatives such as disorder or injustice, is easier to clarify than the positive concept. Personal insecurity is "the threat . . . posed for individuals by other people" (Berki, 1986:3). Berki emphasizes that insecurity is a problem presented by *others*, whether individuals or groups, internal or external to one's state. The hermit confronts many difficulties stemming from isolation, but can avoid the problem of insecurity thus defined, which only comes with society. Insecurity consequently derives from living *together* in a neighborhood, city, province, state, or states-system: it is a *social* and therefore political problem of living among other agents, including states, whose inclinations, actions, or inactions can be threatening. In short, society makes life easier and in many respects more secure, but also has its disadvantages; one of the most significant of which is the threat presented by others who might not only let us down but also do us in.

Insecurity consequently is the *rational* fear we experience living among capable and willful others who are imperfectly civilized or socialized and might conceivably harm us. The very definition of civilization (Collingwood, 1971:292) is refraining as far as possible from the use of force in the resolution of human conflict and always subjecting it to strict procedures if it must be resorted to. If life were completely civilized, the problem of security would not arise because agents would find means to resolve their conflicts which respected the rights, interests, and dignity of others and avoided force. But human life is never completely civilized because humans are imperfect: force is an inescapable element of the human condition. Even in an otherwise civil society we depend upon the legitimate coercive monopoly of the state to shield us from violence. It is this reality which gives rise to prudence which is the paradigm disposition of the political realist and the cardinal virtue of statecraft. In conceptualizing "insecurity" in these terms—in which "security" and "safety" belong to the same logic and language as "threat" and "danger"—we are at the heart of classical international relations theory. This basic model will be employed throughout.

Security in or of what? The answer to this question is rooted in the vulnerability of all humans: they can be deprived of life, limb, sustenance, shelter, liberty, property, and peace of mind by the malevolent or negligent

acts of other humans. These are the goods of human well-being. To be insecure in them is to be wanting in the minimal conditions necessary to human life. If such goods were perpetually in peril, human life would be extremely difficult, which is exactly how Hobbes (1946:83) conceives of such life in the "state of nature" where there is no security but only a war "of every man against every man." Since at least the time of Hobbes the security of such goods has been associated with the political arrangements of the sovereign state. Security provided by independent governments to their citizens within the confines of international borders is the basic (although by no means the only) point of the state. Indeed, as I indicate below, the security afforded by the state is the essential means for developing the good life.

Security from what? I have so far mentioned several sources of threat (which can, of course, also be sources of security): other individuals, groups, and states. In Hobbes's "state of nature" all individuals are at least a potential threat to all others because they are all roughly equal rivals striving for felicity in circumstances of scarcity. We can trust or have confidence in others, but this can never be absolute: human life is contingent and therefore contains an unavoidable element of uncertainty and risk. We can purchase life insurance but this cannot solve the problem: we may still have our life taken from us. Even we who live in comparatively capable and civil states are aware of real situations where something resembling a "state of nature" can exist—such as in certain districts of large cities, usually at night, where there is a definite possibility of being mugged or even murdered. We seek security not only from individuals in domestic society but also from states in international society. Security from other states I take to be the main focus of national security theory, and in the remainder of this chapter I will be primarily concerned with this.

Security by means of what? Insecurity, it has been suggested, is dictated by living among others and being exposed to their hostile or negligent actions. But security is not merely a fortress behind whose bastions all can be protected. The fortified house, the castle, even the walled city are only partial solutions to the problem of security, for they cannot indefinitely provide for other needs such as food or water, which a blockade could interrupt. There are of course no complete solutions. Any viable solution must secure the footpath, market, highway, airport, airspace, or high seas, or any other open place that we must enter to satisfy our needs and wants, but in which we are unavoidably and necessarily exposed to others. Even the state as a metaphorical castle must enter into relations with other states and cannot endure in fortified isolation.

But it is to safeguard our exposure in such places that the state comes into play as offering reasonable protection, occasionally as physical obstruction, but usually as psychological deterrence to the threatening inclinations of others. Thus physical power (primarily military power but also the scientific, technological, and industrial means instrumental to it) and

deterrence (the cautioning effect on another's perception of one's willingness and ability to deploy power to defend oneself or one's interests—credibility) embodied by the state are the principal although certainly not the only means of national security.

To sum up: national insecurity is the rational fear brought about by living in proximity to other states that are armed and imperfectly civilized and could cause damage, destruction, devastation, and even death to ourselves if their power was used against us and overcame our defenses. The model of national insecurity is the reasonable apprehension (1) of the hostile inclinations of agent "A" (a foreign power or alliance) that poses a threat and is in a position to make good on its threat to us (i.e., is both capable and credible), and (2) of the willingness or ability (or both) of agent "B" (our own government and its allies) to provide a defense against "A." To deal with the problem one must either reduce or perhaps eliminate the threat presented by "A" or increase the defensive capability and credibility of "B." The latter is the usual solution that often goes by the name of national security.

The State and Security

The physical and psychological ramparts embodied in the state are the standard means by which security is pursued today. The state is fundamentally a protectorate. But even the most effective and resolute state or alliance cannot completely resolve the problem of insecurity because states are always subject to human imperfections such as limitations of trust, reliability, goodwill, effort, expertise, commitment, cooperation, and so forth. The modern state can nevertheless be a formidable defense arrangement and has been widely resorted to historically in the attempt to keep social hazards within acceptable limits—i.e., those which make it possible for us to build our lives relatively free from fear at a cost in defense and other security measures which is not prohibitive or self-defeating. The state can be a cost-effective security arrangement and its universality today attests at least to its promise as a protectorate. Alternative arrangements such as families, clans, tribes, guilds, companies, religious sects, or gangs are generally at a comparative disadvantage to the state—although they are by no means obsolete, as the tragic experience of Lebanon indicates, where the empirical state (although not the juridical state) has disintegrated and rival private militias defend the various sectarian groups into which the population is divided.

Security for what? The answer to this question should now be clear: so that vulnerable humans may enjoy the economies and other advantages of living together in society while limiting the risks. Hobbes answers this question by indicating what cannot be obtained outside the state:

Men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish . . . in such condition there is no place for industry . . . no culture of the earth . . . no navigation . . . no commodious building . . . no knowledge . . . no arts; no letters; no society. (1946:82)

In short, security is a condition for developing and enjoying the moral and material conditions of a civilized and prosperous existence. And the state is the foundation of development and progress: the secure base upon which the good life, whatever cultural variations it may take, can be built. In this fundamental sense the state is necessary for development and progress. I believe it is clear from modern history that no other means of security compares to the state as a foundation for human advance.

The concept of security can be summed up as beginning in personal security and culminating in a general or political security of one's homeland. In the world of today, and as we have known it for several centuries, that homeland is conceived as a country or nation. "The state," as Berki (1986:28) puts it, "is universally regarded as being more important in this field than any other social grouping or institution." One's country is both an object or sphere, and an agent or source of security: we expect to find relative security within our country and we also expect it to be provided or at least promoted by our government.

We do not expect our government to be a security liability or threat, and if it should become one we would surely condemn it and, if possible, seek to replace it, on the well-established grounds that states and governments exist for the benefit of their people and not the reverse. Yet we also know from history, from contemporary events in many parts of the world, and perhaps even from bitter personal experience that the state is not only a solution but also a problem when it comes to the provision of security. Many governments cannot or will not provide security guarantees to their citizens or indeed to us if we happen to be traveling or residing in their jurisdictions. In short, the state can be a source of security but it can also be a source of threat: that is what Barry Buzan (1983a:20) calls the "paradox of the state."

The Domain of National Security

The domain of national security can be defined on one side by the rights and duties and on the other side by the power and capability of sovereign states, where "states" are conceptualized as right-and-duty-bearing units in possession of power apparatuses—the classical definition in political theory (see Oakeshott, 1975). The moral and legal side of national security presupposes the possibility not only of society but also civilization between states: that is, norms enjoining sovereign governments to avoid the use of violence and resolve their disputes by peaceful means. It is most clearly

disclosed by the concept of "nonintervention," defined as a rule of forbearance from forcible interference in the jurisdiction of another state; "In principle, every state is independent in the management of its own affairs (except insofar as it may be limited by some treaty), and foreign interference is a violation of its rights" (Wight, 1986:191). National insecurity is thus a condition of being placed at risk by the threatening inclinations, actions, or negligence of other states in disregard of international norms (as elaborated below). Sovereignty, nonintervention, and security are all one and the same from the legal-rationalist point of view.

The power side of national security is indicated by the ability of a state to be secure in fact as well as law. This is a question of its relative power, either alone or in alliance with others, or as a result of collective security arrangements. States have rarely if ever been naively willing to rely for their security only on the disposition of other states to act morally or lawfully in international relations. Instead, they have prudently and realistically sought safety in arms, military alliances, and similar means by which the power of hostile others can be deterred, checked, or balanced in some way. Even historical neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland have always maintained substantial armed forces. Alliances or collective security arrangements are means by which even smaller states can achieve a measure of national security based on power.

There is a tendency for certain contemporary international relations theorists, usually self-identified as "realists," to emphasize the power dimension of national security and trivialize the legal-rationalist side. In practice, however, states always accentuate both. National security is a right of states, and sovereign governments claim it as a right—the right in question being that of independence and nonintervention. But national insecurity derived from differentials in power and civility between states is a reality ignored by independent statesmen only at their peril. They know not only that international law will only restrain governments that respect it, but also that no government will always fully respect it if a powerful national interest strongly tempts it not to do so. As indicated, states, like humans, are imperfectly civilized, and recognizing this is only being realistic. The classical political theorists, including Hobbes, although not Machiavelli, therefore acknowledged both the legal and the prudential dimensions of the domain of national security in their theories of the state. I believe contemporary international relations theorists ought to do the same.

African National Security

How should we think about the national security of sub-Saharan African states if we follow this approach? These states clearly are not "powers": they lack (not only individually but also in combination) the military means and

the supporting scientific, technological, and industrial capacity. Most such states are extremely weak in power-politics terms. They certainly cannot deter the most powerful states, who could intervene in their jurisdictions and the region at large virtually at will, were it not for different prudential considerations, such as the opposition of other powerful states. Since decolonization, intervention in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa has been restrained by the Cold War. Whatever security African states have enjoyed since decolonization has been due to the balance of power between East and West, which created an international space for them. African states cannot participate in this balance, however, owing to their underdevelopment. If a powerful state did consider it to be in its interest to intervene in an African state and was prepared to disregard other powerful states that might be opposed to it, no African government or combination of governments—including the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—could block it.

Most African states are far less insecure than this implies, however, because they occupy a peripheral region to which the world is largely indifferent. They are far closer to the “pole of indifference” than the “pole of power” (Wolfers, 1965:81–102) in international relations. If national security means the more or less permanent inviolability of independent territorial jurisdictions, then the vast majority of African countries since decolonization have been secure, are today secure, and very likely will continue to be secure in the future. National insecurity has been confined to a few conflict zones, mainly in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa where the superpowers evidently decided that their strategic interests were at stake. In such areas the Cold War promoted intervention. But this is rapidly changing as a result of the Gorbachev revolution and the winding down of the East-West conflict. If this continues it may soon be the case that the whole of sub-Saharan Africa will be at the pole of indifference in global power politics—a return to its historical position, which existed for millennia prior to European colonization at the end of the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, according to legal-rationalist logic, what sub-Saharan states lack in organized power and credibility they make up for in legal rights (sovereignty) and moral standing (international legitimacy), which provide additional insulation from external threats. They are members of the United Nations, for them a significant security and welfare regime. They are formally associated in the OAU, their own regional security regime based on the norm of nonintervention. They can be confident that their sovereignty is generally respected by other states within and outside of Africa—even if it is profoundly challenged in many cases by protostates based on ethnonational communities within their domestic jurisdictions. Indeed, the UN and the OAU are crucial international fraternities, underwriting the sovereignty of African states primarily by denying international recognition to any other territory-based political groupings in the continent which would disrupt the borders of the existing excolonial jurisdictions. Consequently Biafra in

Nigeria, the Eritrean liberation movement in Ethiopia, the Shaba Province in Zaire, the southern rebels in Sudan, and all other expressions of ethnonational self-determination that interfere with existing boundaries cannot be—and have not been—recognized or given any other kind of international sanction. The silence of the international community on ethnonational claims in Africa and elsewhere has been deafening.

Sub-Saharan governments need not devote much thought, effort or resources to the problem of national security. Neither Western states, the Soviet Union, China, nor any other significant non-African powers have shown any inclination to threaten independent African states. When interventions by such powers have occasionally occurred they have almost always been invited by sovereign African governments, rather than being imposed by foreign powers or solicited by domestic adversaries of such governments. The major interventions by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia and Angola, and by France in Chad, have been of the solicited variety, thus entirely consistent with international law. US support for Jonas Savimbi's rebellion against the Soviet and Cuban-backed Marxist government of Angola was the main exception. South Africa has threatened neighboring African states, of course, but this threat is rapidly receding, if it has not already disappeared, as South Africa transforms itself into a state wherein those of European descent will no longer enjoy a political monopoly, and the formerly excluded black majority will be represented in government on some basis of demographic proportionality yet to be worked out. All of this of course assumes that the country will not deteriorate into full-scale civil war—which remains a distinct possibility.

International opinion firmly opposes unsolicited intervention, especially by the former colonial powers, the United States, and the USSR. Attempted, overtly threatened, or even intimated intervention would provoke immediate, widespread, loud, and unqualified condemnation by the world community. African states individually and collectively enjoy what Ali Mazrui (1967) terms "racial sovereignty," proclaiming that Africa is exclusively for native Africans. The recently restored political independence of African states is morally and legally unassailable. This can be understood in the context of the history of African conquest and colonization by Europeans. Sub-Saharan states are in the reverse position of their nineteenth-century ancestors, whose sovereignty was not taken seriously by imperialists: in fact, the entire continent of Africa, with the isolated and qualified exceptions of Liberia and Ethiopia, was overrun and reduced to colonial status in international law. The unchallenged sovereignty of African states today is rooted in the willingness if not eagerness of former imperial powers to make amends to their excolonies for past imperialism and exploitation.

In sum, in a real sense there is no problem of national security in African states, which enjoy an unusual form of external protection. Their security is based partly on their marginal geographical position and the

relative indifference of powerful non-African states, and partly on the democratic norms of the postcolonial international society, according to which it would be intolerable for developed states to prey upon underdeveloped states, especially if the former are white eximperial rulers and the latter black excolonial subjects.

African Domestic Insecurity

Although African states are externally secure, there is in many of them a persistent and widespread—in some a horrendous—problem of internal security. The benefits of national security tend to be confined to restricted segments of the population, usually members or clients of the government apparatus. African states in this respect are reminiscent of the dynastic states of early modern Europe.

There are various indicators of domestic insecurity. Perhaps the most telling is political refugees: Africa has recently had the largest number of political refugees of any major world region (Gordeniker, 1987; Dowty, 1987). These figures do not include the probably higher number displaced within their own countries as internal refugees. Another indication is internal wars. There have been or are ongoing bloody civil conflicts in states containing more than half the population of sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. The internal wars in Liberia and Somalia are the most recent cases in point. South Africa may slide into this category if the already violent ethnic and racial conflict gets out of control. Localized political violence is endemic in many countries, almost all of which have the potential for civil war. A further indication is military coups, the usual method of changing governments. Praetorian regimes deploy the armed forces not to defend the country but to protect themselves, and African armies resemble the mercenary brigades of early modern European autocrats. In short, the state apparatus is a principal source of domestic threat for many Africans, obliged to look elsewhere for whatever security they can obtain.

The international system relates to sub-Saharan states by endeavoring to prop them up, presumably in the belief that otherwise many of them—perhaps most—would disintegrate. But many of these externally buttressed entities in reality are little more than juridical shells and already disintegrated empirically—if the above-noted indicators are anything to go by. It is a well-known fact that the prevailing wars since decolonization have been internal and not international (see Holsti in this volume). Not usually recognized is the role of the international community in this sorry domestic state of affairs. Unqualified external support for existing African jurisdictions makes it impossible to resolve civil wars by recognizing rebels and redrawing the political map without the consent of the sovereign governments involved, for

obvious reasons. If it had been possible the bloody conflict in Sudan might have ended long ago instead of dragging on with no end in sight. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that if such settlements had been arranged they would have provoked ethnonational demands throughout the continent and beyond for a redrawing of international frontiers. Such a prospect could only cause extreme apprehension to African states and the international community. Thus the status quo may be preferred as the lesser of two evils.

This unusual if not unprecedented situation raises some ironical and ethically difficult questions. External security underwritten by the international community probably has the unintended consequence of increasing domestic insecurity by supporting authoritarian governments and preserving conflict-ridden jurisdictions in which ordinary Africans are driven to seek refuge in kinship arrangements, ethnic homelands, and even neighboring countries. But as a practical matter, how could one turn around only a quarter century after the end of colonialism and argue that authentic self-determination cannot be achieved within the excolonial framework, but should instead be based on some alternative jurisdictions and structures that are more congruent with the real social life of most Africans—i.e., their ethnolinguistic groups? One remote possibility of this happening is bound up in the fate of the nationalities of the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia: if they acquire some kind of authentic self-determination it might have a powerful demonstration effect in other areas, including Africa. Another farfetched possibility would be an international protectorate over the sub-Saharan region, perhaps administered by a United Nations agency under which substantial governing authority and responsibility would devolve from the existing states to the ethnolinguistic groups. But what African statesmen would buy into either option if it entailed losing rather than gaining power and privilege? Chances are the current political map of Africa will therefore be preserved. Accordingly, the external security of African states will ironically continue to favor and even foster the domestic and personal insecurity of their populations.

It can be argued that the international support of existing African jurisdictions sustains two important effects: (1) the perpetuation of domestic and personal insecurity by blocking the formation of jurisdictions that might be less arbitrary, more cohesive, more legitimate, and therefore better protectorates of their populations; and (2) the perpetuation of underdevelopment. World Bank (1989:221) data on Africa indicate a consistent correlation between domestic civil and political instability—which became prevalent by the late 1960s, and economic stagnation and decline—which has been without parallel anywhere since the early 1970s. This postulated connection between domestic insecurity—brought about in significant part by international support for abusive and incompetent African governments—and economic deterioration in African countries has not

received the study it merits; indeed, it has scarcely been recognized (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986).

Future Conceivable Security Scenarios

We are entering a new post-Cold War era of international relations that could affect the African security dilemma if it is true—as argued above—that the Cold War created a political space that allowed domestically insecure Third World states to emerge and survive. Since the conditions upon which this analysis is premised may be changing, it is not only possible but appropriate to speculate about future conceivable security scenarios.

Will the end of the Cold War increase or decrease the indifference of the major powers to sub-Saharan Africa? The conventional argument, focusing on superpower intervention provoked by Cold War competition, as in Ethiopia and Angola, would anticipate reduced intervention. Presumably internal disorder would therefore diminish. But since most foreign intervention in Africa has been of the solicited variety in support of sovereign governments, an alternative argument would expect the defeat of some of these governments if they can no longer count on that support. And if they cannot, in turn, automatically depend on the international community to deny recognition to their opponents where they are in effective control of large territories and populations—as in Ethiopia and Sudan—the possibilities of change could be even greater.

Furthermore, without a threatening Soviet deterrent the West may no longer be prepared to tolerate African governments that abuse human rights and may even be inclined to intervene in an attempt to bring such abuse to an end. A New World Order, based on a rehabilitated standard of civilization enforced by the West in cooperation with a reformed Soviet Union that now recognizes the same doctrine of universal human rights, could even enjoin such intervention. However, such intervention by the West would face a chorus of condemnation from the Third World and its supporters. Besides, now that Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union require major and probably massive Western aid, it seems more likely that the West will justify giving aid to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Poland—although arguably not Yugoslavia, Romania, or Bulgaria—on the grounds that prospects for democracy and development are far better in those countries than in Africa and that aid would therefore be of greater social benefit. An unstated underlying prejudice, which at the root may be racial, that Africans are not capable of putting aid to proper and productive use, may also be a factor. In sum, the more likely prospect is increased indifference to Africa now that the Cold War is over. In effect, Eastern Europe has captured not only the political attention but also the self-interest and assumed obligation of the West.

We can also speculate about the effects of increased indifference. It could be that little of significance will change except that African elites will have to get by on less foreign aid. But it could also be that African states will not receive as much legitimacy and support as previously and, by implication, that the taboo against acknowledging—if not recognizing—the legitimacy of ethnonational claimants will weaken. Clearly, the past practice of categorically upholding the sovereignty and external security of African jurisdictions is a form of intervention favoring sovereign governments and stacking the deck against opposition movements. If that support weakens and the domestic power equation changes accordingly, new possibilities of rearranging sovereignty in Africa could open up. This would get to the root causes of the security dilemma in Africa. But it remains speculation only, and for the time being that dilemma persists.

Implications for National Security Theory

The main argument of this chapter would end here if it did not provoke revisionist questions about the conventional theory of national security in international relations.

The coexistence of national security and domestic and personal insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa turns Hobbes on his head: instead of states or alliances defending their populations against external threats, international society is underwriting the national security of states, whether or not they convert it into domestic security for their citizens. There is no necessary connection between national security and domestic security in this arrangement. On the contrary, there seems to be a contingent connection between national security and domestic and personal insecurity. The linkage of reciprocal rights and obligations between sovereign and citizen established by the social contract in Hobbes's political theory is broken in an ironical way. Instead of an external security problem, there is an internal security problem. Instead of a postulated valuable domicile that national security seeks to protect, there is no such thing. The cart is before the horse and the classical model breaks down.

Thus, unlike Hobbes's theory, the disruption of mutual obligations between sovereign governments and their citizens does not bring about a domestic state of nature enabling a new social contract in which a sovereign able to protect the citizenry is installed. Sovereign-citizen relations break down and give rise to something like a domestic state of nature. However, the sovereign does not fall because international society strictly refuses to recognize any claimant sovereign other than that of the existing jurisdiction—even if that claimant might in fact be more effective or more domestically legitimate or both. What the assumptions and values of classical security theory have difficulty accommodating is not only a

domestically threatening sovereign—as Buzan (1983a) and Berki (1986) point out—but one which is inaugurated and survives primarily, if not almost entirely, by the indulgence of the international system. This relationship deserves more attention than it has received from international relations theorists to date.

Finally, this revisionist reasoning also has general implications for the character of international relations theory. It suggests that any attempt to focus exclusively on national security—the state—and ignore domestic and personal security—the individual—is myopic. The state is not an end; it is only a means. Individuals and their well-being is the end. Just as international politics are not a separate world but merely external facets of sovereign states with connections to domestic politics via statesmen who are simultaneously obliged to look both outwards and inwards, by the same token international relations theory must be considered part of political theory and not separate from it. In conclusion, there is only one theory of security that must address both sides of the equation. This perhaps explains why Hobbes figures as a leading theorist of security in both international and domestic political thought.

Notes

I am grateful to Robert Crawford, David Dewitt, and Samuel LaSelva for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

PART 3
DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL
STRATEGIES TO ATTAIN
SECURITY

The Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization

*Michael Barnett & Alexander Wendt*¹

Scholarly interest in the militarization of the Third World has been something of a growth industry since the 1970s—much like Third World militarization itself. Although many important insights have been generated by this scholarly attention, it has not adequately accounted for the disjuncture between what international relations scholarship typically assumes about the preferences of state actors and how Third World states actually behave. While international relations scholars generally assume that states have a strong preference for autonomy and independence because of the anarchic and self-help nature of the state system, many Third World states embrace a policy of military dependence. Indeed, Third World leaders themselves have simultaneously cursed colonialism and its legacies while pursuing policies of dependent militarization. How does one reconcile the rhetoric of nationalism and the systemic logic of self-help with the pursuit of a policy intentionally designed to promote a dependent relationship?

In order to better understand why Third World states pursue a strategy of dependent militarization, one has to examine two features of the Third World militarization process: (1) In spite of a relative scarcity of capital to labor, Third World militarization has in general been much more capital-than labor-intensive, relying on sophisticated and extremely costly arms and professional soldiers rather than on alternative defenses such as mass militias and territorial defense, in which they have a comparative advantage; (2) Given that Third World states prefer capital-intensive militarization, why have they been unable to pursue such a strategy in an auto-centric fashion?

This chapter is concerned with this second question.² In contrast to the first puzzle, the reasons for the dependent characteristic of Third World militarization have received a fair amount of attention, and on the surface the answer seems rather straightforward: the resources required for military industrialization are distributed unevenly across states, and thus the dependent

character of Third World militarization is a product of domestic or unit-level factors.³ Many scholars have argued that most Third World economies today simply lack the capital, technology, industrial base, and economies of scale necessary to sustain a capital-intensive form of militarization on an auto-centric basis. Stephanie Neuman (1984:192) summarizes this argument when she writes:

Because most Third World countries lack the combination of socioeconomic preconditions (financial resources, a large military, and a sizeable pool of trained manpower for a viable military industry), the number of LDC producers of major weapons is likely to be limited. . . . For sophisticated military weapons, the Third World remained dependent on industrialized suppliers.

While a few Third World countries (e.g., South Korea, Brazil, and India) may contain the prerequisites for an eventually self-sustaining capital-intensive military posture, the vast majority do not and are thus forced into dependent militarization, which despite its political costs is preferable to no militarization at all.

An explanation for Third World militarization centered on the poorly endowed nature of Third World economies is not "wrong"; indeed, when theorizing about the problem from the domestic side it is quite compelling. However, by itself such theorizing is incomplete and therefore potentially misleading. Theorizing about the causes of dependent militarization should also address factors at the systemic level of analysis. Specifically, the domestic-centered approach takes the features of contemporary Third World economies as theoretically primitive or *given*: that capital is in short supply, that industrial, technological, and market bases are small, and so forth. In fact, of course, these things themselves have causes. We want to suggest that these causes are in important part *systemic*.

Thus, the argument of this chapter is that the structure and evolution of Third World domestic political economies (as these pertain to militarization), as well as the demand and opportunities for dependent militarization, are conditioned by the subordinate position of Third World states in the economic and geopolitical structures of the international system. Rather than seeing dependent militarization as a consequence of "stratification" (Neuman, 1984), we see it, in part, as a consequence of international dominance structures. Our primary purpose, then, is to examine how systemic dominance structures have propelled Third World states toward a dependent militarization strategy, and, secondarily, why this strategy has been generally unsuccessful in achieving their long-range goal of arms independence.

Some Third World countries have rapidly developed their arms-producing capacity over the past decade, i.e., Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Argentina, and

India. It is noteworthy that these Third World countries, categorized as "third tier" arms producers (Ross, 1989), are also routinely classified as "semi-peripheral" countries (Väyrynen, 1983:163). It is also noteworthy that peripheral countries are generally ignored when discussing military industrialization. We suggest that those countries that are "third tier" producers and have undergone tremendous growth in their arms-producing capacities over the past two decades inhabit a common space in the international system.

Specifically, these third-tier arms producers have confronted fewer constraints and capitalized on those systemic opportunities afforded them by the dynamics located in the capitalist world-economy and global conflict processes. Although constraints and opportunities may be seen as flip sides of one another, for strictly analytical purposes we treat constraints as largely imposed by domestic limitations, themselves an historical legacy of sovereignty and the capitalist world-economy, and opportunities as created by global capitalism and global conflict processes and available to certain strategically placed regional actors. Both the domestic constraints on Third World militarization and the opportunities offered by global capitalism and conflict processes help to indicate which Third World countries are more likely to successfully employ a dependent militarization strategy to achieve a modicum of arms independence.

Although our discussion focuses on the systemic determinants of Third World militarization, we do not mean to substitute a systemic determinism for domestic-centered determinism, since the impact of the international system on any state is always mediated by domestic structures. The bias in our presentation should therefore be seen strictly as an artifact of the neglect of systemic factors in much of the literature, not as a repudiation of domestic-centered theorizing about Third World militarization. A more fully developed theory of Third World militarization would need to examine the articulation of relatively autonomous domestic, regional, and systemic structures.

The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section we provide a brief discussion of dependent militarization. The second section develops some preliminary hypotheses about how geopolitical and economic dominance structures in the international system shape the dependent character of most Third World militarization programs. This represents the constraint side of our argument. While much of our argument about these structures (especially the capitalist world-economy) is fairly conventional, what is novel is our extension of this literature to dependent militarization. We conclude by considering how those very dominance structures in general and global conflict processes in particular have provided an opportunity for some Third World states to successfully use a dependent militarization strategy to achieve a greater level of military independence.

Dependent Militarization

While the literature contains many meanings of the term “militarization,” we are interested in explaining patterns of militarization as the process of accumulating organized violence potential—what Ross (1987:564) calls “military build-up,” defined broadly to include hardware, manpower, and military infrastructure. It is essential that this concept, referring to the development of a *capacity* for organized violence, not be confused or conflated with *militarism*, referring to a disposition to *use* organized violence—either internally, to set up military regimes and state terror, or externally, to conduct interstate war.⁴ A militarily powerful state could in principle be democratic and/or pacific, while a militarily weak state could in principle be repressive and/or warlike. This is not to say that militarization and militarism are not *causally* related; indeed they probably are, but the nature of this relationship is obscured if we treat it as a conceptual rather than causal one.

Patterns of militarization can be organized along two dimensions: the relative intensity of different factor inputs into a given militarization process, and the relative dependence of militarization dynamics on external sources. All militarization processes feature two basic inputs: capital (both physical capital, such as weapons, and human capital, such as trained soldiers and technicians); and labor (people who become soldiers and technicians). These inputs are both essential to any militarization process, but they are to some extent substitutable and can in principle be combined in a variety of proportions. We reduce these possible combinations to two ideal types: capital-intensive and labor-intensive militarization (see Wendt and Barnett, 1991; Wulf, 1979; Buzan, 1983b). These are not factors of production in the strict sense of the term, since we are not concerned with the production process per se, e.g., how a tank is produced and assembled. Rather, we are interested in why Third World countries have adopted a particular force structure: for example, relying on high-tech weapons systems rather than on a militia. The typical output of a capital-intensive militarization process is what Wulf (1979) calls a “technocratic” army: a mobile military force equipped with expensive high-technology weapons like tanks, jets, and artillery, and staffed by a large core of professional soldiers. In contrast, the typical output of a labor-intensive militarization process is an “unconventional” or “people’s” army: a less technically well-equipped and mobile force relying for its combat power on passive defenses and the mass mobilization of mostly nonprofessional soldiers.

As ideal types these two kinds of militarization dynamics admit in practice to various hybrid forms,⁵ but the distinction between them is nevertheless both real and qualitative: they presuppose different resource mobilization strategies, yield different kinds of military potentials, and have different reproduction requirements. What is important about this argument

for our purposes is that it means that state actors have qualitatively distinct choices about the type of militarization in which they can engage. It may be that most state actors have tended to *choose* one type rather than another, but this should be seen as an historical contingency requiring causal explanation, not as a conceptual necessity.

A distinction can also be drawn between auto-centric and dependent militarization. This distinction is concerned with whether or not "the rate and direction of [military] accumulation are externally conditioned" (Evans, 1979:27) and, more precisely, with whether or not a state itself produces the means of production for the physical, human, and organizational elements of its military machine. A state that produces its own arms and arms technology, training, and doctrine is engaging in "auto-centric" militarization (see Senghaas, 1985). Auto-centric militarization need not be autarkic—such a state may accept inputs into its militarization process. What matters is that the accumulation dynamic is driven primarily by domestic resources and is thus *self-sustaining*.⁶ In contrast, a state relying substantially on imported arms and arms technology and/or military training is engaging in dependent militarization. There are different forms of dependent militarization—importation of whole weapons systems versus importation of the technology and capital for domestic production (import substitution)—but in each case the accumulation dynamic is a reflection of external forces rather than self-sustaining.

Like the previous distinction, this is one of ideal types and as such admits of various possible combinations and hybrids. Nevertheless, it is also at some level a qualitative as opposed to purely quantitative distinction—a difference in kind rather than just degree. At some level and mix of factor inputs⁷ an accumulation dynamic will become self-sustaining and thus capable not only of regenerating itself but of generating novel or *sui generis* dynamics of future accumulation as well. Until this level and mix is reached, that dynamic will be by definition dependent on—and therefore in important part explainable in terms of—external relationships.

This distinction is critical, for we are discussing Third World dependent militarization as a strategy for decreasing military dependence at a time when many nearly self-sufficient arms-producing countries, such as the United States, England, and France, are internationalizing their military production process (Moran, 1990). However, there are important quantitative and qualitative differences between the dependency exhibited by First World and Third World countries. First, the degree of reliance on foreign suppliers is significantly higher for Third World countries than for First World countries, particularly for once nearly self-sufficient militarization programs such as those in the United States and France, which do not approach the degree of external reliance exhibited even by so-called success stories in the Third World. For instance, the United States imports roughly 20 percent of its parts for some weapons systems (National Defense University, 1987), yet

nearly all third-tier (not to mention fourth-tier) countries routinely import 70 percent or more of their inputs (Snider, 1989). Second, and perhaps more important, is the qualitative dimension, namely the control over the technology that goes into the process of weapons production. While in the United States the globalization of arms production includes the importation of certain inputs and products, such as steel, that were once produced domestically, it does not generally include the key technologies that go into producing these weapons systems. In other words, technological progress and innovation continues to reside primarily in first-tier countries. When Germany and France, for example, agree to coproduce a weapons system, both countries generally retain some control over the technology that goes into making the weapons system (and as a result are more able to absorb any new knowledge emerging from the production process). This is not true for most Third World countries, which almost uniformly require foreign-controlled technology for their weapons programs. And although coproduction agreements between First and Third World countries are becoming more frequent, they are still rather limited.

In general, a casual survey reveals that most militarization processes in the contemporary states system are capital-intensive, and of these the overwhelming majority are dependent.⁸ This raises an important question: Given that the international system is today a "self-help" system (Waltz, 1979) in which preferences for military autonomy should—*ceteris paribus*—dominate preferences for military dependency, why have so many Third World states pursued a strategy of dependent militarization? In this chapter we assume that Third World states have a preference for capital-intensive militarization,⁹ and ask: Given this preference for capital-intensive militarization, why do these states pursue a dependent mode of militarization? What are the systemic factors that have conditioned its dependent manifestation? A systemic analysis offers two significant advantages over domestic-centered approaches: (1) It enables us to render a different and more complete understanding of dependent militarization, one that we believe subsumes the domestic-centered explanations we identified earlier. This is the task of the next section. (2) If our argument is correct, and dependent militarization in the Third World is substantially conditioned by systemic forces, then we should be able to isolate the conditions under which Third World states might successfully overturn this dependent relationship, or at the least achieve greater autonomy. We conclude on this theme.

The Systemic Determinants of Dependent Militarization

Two systemic factors are crucially important in shaping the constraints limiting the ability of Third World states to develop self-sufficient military industries: the institution of sovereignty in the contemporary states system,

and the historical development of the capitalist world-economy and the position of the Third World within that structure.

Sovereignty

Sovereignty is often seen by both scholars and statesmen as the "great equalizer." State actors may vary tremendously in the material endowments available to them, but sovereignty gives them equal status as subjects of international politics; indeed, this is a key reason why Third World peoples have always fought so hard for their constitutional independence. On one level, then, it would seem paradoxical to see the principle of sovereignty as constitutive of a dominance structure—yet, this is precisely what we suggest. In other words, we argue that the instantiation of the principle of sovereignty is a mechanism of structural coercion that creates and legitimates the material inequality that disempowers Third World states. In general terms and specifically it forces those interested in capital-intensive militarization to do so on a dependent basis. In order to show this, however, we first have to show that sovereignty is a social rather than a natural right.

According to the explanatory concerns of political realism, the dominant tradition in contemporary international relations scholarship, the sovereignty of existing states is the starting point. States with certain juridical powers and territorial endowments are taken as given, and analysis focuses instead on the dynamics of interaction among these given states. Thus, in this view, the fact that Third World states are endowed with the sovereign power to engage in practices of militarization and, conversely, the fact that they are relatively poorly endowed with the capital resources necessary for auto-centric, capital-intensive militarization, are just that, facts of life in the contemporary international system.

However, as with other individualistic social theories, realism also has implicit *social* foundations. Growing sensitivity to the inherent sociality of the state and states system is manifested most clearly in recent neoliberal treatments of sovereignty. Thus Ruggie (1983), Lake (1987), Keohane (1988), and Krasner (1988), among others, regard the sovereignty of individual states as presupposing an inherently social relationship of mutual recognition. This recognition amounts to a social permission granted by the community of state actors to each member to exercise particular territorial property rights (Fain, 1987). This permission implies a certain measure of self-restraint by other members of this community, a "live and let live" attitude, as it were. This does not mean that states never have conflicts—quite clearly they do—but these conflicts are structured by the collective acceptance of the principle of sovereignty. Far from being a Hobbesian state of nature, then, in this view the states system is a *society*—a fractious and unruly society to be sure, but a society nonetheless. In other words, states in the contemporary international system do not exist as sovereign subjects,

with all the political powers and territorial endowments—including the power to militarize—accompanying this mode of subjectivity, apart from their recognition by other members of the society of states.

This social constitution of the sovereign state has two different implications with respect to our discussion of Third World militarization. On the one hand, it means that certain actors are empowered with territorial endowments and the ability to militarize, and are enabled to exist, although they would not be likely to survive in a Hobbesian state of nature. As Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982) show convincingly for the African case, many states in the contemporary international system depend upon international recognition for their survival;¹⁰ without such recognition it is unlikely that the Bahamas or Tuvalu, for example, would for long have any territorial endowments or the power to engage in militarization at all.

On the other hand, if collective recognition of territorial property rights grants otherwise tenuous actors the full range of sovereign powers, it also provides a basis for an unequal *de facto* ability to militarize on a capital-intensive basis. The juridical equality constituted by the principle of sovereignty does not bring with it any collective commitment to *material* equality. The principle of sovereignty constitutes states as subjects having very unequal territorial endowments with no (or at least few) legitimate claims on the endowments of other states. In other words, the fact so emphasized by domestic-centered theorists—that Third World states lack certain resources, forcing them to engage in dependent militarization—can, in our view, itself be explained in important part by the structure of mutual recognition at the systemic level that constitutes Third World states as subjects having particular territorial boundaries, and thus endowments.

Given that the principle of sovereignty constitutes and empowers states that otherwise might not survive, and given that the territorial inequalities accompanying this principle are socially recognized, indeed jealously defended, by Third World states themselves (Krasner, 1985), it might be asked why sovereignty should be said to instantiate a dominance structure. One response to this question would be that buying into a structure of equal opportunity can be disempowering if doing so requires a state simultaneously to recognize systematic material discrimination in territorial assignments. Another response would emphasize the implications of the fact that acceptance of the principle of sovereignty without material equality is a precondition for entry into the society of states, since would-be states refusing to accept the sovereignty of other states will not be admitted into that society. As such, collective acceptance of the principle of sovereignty constitutes a structurally coercive mechanism of decentralized social control that institutionalizes territorial and therefore resource inequities. These arguments can be given greater force if put into historical perspective. As the fundamental constitutive principle of the states system, the principle of

sovereignty was an institutional innovation of the then most powerful actors in the international system, the West European powers, who devised it as a way of regulating their own interactions and of freeing themselves from the authoritative claims of the Catholic church. This principle applied only to states that the West Europeans considered civilized; those not meeting this criterion could not be members of the international society and thus did not benefit from sovereign recognition (hence the Native American experience). This in turn provided an ideological basis for the "civilizing mission" of colonialism, which reorganized political space in what became the Third World in ways that suited the interests of the colonial powers (Gong, 1984). With colonialism as an historical backdrop, *decolonization* looked like a favor—yet the terms of decolonization did not include any renegotiation of the rules governing the society of states that legitimated gross material inequality, nor much say for emerging states in the territorial organization of the Third World. Thus, the Third World did eventually achieve sovereignty, but it did so on terms that institutionalized its inferiority to and dependence on the major powers.

The Capitalist World-Economy

Capital-intensive militarization requires a large industrial base, scientific know-how and technology, and economies of scale, all absent from most Third World countries. While we agree that the lack of these economic factors makes arms production extremely difficult, we want to suggest that the absence of these ingredients are in part a result of the Third World's position in the world-economy, and to focus on the aspects that many scholars have viewed as most critical to arms production: industrialization, a science and technology base, and economies of scale. The potential for military industrialization is a function of the domestic political economy, and so the effects of the capitalist world-economy on the latter affect the potential for the former. In the following discussion we note the differences between peripheral and semiperipheral states and how these differences affect the dependent militarization process. Again, it is significant that there is an overlap between those Third World countries that are considered third-tier arms producers and those classified as semiperipheral countries.

Industrialization. At its most basic level auto-centric capital-intensive militarization in most of the Third World is unattainable because of an insufficient industrial base. This is not due solely to natural conditions inherent in the economies of the Third World, but also to the effects of global capitalism. There is a vast literature on the effects of the capitalist world-economy on the Third World political economy, in large part centered on the contributions of dependency theory. The core of the dependency approach is that capitalist expansion has altered the Third World state's

political economy and substantially conditioned its development prospects. Our immediate concern is how the incorporation of Third World countries into the capitalist world-economy has affected their ability to develop the industrial base required for military industrialization.

Most Third World countries are characterized today by a structure of production dominated by primary and agricultural products. This is partly due to the colonial legacy and the problems associated with late industrialization. Briefly, although foreign capital was attracted to the colonies for a variety of reasons, chief among these were the gains to be made from the extractive and/or agricultural sectors. Foreign capital was assisted in this penetration by colonial authorities who often introduced new property rights that benefited foreign interests. Moreover, colonial authorities often strictly regulated the industrialization efforts of these territories (lest they compete with home producers), and occasionally used their coercive power to dismantle existing manufacturing enterprises (as in the case of India). In this way the incorporation of these economies into the world-economy produced a simultaneous process of deindustrialization and an expansion of agricultural and primary product exports (Evans, 1979; Bairoch, 1986).

Foreign capital was not the only group to profit from these expanding core-periphery relations, since new domestic groups and classes also benefited from these emerging economic ties. These elites, whose livelihood was dependent on current production patterns, often blocked those economic reforms that possibly would have paved the way for industrialization, and, consequently, threatened their material interests. As a result, the chances for industrialization did not improve substantially after the departure of the colonial authorities, for colonialism introduced and/or strengthened a set of foreign and domestic interests generally opposed to economic reforms that would threaten their political and economic standing. And often these elites had political power matching their economic standing.

Nor did the prospects for industrialization radically improve even in those few cases where colonialism was either nonexistent or did not substantially alter the domestic economic structure. Late-industrializing countries confronted a series of economic and political handicaps—including a dual economy, a shortage of capital, a small domestic market, and an inability to penetrate the export market because of the existence of more efficient competitors from already industrialized countries—that made it difficult to escape from their position in the international division of labor. Market forces, then, reinforced their position in the division of labor, as they were unable to assemble the required factors of production so as to enable them to compete either domestically or internationally against more efficient foreign producers. The global market, in other words, acted as a structurally coercive mechanism that precluded, or at least constrained, the development of an industrial and manufacturing base in late-developing countries. In short, while the capitalist world-economy may allow for development in the

periphery, it may not create the industrial conditions necessary for capital-intensive militarization.¹¹

The Egyptian case illustrates how past and present great-power interference and the functioning of the world-economy have blocked military industrialization. In the early nineteenth century Muhammad Ali created a military industrialization program that by most accounts rivaled those of many European powers. This program was fashioned in typical neomercantilist style, in which the Egyptian state became the principal owner of the means of production and shielded its military industries from foreign competition. While Ali's military program confronted the limitations of its own import-substitution program and industrial bottlenecks, great-power practices cemented the demise of his accomplishments by forcing the military's dismantlement. Once the imperialist powers had disbanded Egypt's military industries and British colonial practices reinforced the economy's move toward agricultural, and away from industrial, development, Egypt was hard pressed to overcome a dependent position in the capitalist world economy. This was illustrated when Khedive Ismail attempted to renew military industrialization during the mid-1800s, but was halted by the country's economic backwardness, great-power policies that limited the military's size, and the sheer fact that Egyptian industries were *fifty years* behind in military research and development (Hurewitz, 1982).

The obstacles to military industrialization increased further once Britain gained control over Egypt's political and economic life after 1881. First, it was impossible for Egypt to generate the financial resources and establish the industrial base necessary for military industrialization, due principally to British policy that limited the type of economic activity that could take place. Second, Britain simultaneously introduced land reform in the rural sector and sponsored the emergence of a landed elite which, after Britain departed from Cairo, often opposed an industrialization program. In general, the Egyptian case is indicative of how the Third World's structural location in the capitalist world-economy has effectively hampered the development of a strong and diversified industrial base, a prerequisite for military industrialization.

Muhammad Ali articulated what would later be known as a core tenet of economic nationalism: late-industrializing countries should deviate from free-trade principles and erect protectionist measures that would contribute to their economic and security objectives. Without such efforts, late-industrializing economies would not become truly "national economies," but would remain vulnerable to the economic and military challenges of developed states. Many Third World leaders took a chapter from the early development history of many advanced industrialized countries, and followed such an economic nationalist strategy in hope that economic development and national security could be pursued simultaneously (Peres, 1970; Ayres, 1983; Wulf, 1987). The dominant post-World War II development strategy advocated the creation

of a large industrial sector behind protectionist barriers that would hopefully provide backward linkages and diversify the structure of the economy, thereby altering the terms of trade, which were supposedly biased against agricultural production. The most-favored industries, i.e., chemicals, electronics, iron and steel, etc., were also those that were seen as most critical to national security. Military elites in many Third World countries also championed developmentalism, believing that the country's national security was dependent on the creation of an industrial base that would further its goal of national autonomy (Fidel, 1975). "The armed forces . . . become advocates of development models that guarantee an expansion of resources for the means of creating a national defense structure based on massive imports of military technology" (Varas and Bustamente, 1983:158). In general, Third World governmental elites viewed the state's security and economy as intertwined.

Those Third World states that became semiperipheral economies and established a relatively sophisticated industrial base commonly did so through a policy of neomercantilism and import-substitution industrialization, e.g., Israel (Peres, 1970), Brazil (Lock, 1986), and Argentina (Millan, 1986). Without such protectionist efforts it is doubtful whether even such relatively well-endowed Third World states would have developed the industrial base required of modern arms production. Although the long-range goal was to increase the national economy's strength relative to foreign producers, most import-substitution industrialization programs required the assistance of foreign capital. Such assistance, however, was available to few Third World countries—typically only those with large domestic markets (i.e., Brazil) or that might act as regional centers (i.e., Kenya) (Wallerstein, 1979). Consequently, in most peripheral Third World states, where industrialization was attempted, it was without substantial assistance from foreign capital, but with a heavy statist orientation. The result has been a remarkable history of tremendous economic inefficiencies, dislocations, and maldistribution of resources (see Bates, 1987:116–117). Many Third World industries, especially state-controlled ones, that were shielded from foreign competition have become an economic drain and failed to stimulate the rest of the economy.

In fact, Third World military industrialization parallels the generally statist orientation found in other industrial sectors. The contrast with First World arms production is distinct. For instance, in advanced capitalist countries where capital is well developed and holds tremendous economic and political power, arms production is undertaken more often by the private sector (see Tilly, 1985; and Anderson, 1988 for its early development). In other words, in the West defense production is assumed to be undertaken by capitalists either for their explicit or implicit benefit. This has been a staple of the Marxist literature (e.g., Luxemborg, 1954; Kaldor, 1982). However, because in the Third World domestic capital is structurally inferior to foreign

capital, the state has become the chief producer of armaments. Although this development is often justified by Third World leaders in the name of national security, it is also clear that domestic capital does not possess the resources necessary for military production.

Science and technology. Although neomercantilism might provide the state with an industrial base, military industrialization also requires scientific know-how and technology, neither of which are common to most Third World countries. However, the issue is not whether there is a lack of these qualities in the Third World, but rather, what is the cause? We call attention to how the core countries' technological lead has become a seemingly permanent feature of the capitalist world-economy, and the implication this has for arms independence. Core capitalist countries successfully joined science and technology to produce a revolution in industrial and economic growth, a marriage that was one of the most important factors in creating the tremendous income gap between the First and Third Worlds. This technology gap has not narrowed substantially over the past few decades, as most Third World countries remain far behind the First World in most categories of technological capacity and knowledge. For instance, in 1970 there were approximately 112 scientists and engineers per 10,000 population in the First World, whereas the figure ranged from 5.8 to 69 per 10,000 in Africa and Latin America, respectively (Stewart, 1977:120). Moreover, the share of the world's capital goods production controlled by peripheral countries was only 3.2 percent, while core capitalist countries controlled 61 percent and socialist countries 36 percent in 1970. Indeed, the Third World contributed only 3 percent of the world's first stages of scientific and technological processes and research and development facilities. Of all Third World countries, only Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency in engineering products. Finally, approximately 85 percent of all patents registered in the Third World are owned by foreigners (Hveem, 1983:281–282).

Two systemic explanations for this gap are relevant to our argument. First, although technological superiority emerged in the First World because of the creation of a scientific base, colonial practices also contributed to the maintenance of this technological gap. For instance, during African colonialism the technological and scientific infrastructure that was established was both "embryonic and highly distorted." Colonizers emphasized applied research and development in those areas most pertinent to their overseas interests, such as agricultural production. Most research occurred in the metropole, and not in the periphery, implying that the local communities had little ability to learn new techniques. Europeans staffed most research institutes, which failed to generate a research agenda reflecting local needs or to create an infrastructure that could train local scientists (Gruhn, 1984:2–3). In general, research and development facilities in the Third World were

characterized by an orientation toward consumption and away from production items (Goonatilake, 1984; Yearly, 1989).

This colonial pattern has been reinforced in the postcolonial period by the present structure of technological development, which enables the First World and transnational corporations located there to dictate the terms under which technology is transferred to the Third World. Hveem (1983:283) argues that "patterns of control of the circulation of technology to the periphery are a major factor in structuring center-periphery relations."¹² Third World countries, with little access to science and technology developments in the First World because of institutional and political obstacles (Streeten, 1984:18) and lacking a scientific community and research and development facilities, have become chronically technologically dependent on the First World (Stewart, 1977:132-133).

Although the diffusionist school argues that this dependence on foreign technology allows Third World economies to skip stages and thus provides latecomers with an advantage, this approach fails to recognize how control over technology and the corresponding R&D facilities have enabled First World countries to reproduce their standing, in no small part because most technology that reaches the Third World is in the last stage of the technological process. In contrast to the diffusionist approach that often implicitly assumes an equalization of the factors of production (particularly with regard to capital), whatever diffusion that is taking place is limited to a small group of semiperipheral countries (Vaitsos, 1989). Moreover, even when technology is transferred to the Third World, it is typically not accompanied by the scientific and R&D base that produced it. In general, the initial exogenously-directed character of Third World scientific communities and the present structure of the international political economy in the creation and application of scientific knowledge have combined to limit the ability of the Third World economy to close the tremendous North-South technology gap.

The above argument with regard to technology in general can be extended to military technology in particular (Katz, 1986:294). Indeed, Lock and Wulf (1979:211) argue that "military-oriented transfers of technology are of critical importance in structuring the whole system of technology transfer and, hence, the pattern of technological development in third-world countries." Military production requires a complex system of technological research. The ability to translate scientific knowledge into military technology has "enabled the developed countries to manufacture products of such high military sophistication that at present the majority of new armaments incorporate the last word in science and technology" (Varas and Bustamente, 1983:142). But the rate of change in military technology far outstrips anything that might be produced by Third World economies, since most of these countries can barely meet their most immediate basic needs, let alone attempt to create a science and technology base. As a result, Third World military-scientific

communities are beset by a host of problems, including a constant brain drain, lack of research facilities, small size, and other institutional problems limiting the ability of local scientists to accumulate knowledge (Katz, 1986).

Because of the underdeveloped character of most Third World countries' scientific base, their arms industries require substantial assistance from industrialized countries. Although in the past advanced industrialized countries have been reluctant to share military technology and thus erode their monopoly of military power in the international system, two forces have led to the growing internationalization of military technology.¹³ The first, well-established, reason for exporting military technology is political, as great powers recognize the leverage that can be gained from establishing an arms dependency (Ball, 1988:256). The second, more recent, reason is economic in nature. Increased competition among the growing number of producers of armaments has given Third World countries greater bargaining leverage over the terms of military transfer (Louscher and Schwarz, 1989). In particular, as costs of production and research and development have risen dramatically, arms producers in developed countries are interested in expanding and protecting their export markets in order to lower the costs per unit of production (Varas and Bustamente, 1983; Katz, 1986; Kolodziej, 1987).

Not all Third World countries have been able to profit from the internationalization of military technology, however, since these opportunities are limited to those countries with an already-established industrial base, sophisticated labor sector, and those that are important regional actors. Consequently, only a handful of countries, notably South Korea, Brazil, India, Argentina, and Israel, have been able to enhance their bargaining position and to gain greater concessions over the transfer of military technology. And it is only these semiperipheral countries that have a scientific community needed to take advantage of licensing and coproduction agreements and absorb the new technology (McLaurin, 1989: 63–66). If these few emerging arms-producing states have been able to lessen their dependence on the First World, and even in some cases to challenge and compete with defense producers from the advanced industrialized countries, it was because of a prior history of coproduction of military equipment, the existence of a sophisticated scientific community with expansive and well-supported research and development facilities, and the internationalization of military technology.

Even for this select group the prospects for attaining auto-centric militarization are remote at best. Albeit that the post-World War II international economic order has institutionalized a commitment to open capital markets, military technology retains a special status: Its diffusion is subject to more state controls and export regulations than is nonmilitary technology. Therefore, if most civilian technology that reaches the Third World is at the last stage of the technological process, this situation is

compounded with respect to military technology. Military technological development penalizes latecomers, as arms production requires, among other factors, steadily increasing R&D, a high rate of product innovation leading to rapid technological obsolescence, and increasingly complex weapons systems, thus reducing the ability to copy technology and giving the licensor greater control (Lock and Wulf, 1979:218; Wulf, 1987).

The Israeli case is instructive here, since Israel has been able to achieve a modicum of arms self-sufficiency and is thus "often seen as a successful case of Third World military industrialization. It is . . . a sort of 'upper limit' to the success that developing countries can hope to attain in the military-industrial sector" (Ball, 1988:354). However, Israel's special status results from its receipt of tremendous assistance from the United States, with 60 percent of Israel's defense needs still being imported, including many key components that remain beyond the capabilities of the Israeli economy, e.g., high-performance engines used in tanks and aircraft. Israel's inability to achieve arms independence is largely due to its seemingly permanent inferiority in research and development and technological innovation. Once technologically behind it is virtually impossible for a small country like Israel, whose entire GNP is a fraction of the US defense budget, to keep pace with important innovations in military technology, which only serves to reinforce its dependence on the United States (Steinberg, 1986a). And Israel has a lower import quotient than do other third-tier arms producers such as India (82 percent), Egypt (83 percent), and South Korea (94 percent) (Snider, 1989:249).

Given their limited resource and scientific base and the nature of military innovation, most Third World countries are likely to remain hopelessly inferior and thus perpetually dependent on the First World for most of their sophisticated inputs and defense needs (Ross, 1988). Nicole Ball (1988:371) concludes rather pessimistically:

Although it was always assumed that it would take time for Third World arms producers to build up the capacity necessary to produce weapons without relying on inputs of foreign technology, it is now suggested that the attainment of technological self-sufficiency may be impossible.

Economies of scale. In addition to the tremendous obstacles presented by the lack of an industrial and technological base, a final problem arises because of the economies of scale required of arms production. Modern military production is characterized by high levels of capital-intensity and preproduction costs, and short run times. A large market is therefore required to make arms production efficient. Most Third World militaries, however, cannot absorb the required hardware in the quantities necessary for achieving the desired economies of scale. In other words, like the problems confronted by an import-substitution economic development strategy with a small

domestic market, local demand is insufficient to increase the economies of scale and thus lower production costs. The obvious answer to this lack of domestic demand is again similar to many industrialization strategies in general: develop and expand the export market. However, as many Third World countries that have developed export industries have soon realized, the international economy has room for only a few "miracles" and newly industrializing countries.

Again, the Israeli case is illustrative of the myriad of problems associated with this export-promotion strategy. First, many of Israel's more sophisticated domestically produced armaments contain imported parts over which the originating state, usually the United States, retains control over how they can be used in combat or for re-export. Thus, when the Israeli government concludes an arms deal with a foreign government it must first obtain approval from the US government. On occasion the United States has vetoed such agreements because of either security interests or the desire of US defense contractors to shield themselves from Israeli competitors. Second, new arms merchants are attempting to compete with well-established weapons producers in a militarily developed world economy. Not only are there more arms producers in the international system than ever before, but many, particularly those in West Europe and the United States, can offer generous financing terms, something unavailable to a small country such as Israel. Moreover, they are better able to guarantee delivery times and quantity desired. Third, even with a so-called strategic alliance with the United States, Israeli arms producers have been unable to penetrate the United States market, as US defense contractors have successfully opposed foreign competition, often on the grounds of national security (Steinberg, 1986b:188).¹⁴

Moreover, the problems associated with an export-led strategy may become amplified in a post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, First World defense contractors could traditionally count on the East-West conflict for a stable arms market; however, with "peace breaking out all over" defense budgets have been targeted for substantial reductions. Consequently, not only will the First World be an increasingly unlikely buyer of Third World weapons systems, but many First World defense contractors have responded to this shrinking home market by emphasizing and becoming more aggressive towards the Third World arms market (*New York Times*, 17 December 1989). This increased competition from First World arms producers for the Third World market will undoubtedly cause problems for many third-tier arms producers that are dependent on an expanding export market for achieving economies of scale. For instance, the cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq has caused a severe downturn in many of Brazil's largest arms industries (*New York Times*, 25 February 1990). Finally, the adoption of an export-oriented approach ensures technological dependence, since without the latest military technology and know-how,

available only from the First World, Third World countries are unable to offer the types of weapons systems that are most in demand.

Conclusion

The Third World's location in the international system makes it unlikely that it will generate the conditions required to achieve military independence via a capital-intensive strategy. This has not precluded some semiperipheral countries, however, from increasing their arms production capacity in limited terms.¹⁵ Therefore, with dependent militarization:

The nature of military independence undergoes a subtle but potentially profound transformation as developing countries turn from arms imports to arms production. Instead of merely importing a finished product, developing countries have begun to import and assimilate the technology necessary to produce, and eventually develop weapons domestically. Consequently, developing countries have been acquiring the means to alter the traditional North-South dependency. (Ross, 1987:278)

Thus, while dependent militarization carries some limitations and dangers, it also contains the possibility for greater military autonomy.¹⁶ We want to suggest, then, that global militarization is somewhat akin to global capital accumulation. On the one hand, it contains uneven effects that are translated into dominance and dependency relations at the international level (Aguero, 1984:77). On the other hand, the internationalization of the means of destruction, like the internationalization of capital, holds out a limited prospect for the transformation of these dependent relations.

A richer understanding of the systemic conditions that might enable a dependent militarization strategy to realize greater autonomy must include the following considerations. While the legacies of sovereignty and the capitalist world-economy have unevenly distributed those economic resources required of military industrialization, the capitalist world-economy does exhibit some centrifugal forces that have allowed for the internationalization of capital (Jenkins, 1987). A limited number of countries, notably those commonly classified as semiperipheral and newly industrializing countries, have been the primary beneficiaries of this internationalization and have increased their possession of the economic prerequisites required for military industrialization.

However, an industrial and manufacturing base is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Third World militarization, since nearly all arms programs have needed technical and scientific assistance from major arms producers. The implication, then, is that the internationalization of capital alone cannot account for the diffusion of military capabilities. Great powers

must have an interest in assisting the Third World militarization process. Global conflict processes, we believe, can help to explain the emergence of such an interest and thus a select number of third-tier arms-producing countries.

Global conflict processes have shaped three typical paths for Third World militarization, and, in the process, created the possibility for arms independence. The first is "militarization by invitation." This occurs when great-power conflict, both latent (the Cold War) and manifest (World War II) spreads to involve the Third World. Great-power strategic thinking frequently includes soliciting the support and assistance of strategically located Third World states. This in effect makes some Third World states a scarce good, directly increasing their bargaining leverage and ability to extract concessions from great powers, such as military technology and assistance with arms production. In fact, during the Cold War many Third World countries, e.g., Iraq, Iran, and Egypt, used their geostrategic position to increase their bargaining leverage and to gain access to military technology.

If this analysis is correct, then in the post-Cold War era many Third World countries that once were privileged clients may encounter greater difficulties and discover that their access to Western hardware and technology is increasingly fraught with obstacles. Consequently, some states, such as Egypt, that become middle-level arms producers because of great-power assistance, might witness the decline of their arms industries. However, while the security threat from the Soviet Union has declined there is growing alarm in the West in general and the United States in particular over the growing security threat from the Third World. This might mean that some countries will benefit, notably those able to portray themselves as allies of the West against a common security threat from the South. For instance, whereas countries such as El Salvador benefited from a Soviet-oriented US security policy, countries such as Bolivia and Colombia might benefit from a drug-motivated US security policy. Or, if the recent US confrontation with Iraq is a portent of future conflicts, those countries that are able to align with the United States in future resource wars will benefit from greater military assistance.¹⁷

The second path is "seizing the chance." This occurs when there is a decline or relatively little interest by great powers in a Third World state's militarization process or the former's lack of means to alter the latter's actions. This argument has a conspiratorial flavor, suggesting that one reason for Third World states' dependent status is because of great-power interference and interest in maintaining an arms dependency. While this smacks of instrumentalism, a stated intention of Soviet and US arms policies is to create an arms dependence that would render these countries more susceptible to their foreign policy goals. Thus, a decline in great-power interest might provide Third World states the opportunity to loosen the ties of dependence. Moreover, traditional great-power influence due to the monopoly-like

conditions of the arms market has been lessened by the increased number of arms sellers over the past decade, allowing some Third World countries to use the increased market competition to secure access to military technology as precondition for an arms agreement, an unthinkable development two decades ago.

These two paths have some common themes. First, both are dependent on dynamics located in great-power conflict, whether because of active interest in the case of "militarization by invitation" or benign complicity in the case of "seizing the chance." It is not enough, then, for these Third World countries to possess certain socioeconomic characteristics, for all Third World military industries need some form of great-power assistance. Second, both paths are limited to those states that already have a relatively well-established arms program that has become relatively self-sustaining because of past militarization efforts.

A third path is found in "self-reliance." Many peripheral Third World states that have an interest in capital-intensive militarization are both capital-poor and unable to attract great-power interest in their arms projects. Consequently, if they want self-reliance they will typically move to pursue a labor-intensive strategy. However, many of these states, located principally in Africa, are also those that have an interest in engaging in capital-intensive militarization because of the danger that arming the masses poses for a regime that has alienated itself from its society (Wendt and Barnett, 1991), and would therefore seem to have an interest in pursuing a capital-intensive arms program. If these peripheral states have not done so, it is partly because great powers have not considered these areas prime geostrategic real estate worthy of investment and also because of a lack of industrial infrastructure due to their historical relationship to the capitalist world-economy.

The important feature of these three paths is that they are highly dependent on changes in both global capitalism and conflict processes. In short, dynamics in the core determine whether Third World states will be able to use successfully a dependent militarization strategy to increase their military independence. Again, this ability is limited to a select few, notably those Third World states with an already-established science and industrial base, able to attract great-power interest in their arms programs. Not all Third World countries are equally positioned to capitalize on these systemic changes. Although at this stage the aforementioned militarization strategies are merely suggestive and purely exploratory, they might be instructive for better understanding past and future trends in the global military order.

In conclusion, while there has been a tremendous growth in Third World defense industries, this growth is highly dependent on both domestic constraints and systemic opportunities. Only those countries that have both the domestic socioeconomic conditions and attracted great-power interest have been able to achieve third-tier status and some level of arms autonomy. The limited prospects for autonomous capital-intensive militarization are also

reinforced by the current postwar climate and the cessation of many Third World conflicts, which had provided a great-power interest in assisting the militarization process in many Third World countries and had been a primary consumer of Third World military exports, respectively.

A systemic-centered approach, then, has a twofold advantage over domestic-centered explanations. First, while domestic-centered explanations can show that Third World states are forced to become dependent because they lack certain factors, they do not really tell us why these very factors are absent in the first place, why they are so difficult to develop, or why Third World state actors prefer capital-intensive militarization at all. Second, while domestic-centered approaches provide a basis for describing the current global military order, they are incapable of identifying the dynamic forces that might transform that very order. By beginning at the systemic level we are better able to account for Third World states' dependent militarization strategies and the possibility of their success for developing an autonomous arms program.

Notes

1. We would like to thank Brian Job, Ethan Kapstein, Aaron Karp, Joel Migdal, and Bruce Russett for their comments and suggestions.

2. The question of why Third World states pursue capital-intensive militarization is pursued in a companion piece (Wendt and Barnett, 1991).

3. Prominent representatives of this viewpoint include Stephanie Neuman (1984) and Gerald Steinberg (1986), but a unit-level theoretical perspective is also implicit in much of the recent descriptive literature on Third World militarization, as reflected in many of the contributions to Brzoska and Ohlson, eds. (1986); and Baek, et al., eds. (1989); and in Catrina (1988).

4. Gillis (1989:1) makes the same general distinction when he argues that "militarization . . . does not imply the formal dominance of the military or the triumph of a particular ideology. Instead, it is defined here as the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence."

5. Examples in a Third World context might include the Cuban and Nicaraguan armies, and in a First World context the proposals for alternative defense postures, making use of nonprofessional soldiers armed with high-technology weapons like antitank missiles, artillery-planted mines, and so on.

6. Thus, while France depends on the demand for arms exports to create the economies of scale necessary to sustain domestic arms industries, it is still engaging in auto-centric militarization because it is capable of achieving the means of production for its own armaments—even if the scale of its military production is in part demand-induced.

7. The location of this level will vary with the nature and quantity of desired outputs; in capital-intensive militarization it will depend on the nature of the desired military technology, while in labor-intensive militarization it will depend more on the nature and quantity of the desired personnel.

8. Only a few major powers with large industrial bases and a few lesser powers, particularly sensitive to military dependency for political reasons, have been able to create and sustain auto-centric capital-intensive militarization

processes; in the former category we would put states like the United States, USSR, France, and arguably the United Kingdom and the former Federal Republic of Germany, and in the latter states like South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland.

9. See Wendt and Barnett (1991) for an explanation of this preference.

10. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) argue that such dependence is unique to African states, but if we understand sovereignty as being "recognized to have territorial property rights by other states" then the basic idea of sovereignty as an institution that is constitutive of the modern state as such applies to all states, despite its more blatant expression in the African case. See Wendt (1989:161-166) for a fuller argument about the universality of Jackson and Rosberg's thesis.

11. We disagree with the claim by early dependency theorists (e.g., Baran, 1957) that core capitalist countries would not permit industrialization on the periphery; rather, we side with the internationalization-of-capital approach that recognizes the possibility of industrialization in the periphery depending on dynamics located at both the domestic and international levels (Warren, 1980; Jenkins, 1987). The insights of this school are explored in the conclusion when we discuss the possibility of autonomous capital-intensive militarization.

12. See Väyrynen (1986) for a good discussion of international patenting and its relationship to structures of control in the international economy.

13. Klare (1983:69) defines technology transfer to include a "wide variety of transactions: the sale of blueprints and technical data for the production of complete weapons by another country; the sale of components, machine tools, and manufacturing know-how for the assembly of such items; the sale of training and technical assistance in the introduction of new production processes; and the sale of complete factories or production lines with all the parts and machines needed to operate them."

14. Wulf (1987:375) notes that even those countries that have developed an export market have remained heavily dependent on foreign assistance and technology, and are more or less integrated into international arms production.

15. Steinberg (1986a:302) notes that Israeli leaders are quite aware of the limitations of achieving arms independence, and have thus settled on an attempt to achieve "partial independence." This can be achieved over a range of categories: availability of spare parts and ammunition (surge capacity) during crises and conflict; production-strategic weapons susceptible to embargoes; rapid introduction of incremental technological innovations required to maintain state-of-the-art imported weapons; production of new technologies; and use of the threat of local production to extract concessions from potential arms suppliers.

16. In recent years there has been a growing diffusion of military capabilities in the international system. The implications of this diffusion have become a subject of growing academic and political debate on nuclear (Weltman, 1980; Dewitt, 1987) and nonnuclear forces (Neuman, 1984; Ross, 1988; Knorr, 1989; Steinberg, 1989). While we cannot review or assess the principal contributions to this debate, our focus on how patterns of Third World militarization are conditioned by systemic dominance structures suggests a quite different perspective on capability diffusion than is found in much of this literature. Despite disagreements about degree, this literature tends to emphasize the structural *changes* and *threats* to Northern dominance that such diffusion has or will create. Although this may be correct, our perspective also suggests that capability diffusion may actually help to *perpetuate* Northern dominance of the international system by virtue of maintaining a Third World dependence on great-power military technology.

17. Access to great-powers armaments was advanced by an indirect effect of the Cold War, namely intensified competition between a growing number of arms

producers since the 1970s. More recently, the United States has attempted to defray its defense costs by shifting some of the burden to local actors. On occasion this has included offset and coproduction agreements between the United States and strategically important Third World states. For instance, South Korea used the Nixon Doctrine to its advantage by securing greater access to US military technology (Baek and Moon, 1989:156–157), which facilitated its goal of moving toward arms independence.

Arms Imports, Arms Production, and the Quest for Security in the Third World

Keith Krause

Arms worth about 40 billion dollars are transferred to the Third World every year; this represents more than three-quarters of total global arms transfers. Arms production in the Third World, while still relatively minor, is worth between 10 and 15 billion dollars a year and has grown rapidly (Deger, 1986:151; Krause, 1992). Global military spending (currently running at about one trillion dollars per year), although concentrated in the developed states, has also expanded dramatically in many regions of the Third World. Prominent Third World states such as India, China, Egypt, Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Indonesia have all launched major efforts to acquire advanced weapons and the technologies to produce them.

What is the significance of the growing military capabilities of Third World states, and of the military expenditure associated with them? What are the underlying motives driving military spending and arms acquisitions in the Third World? Most importantly, what is the relationship between these processes and the quest for security, which in the broadest sense is perhaps the predominant concern of Third World states, regimes, and peoples? Robert Rothstein has framed the issue in stark terms:

A central question in any discussion of Third World military expenditures is why the ruling elites, faced with so many competing demands for the use of very scarce resources, nevertheless spend substantial . . . amounts on defence and security. (1987:14)

From the perspective of the state, the quest for security is manifest in the search to reduce military threats to its integrity originating outside its borders. But this quest is often overshadowed by or entangled with other struggles, between regimes or elites and citizens over the distribution of goods within society and the nature of political institutions, or between states and societies over the definition of security itself and the best means to achieve it. The outcome of these struggles to define and achieve security, on both the interstate and intrastate levels, is not only a matter of political

struggle between actors, but is also linked to the evolution of the forces that structure the state system itself (Ayoob, 1983/1984).

Military expenditures, the import of modern weapons, the creation of indigenous arms industries, and ultimately conflict and war are concrete manifestations of these different quests for security in the Third World. Whether or not one views these processes as dysfunctional depends, however, on which aspect of the quest for security one thinks is implicated. From a structural realist perspective, for example, the motive forces driving military spending, arms transfers, and arms production are subsidiary elements of the struggle of Third World states to increase their autonomy against the dependence that arises from their weak relative position in the international hierarchy of power. On the other hand, critics would note that this approach regards only the interstate dimension of the quest for security. It assumes that military power is the *sine qua non* of the power of states, and security from interstate violence the main goal of states and peoples. But threats to security also emanate from a state against its people, from different groups within and across states, and, when security is cast in individual terms, from other sources entirely, such as poverty, environmental degradation, or the absence of opportunities (Ullman, 1983; Azar and Moon, 1984; Mathews, 1989; Walker, 1990; Sayigh, 1990).

Seldom are these two distinct approaches analyzed together. Most writing on arms transfers, arms production, and the security concerns of Third World states addresses only the interstate dimension of the security quest, accepts the state-centric character of the international system, and seldom concerns itself with the broader historical forces shaping the order within which states operate (Neuman, 1980; Kolodziej and Harkavy, 1982; Neuman, 1984a; Brzoska and Ohlson, 1987). On the other side, much of the work on alternate conceptions of security that stresses the societal or intrastate dimension of the quest, including its relationship to economic and social development, downplays the impact of the motive forces of the global military system and the behavior of actors within it.¹ As Saadet Deger and Robert West (1987:xi) note:

Trends in the growth of Third World military establishments and capabilities have been carefully observed by defence policy analysts . . . but, until quite recently, the trends have been relatively neglected by both practitioners and analysts in the development community.

Also entangled in this is a disagreement over the scope of agency possessed by actors operating within the current self-help system of international politics. A realist approach to security sees states trapped in historical conditions not of their own making, condemned to a perpetual struggle for power. Approaches critical of this imply that the problem of security is rooted in more localized and pernicious forces, such as military rule or regime

dependence, that drive the expansion of military establishments and can be overcome by states and peoples.

This chapter will begin to bridge these two literatures and lay bare the arguments presented by both, in the process challenging some popular conclusions and misconceptions. It will also explore the consequences of arms transfers and indigenous arms production for the interstate and intrastate quests for security in the Third World. Finally, it will attempt to determine what the evidence from the structure and evolution of the global military system can tell us about the motivations behind Third World states' acquisition of the military means for guaranteeing security. The underlying goal is to determine the limits and implications of the process of "militarization" (a term discussed below), and to assess the underlying systemic forces conditioning or determining state action within the global military system.

A systemic perspective allows shifts in the structure of the global military system to be placed in their proper context, and implicitly treats this system as having a semi-autonomous dynamic. But as a consequence it eschews case studies, except for illustration, and thus does not highlight the contingent and idiosyncratic events that provide the grist for much of the contemporary debate. This approach has limits, for as Rothstein (1987:141) points out, "there is no such thing as 'the' security problem in the Third World: differentiation within the Third World itself is growing . . . and there are unique factors in each case that make grand generalizations inherently suspect." Thus the conceptual lens used in this paper can only be a first step in a much larger project.

The analysis proceeds in two main sections. The first section examines the pattern of the diffusion of modern weapons since the early 1960s to assess the overall expansion of military capabilities in the Third World. The second section does the same for the diffusion of the techniques of military production. In each case, after providing a distant snapshot of the data, I discuss the main arguments concerning the impact of these processes on interstate and intrastate security through a more focused examination of the data.

The Diffusion of Modern Weapons

An Overview

The arms trade enmeshes almost all states either as patrons or clients in a complex web of military relationships that include not only the flow of weapons, but military training assistance, spare parts and supplies, military construction, and licensed production arrangements. Four salient features stand out from a distant snapshot of the evolution of the arms trade since the early 1960s, when reliable statistics became available: the increased volume of the trade, the increased number of participating states, the shift in

concentration to the Third World, and the greater sophistication of the weapons transferred. Overall, the global arms trade has increased fourfold in constant dollar terms since 1963, its total value in 1988 being more than 50 billion dollars (United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, various years).² Table 6.1 provides four-year averages for the arms trade since 1963, and indicates the considerable growth in the value of the arms trade, with the major periods of increase occurring around 1972 and 1978. Recent values, however, indicate a decline from the highs of the early 1980s, with the volume of deliveries having stabilized near the level reached in the early 1980s. This has been accompanied by an increase in both the number of suppliers and recipients in the market: from 20 suppliers and 89 recipients in 1963, to 50 suppliers and 120 recipients in 1988.

More importantly, the *direction* of the trade has shifted to focus on the Third World: whereas in the early 1960s Third World recipients accounted for only 40 percent of the weapons transferred, by 1977 roughly 80 percent of arms transferred were destined for these states. This percentage changed only marginally in the ensuing decade. Finally, the weapons traded have progressively increased in sophistication, to the point where the major clients (such as Syria, Israel, or India) of the dominant suppliers (the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the former Federal Republic of Germany) obtain the most sophisticated weapons simultaneously with their introduction into the producers' arsenals. Table 6.2 captures this trend on a global scale and charts the progressive diffusion of advanced weapons into the Third World.

The concrete consequences of the operation of the arms transfer system can be seen from the data in Table 6.3, which documents the growth in weapons arsenals in various Third World regions. Although this table does not take into account the sophistication of the equipment, it does give some indication of the actual increase that has occurred in the military potential of regions of the Third World. Taken in aggregate, this data appears to manifest what Edward Kolodziej (1987:405–406) has called the progressive “militarization of international relations,” in which “the quest for cooperation among states to slow the militarization of international relations . . . will be . . . daunting—if not utopian.” Given that the bulk of arms flow is from North to South, it is evident that this dramatic increase in militarization has occurred in the Third World.

The Case for Dysfunctional Militarization

But what is the specific impact of the arms-transfer system on the interstate and intrastate dimensions of the “security quest” in the Third World, and how does one explain the motive forces that drive this expansion of military capabilities in Third World states? The most widespread explanation is that the diffusion of modern weapons and the sheer volume of the global trade in arms is evidence that the underlying dynamic of the world military order fuels

Table 6.1 World Arms Deliveries, 1963–1988 (four-year averages in millions of constant 1988 dollars)

Year	Volume
1963–1966	12,589
1967–1970	16,475
1971–1974	25,649
1975–1978	36,282
1979–1982	53,297
1983–1986	53,972
1987–1988	52,333

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, various years).

Table 6.2 Numbers of Third World States with Selected Weapons Systems, 1950–1985

Weapons System	Year				
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Supersonic Aircraft	—	1	28	55	55
Missiles	—	6	25	68	71
Armored Vehicles	1	38	72	99	107
Main Battle Tanks	—	32	39	—	62
Modern Warships	4	26	56	79	81

Source: Edward Kolodziej, *Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and Its Implications for the International System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 183. Figures for main battle tanks estimated from Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 12.

Note: Dash signifies data not available.

a process of increasing militarization (Klare, 1980:39; Thee, 1980:30). Conceiving of security in military terms in turn is taken to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of how Third World states ought to guarantee their security. This distorts national priorities, leads to Third World states “squandering [their] resources on the quest for internal and external security,” and demonstrates that “the inclination to rely on military means of coercion for the handling of conflicts . . . seems to be gaining ground everywhere” (Mehta, 1985:5; Eide and Thee, 1980:9).

This argument needs to be developed in some detail, for it challenges the orthodox explanation of why states acquire arms, it advances alternate explanations, and it explains why the process contributes to militarization,

Table 6.3 Number of Weapons and Weapons Systems by Region (selected years)

Middle East and North Africa			
	1975–1976	1982–1983	1988–1989
Main Battle Tanks	11,070	19,762	23,181
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	14,311	24,342	28,818
Combat Aircraft	2,594	3,621	3,921
Helicopters	884	2,307	2,209
Naval Vessels	432	605	711
Sub-Saharan Africa			
	1975–1976	1982–1983	1988–1989
Main Battle Tanks	500	1,962	2,186
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	2,457	7,079	9,182
Combat Aircraft	461	780	1,088
Helicopters	221	543	802
Naval Vessels	164	263	253
South Asia			
	1975–1976	1982–1983	1988–1989
Main Battle Tanks	2,996	4,293	5,250
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	1,538	2,364	3,165
Combat Aircraft	1,240	1,040	1,293
Helicopters	338	500	516
Naval Vessels	145	155	241
East Asia			
	1975–1976	1982–1983	1988–1989
Main Battle Tanks	5,250	6,870	8,829
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	4,249	11,129	15,516
Combat Aircraft	2,315	3,083	3,106
Helicopters	939	1,858	2,337
Naval Vessels	982	1,253	1,938
People's Republic of China			
	1975–1976	1982–1983	1988–1989
Main Battle Tanks	8,500	10,500	9,000
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	3,600	4,600	4,800
Combat Aircraft	4,340	5,980	6,730
Helicopters	350	403	463
Naval Vessels	1,035	1,177	1,472
Latin America and Caribbean			
	1975–1976	1982–1983	1988–1989
Main Battle Tanks	805	1,673	2,213
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	2,245	4,615	6,996
Combat Aircraft	940	1,118	1,279
Helicopters	601	941	1,025
Naval Vessels	500	588	574

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, various years).

Notes: IISS data is subject to great variation from year to year; these figures are trend indicators only. *Main battle tanks* includes heavy and medium tanks; *Other AFVs* includes light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles; *Combat aircraft* includes fighter, strike, reconnaissance, counterinsurgency, and antisubmarine warfare aircraft; *Naval vessels* includes all surface and submarine vessels of greater than 100 tons displacement (excluding hovercraft).

all at one fell swoop. Although there is much conceptual confusion surrounding this concept of militarization (Ross, 1987:562), for my purposes it will refer to the anticipated consequences of military spending, arms acquisitions, and arms production.³

In spite of the fact that most arms acquisitions are justified in terms of meeting perceived external military threats, the process of Third World militarization is argued to have negative consequences for interstate security. Increased levels of armaments under conditions of the security dilemma lead to an upward spiral of armaments and military spending, the exacerbation of conflicts by worst-case thinking, and a concomitant decline in interstate security. An example of this would be the Latin American race to acquire supersonic fighters in the 1960s. Peru was the first state to acquire such planes; by 1975 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela had all followed suit. No war broke out, none was intended, and all states were forced to spend more than they would have wanted on national defense. Such arms races mean that the increased availability of sophisticated weapons (as indicated by Table 6.2) tends to increase the destructiveness of war when it breaks out (Thee, 1980:30–31). Ad hoc evidence for this proposition is also derived from the series of Arab-Israeli wars, where each successive war lasted longer and was more costly to the participants in human and material terms. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War cost Israel roughly the equivalent of the national income for one year (Deger and West, 1987:7)! The Iran-Iraq War, which cost hundreds of billions of dollars, lasted eight years, and resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, is also a potent example for those who argue that it illustrates the inevitable consequence of the global transfer of advanced weapons.

Arms transfers need not result in an increased likelihood of war to be dysfunctional, although some analysts would also argue this is the case (Wolpin, 1986:11–12; Barrows, 1985:118). At a minimum, even if the likelihood of conflict is unchanged (or even if a causal link between the acquisition of armaments and conflict cannot be established), the process of reciprocal regional arms racing rarely increases states' security from external threats. This is also the implied argument behind the advocacy of arms embargoes in specific regional conflicts (Ohlson, 1988:7–11).

Aside from the arms races that might be triggered by arms transfers, the weapons acquired are frequently not related to the interstate security concerns of recipients. This can be seen by posing two questions: (1) Can the recipient state use its weapons against possible opponents with a reasonable amount of training and assistance? (2) Are the weapons acquired appropriate to the potential threats a state faces? These questions are not easy to answer, but they at least permit some evaluation to be made of the underlying motivation behind a military buildup. If one cannot postulate a link between the weapons acquired, their usability, and the threats faced, the search for some other factor driving the acquisitions process should begin (Krause, 1991).

Several examples of weapons acquisitions that fail these tests are prominent. In Libya, for example, up to 1,200 tanks and 450 MiG-23 and MiG-25 planes purchased from the Soviet Union remain in storage, and the relatively poor performance of the Libyan army against Chad suggests Libya's more sophisticated equipment was not effectively used (IISS 1988:187-88; IISS, 1990). In Iran, although the Shah acquired more than 14 billion (constant 1979) dollars worth of sophisticated weapons between 1970 and 1977, a US Senate report (1976) acknowledged that "Iran will not be able to absorb and operate within the next five to ten years a large proportion of the sophisticated military systems it has purchased." Several US Department of Defense studies "concluded that the military threats to Iran could best be addressed by the steady, systematic development and training of its military forces, rather than the rapid introduction of massive quantities of complex high-technology equipment" (Sick, 1985a:14). This (and the tenfold increase in military budgets between 1970 and 1977) suggests procurement policy and military budgets were driven by forces other than the quest for security and rational threat assessment, since it is difficult to argue that the regional security environment deteriorated so greatly in the 1970s. Venezuela's purchase of F-16 fighters, defended on the grounds of a putative threat from Cuba, appears less credible when one notes that Cuba does not possess an aircraft capable of attacking Venezuela and returning to base: Cuban MiG-23s have a range of 600 miles; Venezuela is at least 610 miles distant (US Senate, 1982). The pattern has also been evident throughout Africa, where the weapons acquired have been "usually inappropriate for the environment and absorptive capacity of recipient nations" (Arlinghaus, 1984:42).

Similar conclusions about the appropriateness of the weapons acquired for the threats faced can be drawn for several Third World states, and many rapid arms buildups are difficult to defend with the argument that the regional interstate security environment was deteriorating at a similarly rapid pace. If these arms acquisitions do not appear to be motivated by discernible interstate threats to security, or to have increased the interstate security of Third World states, the argument for a dysfunctional process of global militarization is considerably strengthened. Other explanations are required of the motive forces governing arms acquisitions; the two most prominent focus on external (but not *systemic*) forces, and both argue that the process of militarization also has a negative impact on the *intrastate* quest for security.

First, one can explain high levels of arms acquisitions as being supply-driven, rather than demand-led. In an increasingly competitive environment, major arms suppliers have an incentive to market their most sophisticated weapons in ever-greater quantities either because they depend upon exports to maintain an independent defense-industrial base or to acquire hard currency. West European arms producers, for example, depend on arms exports for between one-third and one-half of their annual sales volume, depending on the

sector. Estimates for Soviet hard currency earnings from arms sales range between \$400 and \$2,600 million annually through the late 1970s and early 1980s; this represents on average 18 percent of hard currency earnings (Krause, 1992; Wharton, 1983:24; Menon, 1986:387). In addition, supplier states can help create the market for arms by emphasizing possible military threats to security and by participating in military assistance and training programs that might ultimately shape weapons acquisition patterns. The argument is that Third World armed forces that receive military training develop a "technological fetish" for expensive, unnecessary, or unusable weapons that diverts resources from more productive uses (Wulf, 1980). Some evidence for this claim exists: one study found that "the US foreign military advisory and training program exerts a significant influence over both the quantity and quality of arms transferred to developing countries" (Refson, 1970:17); another noted that there may be a "contribution training and advice—and other factors—make to the general pressure for modernization of inventories" (Kemp, 1970:67). The activities of individual firms may also play a role: as Anthony Sampson (1982:178) noted, in "the Third World . . . the effects of the [arms] salesmen were more far-reaching, for they were in a position to influence the priorities of developing states" (see also Tuomi and Väyrynen, 1982:13–32).

Second, one can argue that the weak domestic legitimacy of many states and regimes in the Third World means they depend upon external great-power patrons to secure what little legitimacy they can, or to obtain the means to subdue challenges to their rule. Arms acquisitions and military expenditures are then the response of a military or civilian elite to internal threats to their continued rule (Sayigh, 1990:10–22; Ayoob, 1983/1984), and are either required for domestic repression (Klare and Aronson, 1981) or to satisfy the demands of the military as an organized interest group that can itself pose a threat to stability. Direct military rule is not necessary, for this situation can arise whenever the military exercises a disproportionate influence, or is aligned with a faction or group in power that does not enjoy popular legitimacy (Sarkesian, 1978:4–5). It is the external orientation of Third World elites and their dependence upon great-power patrons, however, that reinforces the ascendancy of military elites and their ability to thwart civilian or representative political forces (Rizvi, 1985:201–203). In short, arms transfer relationships serve the "neo-colonial goals of strengthening client military elites" (Wolpin, 1986:84).

This analysis concludes that the framework within which Third World states presently pursue security is dysfunctional. It is either driven by factors external to the needs of the states and peoples concerned, or is negatively influenced by these factors. The arms acquisitions resulting from either of these processes thus not only fail to achieve interstate security, but by the opportunity costs imposed they also diminish intrastate security by making other security goals (in particular economic or social development) more

difficult to achieve. The ranking of military threats to security over other forms of threat means that the scarce economic and other resources devoted to the creation of military power are based on choices among competing alternate allocations for, and competing alternate conceptions of, security.

There are several dimensions of these opportunity costs. The simple economic argument promoted by many participants in the "disarmament and development debate" suggests that the scarce foreign exchange spent on arms acquisitions could be better devoted to other development needs (Ball, 1988:18–30; Jolly, 1978). As the United Nations *Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development* concludes, "the continuing arms race will impede the world-wide prospects of economic growth and delay the developmental process with serious socio-economic consequences, particularly for the developing countries" (United Nations, 1982). A more subtle economic argument posits that military acquisitions distort overall economic planning. As Mary Kaldor notes:

Partly because of the need for an industrial base to service the weapon system . . . and partly because of the ideology associated with the weapon system—the glorification of industrial technology—the armed forces play an important role in support of governments favouring a development model aimed at imitating metropolis society. (Kaldor, 1980:228)

The second line of argument, concentrating on the social impact of increased militarization, first notes that arms transfers, whatever their role in guaranteeing interstate security, increase the threat posed against a population by its own state or regime. This argument is particularly prominent in analyses of the politically repressive role of Latin American military establishments (Varas, 1985; Schmitter, 1973), although it is generalizable to African, Asian, or Middle Eastern militaries (Stork and Paul, 1983). Perhaps more subtly, the concentration of "military security resources" (arms, armies, and arms industries) in the hands of state institutions privileges the state over other ethnic, religious, tribal, racial, cultural, or linguistic forms of collective identity as the vehicle for the achievement of collective aspirations. Finally, increased militarization can have political and cultural/ideological consequences in increasing the role of military values in politics, via "an undue preponderance of military demands, and emphasis on military considerations, spirits, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states" (Vagts, 1957:14).

Limits of the Militarization Case:

The Systemic Account of Motive Forces

Doubtless, the choices made by states in the quest for interstate security have a great impact, whether positive or negative, on the threats a state may pose

to its citizens and the opportunities they have to achieve other goals. The partial merit of the case against high levels of arms acquisitions, or increased arsenals as a means of guaranteeing security against threats from outside one's borders, must be conceded. But the argument that the causal forces driving arms acquisitions are solely external factors, such as great-power patronage or a supply-driven market, must be greatly qualified. To confront directly and comprehensively the arguments presented above would require focused case studies beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, I will challenge both the analysis of the data on Third World militarization and the concomitant account of the motives for Third World arms acquisitions by looking at the systemic aspects of the global diffusion of military capabilities.

The first point to note is that the characterization of the entire Third World as rapidly acquiring vast military arsenals is less accurate as one moves the focus into sharper detail. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 highlight the extremely uneven distribution of armaments around the world, and the disparate rates of buildup. The Middle East and North Africa possess about half the tanks and armored vehicles in the Third World (excluding China). Egypt alone has more tanks than exist in all of South America or sub-Saharan Africa! Within each region, the two or three states with the largest arsenals always account for a high percentage of the total regional arsenal. In South Asia, India possesses about 50 percent of the tanks, 40 percent of the armored vehicles and 30 percent of the combat aircraft. In sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia possesses 35 percent of the tanks, South Africa has 50 percent of the armored vehicles, and South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique together have one-third of the aircraft. In Latin America, Cuba possesses more than 50 percent of the tanks, and Brazil and Argentina one-third of the armored vehicles. In East Asia, North and South Korea possess more than 50 percent of the tanks and roughly one-third of the combat aircraft. In the Middle East, Egypt, Israel, and Syria have 45 percent of the tanks and 28 percent of the aircraft. On a global level, the top ten arms recipients in any given period have always accounted for more than 50 percent of total arms imports. This uneven distribution and diffusion of modern military capabilities immediately points up the concentrated nature of the arms transfer system, and is not consistent with a simple picture of the progressive militarization of the Third World.

The linear projection of increasing militarization and increased insecurity also does not hold as one adopts a longer-term perspective. The shift in arms transfers to the Third World after the 1960s is most easily explained by the reemergence of the European and Japanese arms industries, which meant that these states met a high proportion of their demand for arms from domestic production. Third World states consume only about 20 percent of the total annual global arms production of 260–290 billion dollars, but most of their consumption is accounted for by highly visible international trade, rather

Table 6.4 Number of Arms Delivered to the Developing World, by Region and Weapon Type, 1973–1977 and 1983–1987

Weapon	1973–1977					
	Region					Totals
	Africa	East Asia	South Asia	Latin America	Middle East	
Tanks	2,016	2,496	1,170	971	8,758	15,411
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)	2,676	1,652	497	800	8,624	14,249
Aircraft	578	491	330	168	1,614	3,181
Naval Vessels	2	37	6	40	5	90
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)	7,740	232	1,130	200	10,917	20,219
Weapon	1983–1987					
	Region					Totals
	Africa	East Asia	South Asia	Latin America	Middle East	
Tanks	1,374	542	1,605	610	4,194	8,325
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)	3,009	1,342	2,890	754	8,904	17,155
Aircraft	438	365	265	92	896	2,058
Naval Vessels	25	14	12	30	22	103
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)	7,009	2,146	1,052	1,785	14,469	27,029

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968–1977, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, various years).

than domestic production (Krause, 1992). This presents a far different picture of the global distribution of military capabilities than that derived from the 80 percent share of arms imports accounted for by Third World recipients.

Further, the increased demand from newly independent states in the 1960s and 1970s can be explained by the process of converting small constabulary forces into national armies. This is partly confirmed by the *decline* in the rate of growth of arms transfers evident in the 1980s (Table 6.1), which can be taken as evidence that militarization is not increasing in a linear fashion (Ross, 1987:569–570, 574). Added evidence for this can be found in changes in the flow of major weapons systems to the Third World, as presented by region in Table 6.4. The total number of weapons transferred in the two periods is not consistent with the dramatic increase in the dollar value of the weapons transferred (from Table 6.1). The number of big-ticket items transferred, such as main battle tanks and aircraft, *declined* significantly over the two periods, with the increases being concentrated in the relatively less-expensive categories of missiles and armored vehicles. The increase in dollar value is accounted for by both an increase in the unit cost of items, and a shift to nonhardware purchases (such as military construction). The latter comprised, for example, roughly 26 percent of US foreign military sales in

the 1980–1984 period (US Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1984). This shift is also reflected in the often dramatically lower rates of growth of Third World arsenals in the 1980s, as reflected in Table 6.3.

This evidence suggests overall that the global military system is extremely hierarchical, as similar rankings appear whether one compares worldwide arsenals, arms acquisitions, or military spending. This challenges the analysis presented above, for it suggests that the motive forces determining arms transfers may be systemic, rather than rooted in the decisions of individual actors external to Third World states (neocolonialist great powers or arms firms). On this account, the prime motivation driving the arms transfer system in the post-1945 period has been the quest of newly independent states to reach the highest possible point in the international or regional military hierarchy. If so, the global demand for arms may stabilize (except as temporarily upset by wars) as the outlines of this hierarchy become more clear. In addition, the shift in the type of weapons acquired (from Table 6.4) may reflect a degree of market saturation and the increasing concentration on more appropriate technologies. The absorption problems of the 1970s cited above are thus likely to be ephemeral aberrations, confined primarily to states in which resource constraints were temporarily removed (the oil-rich states).

What also appears to be at work in many cases is the systemic dynamics of a specific regional conflict and the pursuit of regional or subregional hegemony and status. Outside of prominent zones of conflict, there are few states (other than the so-called pariah states) in which arms acquisitions in either relative or absolute terms are dramatically out of line with what would be predicted from factors such as Gross National Product or population. This makes it difficult to explain arms acquisition patterns by factors internal to states or their social orders. Much of the increase in arms transferred from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s can be explained by the Indochina and Middle East conflicts, and the demand generated by the Iran-Iraq War and the regional rivalries in the Gulf. From Table 6.4 one notes that the Middle East accounts for roughly half of the weapons delivered in all categories in both periods. Gulf states alone accounted for almost a quarter of global arms transfers in the 1980–1988 period (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990)!

In fact, if the acquisition of arms is driven by such systemic factors, one would expect larger arsenals (in relative terms) in states or regions that have little or no indigenous arms production, for the goal of reducing dependence and increasing autonomy can only be reached by stockpiling weapons. This might help explain the large arsenals found in the Middle East, where indigenous arms production is (except in Israel) minimal. For example, the Saudis, Syrians, and Libyans all keep large supplies of weapons (surface-to-air missiles, tanks, and aircraft) in storage as a safeguard against possible supply restrictions.

One of the most persistent Third World objections to the debate over

global arms transfers is that it is largely a Western liberal response to the perceived squandering of resources that either denies the genuine security threat faced by many states, or implicitly denies the right of Third World states to achieve the same level of military development as Northern states. On this account too, the post-1945 military buildup is more properly seen as a systemic feature of global politics, rather than a process subject to control or manipulation by individual actors in the absence of changes in the overall structure of international politics.

A more focused examination of the data also calls into question the analysis of the damaging impact of arms transfers on interstate security. Simply put, arms transfers are not a good index of militarization in Third World states. As Nicole Ball (1988:107) notes, "In the public mind, security expenditure in the Third World is firmly linked with the arms trade," but the bulk of Third World military spending is on operating and personnel costs, not on arms procurement. The most recent percentages for several states for which data are available are summarized in Table 6.5, and they indicate that operating costs average more than three-quarters of the military budget. In India, for example, the proportion of the military budget devoted to personnel, operations, and maintenance between 1951 and 1979 was always greater than 80 percent (although it slowly declined over this period). In Britain, France, and the United States, by contrast, procurement expenditures represent about 30 percent of military spending.

Thus the factors that most strongly influence the level of threat posed by a state or regime to its citizens are not likely to be levels of arms imports, and analysts should concentrate more on the consequences of military spending and its nonhardware component than on the impact of arms transfers. As one analyst of sub-Saharan Africa notes, "there seems to be no relationship between the capabilities of a military organization and its propensity to become politically involved" (Barrows, 1985:116). This of course is not the only indicator of the level of threat a military establishment can pose to its citizens, but it is a suggestive *prima facie* argument. It still makes sense to interpret the *amount* of resources devoted to arms acquisitions as possibly detracting from economic security because of the alternate possible allocations of these resources, but it does not appear accurate to speak of a similarly rapid increase in militarization as a social or political problem.

The proper target for analysis of the opportunities for change and transformation, then, is *not* the quotidian operation of the global arms transfer system (the behavior of Western arms firms, or the decisions of regimes dependent upon great-power patronage), but rather the actions of those individual states or groups of states in which military spending and arms acquisitions appear dramatically out of line with what would be expected in relative terms. In this light, the problem of the international arms transfer system is less that it is supply-driven or a function of external

Table 6.5 Operating Costs as Percentages of Military Budgets (Selected States)

State	Percentage (data-year)	
Nicaragua	99	(1978)
Guyana	97	(1979)
Chile	96	(1979)
Liberia	92	(1979)
Philippines	92	(1977)
Sri Lanka	91	(1977)
Brazil	85	(1979)
Malagasy Republic	85	(1979)
Sierra Leone	83	(1976)
India	82	(1979)
Venezuela	82	(1972)
Colombia	81	(1973)
Malaysia	75	(1977)
Ghana	71	(1978)
Argentina	68	(1979)
Morocco	67	(1979)
Nigeria	46	(1979)
Iran	31	(1976)
Average	79	N = 18

Source: Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), Appendix 1.

pressure on weak states than that it is part of the warp and woof of international politics in a self-help system. Systemic forces may influence the relative balance of domestic factors in a way that detracts from interstate security and affects levels of military spending, but this is a subtle process not reducible to a simple analysis of the external orientations of domestic groups.

The Diffusion of Military Production: Motives and Limits

A clearer picture of the systemic forces operating on the global military system can be gained from an examination of the patterns of and limitations upon Third World arms production. A parallel albeit less clearly articulated debate is conducted over the consequences for interstate and societal security of the increasing diffusion of military production around the world. Before sketching the debate, it is worthwhile to present a snapshot of the scope and extent of military production in the Third World. Total military production in the Third World increased from roughly 2.48 billion dollars in 1970 to 6.17 billion dollars in 1980, with a projection for 1990 of 11.02 billion (Deger, 1986:151). This fourfold increase in military production in two decades

parallels the increase in arms transfers. A similar trend is charted by data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986:8), with the production of major weapons systems increasing from 6 million dollars (constant 1975 dollars) in the 1950–1954 period to 1,696 million dollars in the 1980–1984 period. There has been a concomitant increase in the number of states producing major weapons systems, from three in 1965 to eleven in 1984 (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1987:8, 10, 23).⁴ These eleven states account for almost all Third World arms production, and roughly twenty other states produce some weapons, often under license or coproduction arrangements with major suppliers.

Why do states develop an independent arms production capability? If arms were traded as purely commercial goods, the pattern of production would correspond to the distribution of international comparative advantage, with perhaps different suppliers meeting the demands of different market segments. Given the significant costs imposed by arms production, it is evident that the primary motivation, at least for the *initiation* of indigenous arms production, is political. In the Third World, as Michael Moodie notes, “underlying all other incentives . . . is the desire to eliminate, or more realistically, to minimize, dependence on industrial countries for arms that are considered vital for national security” (1976:26). The primary driving force behind the production of arms on a large scale is the existence of states in potentially conflictual relationships, operating under the security dilemma in a self-help system. The fundamental goal is to gain greater autonomy for foreign and defense policymaking. Again, this roots the motivation in the structure of the state system, and not in particularistic forces operating either at the domestic level or within relations between weak and strong states. This motivation is further evidenced in the fact that all the major suppliers (India, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, South Korea, South Africa, and Chile) have had significant restrictions placed on their ability to acquire weapons at various points in the past two decades. Several of the major producers (Israel and South Korea in particular) also face direct military threats that have catalyzed arms production.

If this analysis is correct, then “strong military, political and economic stimuli exist for further expansion of domestic arms production” (Wulf, 1983:311). Third World states are merely at the bottom of the defense-industrial “ladder of production,” which, although it can be constructed in many ways, begins with the assembly of arms, proceeds to licensed production of weapons components (and later entire weapons), and culminates in indigenously designed and produced weapons (Ross, 1981:4–5; Louscher and Salomone, 1987:4–7; Boutin, 1989). Although progress through the stages will be erratic, the assumption is that at least some Third World arms industries (e.g., the Indian, Chinese, or Brazilian) will be capable of reaching the level of complete indigenous design and production. Further, as states reach an appropriate level of industrial development, they too may attempt to

create indigenous arms industries, leading to an ever-increasing number of Third World arms producers at the bottom rungs.

But the "ascending ladder" model of Third World arms production fails to account for the structural limits to the diffusion of military production, on two levels (Neuman, 1984b:181). First, although Third World arms production may be driven by the self-help nature of the system, and catalyzed by specific events—such as arms embargoes—the uneven distribution of economic, social, and technological capabilities suggests that differentials will exist in states' ability to produce arms. Saadet Deger (1986:164–171), Stephanie Neuman (1984b), Herbert Wulf (1983), and Ilan Peleg (1980) have all analyzed the correlation between indicators of economic development (such as manufacturing as a proportion of GNP, the numbers of scientists and engineers, level of development of the iron and steel industries, and the size of the military) and the distribution of arms production capabilities in the Third World. Neuman (1984b:183–184) found high and significant correlations for the size of the military and GNP with arms production. Deger's composite index ranking the arms production potential of Third World states found a highly ordered system among the six major producers, but a less orderly relationship for the remaining eleven states for which data was available.⁵

All of these scholars agreed that Third World arms production appears more to accompany the achievement of a specific level of industrial development, rather than act as an autonomous variable that is introduced or catalyzed by either domestic or external political factors such as the nature of the domestic regime or its external alliances. With few exceptions (such as Mexico), the attractiveness of an arms industry as a symbol of national power is such that few states with the capacity to maintain one will forgo it. The implication is that systemic forces at work in international politics severely restrict the scope of the agency that can be exerted by Third World states.

In addition, none of the major Third World arms producers has ascended to the upper levels of the ladder of production, and it is unlikely any will. Although the most advanced producers (Israel, Brazil, and India) have all developed an across-the-board capability (i.e., to produce major air, land, and sea weapons), they have neither successfully freed themselves from dependence upon imported components, nor captured the process of technological innovation. A plateau has been reached near the point where limited local R&D and limited independent production of advanced weapons occur.⁶ Brazil's most advanced aircraft program, for example, was a result of its 1980 decision to participate with a 30 percent stake in development and production in the Italian AMX fighter project. All subsequent projects were at or below this level, and all involved high levels of foreign technical assistance, "indicating how far [Brazil's] aircraft industry is from attaining an indigenous R&D capability for advanced aircraft" (Boutin, 1989:52). A similar tale can

be told for other sectors of the Brazilian defense establishment, and for the Indian and Israeli industries (Katz, 1984; Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986). In the case of the Israeli Lavi fighter, the project was canceled at the prototype stage after more than \$1.8 billion had been spent, mostly US military assistance. Even in this case, the final product would have been 55 percent produced in the United States, with the engines and much of the avionics being US-made (*International Herald Tribune*, July 25, 1986; *Financial Times*, January 13, 1987). The Indian Arjun tank project, which was conceived in 1974 and intended to be wholly Indian-designed, had by 1989 been downgraded to 55 percent local content, with crucial components (the engine) to be imported, and major cost overruns (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, August 5, 1989).

The expectation that this plateau is not temporary is based on the fact that the motor of technological innovation and R&D spending remains firmly in the North, with about three-quarters of global military R&D conducted in the United States and the Soviet Union (Krause, 1992). In addition, the high degree of dependence of most of Third World producers on exports to remain viable suggests that increased competition and market saturation will force many smaller producers to the wall, and raise the barriers to entry for future producers. In 1980–1984, Brazil exported about 80 percent of its output; South Korea about 50 percent; Israel about 25 percent (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986:32). Many existing enclave industries may even perish, especially where government support has been crucial to their survival. As Neuman (1984b:192) concludes, “the data suggest that today’s leading LDC [less developed countries] arms producers . . . are unlikely to be followed by a second tier of LDC competitors . . . [and] the number of LDC producers of major weapons is likely to remain limited.” The result is again, as in the case of the arms transfer system, a pattern of hierarchical and stratified global arms production dictated by structural factors.

What are the alleged consequences of Third World arms production for pursuit of interstate or intrastate security? At the interstate level, the process of creating and expanding Third World military-industrial complexes is seen by many authors as having negative consequences for international security: in the title of one work it is described as “sowing the serpent’s teeth” (Katz, 1986). Here the focus is on the diffusion of the techniques of production of advanced military technologies, such as ballistic missiles or chemical weapons, which increase the destructiveness of war should it break out (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1990:111–112; 369–391). But as the above analysis suggests, this process likely has limits, and the emergence of regional arms-producing hegemony (as in the arms transfer system) may generate the creation of a *modus vivendi* that resembles a series of regional balances of power, even as it increases the likelihood of conflict.

In terms of intrastate security, the investment effort required to generate an arms industry and the demands for procurement it creates are again regarded as allocative choices impeding the achievement of development goals. If

“military-related investment . . . occur[s] at the expense of more productive civil-sector investment, or encourage[s] an overly heavy emphasis on capital-intensive techniques of production” it might “ultimately reduce the growth potential of the economy” (Ball, 1988:106; Benoit, 1973). The reasoning behind this is that indigenous defense production imposes certain burdens, as it usually includes higher unit costs for weapons (because of shorter production runs as compared to those of major arms producers), a lower level of technology than could be imported, and occasionally direct government subsidies to production (Landgren-Backstrom, 1983:200–204; Deger, 1986:158–159). In addition, if the defense sector employs a significant proportion of scarce investment capital or technical talent, it may impede capital investment and formation (Ball, 1988:106).

The evidence for such negative consequences is not strong. For some states, most notably Brazil, the development of an arms industry appears to have been treated as a form of export-led industrial development, rather than having been dominated by concerns for import-substitution. Further, the backward and forward linkages that can be established in an advanced industrial sector such as arms production may have significant spin-off benefits (Evans, 1986:101; Whynes, 1979:52–53).⁷ The military sector can be used to induce R&D spending and accelerate skill formation (Deger, 1986:153). The benefits of even small savings in foreign exchange may also be great, even if the dollar cost of domestic production is higher than that of imports. Finally, as Robert Looney’s (1988:67) study of the macroeconomic effects of military industrialization concludes, “it appears the macro-linkages from the arms industry to the economy enable third-world arms producers to minimize most of the adverse impacts on the economy often associated with increased military burdens.” In this respect, arms production may actually *ameliorate* the negative impact of military spending and in some ways improve economic security (although Looney also notes that it appears to worsen income distribution).

The social impact of indigenous arms production is less clear. Many analysts argue that:

Arms production programs tend to further reinforce the military’s already strong societal position . . . tend to give greater power to the government at the expense of those outside the government, and can enhance a government’s ability to suppress opposition to itself. (Katz, 1984:11)

Again, however, such linear projections ignore the dialectic of politics in many states. Although the power of military establishments may be enhanced in the short or medium term, the concomitant creation of a class of educated industrial workers, or ex-soldiers, or professionals, socialized to expect certain types of liberty and possess political power, suggest that historical pessimism over the future entrenchment of military rule is simply

not justified by the evidence (Sundhaussen, 1984). South Korea, Turkey, Argentina, and Brazil all have witnessed in varying degrees a military retreat from power that runs in the face of their progressive development of arms production capabilities.

Conclusion

Any understanding of the post-1945 dynamic of the international arms transfer and production system must be rooted in the evolution and structure of the international system as a whole, rather than resting upon purely idiosyncratic or ephemeral developments. Although there are negative consequences for interstate and intrastate security that stem from the diffusion of advanced weapons and the means of their production, these consequences are not as clear-cut as most analysts have argued. It is difficult, for example, to establish a direct link between arms races and interstate conflict. In addition, although arms imports represent an expenditure of resources that is lost to the local economy, they are not a major drain on the resources of most Third World states when compared to overall military spending, and the creation of Third World arsenals has not in most cases represented a large net opportunity cost. Indigenous arms production, on the other hand, has complex backward and forward linkages that cloud the relationship between indigenous arms production and economic development, in effect, a reflection of one dimension of intrastate security.

Arms transfers and arms production are intimately bound up in more fundamental questions of the nature of interstate security in a self-help international system. The arms transfer and production system's consistently hierarchical structure has been obscured by historical conjunctions characteristic of a period of rapid transformation. Our ability to clearly perceive the long-term effect on Third World states of the forces driving the system has been obscured by the dramatic changes that accompanied the globalization of the state system via the decolonization process. The rapid growth in Third World arsenals is to a great extent a natural consequence of the emergence or reemergence of interstate security dilemmas in the immediate post-independence period. This, coupled with the process of diffusion of military technologies in a period of rapid technological change, may go far to explain the process of militarization in the Third World in the past three decades.

But if these two factors are critical, then a linear projection into the future of recent trends is almost certainly incorrect. As we move into a period of less dramatic transformation and perhaps normalization, the forces driving the evolution of the international system come more clearly into focus. The underlying dynamic driving the global arms transfer and production system can be described as a global and regional sorting out of the positions of states

within a broader hierarchy. The key element determining a state's final location in the system is its mastery of military *technology*, including not only the science of making weapons, but the art of producing and operating them in a particular sociocultural, economic, and political context (Krause, 1992).

At the top of this hierarchy one finds innovators such as the United States and the Soviet Union, which have mastered the skills needed to create advanced weapons. They produce and export the entire range of modern weapons at the technological frontier. They are followed by states such as Britain and France that possess both a limited capacity to innovate and the skills needed to adapt weapons technology to the needs of the battlefield and the market. Such producers are active exporters, because their smaller domestic infrastructure and demand for weapons creates great economic pressures to export not only weapons but the technologies to produce them. The beneficiaries are a third tier of states (e.g., Turkey, India, Brazil, and China) which, through licensed and coproduction arrangements with stronger producers, have mastered the scientific and engineering skills needed to reproduce advanced technology. The survival of their industries as more than enclaves is contingent upon a serious domestic commitment to override economic considerations and carve out an export market niche.

The fourth tier consists of those local or regional powers that are only able to acquire and utilize advanced arsenals effectively. Of course, still below them are those states who either cannot obtain or cannot effectively use modern weapons; such states are condemned to a position of near-permanent inferiority in the system. Given this, the true militarizers of the system are likely to be those states in which regional security threats or weak state structures place great pressures on regimes to achieve a level of military capability beyond the overall relative capabilities of the state. Such states will most likely be found in this fourth tier or below. Again, this implies that the potentially deleterious impact of arms transfers or arms production will be concentrated in states attempting to reach a position in the international or regional hierarchy of power that is not warranted by their underlying economic base or factor endowments.

If this portrait is accurate, the causal connection between arms transfers and production and interstate or intrastate threats to security is tenuous, and the policy prescriptions that derive from this connection are similarly weak. Many analysts focus on the arms transfer and production system as an *autonomous* factor that directly increases insecurity, either by increasing the destructiveness or likelihood of war, by diverting resources from economic development, or by posing threats to citizens from their own state, in order to advocate control of this process as the best means for reducing or halting global militarization. The analysis provided in this chapter suggests that several of the presumed deleterious consequences of arms transfers and production either do not exist or are more complex than is usually imagined,

and further that those that do are not easily susceptible to direct attempts to control arms transfers or production. The wellsprings feeding this process are located in the forces driving state behavior in a self-help international system. Thus the solution to the problem of insecurity in the Third World does not lie in the advocacy of partial fixes targeting any one aspect of the problem, whether it be arms production in the Third World, arms imports to a particular region, or levels of military spending. These are conditioned by global and regional patterns of conflict and military development, and only when the signals, motivations, and actions of many states, especially leading states, change can we expect those states farther down in the global hierarchy to respond in a positive manner.

Notes

1. The writing on the link between military expenditures and economic development, which can be taken as a proxy for the economic dimension of intrastate security, is a partial exception to this (Ball, 1988).

2. Arms transfer and production statistics are among the least reliable figures available. Wherever possible, comparisons between different sources have not been made, and the statistics are used as trend indicators, not as absolute values.

3. This is close to Eide and Thee's (1980:9) formulation of militarization as "the increase in armaments, advances in the destructive capacity of weapons, growing number of people under arms, and dramatic increases in military expenditure."

4. The producers of major weapons systems (using the SIPRI definition of fighter aircraft, helicopters, missiles, battle tanks, and major fighting ships) in 1965 were the People's Republic of China, India, and North Korea. The major producers in both weapon types and volume thereof in 1984 were: the PRC, India, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Argentina, Egypt, and Turkey.

5. State ranking in descending order for actual arms production, with potential arms production, based on defense-industrial capability, in parentheses. Israel (6); India (3); Brazil (2); Yugoslavia (1); South Korea (4); Turkey (5); Indonesia (15); Egypt (11); Pakistan (16); Singapore (12); Iran (9); Columbia (14); Portugal (8); Greece (10); Venezuela (13); Nigeria (17); Chile (7) (Deger, 1986:170).

6. I am indebted to Boutin's (1989) detailed examination of the level of production reached in the Brazilian, Egyptian, and South Korean arms industries for the examples that follow.

7. It should be noted, however, that these spin-offs have proven difficult to find. Deger's (1986:171-176) study of the Indian case, although it admits the possibility of spin-offs, "fails to reveal any significant evidence of spin-off."

Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and the GCC

Amitav Acharya

The Concept of Regime Security

In the theoretical literature as well as in real-life policymaking discourse on international relations, major debates over the meaning of security often revolve around two key questions: "Security against what?" and "Whose security?" The orthodox view of national security is state-centric and external-oriented. Security in this sense is defined as "the physical protection of the state from external threats—violent threats that are predominantly military in nature" (Azar and Moon, 1988:3). However, recent studies have questioned the conceptual adequacy of this view being applied outside of the traditional Western context, especially in explaining the security predicament of Third World states (Ayoob, 1986; Azar and Moon, 1988; Korany, 1986; Buzan, 1988). The ensuing debate forms the basis for an alternative view of security centered on two crucial arguments. The first, addressing the question "Security against what?" points to the relative importance of domestic instability as opposed to external military attack in the national security threat perceptions of Third World countries. The second, relating to the question "Whose security?" stresses the need for a careful distinction to be made between the security interests of the state as opposed to that of its regime.

The two arguments forming part of the alternative view of security are in fact closely related. The concept of national or state security usually implies the protection of the core values of the state, especially its political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Core values in this sense are the fundamental and enduring attributes and functions of the state, cherished by the overwhelming majority of its population, and more importantly expected to survive any change in its regime or government. Protection of these values is the chief responsibility of any regime assuming political control over the state. But frequently, because of their narrow political bases within the societies over which they rule, Third World regimes tend to be concerned

less with the larger well-being of the state than with their own self-preservation. As Buzan argues:

it is tempting to identify national security with the governmental institutions that express the state, but . . . governments and institutions have security interests of their own which are separate from those of the state, and which are often opposed to broader national interests as aligned with them. (Buzan, 1987:6; see also Ayoob, 1986:11)

In this view, the basic attributes of security in the Third World would seem to involve not just the physical protection of the core values of the state from external military threats, but also the maintenance of societal cohesion and ensuring regime survival in the domestic context.

However, an important point about the problem of regime security needs to be made here. Crises of legitimacy and domestic vulnerability need not be the case only with those regimes which come to power through coups or who resort to corrupt means and repression to ensure their self-preservation. Stripped of such pejorative connotation, regime security is basically a question of the ability of the government of the day, the ruling group or elite, to successfully manage and overcome the problems of governance while maintaining the continuity of its authority and hold on power. Regime insecurities may or may not be reflected in the tendency of the regime to use political power for its narrow ends or preserve itself through the use of violence. Although such practices are common in the Third World, it is important to bear in mind that there are many examples of Third World leaders who, despite being genuinely committed to the goal of national development and equity, and enjoying considerable mass support, still do not escape serious challenges to their hold on power because of the lack of indigenous institutions to cope with the political consequences of modernization and development. Unlike Western societies, wherein the questions of governance and durability of leadership are settled through well-defined constitutional procedures and mediated by stable institutions, Third World states, as Ayoob himself points out, suffer from a very low "level of consensus on fundamental issues of social and political organization" (Ayoob, 1986:10). Political institutions are correspondingly weaker and the prevailing mode of political rule is likely to enjoy a low level of legitimacy. Furthermore, even if the regime is committed to the goal of national economic and social development, it may not match it with political liberalization and reform, because it might see its own survival as an important precondition for successful national development. Southeast Asia, especially the ASEAN segment, provides a good example of how seemingly progressive leaders committed to a course of national development nonetheless define national security in terms of their own survival. As Franklin Weinstein points out:

To be sure, the ruling elites see their national responsibilities in broader terms than the preservation of their own privileges. Egalitarian ideologies have become part of the everyday rhetoric of political discourse in Southeast Asia. But when these leaders are forced to make hard decisions, they tend to interpret any threat to their own survival as a challenge to national security. (Weinstein, 1978:20)

In fact, the legitimacy crisis of Third World regimes could stem to a large extent from their policies of modernization, rather than repression. Narrowly based regimes in the Third World often seek greater legitimacy by rapidly bringing to their people the fruits of their policies of national development. But their modernizing policies often run counter to the traditional values and beliefs of their subjects. Modernization could erode the traditional values on which the legitimacy of many Third World regimes are based, or it could prompt a backlash from conservative sectors of the population who resent and resist modernization. The recent political history of the Gulf region provides a good illustration of these problems. The economic and military modernization policies of the Shah of Iran were not accompanied by political liberalization, and eventually aroused conservative anger leading to the overthrow of his regime. Many of the legitimacy problems of the Arab Gulf states stemmed from the erosion of traditional legitimizing values, such as Islam, the tribe, and the extended family, as a result of the rapid modernization of these societies following the oil boom.

In addition to eroding traditional values, modernization could undermine regime stability by introducing new criteria of legitimacy, learned by its population from other societies as a result of increasing communications and cultural exchanges. This problem is almost universal to Third World societies—the notion of legitimacy has been increasingly influenced by Western concepts of political participation. Exposure of students or the middle-class populations of Third World societies to the values of liberal democracy creates the potential for them to challenge the legitimacy of existing power structures in their own societies. Such legitimacy crises could haunt even the most benevolent of authoritarian regimes.

Whether Third World regimes are seen as benevolent or repressive, their security interests may not fully coincide with the security interests of the state or nation. But the distinction between state security and regime security, while apparent in the case of the great majority of Third World countries, might not always be an easy one to make. A careful look at what is referred to as the national security policies of many authoritarian Third World states would show that regimes try and frequently succeed in presenting their own legitimacy problems as national and state security problems. In such cases, regime survival often dictates the official perception and definition of what constitutes a threat to national security. In the orthodox logic of national security, acts by neighbors or extraregional powers are deemed national security threats if such acts raise the prospect of military attack. But there

have been many instances in which governments have portrayed an external geopolitical event as a threat to national security even though such events did not carry any threat of military expansion. Revolutionary upheavals in a neighboring state are the most common examples of such value-based threats that might dominate the national security agenda of neighboring regimes. The linkage is evident in cases where revolutionary events create alternative models of political order or revolutionary regimes manipulate the domestic opposition groups of the regimes in the neighborhood. Such perceived threats to regime survival lead to policy responses involving the full range of national security apparatus of the state, including military force. A study of the origins of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 confirms this thesis. A basic determinant of Iraq's policy toward other Gulf states at that time concerned President Saddam Hussein's own regional ambitions, including his desire to assert Iraqi power by rejecting an insulting border agreement negotiated with the Shah over the control of Shatt al-Arab. But as Bahgat Korany points out, his decision to launch an attack on Iran was based not on this factor, nor on his fear of revolutionary Iran's military might (which had been seriously depleted by purges and desertions), but on the fact that "Iran's Shi'a dominated revolution was encouraging Iraq's Shi'a majority to revolt and topple the Sunni-dominated state elite" (Korany, 1986:553).

Does a concept of security that draws attention to both the physical protection of the state structure as well as the legitimacy problems of its regime help us to explain the full range of security behavior in the Third World? Ayooob and others have highlighted regime security as a key component of the national security perceptions and agenda of individual states. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to understand whether and how regime security concerns explain regionalism in the Third World, a phenomenon that often encapsulates many of the crucial variables of national and regional security within a given geographic area. In the postwar era, a number of Third World countries have viewed regionalism as an important, if not exclusive, framework for addressing their security problems. Evidence for this can be found in the emergence of a number of regional groups on a continental and subregional geographic scope (Ispahani, 1985). But what notion of security underpins their interest and involvement in regionalism? Is it a quest for the security of the state or that of its regime? Is it a response to violent military threats arising from the external sphere or to a shared crisis of political legitimacy of the regimes, rooted essentially within their domestic political milieu?

This chapter addresses these questions by comparing the cases of two of the newer regional groups: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It focuses on the origins and the formative years of ASEAN and the GCC, and identifies the security perceptions of the regional actors during that period who contributed to their interest and involvement in regionalism. For ASEAN this means the

period between its formal establishment in 1967 and the first summit meeting of its leaders in 1976. In the case of the GCC, the relevant period is between the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980. To assess the mix of security challenges perceived by the regional actors, i.e., the relative salience of issues relating to domestic problems of regime legitimacy vis-à-vis possible external military threats to regional actors, the chapter examines the implications of what is usually seen as the major catalyzing events in the evolution of regionalism in both cases. For ASEAN, this event was the Communist victories in Indochina; while for the GCC, the Iranian Revolution can be viewed in a comparable light. By looking at the impact of these events on the security perceptions of the regional actors, an attempt will be made to find answers to two questions: (1) To what extent were the threats from these revolutionary upheavals, as perceived by the regime of the regional actors, shaped by their own existing domestic vulnerabilities? (2) To what extent did the resulting mix of security threats influence, and to what extent were they reflected in, the pattern of security cooperation among the regional actors?

Weak State Regionalism and Regime Security: Conceptual Linkages

If the main theoretical concern of the chapter is to look at regime security as a motive force of regionalism in the Third World, then the available literature on regionalism and regional security is of little help in providing a relevant conceptual framework. The regionalist concepts of peace and security that emerged during the interwar and early postwar era, and that should be the natural starting point for comparing the security orientation of regional organizations such as the ASEAN and GCC, shed little light on the linkage between regionalism and regime security. In the literature on regionalism, the peace and security role of regional organizations is usually defined as "(1) the potential of a regional organization, through its peacekeeping machinery and diplomatic techniques, for controlling the forceful settlement of disputes among its own members, and (2) the potential of the organization to present a common military front against an outside actor or actors" (Miller, 1973).

In the case of the Third World, these roles are best represented in the three original regional organizations: the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Members of the first two organizations were among the foremost advocates of the regionalist position in the famous Regionalist-Universalist debate in the period leading to the formation of the United Nations at the end of World War II (Etzioni, 1970; Potter, 1943; Wilcox, 1965). As a result of the compromise formula adopted at the San Francisco conference, these regional organizations (later joined by the OAU), were given the mandate to develop

appropriate procedures and institutions to manage and resolve international conflicts within their membership (Nye, 1971; Zacher, 1977). As for the security role, both the OAS and the Arab League contain collective defense aspects as part of their formal agenda of cooperation. In the case of the OAS, this machinery is part of its goal of achieving "a common policy in the face of intervention from outside the region" (Miller, 1973:60; Manger, 1953; Child, 1978). The Arab League's security function is aimed primarily at Israel. Although Israel is geographically located within the region, the concept of externality applied by the Arab states toward Israel relates to the latter's making "a rupture with the regionally-specific cultural and economic pattern" (Said, 1986:260). While the OAU has been less successful in developing a collective defense mechanism to resist foreign intervention or to assist its members in crisis situations, it has been active in the pacific settlement of disputes among its members (Cervenka, 1974; Wiseman, 1984; Meyers, 1974; Imobighe, 1980).

While the classical regionalist concepts do not address the security orientation of regional groups that may distinctively relate to regime survival,¹ the more recent literature on regional security, despite its contribution in exposing the limitations of the national security model in the context of the Third World states, does not offer much insight into the motive forces of regional cooperation. The interest of regional security analysts has gravitated more towards exploring the sources of regional conflict rather than defining the conditions of regional cooperation, whether such cooperation is rooted in considerations of regime security or any other motivating factor. The emphasis on identifying the sources of regional conflict has led to theoretical attempts to correlate the problem of domestic instability, including regime vulnerability, and the incidence of regional strife in the Third World. Thus a key assumption of much recent writing on regional security in the Third World has become that the regional relations of "weak states"—a condition involving both structural weakness and regime insecurity—tend to be more conflictual than cooperative or problem-solving (Buzan, 1988:32; Hoffmann, 1981:553). As Buzan contends:

A local security environment composed of weak states contains within itself many sources of instability. A state within such an environment can not count on the political continuity of its neighbours, and therefore can not easily build up a durable and stable set of local political relations. . . . In good part because Third World states themselves are unstable, conflicts between them are rife, alliances are temporary and unreliable. (Buzan, 1988:32)

Buzan's pessimistic outlook on the prospects for weak state regionalism, however, leaves out the theoretically relevant question of whether weak regimes, facing common domestic challenges to their authority and legitimacy, could enter into security arrangements to ensure their self-

preservation. Given that regime security concerns often dictate the overall security policy framework of the state, a convergence of regime security interests could override the animosities and conflict that would normally arise within a local security environment composed of weak states. This possibility is addressed by Ayoob, who argues:

Narrowly-based and insecure Third World regimes, particularly those under increasing challenge domestically and regionally, use the idea of regional security to form co-operative arrangements with similar regimes in their regions to defend themselves as well as to justify their strategic and political links with external powers whose interests converge with the interests of these regimes. (Ayoob, 1986:20)

But Ayoob views such regime cooperation in a somewhat negative light, because it tends to be exclusivist, subregional, and therefore polarizing for the larger region. In a more recent contribution, Buzan also notes the "existence of subregional organizations [which] defines lines of regional rivalry" (Buzan, 1989:6). His argument points to a security dilemma at the regional level, and echoes what Yalem (1979:221) and Nye (1971) consider to be the "conflict creation" potential of regional organizations. This potential is admittedly more present in the case of subregional or microregional groupings than in continental regional organizations. While conceding this prospect, it can be argued, however, that such groups could contribute to an overall reduction of regional tensions in a number of ways. These include their role in removing those segments of regional conflict that previously marked relations among their members by promoting greater domestic stability in the member states through economic, political, and security cooperation, and acting as a deterrent to aggressive designs of strong powers in the wider region. Last but not the least, an inward-looking view of security based on regime solidarity could lessen the dependence of the members on external security guarantees, at least with respect to domestic threats. To the extent that external guarantees are increasingly seen to have little utility in situations of civil strife (witness Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the Shah's regime in Iran), and that the latter constitute the primary threats to security of weak states, a regime value-based framework of regionalism could fulfill some of the major national security goals of Third World countries, and need not just be seen as an agent of regional polarization.

Thus, a theoretical argument can be made that weak states with politically vulnerable regimes could find regional/subregional security arrangements useful for coping with their domestic challenges and countering common threats to regime survival. Their common vulnerabilities arising from similar ideological outlooks and domestic political predicaments can provide the basis for unity in dealing with the regional security environment. Shared perception of a common internal enemy can also provide a strong impetus for collective defense arrangements, in addition to coordination on

measures to ensure internal security. Thus, while alliances of weak powers generally have proven ineffectual in coping with aggression, security cooperation among weak states against threats to domestic and regime security may fare better. Not only do such threats constitute the most pressing security problems of Third World countries, but dealing with them does not require significant military capabilities and in fact can be pursued through non-military means.

ASEAN and GCC

Looking at the specific cases of the ASEAN and the GCC,² one finds that despite being subregional in geographic scope, both bear striking resemblance to the original larger regional organizations in terms of their security orientation and role. Both are multipurpose in orientation and as such can be distinguished from functional and integrative economic associations (such as the East African Community) on the one hand and regional military alliances—such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)—on the other (see Nye, 1971 and Miller, 1973). Thus, the regionalist concepts of peace and security that are reflected in the role of the original regional groups do apply to ASEAN and GCC as well. The political role of the ASEAN and GCC as a forum for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts among their members was clearly a major part of the rationale for their creation. The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 not only resulted from the end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, but also reflected a strong desire on the part of the original five members—Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—to minimize the prospect for any further conflict among themselves. ASEAN was meant to provide a forum in which contentious issues could be discussed and resolved. This role of ASEAN was institutionalized with the creation of a mechanism for conflict resolution at the Bali Summit in 1976 under articles 13–17 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The role of the GCC in peaceful resolution of disputes among its members is similarly articulated in its charter. Article 10 of the charter provides for a mechanism akin to the provisions of the original regional organizations with respect to regional peacemaking. The role of both groups covers management and resolution of political as well as territorial disputes, and the ultimate objective of both with respect to intermember conflict is to create a “security community” in which their members develop “dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’” in intraregional relations (Deutsch, 1957:5–6).

Like the original regional groups, the security perspectives of both ASEAN and GCC stress the goal of regional autonomy vis-à-vis outside influence and intervention. In this respect, these groups differ from Cold War

alliances. Disillusionment with and rejection of great-power security guarantees was a key factor in the evolution of regionalism in both cases. In the case of ASEAN, the departure of British forces from Malaysia and Singapore, the low credibility of the Five Power Defence Arrangements that replaced the British presence, the demise of SEATO (whose members included Thailand and the Philippines), and the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine created the basis for an alternative concept of regionalism among the pro-Western countries of Southeast Asia, which had traditionally based their security options on the credibility of the Western security umbrella. Regional cooperation was seen as an essential response to the threat posed by communist advances in Indochina, a threat against which the US policy of military confrontation was not an entirely credible answer. These developments brought about a greater convergence in the security perspectives of these four states with that of Indonesia, which from the outset had stressed that the close and dependent security ties of regional countries with external powers carried with it the risk of aggravating great-power rivalry in Southeast Asia.

The GCC's declared political and security goals similarly reflected the declining credibility of Western security guarantees. The interest of the conservative Gulf states in regional cooperation can be traced to the British withdrawal from "east of Suez" in the early 1970s. But the United States stepped into the vacuum by encouraging and materially assisting the creation of a framework of regional security centered on a leading role for the Shah of Iran in keeping with the latter's interest in becoming the "regional policeman." It was the collapse of this *de facto* US security umbrella with the overthrow of the Shah's regime in 1979 that became one of the chief catalysts of the GCC. The first summit of the GCC called for "keeping the entire region free of international conflicts, particularly the presence of military fleets and foreign military bases." The GCC's position against foreign military presence in the region stemmed not only from its fear of possible Soviet expansionism, but also its reduced faith in the US security commitment to the survival of conservative regimes. The perceived US failure to help the Shah of Iran in the face of a domestic upheaval contributed to this disillusionment. Since US help was not credible and could even be counterproductive in situations of domestic strife, a regional self-help mechanism was deemed essential. The establishment of the GCC provided the political framework for such a mechanism.

Although the ASEAN and the GCC are clearly in the mold of the original regional organizations, an interpretation of their motive forces solely in terms of the regionalist doctrines manifested by their original regional groups would be highly misleading. It would not explain why these groups, despite their declaratory objectives as instruments of regional order, felt it necessary to exclude other regional actors (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the case of ASEAN, and Iraq and Iran in the case of the GCC) who cherished

the goal of autonomy and theoretically could have formed part of the framework for the pacific settlement of disputes. The explanation for the exclusivist brand of regionalism practiced by ASEAN and the GCC, of course, is to be found in the nature of the regimes which ruled over the member states and the similarities in their political and ideological values. The extent to which these values formed the basis of a shared sense of vulnerability and a common notion of regional insecurity are central factors in the origin and evolution of regionalism in both cases.

Regime Values and Common Domestic Vulnerabilities

Looking at ASEAN, one finds that the member states were remarkably divergent in terms of their physical size, ethnic composition, sociocultural heritage, colonial experience, and postcolonial polity. The ruling regimes were just as disparate, with Indonesia and Thailand under military control, Malaysia and Singapore governed by a parliamentary system in the Westminster model, and the Philippines by a US-style presidential system. However, differences in regime structure based on varied colonial experience were not a significant barrier to an important common element in the political outlook of the ASEAN regimes. This element, a key factor in the formation of ASEAN, has been identified by the former Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Mohammed Ghazalie Shafie:

The concept of free enterprise as they apply [sic] in the ASEAN region is the philosophical basis of ASEAN. The appreciation of this is vital in the understanding of ASEAN and its sense of direction. The countries of the ASEAN region had come together to protect the system of free enterprise as a counterpoise against communism on the one hand, and monopolistic capitalism on the other. (Shafie, 1982:31)

Similarities in regime values among the ASEAN countries were the basis for the notion of a common internal enemy, "seen to feed and depend for its success on a cluster of social conditions that are essentially the same in the various countries" (Dahl, 1982:102). The ASEAN regimes all shared the problems of massive poverty and underdevelopment, and their approach to the problem of national development was in many respects similar. Two elements of this approach are of particular relevance here in understanding the problem of regime legitimacy in ASEAN countries. The first was a "common interest [among the ASEAN regimes] in preventing radical internal political change" (Leifer, 1978:268). This, in turn, led to a common belief that political stability and continuity of leadership should assume priority over political participation in order to create the necessary climate for rapid economic growth. Adjustments to political systems over which the ASEAN regimes presided reflected this shared interest in self-preservation. As Chan Heng Chee points out: "The ASEAN countries, except for Thailand, emerged

from the colonial era experimenting with Western liberal democracy, but each abandoned the original model for variations of authoritarian forms which accommodates degrees of democracy" (Chan, 1982:11). Secondly, ASEAN regimes shared an almost religious belief in the effects of rapid economic growth in diffusing the sources of social and political discontent within their societies. To the extent that such discontent was rooted in chronic poverty and pervasive maldistribution of wealth (including significant urban-rural disparities), ASEAN regimes placed their faith in the "trickle-down" effect of rapid economic growth achieved in a climate of political stability. This assumed that growth achieved through a process of urban industrial development based on the use of advanced technology could lead to automatic adjustments to the overall distribution of wealth (Paribatra and Samudavanija, 1986:67). Greater equity and prosperity, in turn, could eradicate conditions that made their societies prone to insurgency and subversion and enhance the legitimacy of authoritarian political structures over which they presided.

Although the consequences of the ASEAN regimes' development policies are a matter of debate, there is evidence that at least in the short term they did not contribute significantly to any offsetting of their problems of legitimacy. This was reflected in the aggravation of what Snitwongse (1983:144) characterizes as the three major dilemmas facing the ASEAN regimes during the 1970s: "the reconciliation of economic growth with equity, national integration and ethnic pluralism, and political stability and participation." There was a general consensus among ASEAN policymakers that instability resulting from their failure to resolve these dilemmas could be the most serious threats to the political and security order in ASEAN. In this sense, the ASEAN countries' calculation of the mix of threats to regional security were weighted heavily towards domestic challenges, even as the external situation for the ASEAN states deteriorated with the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the US debacle in Indochina. This view was clearly articulated by President Marcos of the Philippines on the eve of the first ASEAN summit in Bali:

Insurgency is the cause of insecurity and it probably will be the cause of insecurity within our region for the next five to ten years. I can not foresee any threat of outright external aggression from any country. . . . Economic crises as well as stagnation will increase the possible valid grievances from which it arises. (*New Straits Times*, January 29, 1976)

The ruling regimes of the GCC states faced a situation similar to their ASEAN counterparts in terms of common domestic vulnerabilities and legitimacy problems. In fact, the notion of a common internal threat was even more appropriate in the case of the GCC members, remarkably homogenous in terms of their history, culture, ethnic, and linguistic identity and political systems. Challenges to the stability of the conservative political order were also similar in all the GCC states. In these societies, the main

security problems are the result of the impact of modernization—the “inter-related growth trends in the economy, technology, education, urban lifestyles, and mass media exposure” (Hudson, 1977:126) on traditional societal values. As Dawisha (1983:4–9) has convincingly argued, the primary threat to regime stability in the Arabian Peninsula stems from the erosion of the three principal “legitimizing values”—Islam, tribe, and extended family—an erosion directly attributable to the social and economic effects of the infusion of oil revenues to the Gulf states following the global oil crisis of the early 1970s. Problems of domestic legitimacy then confronting the Gulf regimes as a result of rapid social change were compounded by their failure to develop institutions for political expression and participation to keep pace with the recent rapid modernization and economic prosperity of their societies (see Harb, 1986:136–137).

For both of the GCC and ASEAN states, the legitimacy problems of the ruling regimes were reflected in a wide variety of domestic political opposition movements. In the case of ASEAN, the main internal threat was communist insurgency. While often viewed as an externally inspired danger, the ASEAN regimes were all too aware that the insurgency movements they faced, such as the Communist Party of Malay (active in Malaysia, Singapore, and southern Thailand), the Communist Party of Thailand, the PKI in Indonesia, and the Communist Party of the Philippines, were rooted in the internal contradictions of their societies. In most cases, the communist insurgencies in the ASEAN countries had established themselves by exploiting the nationalist campaign against colonial rule. In terms of their origins and appeal, communist insurgencies in ASEAN countries corresponded to what Leifer identifies as being the common feature of such insurrections in postcolonial societies: “organized armed opposition to successor elites who offer a radically different vision of modernity and social order” and whose “appeal is cast doctrinally in terms of the values of distributive justice and are designed to attract groups alienated by poverty, by gross disparities of private wealth and by intolerance of a dominant culture” (Leifer, 1980:4). To the extent that socioeconomic patterns in the ASEAN countries in the postcolonial period were marked by these features, communist insurgencies in the region were a product, first and foremost, of factors both internal and endemic to these societies.

The political opposition groups challenging the conservative Gulf regime fell into three categories: communist, radical nationalist, and Islamic fundamentalist (which became prominent after the Iranian Revolution). Until 1974, the most serious challenge to regime survival in the Arabian Peninsula was posed by the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). A breakaway faction of this group, called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, organized a major insurgency in Oman’s Dhofar Province. Although Oman defeated the insurgency with help from the Shah and Britain, the movement had remained active in propaganda. The Saudi

regime also was the target of several opposition groups, among them the Saudi Arabian Communist Party, the Arabian Peninsula People's Union, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saudi Arabia, the Revolutionary Najd Party, the Saudi Arabian National Liberation Front, the Popular Democratic Front, and the Socialist Labour Party in the Arabian Peninsula. Other conservative regimes faced opposition from assorted groups such as the National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Popular Front in Bahrain, and cells of radical Palestinian organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Although many of these groups lacked a credible popular base and were weakened by lack of resources and internal feuding, they nonetheless constituted the main target of the security concerns of the conservative Gulf states.

Impact of Regional Insurrection

To what extent did the problems of domestic stability and legitimacy facing the ruling regimes of the conservative Arabian Peninsula and noncommunist Southeast Asia influence their perception of the security implications of external developments (e.g., the Indochinese Revolution in the case of the ASEAN, and the Iranian Revolution in the case of the GCC)? What was the nature of the threat perceived from these insurrections? Was it a threat of direct military attack or a value-based threat that fed upon the existing domestic vulnerabilities of the regimes?

Taking the case of ASEAN first, the communist takeover of South Vietnam, culminating in the Indochinese Revolution, was not seen by its members as posing a direct military threat to noncommunist Southeast Asia. Although there was some concern that weapons left by the United States could encourage and enhance Vietnam's capacity for armed aggression, any such move on the part of Hanoi was seen as extremely unlikely. A war-weary Vietnam not only needed to pay urgent attention to the formidable task of national reconstruction, it also lacked a credible power projection capability to attack its ASEAN neighbors. Furthermore, in contemplating aggression against pro-Western ASEAN states, Vietnam could not count upon any backing from its powerful communist allies, China and the Soviet Union, both of whom were then seeking improved ties with the United States. Thus, the real threat from developments in Indochina perceived by the ASEAN regimes even prior to the final communist victory in 1975 was seen to lie in the demonstration effect of the communist onslaught against the South Vietnamese regime, on insurgencies already active or dormant within their own countries. As a Malaysian newspaper editorial put it, "If the non-communist [Southeast Asian] states are toppled, they will almost certainly be toppled from within" (*New Straits Times*, May 14, 1975). Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore warned that communist subversion would occur if the ASEAN

countries failed to resolve their "internal contradictions—lack of economic development, and/or lack of an even spread of the benefits of economic development" (*New Straits Times*, November 26, 1975).

The perception of the conservative Arab Gulf regimes of the impact of the Iranian Revolution was remarkably similar to that of the ASEAN regimes with respect to the impact of the Indochinese revolutions. Despite the alarm it caused, the Iranian Revolution was not viewed by its Peninsula neighbors (or for that matter Iraq) to be a direct military threat. Far from flexing the military muscles built by the Shah, the Khomeini regime instead contributed to the further disintegration of the Iranian armed forces. It not only canceled outstanding orders for weapons made by the Shah, but signaled a more inward-looking security policy. Its execution of large numbers of military commanders identified with the Shah's regime led to a serious depletion of the Iranian military. Besides, Iran had to worry more about any possible interference in its internal affairs by the giant neighbor to the north, the Soviet Union. Widespread ethnic strife following the overthrow of the Shah further undermined its ability to launch aggression against the conservative Arab Gulf states.

Rather, it was the political and ideological implications of the revolution that caused disquiet and alarm in the conservative Gulf states. The Saudi regime was especially worried. For the Saudis, as Ayoob (1984:101–102) points out, the Iranian Revolution's "anti-monarchical, anti-Western, anti-American, anti-feudal, and anti-privilege thrust threatened all the major pillars on which the Saudi system rested." Although conservative Arab Gulf states were less repressive than the Shah and enjoyed a better relationship with the clergy, they were not immune to the kind of backlash that the Shah's modernizing policies had provoked from the traditional sectors of their population. They were also concerned that the success of the radical Islamic forces in Iran could encourage elements within their own societies who might be resentful of their pro-Western outlooks and policies.

These fears were confirmed by the Khomeini regime's launching of an active policy to export its revolution, with the special focus of this effort being the conservative Gulf regimes. The latter were portrayed as un-Islamic and corrupt, as having lost their right to rule because of their dependence on Western powers. Iran's frontal assault on its neighboring Arab regimes was helped by the presence of large Shi'a minorities in the Arabian Peninsula whose relative economic backwardness and perception of being discriminated against at the hands of the Sunni elite made them ideal targets for Khomeini's revolutionary message. The impact of Iran's campaign was felt as signs of unrest among the Shi'ite population became evident in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province as well as in Kuwait and Bahrain. Thus, while a military threat from Iran to the conservative Gulf states did not seem likely (until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War), the Iranian Revolution was seen as presenting a grave threat to regime survival in the conservative Gulf states.

Developments in the extraregional sphere also formed the basis for a common security challenge to the conservative Gulf states. The danger of a spillover of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Peninsula remained a major concern. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another major development perceived by the Gulf states as a threat to regional security, especially because it seemed to climax an incremental pattern of Soviet influence-seeking and interventionism in the periphery of the Gulf—Moscow's other moves being its growing strategic ties with Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, and Ethiopia. But the importance of these events relative to the domestic vulnerabilities of the GCC regimes could be overstated. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was not likely to lead to an invasion of the Gulf, not the least because of its failure to quickly pacify Afghanistan and the prospect of a swift US military response, promised by the Carter administration. Any possible spillover of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Gulf was similarly not so much a direct military spillover, but a political one threatening regime legitimacy in the conservative Gulf states. The Palestinian issue had emerged as a major test of legitimacy in Arab politics, and the GCC states faced the prospect of getting embroiled in a new round of Arab-Israeli warfare through their support for the Arab confrontation states. Failure to provide such support carried the risk of a Palestinian backlash within their own societies, in which the Palestinians constituted a significant segment of skilled migrant labor. Thus, external threats such as the Arab-Israeli conflict became important to the security of the GCC states largely in the context of the domestic vulnerabilities already extant within their societies (in this case dependence on foreign labor).

Regime Survival as an Objective of Regional Security Cooperation

To what extent were regime insecurities emanating from deep-rooted social, political, and economic factors and aggravated by revolutionary insurrections in the neighborhood, reflected in the political and security agenda of the two regional groups? In the case of ASEAN, this linkage is evident from two aspects of its early regional security orientation: the concepts of regional resilience and its rejection of an alliance option in favor of bilateral cooperation on border insurgencies.

The concept of national and regional "resilience," advanced by the New Order regime of President Suharto of Indonesia, and adopted as something of an ASEAN motto by other members of the group, highlights the importance of domestic order and regime stability as an objective of the regional agenda. The concept of national resilience is an

inward-looking concept, based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances or under the military umbrella of a great

power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism. (Irvine, 1982:40)

Regional resilience is the sum total of national resilience in individual ASEAN states, that is:

If each member nation [of ASEAN] can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience can result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts. (Wanandi, 1984:305)

The internal stability and regime legitimacy aspects of the ASEAN's political agenda were further underscored in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord which committed each ASEAN member to "eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thereby strengthening national and ASEAN resilience," and making "an essential contribution to international peace and security." Another aspect of ASEAN regionalism, its role in the pacific settlement of intra-ASEAN disputes, can be similarly viewed in terms of its contribution to domestic stability and political continuity in the member states. As Michael Leifer points out, "the management of intra-mural tensions within ASEAN will enable more effective individual attention to be paid to internal revolutionary challenge in an environment in which internal security is believed to be indivisible among the five states of the Association" (Leifer, 1980:6).

The salience of regime survival in ASEAN's security orientation is further evident from its attitude toward the issue of military cooperation. ASEAN states from the very outset rejected the idea of creating a military pact because they did not

perceive the existence of a major external threat, but they [were] concerned with threats from within their national borders, which could invite outside forces to create instabilities through subversion and infiltration. (Wanandi, 1984:305)

While rejecting the concept of a pact, ASEAN states developed an extensive network of bilateral security ties focusing on the threats of domestic instability and communist insurgency. Many of these ties predated the formation of ASEAN, e.g., the bilateral cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand (1959), the 1964 agreement to control border movement between Indonesia and the Philippines, and the active cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia after the end of their hostilities. In fact, the swiftness with which the new anticommunist regime of President Suharto moved to establish security links with Malaysia suggests that the problem of the insurgency along their common border was a major motivating factor in Indonesia's newfound interest in cooperation with her neighbors.

Such bilateral security arrangements expanded in scope following the establishment of ASEAN. A new security agreement between Malaysia and Thailand, signed in 1970, provided for combined operation as well as hot pursuit of insurgents into each others' territory. Similar joint operations against communist insurgents were carried out by Indonesia and Malaysia in 1971. Although ASEAN states deliberated over the need for a multilateral security arrangement against communist subversion (as proposed by President Marcos of the Philippines), bilateral and multilateral intelligence exchanges on the activities of communist and other political opposition groups had become a regular practice by the time of the Bali summit in 1976 (Simon, 1986; Palmer and Reckford, 1987:116–127; Acharya, 1990).

But the effectiveness and adequacy of these arrangements should not be overstated. Two factors were especially important in undermining ASEAN security cooperation in its formative years: (1) Malaysia's territorial dispute with the Philippines over Sabah which prevented any arrangement between the two countries; (2) a general fear held by the members that any ASEAN security arrangement would provoke a hostile response from Vietnam. Mutual suspicions between Singapore and its two Malay neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, especially the latter, militated against closer and effective security cooperation. In addition, all ASEAN members except Indonesia continued to maintain strong linkages with external powers, including the United States, Britain, and Australia, as a deterrent against perceived Vietnamese expansionism. Nonetheless, border cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia as well as between Thailand and Malaysia did have a major impact in curbing communist insurgency in these countries. Similarly, while Singapore's political ties with Malaysia were often marked by tension, this did not prevent them from close cooperation over internal security issues (Acharya, 1989b:146). The fact that these arrangements were neither comprehensive in nature nor always effective against the threat concerned should not detract from the fact that they were an important basis for overall ASEAN solidarity.

The GCC's agenda of security cooperation was even more directly focused on internal threats to regime security. The GCC states had from the outset adopted cooperation on "two aspects of security: an internal aspect and a general strategic and defence aspect" (Acharya, 1990; Kechichian, 1985; Guazzone, 1988). Of these, the internal aspect was by far the more important. The GCC states' concern with internal security predated its formation. In 1978, a central computer bank was created in Riyadh to facilitate intelligence exchanges between the conservative Gulf states. In August 1980, the Interior ministers of the GCC states responded to the Iranian Revolution by taking note of "the social changes which have begun to infiltrate into modern Arab societies" and called for joint efforts to compensate for any weakness that may affect the traditional codes of conduct and any disturbance in the social edifice" (Rubin, 1983:138). These concerns

were soon reflected in bilateral as well as multilateral agreements covering domestic security problems. The bilateral agreements, signed at the Saudi initiative, provide for "cooperation between the ministries of interior in all fields; the regulation of relationship between border guards, combatting infiltration and crime, the exchange of information in all fields, and the extradition of criminals" (Acharya, 1989a:17). In another move, the establishment of a GCC Rapid Deployment Force was a response to a failed coup attempt in 1981 against the Bahraini regime by Iranian-backed dissidents. While this GCC force was touted as a deterrent to external threats, its limited force structure made usefulness in such scenarios extremely doubtful, supporting the view that GCC military integration was aimed at creating an "internal security force" to be rushed to the aid of regimes faced with domestic disturbances.

The GCC's emphasis on internal and regime security was further underscored in the conclusion of a "comprehensive security agreement" signed in December 1987. The key aims of this agreement were to prevent citizens of one member state from interfering in the internal affairs of another, and to insure cooperation among the members to control political dissidence. These objectives were to be achieved through measures such as intelligence-sharing, a common ban on publications considered subversive, improved police communications, and standardization of the laws relating to residence, work, and civil conditions in the member states.

Like that of ASEAN, security cooperation among the GCC members was marked by several limitations. On the one hand, structural constraints such as lack of adequate manpower and industrial capacity, divergent perceptions of Iranian power, and differences over the role of the United States in the region were major barriers to security cooperation. On the other hand, fear of Saudi domination of any military framework was a key factor in slowing the progress towards and implementation of a GCC comprehensive security agreement. Moreover, there was a realization that subversion aided and abetted by outside powers, such as Iran and Iraq, would require assistance from outside security partners of the GCC. This led to continuation of the GCC's security dependence on Pakistan, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as Western powers such as the United States. Kuwait's request for US protection against the tanker war in the Gulf in 1987, and again following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, starkly demonstrated the limits of the GCC's professed goal of self-reliance and of its capacity to insure the regime security of a member confronting determined aggression from another state.

On the other hand, the nature and implications of the Iraqi invasion precisely support the main theoretical argument of this chapter. The Iraqi invasion was not an internal threat, nor was it directed against the Al-Sabah regime. The real Iraqi target was Kuwaiti oil and territory, the so-called "core-values" underlying conventional definitions of security. The Iraqi attack was

an external threat backed by overwhelming military force. It did not manifest in the shape of pro-Saddam demonstrations and strikes. Had the Iraqi leader wanted to topple the Kuwaiti regime through subversion (e.g., promotion of pro-Saddam or anti-Emir demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of civil disturbance), rather than outright invasion, the GCC's internal security measures, including its own rapid deployment force, could have been activated in defense of the Kuwaiti regime.

As emphasized earlier, the GCC was never intended to cope with conventional external threats like the Iraqi invasion. As Nancy Troxler succinctly stated, "The intention [of the GCC regimes] was not to form a regional military pact, but rather to stabilize the local governments so they could continue to rule with a minimum of internal threats to their regimes in an economically productive environment" (Troxler, 1987:12). Insofar as external threats were concerned, the GCC regimes were aware of their limitations and the need to seek help from outside powers. The response of the GCC states, led by Saudi Arabia, in soliciting assistance from a US-led international force against Iraq, the subsequent events of the war, and its aftermath—in which Gulf state military forces have played virtually no role vis-à-vis Iraq—confirms this interpretation.

Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing discussion of the origins and evolution of the GCC and ASEAN, a number of observations can be made with respect to the main theoretical question posed at the outset, i.e., the prospect of weak states with internally vulnerable regimes to enter into security arrangements with like-minded regimes in the region to counter common threats to regime security.

In both cases, members of the regional associations considered internal challenges, including threats to regime survival fueled by discontent over ideological, political, and economic issues, with far more seriousness than the possibility of any external military threats. The ruling regimes perceived the security implications of major geopolitical events in the wider region in terms of the latter's possible or actual impact on their own domestic vulnerabilities. In both cases, these supposedly external events did not constitute a likely threat of military invasion. But they were regarded as security threats because of their potential to aggravate the existing domestic challenges to the ruling regimes, in part by presenting models of political systems that were radically at variance with, and potentially more mass-based, than their own. The ASEAN states, sharing a capitalist and pro-Western outlook, were concerned that the communist victory in Indochina would encourage their internal communist insurgencies. In the case of the GCC, the overthrow of the Shah, and the emergent Iranian republic

espousing a revolutionary Islamic worldview, was seen as a challenge to the legitimacy of the conservative rulers.

Regime security concerns were a major factor in shaping the nature and agenda of security cooperation undertaken by members of both the regional organizations. Joint internal security measures, including intelligence exchanges, political extradition, and joint operations against subversive elements, were a marked feature of bilateral and multilateral collaboration among the members of the regional groups.

While the GCC's willingness and ability to develop multilateral security arrangements contrasts with the ASEAN members' preference for bilateral ties outside the framework of the grouping, the two groupings faced a number of similar constraints, including political differences and divergent threat perceptions within their membership, in insuring effective security cooperation. There remained a gap between their rhetoric of self-reliance and reality. As a consequence, the members of both groupings continued to value their external security linkages, despite professing regional autonomy and self-reliance as a long-term objective. But regional security cooperation did help to underscore a greater commitment to regional autonomy that could mitigate the perception of excessive dependence on outside powers. Despite the persistence of intragroup conflicts, common regime security concerns were powerful factors in holding these groups together and in shaping the nature of bilateral and multilateral cooperation among their members. The fact that none of the regimes fell to internal threats during the period under survey, while not entirely attributable to regional cooperation, was nonetheless helped by it. This salience of regime security is a distinctive mark of the two groups that also sets them apart from other regional/organizations in the Third World, especially from the collective defense arrangements of Arab League and the OAS, and the peacekeeping machinery of the OAU. Among the subregional groups, only the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) has promoted internal security cooperation among its members through their participation within a "Regional Security System" based in Barbados (Simmons, 1985).

A comparative study of the emergence of ASEAN and GCC not only provides insight into the linkage between regionalism and regime security, but also, by implication, helps us rethink the concept of national and regional security in the Third World. It validates the relevance of the question "Whose security?" in any meaningful discussion of national security problems of Third World countries, and it establishes the theoretical basis for going beyond regionalist concepts of peace and security, which have until now provided the main criteria for evaluating the role and effectiveness of regional groups in the Third World. This is because the imperative of regionalism in the cases of both the ASEAN and the GCC was originally conceived not only in terms of the need for solidarity against the outside world, but also in terms of a general agreement based on the notion of a

common internal enemy. While the original regional organizations, concerned as they were with the problems of decolonization, neocolonialism, and great-power rivalry, looked to the outside security environment to generate their regionalist impulse, the major inspiration for regionalism in the case of both the ASEAN and the GCC has come from within the boundaries of their member states. In the perceptions of the regional actors in the context of their individual security predicament as well as their outlook on regionalism, the notion of national and regional security has in essence been a concern with regime security.

Notes

1. There are some instances in which regime security has been a consequence, albeit an indirect one, of the political and security role of the original regional organizations. All regional organizations are based on norms of conflict prevention, forbidding member states from interfering in the internal affairs of one another, thereby reducing the possibility of regime instability caused by meddling neighbors. In the case of the OAS, its stand against communism in the hemisphere, and its expulsion of Cuba from membership exemplified regime security as an objective of regional solidarity. But this orientation of the OAS reflects its subordination to the dictates of its superpower patron, the United States. The other two regional groups also contributed to regime security by virtue of the fact that membership in these groups often added to the legitimacy of the regime in newly liberated territories. However, this was basically international rather than domestic legitimacy. Unlike the OAS, membership in the OAU and the League was offered to those regional states seeking it without regard to the internal political and ideological characteristics of their regimes. Moreover, in all these groups, while acceptance as a member enhanced the legitimacy of the regimes, regime security was *not* the primary purpose behind the creation of these groups. And it is in this crucial respect that the two regional groups, ASEAN and GCC, differ from the original regional organizations.

2. ASEAN, formed in August 1967, originally consisted of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. Brunei became its sixth member in 1984. The GCC held its inaugural summit in May 1981 with the participation of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and United Arab Emirates.

Although ASEAN lacks a formal charter, its basic objectives are spelled out in four key documents: the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 (establishment of ASEAN); the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 (Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace and Freedom and Neutrality, i.e., ZOPFAN); the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976 (pacific settlement of disputes); and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 (endorsement of security arrangements among the members on a nonorganizational basis). The GCC adopted its charter in May 1981. From a reading of these documents, both the ASEAN and GCC emerge as multipurpose groupings espousing cooperation in economic, cultural, and political fields.

A major difference between the two groupings concerns the formalization of security activity. The GCC developed security programs under its formal institutional framework, holding regular meetings of its defense ministers,

interior ministers, and armed forces chiefs of staff. Joint military exercises among the member states on a bilateral and multilateral basis became commonplace. No such institutionalization has taken place in the case of ASEAN, whose members rejected any formal military cooperation under the ASEAN banner. However, ASEAN has endorsed bilateral security arrangements within its membership, such as military exercises, border security, and intelligence sharing (which is also multilateral), as an important ingredient of regionalism. Over the years, these bilateral ties have become so overlapping and interlocking (in popular ASEAN parlance, a defense spider web), that no serious evaluation of ASEAN regionalism can be made without reference to these bilateral ties, even though member states continue to deny any desire for entering into an alliance.

PART 4
THIRD WORLD SECURITY
IN A RESTRUCTURED
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective

*Barry Buzan*¹

In recent writings (Buzan, 1988a:39–42) I concluded that in studying Third World security more attention needed to be given both to state structures and to regional patterns of security relations. It is regional security that I want to explore further here, having already discussed this issue in some detail elsewhere under the label “security complexes” (Buzan and Rizvi, 1986; Buzan, 1989a; Buzan 1991). My intention in this chapter is to extend the idea of security complexes by looking both at the history that led to their emergence in the Third World, and at the way the current pattern of security complexes relates to the political structure of the international system. This chapter is organized into four sections: (1) recaps the idea of security complexes, (2) puts the idea of regional security into historical perspective, (3) surveys the current pattern of regional security, and (4) draws some conclusions about the relationship of this pattern to the shift away from bipolarity in the international system structure.

Security Complexes

Security is a relational phenomenon, and therefore one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence within which it is embedded. The trouble with this logic is that if the security of each is related to the security of all, then nothing can be fully understood without understanding everything. That poses an unrealistic task. Consequently, the only hope of defining manageable subjects for study that neither lose, nor succumb to, the vital sense of the whole, is to find a hierarchy of analytical levels within the international system. The obvious candidates for such levels are individual states (at the bottom), the international system (at the top), and regions (in the middle). Each of these levels must identify durable, significant, and substantially self-contained features of the security problem. By

"substantially self-contained," I do not mean totally free-standing, but rather a significant pattern of security interrelations that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it. The dynamics of these security relations can be military, political, societal, economic, environmental, or some combination. Israel and Syria, for example, would be military rivals even if neither of them had been supported by a superpower sponsor. Pakistan and India threaten each other politically, militarily, and societally regardless of what great-power pressures play on the South Asian region. Myanmar, South Africa, and Sudan have serious domestic instabilities regardless of their relations with other states. No one level will, by itself, be adequate to understand the security problem as a whole, and the full meaning of each will only become clear when it is seen in relation to the others.

The top and bottom levels of this scheme are well developed. There is an endless security literature discussing the system and the state levels of analysis. But the important set of security dynamics at the regional level often tends to get lost or discounted. At that middle level, one finds only the hazy notions of regional balances of power and subsystems, or crude media references that use regions to describe whatever location currently contains a newsworthy level of political turbulence. Comprehensive security analysis requires that one take particular care to investigate how the regional level mediates the interplay between states and the international system as a whole. Unless that level is properly comprehended, neither the position of the local states in relation to each other, nor the character of relations between the great powers and local states, can be understood properly. The regional level offers opportunities to develop the concepts and language for systematic comparative studies, still an area of conspicuous weakness in Third World studies. It also provides a structural framework capable of identifying significant continuities, and therefore also capable of serving as a baseline against which to assess significant change.

In security terms, "region" means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other. Such a sense has historically been very strong in thinking about the European balance of power. But because the European states came to dominate the world system—and indeed to occupy much of it directly—no similarly strong sense of other local security subsystems has developed within Western thinking about international relations. Even the massive processes of decolonization, which should logically have caused attention to be paid to the reemergence of local security subsystems, was overshadowed by the global rivalry between the superpowers.

In defining regional security complexes, the principal element is the pattern of amity and enmity among states. By amity I mean relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectations of protection or support. By enmity I mean relationships set by suspicion and fear. Separating these two

poles is a broad band of indifference and/or neutrality, in which amity and enmity are either too weak to matter much, or else mixed in a way that produces no clear leaning one way or the other. Patterns of amity/enmity arise from a variety of issues that could not be predicted from a simple consideration of the distribution of power. These range from specific things such as border disputes, interests in ethnically related populations, and ideological alignments, to long-standing historical links, whether positive or negative, such as those between Jews and Arabs, British and Americans, and Vietnamese and Chinese. On this basis, regional security complexes can be identified in terms of patterns of amity and enmity substantially confined within some particular geographical area. These patterns have political, societal, and economic determinants as well as military ones. A security complex is broadly defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns are sufficiently closely linked that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Security complexes emphasize the interdependence both of rivalry and of shared interests. In principle, a security complex could be defined by either positive or negative security interdependence. Thus, a spectrum of possibilities exists ranging from what Väyrynen (1984) calls a "regional conflict formation," through Jervis's (1982) "security regime," to Deutsch's (1957) "security community." In practice, most security complexes are still found towards the conflict-formation end of this spectrum.

A security complex thus represents more than just the arbitrary abstraction implied in the "any subset" definition of subsystem. In part, the idea of security complexes is an analytical construct whose central justification is that it helps to give a clearer view of a complicated reality. But security complexes are also an empirical phenomenon with historical and geopolitical roots. In theoretical terms, they can be derived from both the state and the system levels. Looked at from the bottom up, security complexes result from interactions between individual states. They represent the way in which the spheres of concern that states have about their environment interact with the linkage between the intensity of military, political, and societal threats, and the shortness of the range over which they are perceived. Because most threats operate more potently over short distances, security interactions with neighbors will tend to have first priority. It is the relative intensity of adjacent threats that gives rise to regional security complexes as significant subpatterns in the international system.

Seen from the top down, security complexes are generated by the interaction of anarchy and geography. The political structure of anarchy confronts all states with the security dilemma, but the otherwise seamless web of security interdependence is powerfully mediated by the effects of geography. Unless capabilities for transportation are very unevenly distributed (i.e., so as to offset the effects of geography), as they were during the nineteenth century, all states will tend to be thrust into closer contact

with their neighbors than with those further afield. That contact will tend to generate patterns of regional security interaction more intense than, and distinct from, those arising with more distant states. By either of these routes, regional security complexes can be seen as characteristic products of an anarchic international system. They represent durable rather than permanent patterns within such a system. Other things being equal, one should expect to find these localized nodes of distinctively intense security interdependence existing throughout the system.

The empirical side of this argument courts the charge of reification (treating abstractions as objects). But the fact that security complexes are in some sense real is important. It is their reality that explains the mediating effect they have on relations between the great powers and the local states. The reality of security complexes lies more in the individual lines of amity, enmity, and indifference between states, than in the notion of a self-aware subsystem. Like a balance of power, a security complex can exist and function regardless of whether or not the actors involved recognize it. They will, of course, recognize the particular lines of threat that bear on them, for if they did not, the whole idea of security complexes would be void. But they may well not see, or appreciate fully, the whole pattern of which they are a part. Typically, states will be much more aware of the threats others pose to them than they will be of the threat they pose to others. Though recognition of the complex, as with a balance of power, is not a necessary condition for its existence, if recognition occurs, it may well influence the policies of the actors involved by making them more conscious of the larger relational context underlying their specific policy problems. The development of such awareness might well be seen as a precondition for successful regional security management.

The dominance of particular amity/enmity relationships over awareness of the whole complicates the process of identifying security complexes in hard scientific terms. The individual lines of security concern can be traced quite easily by observing how states' fears shape their foreign policy and military behavior. Pakistan deploys the bulk of its army against India rather than on its borders with China, Afghanistan, or Iran. Thailand is much more concerned about threats from Vietnam than from any of its other neighbors. Greece worries much more about Turkey than about its other neighbors. But assessing the overall pattern formed by those lines, and particularly finding within the pattern concentrations of interaction that are strong enough to constitute a complex, may be a matter of controversy. The problem of the seamless web is at its most acute in the regional level of analysis.

The task of identifying a security complex involves making judgments about the relative strengths of security interdependencies among different countries. In some places these will be very strong, as between India and Pakistan, in others relatively weak, as between Indonesia and Australia. In some places the interdependencies will be positive, as in the mutually

supportive neutralities of Sweden and Finland, in others negative, as in the triangular rivalry among Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Usually, they will arise from local relationships, but when very large powers are involved, a whole group of states can be bound together by a common threat. The squeezing of the Western European states by superpower rivalry during the Cold War provides an example of this kind of interdependence (Buzan, 1989b; Buzan et al., 1990: chapters 3 and 4). In some places security interdependence will be very low, and these point to boundaries between more intense nodes of interaction. Myanmar, for example, marks a boundary where the local security dynamics of South and Southeast Asia stand, as it were, back to back.

Within the overall seamless web of security interdependence, one can thus expect to find patterns shaped by the different intensities of the lines of amity and enmity. A security complex exists where a set of security relationships stands out from the general background by virtue of its relatively strong, inward-looking character, and the relative weakness of its outward security interactions with its neighbors. Security interdependencies will be more strongly focused among the members of the set than they are between the members and outside states. The boundaries between such sets will thus be defined by the relative indifference attending the security perceptions and interactions across them. The strong insecurity links between Iran and Iraq put them clearly within the same complex, while the relatively weak links between Iran and Pakistan, and between Myanmar and all its neighbors, suggest the existence of boundaries between complexes. Evidence for the existence of security complexes also comes from patterns of war. It is notable, for example, that several substantial wars in South Asia have had virtually no impact on Southeast Asia or the Gulf. Conversely, major wars in Southeast Asia and the Gulf have had little discernible impact on South Asia. This insulation from the upheavals of neighbors points strongly to the existence of distinct nodes of concentration in the pattern of security relations across southern Asia, and suggests the existence of three distinct security complexes in that area.

The principal factor defining a complex is usually a high level of threat/fear which is felt mutually among two or more major states. Unless they are world-class powers, these states will usually be close neighbors. In theory, a high level of trust and friendship can also serve as a binding force, as it does amongst the ASEAN and Nordic groups of states. Instances of this defining a whole complex are rare, though Europe seems to be moving in this direction. More commonly, the existence of subregional organizations defines lines of regional rivalry, as in the case of ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) (Väyrynen, 1988:194–197). In South Asia, the complex is defined by the Indo-Pakistan rivalry, while in the Gulf, it is defined by a three-sided rivalry among Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and in

Southeast Asia, at least up to the early 1990s, by the rivalry between the ASEAN group and Vietnam. The extent to which neighboring local dynamics like these are distinct is indicated by the rhetoric of the states concerned, by their military deployments, and by the record of their conflicts.

One reason for using the criteria of mutuality in defining a security complex is the problem that otherwise exists because of a lopsided security link between two major local states. The relationship between China on the one hand, and India and many of the Southeast Asian states on the other, provides a clear example (Buzan and Rizvi, 1986: chapter 7; Buzan, 1988b). China is a major security concern for India, and also for Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia: arguably even the principal one. Chinese military strength lies close to India's and Vietnam's main centers of population, and China has fought fierce though small-scale border wars with both. This evidence points to a strong insecurity link and therefore possibly to a security complex. But the lack of balance in the relationships points to distinct complexes instead. India and Vietnam are relatively minor security concerns for China, whose main security worries are with the superpowers. Indian and Vietnamese military strength sit far from China's heartlands, and weigh little compared with the other threats to China's interests.

A situation like this typically indicates the existence of a boundary between a lower- and a higher-level security complex. A lower-level complex is composed of local states whose power does not extend much, if at all, beyond the range of their immediate neighbors. This constraint on power is a key element in the existence of relatively self-contained local security dynamics among sets of neighboring states. A higher-level complex, by contrast, contains great powers: states like the United States, whose power may well extend far beyond their immediate environment, or states like China and the Soviet Union, whose power is sufficient to impinge on several regions of what their enormous physical size makes a vast "local environment." Higher-level complexes define the system or global level of analysis. In effect, the global, or "higher"-level great-power security complex is simply another way of talking about the power structure, or polarity, or the international system. The distinction between lower- and higher-level complexes thus becomes important when all of the levels of security analysis are reintegrated. Given large power differentials between the higher and lower levels, one expects unequal intervention from higher to lower to be a normal feature of the system. One major advantage of the security complex idea is precisely that it provides an insight into the regional-level security dynamics that shape and mediate such intervention.

Because security complexes are in part geographical entities, they will often include by default a number of minor states. Due to their relatively low power in comparison with their neighbors, these states may have little impact on the structure of the complex. Their own securities are intimately bound up in the pattern of the larger states, but they can only become a

source of threat to a larger state by virtue of the impact of their alignments on relations among the larger powers. In the Gulf, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE are in this position. In South Asia, it is occupied by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, nearly all of which are tied closely to India by the dictates of geography and culture. Some of these small states may play buffer roles within the local security dynamics: e.g., Switzerland, Belgium, Cambodia, Jordan, Kuwait, and (before 1976) Lebanon.

As already noted, some states occupy insulating positions between neighboring security complexes. They define and occupy the boundaries of indifference between the self-contained dynamics on either side of them. Burma is a very clear example of this role between South and Southeast Asia, as is Turkey between Europe and the Middle East, Mauritania between the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, and Afghanistan between South Asia and the Middle East. These insulators may exist in relative isolation from the security dynamics on either side, as in the case of Myanmar, or they may, as it were, face both ways on the edges of neighboring complexes without linking them, as Turkey and Afghanistan do. A variant on this theme is those states that act as insulators between lower- and higher-level complexes. Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Yugoslavia played this role between the Soviet empire and Western Europe during the Cold War, and Nepal plays it between China and India.

The question of whether cultural and racial ties should be a factor in identifying security complexes is an interesting one. It seems likely that shared cultural and racial characteristics among a group of states would cause them both to pay more attention to each other in general, and to legitimize mutual interventions in each other's security affairs in particular. The South Asian complex, for example, coincides with what Subrahmanyam has called a "civilizational area."² It is not difficult to find evidence that Arab, Latin American, and Islamic cultural factors likewise facilitate and legitimize security interdependence among a large group of states. A similar line of ethnocultural thinking underlies much traditional analysis of European history, with its emphasis on the role of Latin Christendom in defining a community of states. This factor is particularly clear in the Middle East, a vast area stretching from Morocco to Oman, and from Syria to Somalia. Within that area, the idea of an Arab nation and the transnational political force of Islam combine to create a potent regional political arena. Arab nationalism and Islam both weaken the identity of the local states, legitimizing an unusually high degree of security interpenetration (Mandelbaum, 1988:268-271). They stimulate a marked propensity to establish regional organizations (the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council, and the Maghreb Group), and even to promote (mostly with little success) mergers between states. They also play a major part in defining the main nodes of conflict in the region centered

on three non-Arab states embedded within it—Israel, Ethiopia, and Iran—the first two of which are not Islamic, and the third of which is the representative of Islam's principal schism. In analyzing the shape and structure of security complexes cultural and racial patterns may well be an important contributing factor, though they come second to the patterns of security perception, which are the principal defining factor.

Even using these guidelines, there are bound to be empirical disagreements about the relative strength of different lines of security interdependence, and therefore about the location of boundaries distinguishing one security complex from another. Measuring variables like amity and enmity is an even less precise business than measuring power or sociopolitical cohesion, though in all of these cases the main features usually stand out quite clearly even in the absence of scientific scales for comparison. As argued above, security complexes are a natural product of anarchic structure mediated by geography. Other things being equal, one should therefore expect to find a pattern of such complexes covering the entire international system. Sometimes this is a fairly straightforward exercise, as in South Asia. But other things, of course, are not always equal. As a consequence there are cases where security complexes are hard to find, and cases where the correct placement of boundaries is not obvious.

There are two general conditions that explain why a security complex may be hard to find. The first is that in some areas local states are so weak that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries. These states have domestically directed security perspectives, and there is not enough security interaction between them to generate a local complex. These conditions are characteristic of some parts of Africa, and perhaps also among the small Pacific Ocean island states, where very weak powers are separated by vast insulating expanses of water.

The second condition is more complicated. It occurs when the direct presence of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states. This condition is called overlay. Overlay is qualitatively different from the normal patterns of interaction and intervention that one expects to find in relationships between lower-level (local) complexes and higher-level (global, great-power) ones. At a minimum, overlay involves substantial long-term stationing of military forces by outside powers in the region. It may also involve effective political takeover, as in the case of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe after World War II. As the term implies, overlay involves the subordination of the locally generated security dynamics of the region to those of the overlaying power(s). The mere existence of alliances between states within a complex and outside great powers, as occurs in both South and Southeast Asia, does not constitute overlay.

The best examples of overlay are the period of European colonialism in what is now the Third World, and the submergence of European security

dynamics by superpower rivalry after World War II (Buzan et al., 1990:chapter 3). By definition, under overlay one does not know what the local security dynamics are, and therefore cannot identify a local complex.³ One knows only what the local dynamics were before overlay. Since overlay is normally a transforming political experience of many decades duration, one can only speculate as to what the local dynamics might be once overlay breaks up. When the colonial overlay lifted, it left behind the more than one hundred territorial states that now populate the Third World. As superpower overlay lifts from Europe, it is obvious that what is emerging bears only a very partial resemblance to the pre-1945 dynamics. Indeed, what the character of the European security complex will be in the twenty-first century is one of the great speculative questions of the day.

One problem in locating the boundaries of security complexes whose existence is not in doubt involves the existence of the lopsided security interdependence that occurs when higher- and lower-level complexes are physically adjacent. Significant security relationships may exist across these boundaries, as in the case of China's disputes with India and Vietnam noted above. The argument here is not that such relationships should be ignored or discounted by being defined out of the security complex, but that the best place to deal with them is when looking at the interaction between the higher-level complex at the system level, and the lower-level ones rooted in particular regions. This issue, in other words, comes clear when all of the levels in the security analysis from domestic to global are reassembled into a complete picture. The same logic applies to cross-linking alliances such as SEATO, or the many bilateral alliances between the superpowers and Third World countries.

Once the regional level is established, then the full range of levels that comprise a comprehensive analytical framework can be sketched out. At the bottom end lies the domestic security environment of individual states. It is vital to understand the internal character of the states concerned, because weak states with unstable sociopolitical structures clearly have more vulnerabilities, and therefore face different and more complicated security problems than do strong states. Next comes the regional level, on which one finds the lower-level, or local, security complexes. One would expect security relations to be relatively intense within these complexes, and relatively subdued between them. Within a large, many-membered regional complex such as that in the Middle East, there might be subcomplexes of particularly high local security interdependence. In some instances, significant interplay can occur across the boundaries of indifference that mark one complex off from another. Thus relations between security complexes also comprise a layer within the framework, and one that can become important if major changes in the pattern of security complexes are under way (i.e., if the pattern of regional security is changing because the boundary between two local complexes is collapsing, as would happen, for example, if Pakistan got

drawn deeply into a Gulf War as an ally of Saudi Arabia). At the global level, one finds the higher or great-power complexes. These define the system level, as discussed above. One would expect security relations among the great powers to be intense, and to penetrate in varying degrees into the affairs of the local complexes.

The method of analysis within this framework is first to understand the distinctive security dynamic at each level, and then to see how the patterns at each level interact with each other. Cases in which there is not at least some action on each of the four levels will be rare. One useful feature of the multilevel approach to security analysis is that it enables one to think about the relative importance of the different levels. In some regions domestic security issues will dominate, as in South Africa. In others, the regional dynamics will be very strong, as in South Asia and the Middle East. In yet others, outside powers will tend to dominate the picture, as in Southeast Asia. Regional-level security dynamics will never explain everything. But in some places they will dominate the security agenda, and almost everywhere they will have an important impact on both domestic security issues and outside penetration into the region.

To sum up, the concept of security complexes is useful in bringing out the regional level in security analysis. As an analytical construct, it forces attention to durable local patterns of security interdependence. By so doing it acts as a counterweight to the placement of excessive emphasis on the state and system level. Identification of these middle-level patterns helps differentiate regional from global security dynamics, and provides a foundation for understanding change. It also provides a framework for analyzing the mechanisms and consequences of great-power intervention in regions. It is rare for any regional complex to be unpenetrated by great-power influence. The norm is for great-power penetration to follow the lines of amity and enmity set by the local complex. At an extreme, great powers can overlay a local complex, effectively suppressing the indigenous security dynamic, and so suspending for a time the operations that give the complex its identity.

A Historical Perspective on Regional Security

Regional security has had an odd history in the modern international system. From the idea that adjacency generates more intense security threats, other things being equal, one would expect a pattern of regional security complexes to be a normal condition of the system. In historical fact, other things have rather seldom been equal over the last few hundred years, and the current pattern of regional security complexes is mostly of quite recent vintage.

In McNeill's interpretation (1963), for two millennia before the rise of Europe to global dominance, the international system was structured around

four great civilizational areas: Europe, the Middle East, India, and China. These were all in a rough balance with each other, and each was usually more threatened by periodic surges of barbarian (i.e., nonurban, but not primitive) people from the Eurasian steppe, than it was by attack from its neighbors. Because of the relatively low level of human technological achievement, the interaction among the major power centers was predominantly cultural (i.e., trade in luxury goods, importation of religious and technological ideas). There was enough interaction to form an international system, but insufficient strategic and economic interaction to structure the system according to Waltz's (1979) logic of power politics. Strategic interaction occurred more within the civilizational areas than between them, making the system subsystem-dominant. Only when European power became sufficient to sustain strategic and economic interaction on a global scale did a full international system structure in Waltz's sense come into being. Prior to that, Waltzian logic worked almost entirely within the subsystems rather than between them (Buzan et al., forthcoming). At times each of these civilizational areas achieved imperial unity, for example Europe under Rome, China under the Han and several other dynasties, India partially under the Gupta rulers, and the Middle East under Persian and other dynasties. For China unity was the rule and fragmentation the exception. The Middle East also tended in this direction, though achieving less consistency in part because of pressures from the west and north. In Europe and India, fragmentation was the rule, and imperial unity the exception.

These four centers were themselves the product of a slow process of diffusion stretching back a further two millennia, in which civilization seeped steadily outwards from its heartlands in the great river valleys of Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, and China. Over time, they stimulated higher levels of social, political, and economic organization in Southeast Asia, Central and Northern Europe, and much later in Africa. Barbarism steadily gave way to more settled, statelike forms of sociopolitical organization, though not without occasional great surges into the areas of civilization such as that mounted by the Mongols, which peaked in the thirteenth century. Minor outliers to this process developed independently, but very late, in the Americas. These however, did not survive contact with European power.

Because of the low level of strategic interaction among the major centers of power, this essentially Eurasian world system had quite different structural qualities from those associated with the modern international system. On the system level it was not strongly driven by the competitive logic of the security dilemma and the balance of power. These logics were much more conspicuous in relations within subsystems than in relations between them. In the terms of the present discussion, the premodern international system was thus one in which the dynamics of the regional security complexes generally dominated. Higher-level powers did not have the capacity to pursue competitive interventions throughout the system. Where adjacency permitted,

there were sometimes analogs to modern great-power wars in which great empires fought for control of civilizational core areas. Hellenistic and Persian, and later Islamic and Christian empires clashed repeatedly. India largely succumbed to Islamic conquest. Almost every empire except Western Europe's gave way to the short-lived power of the Mongol Khans. At other times, local security dynamics predominated, as in the warring states periods in India and China, the classical Greek period, and the fragmentation of Europe after the collapse of the Western Roman empire.

A pattern of great-power intervention in the affairs of local security complexes did sometimes operate. Both the Persian and Roman Empires meddled in the highly divided politics of ancient Greece, and the Chinese Empire tried always to keep the steppe barbarians to its north and west divided against themselves. But limits to military and economic power generally prevented the operation of sustained long-distance power projection by great powers against each other, and this limit favored a subsystem-dominant pattern of security relations. Before 1500, these limits meant that the international system functioned more efficiently on the cultural level than on the power one. The balance of power operated weakly, if at all, at the global level because distance and resource limitations prevented most of the great powers from threatening each other. Neighboring clashes were possible, as between Christendom and Islam, and Islam and Hindu civilization. But China was effectively insulated from the other three in military and political terms, and similarly there was almost no strategic interaction between Europe and South Asia. This highly constrained balance of power limited the extent to which great powers could intervene competitively into the affairs of lesser states, except for those located in their immediate periphery, such as the Balkans, or more briefly in Southeast Asia. Thus although there were some elements of a strategic international system before 1500, these operated rather selectively. In various times and in various places one could see both great-power patterns and regional security complexes. Sometimes empires would overlay or absorb local patterns of rivalry. But the international system itself was only weakly developed, and therefore no strong or sustained systemic pattern of relationship between greater and lesser powers could develop. For the most part the four great centers of civilization operated as relatively self-contained subsystems.

The rise of the European powers from the fifteenth century quite quickly transformed this pattern into a fully functioning, and global, international system (Bull and Watson, 1984). But the system so created was a very lopsided one. It reflected the dominance of the whole system by one part rather than the emergence of a truly global system in which power and interaction had many points of origin. Rather than the four classical power centers expanding into a global system, one of them took over the rest. With their relatively advanced transportation and military technology, and their robust and aggressive organizational structures, the Europeans steadily

subjected nearly all of the ancient system to overlay. As European empires spread, the pattern of global security consequently became less and less driven by local dynamics, and more and more subordinated to the dynamics of European rivalries. This global process of overlay suppressed the development of independent regional security dynamics everywhere except Europe.

One of the great paradoxes of the European ascent is that the European states became dominantly powerful in good part *because* they were divided and competitive amongst themselves. It was not a united European empire that took over the international system, but an exceptionally vigorous and aggressive local security complex. Having sharpened their economic and strategic capabilities against each other, the European powers soon found that their superior organization and technology fairly easily enabled them to reach and overawe local power almost everywhere else in the international system. As a consequence, the two-thousand-year-long quadripolar balance of civilizations in Eurasia was steadily transformed into a global extension of the European security complex. The Amerindian empires collapsed at the touch of a social and military system three millennia more advanced than themselves. Resistance elsewhere from both barbarians and civilized peoples was more robust, but the power advantage of the Europeans was so great that they had more often to worry about each other than about local opposition.

This overlay by European, and later Japanese and American, colonial empires effectively suppressed most of what is understood in this analysis as regional security dynamics. Broadly speaking, the European complex transformed itself from a lower to a higher-level one and captured the whole system. The pattern of global security was thus simply an extension of European great-power rivalries, with the United States and Japan as late-arriving additions. The United States was in this view simply an offspring of European power, being the most powerful and successful state to result from the first round of European settlement and decolonization in the Americas. Japan was the only non-European country to adopt European ways both quickly enough to avoid being colonized, and successfully enough to itself enter the ranks of the great powers.

Although overlay suppressed local security dynamics, it was by no means politically neutral as regards the subject populations. In retrospect, overlay can be seen primarily as a process of state construction. In effect, the Europeans globalized the form of political organization—the sovereign territorial state—that underlay their own success. Sometimes they did this by direct transplanting of population, as in the Americas, Australia, and South Africa, sometimes by imperial imposition, as in Asia and Africa. In a few cases, local adaptation to the European model, as in Japan, or European balance-of-power considerations as in Thailand and China, provided a narrow escape from colonization. This export of the territorial state was most successful either where the local populations were largely replaced by

European immigrants, or where, as in much of Asia, older civilizational traditions could be fitted into the new political structure. It was least successful in Africa, where civilizational traditions were sparse and shallow-rooted, and where local populations constituted a highly divided social mosaic.

Despite its mixed results, the transplantation of the European territorial state to the rest of the planet inevitably paved the way for the universalization of the competitive European style of anarchic international relations.⁴ When overlay broke up, first in the Americas, and then, after World War II, in Asia and Africa, it left behind an entire international system organized along sovereignty-anarchy lines. It is from that release of overlay that the contemporary dynamics of regional security stem. In some places, as in the Americas and parts of Africa, the successor states to the European empires constituted a wholly new pattern of relations. In other places, as in much of the Middle East and Asia, they released older patterns of relations dressed up in the new form. The relative recentness of these events perhaps goes some way to explaining why great-power perspectives still dominate analysis of regional security: for a long time such a perspective reflected reality.

For those with a sense of historical irony, there was also some justice in the fact that the principal colonizers in Europe and Japan were themselves overlaid by the superpower rivalry after 1945 (Buzan et al., 1990: chapters 1–3). In a process paralleling the earlier dissolution of the European empires, the breakup of the Soviet Empire that began in 1989 signaled the end of this superpower overlay and the reemergence of regional security dynamics in Europe. If empires are seen in terms of overlay, then their decline will always be accompanied by a rise in the importance of indigenous regional security dynamics.

Decolonization and the Current Pattern of Security Complexes in the Third World

The freeing of the Third World from European and Japanese control did not immediately give rise to fully formed security complexes. As Walter Little (1987:593–594) argues from the Latin American case, a “working out” period is necessary after decolonization in order for the new states to find their feet and sort out their relationships. For Latin America, that period was more than half a century. Given this kind of time scale, it is not surprising that a global pattern of security complexes resulting from the much more recent round of decolonization is not yet fully formed. The new states did not emerge into a neutral environment. Most of them remained dependent on the ex-metropolitan powers, and all of them, after 1947, were subject to the intense global rivalry of the two superpowers. Nevertheless, in many areas,

distinct local dynamics have emerged, and full-fledged regional security complexes are functioning. In some areas, strong remnants of overlay still affect the expression of local security dynamics.

Where the process of decolonization was uneven and protracted, there was by definition a long mixed period in which emergent regional forces existed side by side with remnants of colonial overlay, as for example in southern Africa, where the Portuguese hung on for over a decade after the bulk of British and French withdrawals. But with most of the last round of decolonization now a quarter century in the past, most Third World regions have developed clear security complexes. This is true for South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Africa, and, more arguably, in the South Pacific, where the South Pacific Forum binds Australia, New Zealand, and many of the small island states into a loose security regime. In East Asia and the Pacific, water often acts as a significant damper of the security dilemma between neighbors. This facilitates the emergence of security regimes, as in the ASEAN group and the South Pacific Forum, as an element in the formation of security complexes. It also allows Australia to disengage itself from Southeast Asia. Latin America and the northern part of sub-Saharan Africa are for quite different reasons special cases.

What follows in this section is a first-order look at the contemporary pattern of regional security. One purpose of this observation is to notice the differing degrees of relative autonomy of regional security dynamics. In some places the regional dynamics are strong, in others they are still constrained by vestiges of overlay, or simply less important than the influence of overbearing great powers.

South Asia is the simplest and clearest of the Third World security complexes. Because decolonization was nearly simultaneous, the South Asian complex sprang into existence almost fully formed in 1947. It contained just two major states, India and Pakistan, and one defining rivalry. In effect, the internal rivalry between Muslims and Hindus that had been building up within the British Raj was transformed from a domestic conflict into an international one. The basic bipolar structure, and the defining enmity between India and Pakistan, have remained solid ever since, surviving the partition of Pakistan in 1971, and being reinforced by three inconclusive wars and a permanent arms race (Buzan and Rizvi, 1986).

Southeast Asia, with nine states, including four quite large ones, is more complicated, but still presents the clearly self-contained regional dynamic of a security complex. Its transition from colonization was much more protracted and violent than South Asia's, and it was much more intensely caught up in Cold War rivalries. For both reasons, the indigenous regional security dynamic in Southeast Asia has had to emerge alongside a continuing heavy great-power intervention in the region. First France and then the United States fought long wars against Vietnam's national communism. China and the Soviet Union were drawn into these wars, and China has a traditional

interest in the area as part of its sphere of influence, which makes it, among other things, hostile to Vietnam. These massive intrusions have marked and distorted the local security dynamics. To some extent all of the Southeast Asian states, and particularly Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, fear Chinese power. This fear makes the region vulnerable to the participation of outside powers.

But beneath this concern there is also an indigenous rivalry that polarizes the region between the ASEAN group and Vietnam. The ASEAN states form a rare Third World security regime based on mutual acceptance of the fact that the pursuit of rivalry among them would more probably undermine than consolidate their fragile domestic political structures. Although not an alliance, this group of states has significantly reduced its internal threats, and has developed a certain commonality of view toward dealing with the Western powers. Vietnam's legacy of national communism sets it apart from, and against, this group. Its legacy of military power from its protracted wars of independence, and its use of that power to occupy Laos and Cambodia, created a fear of Vietnamese imperialism that polarized the region into a single rivalry. Thus despite its more diversified internal structure, the Southeast Asian complex, like that in South Asia, has one predominant axis of enmity. Whether that axis is about to undergo a major change is an open question. As Vietnam withdraws from Cambodia, loses its Soviet military backing, and responds to the winds of reform sweeping through the communist world, it is possible that this local axis of enmity in Southeast Asia will weaken. The existence of common concern about China, combined with a more supportive and less polarized great-power influence, could conceivably extend the ASEAN security regime to encompass the whole complex—a development often brought up, though little acted on, in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) proposals for the region (Buzan, 1988b).

Before World War II, a second great-power complex existed in Northeast Asia. So long as Japan continues to remain a security dependency of the United States, overlay prevents the full reemergence of this regional security dynamic. Sino-Soviet rivalry forms part of it, but until Japan is a fully independent strategic actor it is hard to see whether the great powers in Northeast Asia will reconstruct some new security complex, or whether they will simply blend into an emerging multipolar great-power complex at the global level.

The Middle Eastern security complex poses a particular difficulty not found in either South or Southeast Asia, i.e., the presence of two or more nodes of security interdependence within a group of states that can be seen as a single complex. The Middle Eastern complex contains two dozen states and three, or possibly four, subcomplexes that have distinct dynamics within the overall complex. The three main subcomplexes are centered on the Gulf, with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia as the principals; the Horn of Africa, with Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia as the principals; and the Eastern

Mediterranean, with Israel, Syria, and Egypt as the principals. There is a vaguer node of rivalry in the Maghreb among Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. All of these nodes have their own distinctive dynamics, but there is enough crossing of boundaries within the Middle Eastern complex to justify identifying the larger formation as the main regional unit. Syria figures in the Gulf subcomplex by allying with Iran and opposing Iraq; and Egypt has also, by supporting Iraq against Iran, and more recently Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, et al. against Iraq; with Saudi Arabia against Iraq as well. Saudi Arabia and Egypt take an interest in the Horn. Nearly all of the Arab states take some part in the opposition to Israel, which returns the favor by stirring up inter-Arab and inter-Islamic rivalries wherever it can. Israeli military raids extend as far as Iraq, Libya, and even Uganda, and Iraq has emerged as a major player against Israel. The Arab League provides a legitimizing forum in which the affairs of the different subcomplexes get linked, and which helps to differentiate Middle Eastern security affairs from those in Asia, Europe, and central Africa.

Complicated regional conditions of this sort may well generate arguments about boundaries. Should the Gulf be considered as a separate complex from the Middle East or as a subcomplex within it? One good reason for defining the complex in the Middle East as a whole is precisely that it avoids difficult and unnecessary arguments about whether Syria and Iraq belong more to the Gulf or more to the Eastern Mediterranean grouping. A similar complexity prevails in Europe (Buzan et al., 1990). The more than two dozen states there contain several distinct subregions such as the Nordic area and the Balkans. As yet, regional security analysis in Europe is made difficult by the lack of clarity about local dynamics because of the still substantial, though rapidly fading, presence of overlay. What is clear is the unique position of Europe over the last forty years during which the threats from superpower rivalry far outweighed any security threats arising from within Europe itself. Despite their different locations, Sweden, Spain, Ireland, and Italy all faced the same common threat that Soviet power might overawe Europe, or that Europe might be destroyed in a war to defend it against Soviet attack. As with the Middle Eastern complex, that in Europe also has some awkward boundaries. The Middle East blurs into Africa, and Europe blurs into the Soviet Union.

The main point here is that there is enough security interdependence within these regions to justify differentiating them from their neighbors as a distinct security complex. More is gained by defining the complex at the wider level, and incorporating subregional nodes, than by elevating the subregions to security complexes in their own right. The broader view identifies the main boundaries of security indifference, as between the Middle East and both Europe and South Asia. Taking the subregions as security complexes would lose some of this clarity, and create the problem of how to deal with the significant security interactions among the subregions.

In southern Africa, the confrontation is between (and within) South Africa and the frontline black states. The resultant security complex extends as far north as the southern boundary of Zaire and Tanzania. This complex has a unipolar power structure because South Africa is overwhelmingly strong in military and economic terms. Its most unusual feature is the primacy of domestic issues: in effect, the security dynamics of the complex stem from the domestic politics of South Africa spilling over into the adjacent region. This whole problem can be seen as a peculiar holdover from the colonial period. In most places, the European colonizers either overwhelmed and/or replaced the indigenous population (as in the Americas and Australia), or ruled local masses as an elite (as in most of Africa and Asia). Decolonization thus either left behind Europeanized successor states, or necessitated the withdrawal of the European elites. South Africa fell in between these options. The European population was too big to withdraw, but too small to eliminate its local rivals (Buzan and Nazareth, 1985–1986). If the domestic problem in South Africa can be peacefully resolved, this complex might either disappear, or transform itself into one defined by a hegemonic security regime.

In some Third World areas, most notably the band of over twenty states sandwiched between the southern side of the Middle Eastern complex and the northern side of the southern African one, no firm patterns of local security interdependence have yet emerged. Most of these states are too weak both as states and as powers to generate a significant pattern of regional security relations. All of them are more preoccupied with domestic than with national security problems, and rare exceptions such as the Tanzanian invasion of Amin's Uganda do not even begin to create a pattern that might indicate the outlines of future regional security complexes. Perhaps only the Nigerian experiment with the Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS) foreshadows a potential regional pattern. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) might be seen as a kind of weak political security regime supporting the territorial entitlement of the postcolonial states in Africa. But the OAU does not itself define a security complex any more than the United Nations does, and neither does it explain the absence of regional security dynamics in this area. The explanation for the absence of security complexes here is that the states in the region are still too weak to generate them out of the interactions among themselves.

The Americas are somewhat harder to characterize, not least because of the overwhelming presence of the United States. North America, including Central America and the Caribbean, is perhaps best seen as mixture of a security community and a security complex dominated by a single great power. The Central American and Caribbean states are for the most part very weak both as states and as powers. They are so penetrated by the United States, and/or by superpower rivalry, as to make the emergence of any independent security dynamics virtually impossible to discern. The parallel

drawn by Cantori and Spiegel (1973) between Latin America and Eastern Europe, though no longer valid for the latter, still holds for the former in terms of the maintenance of considerable overlay by a superpower on the security relations of states within its immediate backyard. The small island states also benefit from a water buffer. The odd sputtering of local rivalries as between Honduras and El Salvador, or Guatemala and Belize, indicate the potential for a Central American security dynamic. But the residual overlay of the United States, as most recently demonstrated in Grenada and Panama, acts powerfully to constrain the development of any local pattern of security dynamics.

South America also falls under the shadow of the United States, but much less so than Central America, and decreasingly as the quite substantial powers there consolidate themselves (Little, 1987). In some ways, South America still displays residual signs of overlay, most notably in the role of the Organization of American States (OAS), which ties the region's security relations to the United States. Being remote from other great powers has the advantage of insulating Latin America from rival penetrations, but the disadvantage of leaving it vulnerable to US domination. Only the emergence of another great power in the western hemisphere, for which role Brazil is the sole candidate, could solve this latter problem. In other ways South America displays the features of a security regime, with the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone constituting a significant regional regime, indeed one that extends right up to the United States border. With its relative civilizational homogeneity, Latin America was long the hope of the regional integrationists. It could be argued that South America, like central Africa, lacked sufficient interaction to form a security complex. Although its states are better developed and more powerful than those in Africa, nearly all of the territorial boundaries run through remote, sparsely populated areas that are either mountainous or covered in dense jungle. There is no clear axis of regional rivalry, as in South Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, and not even a clear polycentric arrangement, as in the Middle East.

But against this, the region's history does show clear signs of indigenous security dynamics. There have been several substantial wars—Paraguay versus Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (1865–1870); Chile versus Bolivia and Peru (1879–1884); Paraguay versus Bolivia (1928–1935)—and one crisis with clear threats of war—Columbia versus Peru (1932–1933). All of these concerned territorial disputes, and Bolivia is still not reconciled to the loss of its coastal territory. More recently, Chile and Argentina have been in dispute over islands in the south, and Venezuela claims a large chunk of Guyana. Brazil and Argentina have indulged in a general power rivalry since before World War I, when they competed to buy expensive dreadnoughts from Europe. More recently, their competition has taken the form of military-run “civil” nuclear power programs, though since 1980 this rivalry has increasingly turned toward cooperation. The Amazon jungles are quickly

disappearing, and as the Brazilians continue their interior road-building plans, many of the continent's territorial boundaries will cease to be insulated by remoteness. Thus all the makings exist for the South American complex to evolve either toward the rivalry dynamics typical of most other Third World regions, or toward a more mature anarchic structure in which the security dynamics of the region are governed by a stable multilateral regime. Like Southeast Asia, South America hangs in the balance between a security complex based on rivalry and one based on a security regime.

Conclusions: Regional Security Complexes and System Structure

All of these quite recently formed regional security dynamics in the Third World are now evolving against a background in which the higher-level complex is also in a period of transformation. For most of the postwar period, the pattern of intervention from higher to lower levels was structured by the bipolar rivalry between the superpowers. But as the century draws to a close, both the superpowers and their rivalries are weakening in relation to the rest of the international system. China has already established itself as an independent great power in Asia, and India is headed down that road. More significantly, as overlay breaks up in Europe and Northeast Asia, both Japan and the European Community are, in their own odd and hesitant ways, beginning to play roles in the system commensurate with their power.

This shift away from bipolarity towards a more polycentric power structure at the system level cannot help having profound consequences for Third World regional security. Where penetration from higher to lower levels is unipolar, then the result is like overlay, and the consequence is suppression of local interstate (though not domestic) conflicts. The US role in Latin America and the Soviet role in Eastern Europe illustrate this process. Bipolar penetration suppresses local conflict if it takes the form of overlay, as in Europe. But if it is just alignment, as in much of the Third World, then it amplifies them. Väyrynen (1985a; see also Cantori and Spiegel, 1970:33–37) suggests that the logic of this progression points to multipolar penetration as the worst of all cases, but this is arguable. Bipolarity encourages peculiarly intense, zero-sum competition, and might thus be thought the most likely to amplify local rivalries. Multipolar penetration, as currently in Southeast Asia, may be messy, but it is less intense, and gives the local states greater latitude to balance and offset external influence. In theoretical terms, it is not surprising that the current shift from bipolarity to multipolarity is being accompanied by the dramatic winding-down of the Cold War. Thus, to the extent that bipolar conflict and the concentration of power in the center are both presently weakening, the

current outlook should be for less competitive intervention by the great powers in regional security affairs.

That trend is supported by the diffusion of power to the regional states, which should extend the process begun by decolonization of increasing the importance of regional security dynamics relative to those of the great powers. Whether a lower weight of intervention will mute or exacerbate regional conflicts very much depends on circumstances. It may, as in the case of the Iran-Iraq War, give freer reign to the pursuit of local rivalries, though arms suppliers may still be able to prevent local victories, as they did in that instance, by giving more to the weaker side. On the other hand, it may, as apparently in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, provide external support for regional efforts at conflict resolution. Either way, as Kolodziej and Harkavy put it (1980:59; see also Väyrynen, 1985a:22–28), there is a trend toward the “decentralization of the international security system.” It seems a safe bet to predict that indigenous patterns of regional security will be increasingly important features of the international system in the twenty-first century, thus closing forever the historical period in which huge differentials in technology and sociopolitical organization enabled a handful of states to impose their control on the entire international community. The European powers were able rather easily to defeat the governments of Asian empires during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the Ottomans at Zenta (1697), Egypt (1798), and Navarino (1827), Indians at the siege of Madras (1746), and the Chinese in the Opium War (1839) (Bull and Watson, 1984:36–37, 149, 151, 166, 176). But once the populations become politically and militarily mobilized on their own behalf, such easy domination became impossible.

As nodes in the system, security complexes not only define intense and relatively durable local patterns, but also serve to guide and shape the impact of larger external powers on these local patterns. The local and external patterns tend to reinforce each other's rivalries through the addition of resources and allies. The impact of this higher–lower level relationship is normally greater on the local pattern because of the disproportion in resources. The local states do have considerable influence over how external powers impinge on their affairs. But they have little ability to control external penetration unless they are able to resolve local rivalries, which generate the demand for external support. Conversely, the external powers cannot easily moderate or control the local security dynamic because they depend on it for access to the region. The dynamic of rivalry among the great powers automatically reinforces existing local rivalries in a pattern that is difficult to break. From this perspective, South America, Southeast Asia, and possibly southern Africa, with their existing or potential low level of local enmity, have better prospects for avoiding destructive penetration than do the Middle East and South Asia.

As a rule, external actors have far less impact on the pattern of local

hostilities than they do on the distribution of power. This conclusion is illustrated by the history of great-power intervention in the Southeast Asian, South Asian, and Middle Eastern complexes. The rule seems to be that external actors tend, whether explicitly or implicitly, to fall into line with the pattern of local hostility. Since external actors are usually pursuing their own interests, acquiescence in local patterns of hostility is by far the easiest way to penetrate a local complex. Local states frequently beg, as Pakistan did, for external support against local rivals. Unless the pattern of intervention is very lopsided, competing external powers will therefore normally reinforce rather than change the existing pattern of local hostility. They may attempt to mediate in local disputes, as the Soviet Union has done in South Asia, as the United States tries periodically to do in the Middle East, and as both are trying to do in Cambodia. But attempts by external powers to go against the grain of local alignments do not have a good record, especially when the external powers are highly divided among themselves. As Cantori and Spiegel (1970:30–33) observe: "In general, the experience of intrusive powers has been that it is easier to impose conflict than cooperation upon members of a subordinate system."

The significance of the diffusion of power in the contemporary system is that it raises the importance of the actors at the bottom of the power hierarchy for the functioning of the system as a whole. If, because of their relative weakness, they still serve as the objects of great-power rivalry, at least they now have some durable features of their own, and create patterns within and among themselves that to some extent condition the behavior of the great powers. As Hoffmann (1978:175) argues, "it is a mistake to treat issues in which third parties are embroiled as if these countries were pawns in a global balancing game, instead of dealing with the issues' intrinsic merits and the nations' interests." The international system is not returning to the "subsystem dominant" mode that prevailed before the expansion of European power. But there does seem to be a firm trend toward redressing the imbalance between regional and great-power security dynamics that prevailed during the period of European colonialism, and to some extent even during the Cold War.

Notes

1. This chapter follows from Chapter 5 of my *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2d ed. (1991). This chapter contains a considerable expansion of the historical background and current patterns of regional security in the Third World. Those seeking a fuller exposition of the concept are referred to the earlier text.

2. In discussion at a conference on South Asian security, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, October 1984.

3. Ole Waever (1987:4–5) takes a different view, arguing that a security complex should be defined by the regional specificity of security dynamics, and

not by the degree of autonomy of endogenous security dynamics. This would mean that security complexes always existed, though it is not clear by what logic their boundaries could be drawn.

4. On this argument, the logic of regional security is primarily politico-strategic in nature, and is an element in the anarchic dynamics of the international system. This line is entirely complementary to those analyses that see anarchy and capitalism as linked or even mutually constitutive structures. It is not, however, compatible with Marxian-derived arguments that give primacy to economic relations. Among other things, the dynamics of economic security are much less dominated by geography than are those in the political, societal, and strategic sectors. For elaboration and sources, see Buzan (1991: chapters 3–6).

A New Role for Middle Powers in Regional Conflict Resolution?

Fen Osler Hampson

The momentous changes in East-West relations are rapidly changing the postwar international system—a system hitherto marked by superpower rivalry, competition for influence in the Third World, and bipolarity. The conflict in the Gulf quickly put to rest any delusions that the end of the Cold War would foster international harmony and peace, and the threat of violence and armed conflict in the Third World remains high. Although a new security system has yet to emerge, some observers foresee new opportunities for multilateralism and greater middle-power involvement in international affairs. In the words of a former Canadian diplomat:

World conditions during the last fifteen years did not favour middle power involvement, but now the pendulum is swinging back in their favour. . . . Conditions have changed radically, at least for the moment. Superpowers are more likely to welcome middle power mediation, and the demand for international peacekeepers is mounting. (Hyndman, 1989:28)

Others have seized upon the fact that the UN's important role in the Gulf crisis has opened the door to greater middle-power influence and involvement in the collective management of global security (Wood, 1990).

These calls hark back to what has been dubbed the "golden age" of multilateral diplomacy and "middlepowermanship." Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and a number of other countries played an important role in shaping the postwar international political and economic order by lending support to the creation of international institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and NATO. The pinnacle of Canadian diplomacy came in the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Canada's then Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, and Dag Hammarskjöld, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, collaborated to devise a UN peacekeeping role to defuse the crisis, subsequently winning Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize.

The purpose of this chapter is not to review the history of middle-power diplomacy but to address the general proposition that "middle powers" have a new role to play in international politics at the end of the Cold War, notably in international mediation, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. It is the contention of this chapter that the new détente in superpower relations has not necessarily opened the door to "middle powers" in international conflict resolution. Change in system structure does not necessarily mean that new norms have taken root in conflict management. Moreover, the rediscovery of the concept of collective security in the Gulf War may be short-lived. Most of today's conflicts do not involve outright aggression by one state against another, and it will be difficult to invoke the collective security provisions of the UN Charter to solve them. This may further circumscribe the opportunities for middle power influence.

The calculus of third-party intervention also suggests that middle powers' bargaining and diplomatic resources may be limited. Mediation success generally depends on such factors as a country's geographical and cultural proximity to the conflict, bargaining leverage, and previous ties to the disputants. Third parties may also incur real economic and political costs from intervention, and such costs may act as a further deterrent to their involvement. A functionally oriented appraisal of the requirements for successful intervention may thus yield more sober conclusions about the ready availability of new opportunities for direct middle-power influence in the settlement of regional disputes, although this does not preclude ongoing middle-power involvement in multi-lateral diplomacy, internationally sponsored mediation efforts, and peace-keeping.

Definition of "Middle Power"

Who are the "middle powers" in international politics? According to one definition:

Middle powers . . . can be distinguished best in terms of the strength they possess and the power they command. If the power of a nation is defined as its ability to impose its will on other states and to resist attempts by other states to impose on itself, the force, or strength, of a nation may be defined as the means by which it exercises this power. (Holbraad, 1972:78)

This definition is ambiguous because it fails to explain or define what is meant by the term "power." Greater precision can be given to this concept by defining a nation's power according to such factors as geographical size, GNP (gross national product), size of military forces, population, and so forth. Cox and Jacobsen, for example, use five composite indicators to measure

state power: GNP, per capita GNP, population, nuclear capability (either actual or a state's known or reputed ability to have them), and prestige (defined in terms of the degree of autonomy or influence of a state's foreign policy) (Cox and Jacobsen, 1974:437–443).

Others argue that GNP may be the best indicator of power because as a measure of economic strength it also indicates a country's military potential. In one such study the list of states defined as middle powers includes Italy, China, Brazil, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, India, Mexico, Australia, Poland, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Romania, Norway, Finland, Hungary, Pakistan, Algeria, South Africa, Korea, Indonesia, Norway, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia, and Iran (Wood, 1988:18). The problem with this kind of scoring system is that it leaves out countries that historically have been viewed as middle powers because of their special skills, leadership, or diplomatic influence in international affairs—factors that may have little or no relationship to quantitative measures of state strength. A country like New Zealand, for example, is a small power by most quantitative indicators but nevertheless has historically played an important role in international affairs.

Systemic versus subsystemic levels of analysis may also yield different definitions of state power and influence (Jones and Hildreth, 1986; Thornton, 1989). At the international systemic level, for example, a country like India may well be considered a "middle power." However, at the regional or subsystemic level India's economic size and military power vastly exceeds that of its closest neighbors—thus it is rightly cast as the region's hegemon (Jones and Hildreth, 1986). Similarly, South Africa's economic and military clout overshadows the frontline states of Southern Africa which are both dependent upon and highly vulnerable to pressure from South Africa. This further complicates meaningful comparative assessments about middle-power influence in international politics generally, and of "middle power" roles in Third World regional conflicts, in particular.

The uses and potential of state power may also vary in different settings and situations. As David Baldwin notes:

The means by which one actor can influence the behaviour of another depends on who is trying to get whom to do what. Diplomatic pressure may suffice to gain support on a relatively unimportant vote in the UN General Assembly, but force may be necessary to get a country to relinquish land claims. What functions as a power resource in one policy-contingent framework may be irrelevant in another. The only way to determine whether something is a power resource or not is to place it in the context of a real or hypothetical policy-contingent framework. (Baldwin, 1979:165)

Thus, whatever measure one develops, squaring quantitative indicators of state capabilities with qualitative assessments of international influence is problematic, and assessments of state power are likely to be highly situational or context dependent.

Students of international political economy have suggested that middle powers may be defined in functional terms according to their role in agenda setting, coalition building, and technical competence in the development and formation of international regimes (Higgott and Cooper, 1990; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1991; Hampson, 1989–1990). They argue that there are heightened opportunities for middle-power influence in a world characterized by growing interdependence between states and greater issue density and complexity in interstate interactions. The wide range of interactions in international political economy on an ongoing basis thus increases the middle powers' bargaining leverage and ability to shape negotiated outcomes.

While in many spheres of international life there are opportunities for collective action and coordinated international behavior, e.g., trade, environment, aid, investment, etc., such opportunities are fewer and more constrained in the security realm of international affairs. The costs of involvement may also be higher and the potential rewards less clear than they are in matters relating to the coordination of international economic behavior. As many international relations scholars have noted, we must be careful about viewing opportunities in one area, i.e., economics, as having a spillover effect into others, i.e., security (Nye, 1990; Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Nye, 1976).

In the security realm, middle powers have often been regarded as those states capable of buttressing those international norms, rules, and procedures that sustain international peace and security (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1991). Indeed, one way of distinguishing so-called middle powers from "lesser" powers is the greater perceived stake middle powers have identified for themselves in promoting and sustaining international norms, and their projection of these interests globally (Molot, 1990:79–80). Middle powers generally see themselves as having the most to gain from the promotion and expansion of these norms (and the most to lose if order breaks down) because their own power and influence depends vitally upon international stability. Those states which actively lend their support to international institutions, like the United Nations, are thus typically viewed as "middle powers," and their influence is likely to be felt most in multilateral activities like international mediation, peacekeeping, and the enforcement of the collective security provisions of the UN charter. These forms of involvement are discussed at greater length below. But first, what does history suggest about the opportunities for middle-power activism in a multipolar world and the relationship between systemic or structural change in the international system and middle-power influence?

Historical Role of Middle Powers

History suggests that although middle powers, particularly through their diplomacy in situations of great-power rivalry, have regularly made important contributions to international order, a multipolar world order does not automatically lend itself to greater opportunities for middle-power involvement (see Holbraad, 1972:179–181; Wight, 1978:30–67; and Bull, 1977:200–229).

In the multiple concert system that marked European politics after the Napoleonic wars, the great powers (later joined by France) were able to manage and coordinate their affairs and deal with interstate rivalries and territorial disputes by regularly consulting with each other either informally or through formal diplomatic conferences. The concert of Europe effectively managed the European balance of power for almost half a century by maintaining the international political status quo. However, from the point of view of Europe's middle powers, like Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, who were members of the Committee of Eight at the Congress of Vienna, the institution was a repressive one. These countries soon found themselves excluded from all important negotiations at Vienna and were often subjected to high-handed treatment from the great powers. Likewise the Ottoman Empire, whose middle-power status was compromised by its position as the "sick man of Europe," frequently found itself the victim of repeated diplomatic threats of intervention and coercion by the great powers.

In the great-power concerts of 1919 and 1945 following the two great wars, the middle powers also found themselves disadvantaged. Brazil and Canada were unsuccessful in their attempts to challenge the authority of the five great powers, through the Council of Ten, at the Paris Peace Conference. The 1945 Yalta Conference among the three principal allied powers settled Poland's fate without Polish representation, and the great powers at the San Francisco Conference and later United Nations meetings in the early postwar years were successful in fending off attempts by lesser powers, led by Australia, who were championing the rights of smaller states.

Comparisons between today's world and that of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should not be overdrawn. This is because the processes of decolonization, social mobilization, and the expansion and integration of the world's economy have opened up new centers of power and influence in world politics while greatly crowding the world stage by introducing a large number of new state, nonstate, and transnational actors. Nonetheless, history does suggest some important cautionary notes about the opportunities available for middle-power influence in what may be an increasingly multipolar world.

Middle Powers and Collective Security

Collective security is an important concept in international security. In its most ideal sense, collective security refers to a willingness by all states to oppose any state committing aggression. The concept is embedded in the Charter of the United Nations (Chapter 7) and the instrument for invoking these provisions, the Security Council. For example, Article 39 of Chapter 7 notes that "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken."

In practice, the problem of identifying acts of aggression and appropriate responses to aggression has been extremely problematic, to say the least. Moreover, during much of the Cold War the superpowers engaged in their own bitter rivalry and were incapable of agreeing on those disputes that constituted threats or acts of aggression demanding a coordinated international response. The fact that the collective security provisions of the charter for military enforcement actions have only been invoked twice, first in Korea (1950) and more recently—if ambiguously—in the Gulf (1990), is testimony to the difficulties of instituting the collective security system envisioned by the writers of the UN Charter. Furthermore, these cases illustrate that middle powers have not been unanimous in their endorsement of collective security, when it has been invoked under the UN Charter, nor alone among those who have helped to enforce it. Identifying a special middle-power role in the defense and maintenance of collective security is therefore problematic.

Canada, Britain, and Turkey contributed more than token forces to the collective security enforcement action in Korea, while other UN members (and purported middle powers) with military capabilities, such as Argentina, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India, Mexico, and Poland, remained on the sidelines, taking no active part in the military operations on either side (Morgenthau, 1985:459). In contrast, some forty years later in the Gulf War, a massive coalition of thirty-one countries contributed forces or support units to the multinational campaign to enforce numerous UN Security Council resolutions in driving Iraq out of Kuwait. Importantly, this list of states included a combination of small, middle, and great powers.¹

The successive resolutions of the Security Council condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and calling for the implementation of sanctions and the use of "all necessary means," including the use of force, testify to unprecedented levels of cooperation and capacity to coordinate, not just between the two superpowers, but also between many of the other permanent and nonpermanent members of the Council. Although participation in the coalition for some states was motivated by a desire to "safeguard the rule of law" and "deter future aggressors" (Rudner, 1991), for other states, US pressure and offer of side-payments (including a tacit promise to work toward the settlement of other outstanding problems such as the Israeli-Palestinian

issue) explain the basis of their involvement (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1991). The international composition of the group also made it easier for the Gulf states, who were worried about being too closely allied to the United States, to participate in the coalition.

While some argue that the unprecedented degree of international cooperation in the Gulf War points toward a New World Order grounded in a vibrant sense of collective security that will heighten middle-power influence (Wood, 1990), such expectations may be short-lived at best and inappropriate at worst. Although some states, middle powers among them, fared well in the crisis, gaining some input into the peace process through their participation in the multinational coalition, this by no means suggests that their influence has extended beyond the crisis itself, nor that they will be able to shape and sustain a collective security agenda in the future. The reasons have less to do with "middlepowermanship" and influence, and more with the changing nature of international conflict and the appropriateness of collective security mechanisms for conflict management.

Most of today's conflicts arise in the form of regional and local wars between states and as acts of terrorism undertaken almost anywhere in the world. Like all but one of the 141 armed conflicts that have occurred since World War II, the Gulf crisis took place in the Third World (Sivard, 1989a:23). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait involved a clear-cut case of aggression and territorial annexation of another country, and therefore violation of state sovereignty. However, most conflicts in the Third World are characterized by civil or local wars that have spilled across international borders, or long-standing historical disputes over territory (for example, the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir or the Arab-Israeli dispute) where successive incursions and crises make it difficult to identify a clear aggressor (Azar, 1986; Buzan, 1988). The United Nations' instruments of collective security were not set up to deal with these kinds of conflicts but with instances of clear-cut aggression after the manner of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is therefore anomalous. Even so, the primary purpose of collective security—to deter aggression—failed and the task of repelling aggression had to be taken up by a coalition of member states. As Stanley Hoffmann notes:

The remarkably effective coalition put together by the [United States] in the Gulf crisis against a state whose resort to naked aggression is undeniable may not be easily reproduced in cases that are less clear-cut or in parts of the world that are less obviously vital to the security of most states. (Hoffmann, 1991:6)

To reiterate, seldom do regional conflicts erupt so that they pose a threat to established norms and principles of international law, and therefore collective security does not obviate the need for activities that have become the more traditional forms of UN involvement in international conflict:

peacekeeping, mediation, and good offices. It is to these areas of potential middle-power involvement and activity that we now turn.

Middle Powers in International Mediation

Whereas collective security and middle-power involvement can take the form of crisis management in sharply demarcated conflicts enforced by arms and sanctions, the more usual kinds of intervention undertaken to lend support to international order and stability in "gray-area" regional conflicts are mediation, peacekeeping, and arbitration. Middle-power intervention in these conflicts can take a variety of forms, including public appeals asking parties to stop hostilities, the use of mediators (e.g., through the UN) to start negotiations, provision of channels of communication between adversaries, provision of regular mediation services and other forms of intermediary assistance, provision of fact-finding and observation committees, provision of peacekeeping forces, and the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance. There is also a distinction between *direct* and *indirect* forms of assistance; the latter usually involves diplomatic or logistical support for other kinds of third-party involvement in regional conflict, usually by international bodies like the UN, other third-party countries, or regional, subregional, or nongovernmental organizations.

The problem with conceptualizing the notion of mediation in regional conflicts and an anarchic international system is that the type of assistance required from third parties is a lot more than just encouragement and goodwill; it often requires direct bargaining with the parties concerned (Touval, 1982). This suggests that the prerequisites and requirements for a good negotiator also apply to mediators, and mediation is therefore best defined as third party-assisted negotiations. While having a lot of experience in multilateral forums and the international legitimacy that experience entails, middle powers may nonetheless lack the resources, wherewithal, and staying power to engage disputants outside of this familiar context. The costs and risks of intervention may also be prohibitively high for middle powers unless mechanisms can be found by which to share them multilaterally.

"Ripeness" in Regional Disputes

Much of the burgeoning literature on third-party mediation suggests that one of the key factors hindering successful mediation in many regional conflicts is not a lack of skilled mediators and formulas, which may meet the substantive interests and requirements of the parties to the dispute, but the absence of "ripeness." Greater attention to the situational aspects of conflict

itself suggests that intervention by third parties—whether middle powers or otherwise—may be futile or even counterproductive in the absence of “ripeness,” defined by Haass as

the prerequisites for diplomatic progress, that is, . . . particular circumstances . . . conducive for negotiated solution or even progress. Such prerequisites may include characteristics of the parties to a dispute as well as considerations about the relationship between or among parties. (Haass, 1988:232)

Various factors may make resolution more attractive, thereby enhancing the prospects for successful third-party intervention. Zartman suggests that one of the prime conditions for ripeness is if neither side feels it can win a conflict and the parties perceive the costs and prospects of continuing war to be more burdensome than the costs and prospects of settlement (Zartman, 1985; Zartman, 1987). The prospects for a negotiated settlement to a dispute are thus greater when war weariness has set in among the parties and a conflict has reached a plateau or “hurting stalemate” in which unilateral advantage is no longer possible. Third-party mediators will enjoy greater likelihood of success under these conditions, as compared to cases in which the conflict has not reached a hurting stalemate, where the parties are content with the status quo, or where unilateral gains are still seen as achievable.

Shifting power balances and the emergence of a “hurting stalemate,” however, are not the only factors that may make resolution more attractive in certain conflicts. Additional requirements for ripeness include the following: (1) the parties are ready for agreement, i.e., they are predisposed to enter into serious negotiations to terminate military hostilities; (2) the parties have redefined their interests and are no longer content with the status quo; (3) old norms and patterns of behavior are replaced by new norms facilitating the possibilities for compromise and negotiation; (4) the parties share mutual perceptions about the desirability of an accord; (5) the parties agree to a common bridging process; (6) there is an available formula allowing for compromise and a negotiated end to hostilities; and (7) there are no major diversions to derail negotiations (Zartman, 1989; Stein, 1989; Kegley, 1975).

The central importance of “ripeness” in regional disputes underscores the fact that third-party negotiators are only one element, and possibly a minor one at that, in regional conflict resolution and dispute settlement processes. What many conflicts lack is not a shortage of skilled third-party mediators, resolving formulas, or reasonable frameworks for solution, but ripeness to the conflict itself. For example, Cyprus remains divided between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, with little prospect of resolution to long-standing ethnic and communal grievances that have divided the two communities and have occasionally erupted into violent armed confrontation.

There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts at third-party mediation, most recently in 1988, when UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar launched a peace initiative to get Greece and Turkey to hold new talks on unifying the island. All of these mediation efforts failed largely because the two sides continue to prefer the status quo to any of the possible alternatives, which would dilute the political authority and autonomy of the island's two communities. Furthermore, the long-standing presence of a UN peace-keeping force on Cyprus has kept violence to a minimum that is obviously tolerable to the two sides (Epstein and Popper, 1986; Keashly and Fisher, 1990).

In some conflicts, such as those in Lebanon or Sri Lanka, none of the above-mentioned conditions may ever come into play because of the protracted nature of these conflicts. Protracted conflicts are those that seem self-sustaining in spite of the recurrence of extensive violence, and are usually rooted in a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping tensions at the intrastate or intercommunal level—tensions evolving from ethnicity, religion, communal strife, socioeconomic problems, regional grievances, etc. These conflicts are many-layered and characterized by mutually reinforcing misperceptions at various levels. Protracted social conflicts are also distinguished by the fact that they usually appear to have no obvious phases or end points. Notions of the “ripe moment” as a guide to third-party intervention may *not* therefore serve as an adequate basis from which to evaluate the prospects for success. In fact, these conflicts appear to be hyperstable and seem to bypass ripe moments altogether, insofar as they seem to sustain themselves indefinitely in the face of recurring violence (Azar, 1986).

Many protracted Third World conflicts are thus not easily split into manageable or negotiable components. Much of the literature on third-party intervention argues that conflicts are most amenable to resolution when issues are well defined and structured in a way that permits a confidence building process to emerge over time. Unfortunately, in protracted social conflict situations it is often difficult to identify a formula or any sense in which issues must be resolved first so as to lend momentum to the peacemaking process. The presence of such a large “gray area” presents a major problem for potential third parties who, prior to intervention, must have a rough measure of the common ground (if any) between parties.

Some conflicts, because of their protracted nature, may simply not be amenable to peaceful intervention by *any* third party—be it a great, middle, or small power, or an international organization. For those conflicts that are amenable to the good offices of intermediaries, the prospects for success may well depend more on the dynamics of the conflict itself and situational pressures rather than the presence or absence of resolving formulas and/or a skilled third-party mediator (Kriesberg, 1989).

Characteristics of the Mediator

Notwithstanding the above, it may be argued that certain countries are better suited to intermediary roles when mediators are in fact called upon to help resolve particular disputes. It is sometimes argued that middle powers are especially well suited for this role because they are not burdened, as are great powers, by geopolitical interests, spheres of influence, and crosscutting pressures and constraints. They can therefore exercise greater impartiality and objectivity. However, evidence suggests that mediators do not have to be impartial in order to be effective or have influence. Instead, a mediator's acceptability is more apt to be determined by "power potential considerations—by the expected consequences of acceptance or rejection—not by perceptions of impartiality" (Touval and Zartman, 1985:256). In this respect, perceived bias can sometimes work to the advantage of certain middle powers occupying a special position within their own regional sphere of influence. The United States accepted mediation by Algeria (a regional middle power) in the hostage crisis with Iran, not because Algeria was deemed impartial, but because Algeria had close ties with Iran (Sick, 1985b). Similarly, Canada's mediation in the Suez crisis in 1956 was facilitated by its close relationship with two of the principal actors who found themselves at loggerheads: Great Britain and the United States (Holmes, 1970; Holmes, 1976; Reid, 1985; Fry, 1988).

Perceived biases and close ties between a mediator and one or more parties to the dispute are usually a source of strength and positively affect a mediator's ability to elicit cooperative behavior and concessions. This may work to the advantage of middle powers in special circumstances like the above. However, the more removed or distant a third party is from the conflict, the more this will undermine or weaken its attempts at mediation.

Mediators with Muscle

Some conflicts also demand "mediators with muscle," i.e., those who can coerce and cajole adversaries with a combination of carrots and sticks in order to bring about a negotiated settlement. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the Middle East (Touval, 1982; Quandt, 1986; Saunders, 1985). One of the reasons why the United States has been a successful mediator in the Arab-Israeli dispute is that it has been sufficiently powerful to wrest concessions from the Israelis and offer side-payments, not just to Israel but to other parties as well, such as Egypt. For example, in the 1975 Sinai II agreements only large US side-payments in the form of aid and security guarantees provided Israel with the exchange it needed to submit to the accords. US promises of a massive economic aid program, a large-scale military aid program to Egypt, and promises of assistance to Israel to construct new air bases also helped smooth the path to agreement at Camp

David in 1979 (Touval, 1982:317). The Middle East is not the only region where mediators with muscle are required. Britain's ability to provide similar kinds of economic concessions and to promise the removal of economic sanctions facilitated negotiations for the Lancaster House negotiations in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe peace settlement (Zartman and Berman, 1982:127–128).

Middle powers generally lack the requisite resources to facilitate compromise in these conflicts. Middle powers typically do not have sufficient political muscle to coax and threaten parties in the kind of hard bargaining that is often required to bring adversaries to the negotiating table. An inability to offer side-payments or force concessions is thus a source of weakness for outside middle powers who are keen to offer their intermediary services.

Informal Matching

There is also a kind of "informal matching" process between mediators and disputants that may or may not work to the advantage of outside mediators, be they middle, great, or small powers, or other groups (Keashly and Fisher, 1990). In many conflicts, for historical reasons, or because of colonial legacies, previous interaction between parties, or a common background or culture, there would appear to be a natural fit between the third party and the disputants such that third-party bias and leverage can be exploited in the context of triadic bargaining, which characterizes most mediated negotiations. For instance, Brown argues that small regional groupings, often including middle powers, like the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay) or the Association of South-East Asian nations (ASEAN—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) are especially well suited to address the resolution of specific regional problems (Brown, 1986:208–220). The reasons include the small size of these regional groupings, the narrow focus and agreement among the members that they have a common problem requiring a common solution, mutual concern about the threat of superpower involvement and escalation (and obvious desire to limit such involvement), operational methods that tend to be informal and unbureaucratic by comparison with larger regional or international organizations, geographical proximity, and a common language, religion, or shared cultural heritage with the disputants.

A somewhat different kind of informal matching process is also evident in the relationships between former colonial powers and Third World countries embroiled in a regional conflict, seeking outside support or assistance from their former colonial patrons in ending military hostilities or armed aggression. Former colonial powers, like France and Britain, are not middle powers in the sense used here because they possess sizable military forces, have nuclear weapons, and occupy a privileged position

internationally as permanent members of the UN Security Council. They are more appropriately viewed as great powers in the traditional usage of this term.

Nonetheless, France's role in black Africa is illustrative of the matching process that often occurs between mediators and disputing parties. France has intervened both as mediator and "counterscalator" in the conflict in Chad on successive occasions: in the early 1960s, in 1968–1975, in 1977–1980 and again in 1983 to counter the Libyan invasion of Chad. France was uniquely qualified to exercise leverage in the conflict in Chad because of its postcolonial status. Importantly, it also had a stake in the conflict because of its long-standing ties with the region and because its postcolonial reputation and responsibility were both at issue (Zartman, 1986; Balta, 1986; Kelly, 1985; McNamara, 1989; Piro, 1987). Likewise Britain's involvement in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe settlement can also be explained by its colonial and postcolonial ties and interests in southern Africa (Matthews, 1990; Zartman, 1985).

Informal matching is crucial to understanding why some states are sought out by or offer their services to adversaries in certain regional conflicts. Their legitimacy and bargaining leverage may both depend upon historical, cultural, or particular affinities with a region. Absent such ties or interest, third-party intermediaries will face an uphill battle if they try to intervene in such conflicts. Again, this has important implications for potential middle-power intervention and mediation in regional conflicts.

Rewards and Risks of Mediation

The growing politicization of what were hitherto viewed as foreign policy issues, coupled with the increasing involvement of nongovernmental organizations and groups in the foreign policy process, also increases pressures on governments to become more actively involved in international conflict resolution and mediation processes. Interested publics are pressuring governments to take more positive, independent action in the resolution of specific regional conflicts in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East. With domestic agendas fraught with problems it is hardly surprising that political leaders increasingly view the international arena as enticing and potentially useful for domestic political purposes. The possibility of a success in international mediation that would have high payoffs both domestically and internationally has many attractions. Moreover, countries intent on proving their middle-power credentials may have other reasons—such as international prestige—for becoming involved in regional conflicts.

Mitchell suggests that there are a number of rewards that can accrue from successful mediation: (1) public goods benefiting all parties, through the cessation of conflict and restoration of peace; (2) private goods, benefiting

only the parties to the conflict and the mediator; and (3) indirect rewards of "enhanced prestige and influence, greater trust and status which an intermediary obtains from third parties as a result of assuming the role of intermediary" (Mitchell, 1988:44).

But there are also costs attached to mediation. Costs may come from taking on the process of mediation or from the outcome of mediation itself, regardless of whether the mediation is a success or not (a successful mediation, especially if it involves heavy side-payments to the parties, may for instance meet with opposition at home if the public is unwilling or reluctant to pay these costs). Mitchell notes that:

Reputations can be damaged as well as enhanced; mediation processes can result in decreased as opposed to increased regional stability (especially if they fail). Embargoes can be sustained and even intensified if those opposing them feel dissatisfied with the way in which an intermediary has conducted itself. Costs can also be suffered in the form of diminished support and approval from internal constituencies. (Mitchell, 1988:47)

There is therefore no free ride for those who choose the role of "honest broker." In some conflicts third parties will have to entrench and institutionalize their role within the peace-building process. Third parties with this objective must possess significant resources and staying power to remain engaged in ongoing negotiations. For middle powers with limited influence or an indirect stake in the conflict, the costs and risks of intervention will usually outweigh the foreign policy benefits to be gained by involvement. This usually argues for a multilateral approach to conflict resolution, whereby the costs and risks associated with intervention can be shared within a larger group, although the political rewards that come with success will accordingly be diffused.

Multilateral Diplomacy, Peacekeeping, and Other Roles for Middle Powers

Multilateral Diplomacy

Middle powers have occasionally participated in multilateral, third-party mediation undertakings in which the aim has been to bring the full weight of international public opinion and pressure to bear on a conflict in order to promote a negotiated settlement. Involvement in these efforts is usually explained by prior middle-power commitments or involvement in the conflict, e.g., via deployment of peacekeeping forces in the region or by their membership on the UN Security Council (as an elected nonpermanent member) when the issue has been brought before the Council. In Cyprus, for example, the United States launched a multilateral mediation initiative in

1978 along with Canada and Britain (known as the ABC initiative) with the aim of reviving the intercommunal dialogue between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Having maintained peacekeeping forces on the island since 1964 as part of the overall UN peacekeeping effort, Canada was a stakeholder in the peace process and in a position to provide input into the negotiations. The effort led to the formulation of a set of principles intended to provide the basis for a constitutional dialogue. Although the response of the two communities was negative, the ABC initiative nonetheless stimulated the resumption of intercommunal talks the following year (Wolfe, 1986:115).

Canada was a nonpermanent member of the Security Council when the Western Contact Group (WCG) was formed in 1977 with the objective of launching a negotiating process with South Africa to pave the way for Namibian independence on terms acceptable to South Africa's neighbors and the international community. The Group's membership comprised the three Western permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, France, and Britain), Canada (a nonpermanent member of the Council), and Germany (Namibia's former colonial ruler before the territory fell under South African administration after Germany's defeat in World War I). Although the Contact Group was ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement to the conflict—Namibian independence was finally secured in 1989–1990, long after the Group had been disbanded—it did help to define the issues, crystallize the negotiating agenda, confer international legitimacy on the key parties to the negotiation, and identify the broad contours of what eventually became the basis of the final peace settlement. These conditions, including a cease-fire, a UN peacekeeping force, and UN-supervised elections in Namibia, were laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). By presenting a united front, the Western powers forced South Africa to negotiate, which it had been reluctant to do up until then (Hampson, 1991).

Peacekeeping

The more typical form of middle-power involvement in multilateral conflict management and resolution processes has been in the area of peacekeeping. There have been some twenty-six peacekeeping and observer operations since the first UN observer group was sent to Kashmir in 1949 (Department of National Defence, 1991). Middle powers like Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Sweden have regularly provided forces and teams of observers to these operations (Bennett, 1984:149). This is because historically they have been recognized as countries without geopolitical ambitions, thus making them acceptable participants in most peacekeeping operations. (For discussions of the record of success in UN international mediation and peacekeeping see Haas, 1987; Puchala and Coate, 1989; Väyrynen, 1985b.)

In recent years, UN peacekeeping commitments have grown to extend across numerous regional environments, and with this the demand on middle powers to provide military and technical assistance has grown. Examples include the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG) to monitor the Iran-Iraq cease-fire (1988); the UN Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) in Afghanistan to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet forces (1988); the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989–1990) to monitor elections and oversee independence; the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVIM) (1988); the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to monitor the 1990 Nicaraguan elections and oversee the regional peace process (1989); and the UN Observers for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEM, 1990–1991) (CIIPS, 1990). The UN has also supplied peacekeeping and observer forces in the Gulf and the western Sahara and will do so in Cambodia.

UN peacekeeping and mediation efforts have been positively affected by the new spirit of cooperation between the two superpowers, the willingness of disputing parties to turn to the UN, and finally the support and willingness of various middle powers to provide peacekeeping and observer forces (Report of the Secretary-General, 1989). For most middle powers the UN continues to remain the principal vehicle for their participation and involvement in mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Third World regional conflicts. The reasons are as follows: (1) the international role of the United Nations in the settlement of international disputes is widely accepted and formally enshrined in its Charter; (2) the United Nations provides a forum for dialogue and cooperation between the two superpowers, whose support is essential if the United Nations is to be an effective mediator and peacekeeper; (3) neutrality and impartiality has proven critical to the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping—the Blue Helmets “have no enemies, are not dispatched to achieve victory, and can use force only in self-defence” (Perez de Cuellar, 1988:8); and (4) from the point of view of middle powers, participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace-building efforts provides a way to share responsibilities, while also distributing the costs and risks of intervention, which may be too much for a single state to bear alone.

However, the UN role in regional conflict management and resolution depends crucially upon several factors. First, even if the superpowers’ rekindled interest in the United Nations continues to flourish, UN involvement in dispute settlement also depends upon the willingness and desire of belligerents in regional conflict to use its good offices. If disputants are skeptical about the impartiality of the United Nations, or if they worry about undue influence exercised by the great powers in the Security Council, this will limit or thwart the UN’s role in the peace process (Cox, 1991; Rikhye and Skjelsbaek, 1990; Sigler, 1982).

Second, there is a fundamental problem that the United Nations faces, which concerns the dilemmas of international mediation and peacekeeping for

conflicts in which the line is blurred between interstate or regional and domestic or communal violence. Most states refuse to allow intervention in their own internal affairs, and the concept of state sovereignty and nonintervention is enshrined in international law. The UN's controversial and bloodied record in the Congo in 1960–1964 (where ONUC found itself caught in a civil war and had to use force to prevent the secession of the province of Katanga), its recent involvement in implementing the Central American peace process, and its ambiguous mandate in Lebanon are stark reminders of the difficulties of peacekeeping in confrontations where the domestic/interstate boundary is blurred.

Third, there are obvious tradeoffs between certain kinds of conflict management, like peacekeeping, and conflict settlement or resolution. The interposition of peacekeeping forces in certain conflicts may in fact freeze the possibilities of settlement by moving these conflicts to a stable equilibrium from which it is difficult to budge the parties to the dispute. Short-term management of a conflict will inevitably have an impact on its possibilities for long-term settlement and resolution. For example, UN forces have kept the peace in Cyprus for almost twenty-five years, but no resolution of the conflict is in sight because the parties cannot agree to a negotiated settlement (Diehl, 1987).

Regional cooperative efforts at mediation and dispute settlement can also be complemented by formal technical assistance from the United Nations to monitor verification and compliance with negotiated agreements. In the Gulf, Central America, and Indochina, the parties are looking to the United Nations and other third parties for involvement, not just assistance, in verification and provision of observers, but also, more generally, for assistance in refugee settlement, economic support, and diplomacy. For middle powers, which have developed specialized expertise in these areas, the United Nations is the logical instrument to coordinate peacekeeping and relief assistance. Though not high-profile activities, these are areas in which middle powers will continue to make their international presence felt.

Conclusion

The changing global situation, reaffirmation of collective security as symbolized by the Gulf crisis, and the settlement of several major regional conflicts are creating new opportunities for third parties to play a major role in the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding process. In the Gulf, the Middle East, Central America, Africa, and Asia, the demands for international involvement in one form or another are growing. Collective security is one form; peaceful intervention in the form of mediation, peacekeeping, and arbitration is another.

The opportunities for middle powers to engage in a new collective

security framework may be limited, however, because of the limitations of collective security itself in addressing the roots of today's conflicts—conflicts typically not involving clear-cut instances of aggression and violation of international norms regarding state sovereignty. Most Third World regional conflicts are characterized by intrastate and/or intercommunal conflicts that have spilled across state borders, or long-standing historical disputes over territory, sometimes going back centuries. These conflicts are altogether resistant to the use of existing international institutional mechanisms and approaches to conflict settlement and resolution. The absence of well-defined political, geographical, and cultural boundaries to these conflicts greatly complicates as well as limits the possibilities for successful intervention by most external actors, including middle powers.

Although the opportunities for direct intervention by middle powers in Third World regional conflicts may be limited and severely circumscribed by the situational dynamics of these conflicts, there is nevertheless a welcomed role for middle powers in support of international mediation and peacekeeping missions undertaken by international organizations like the United Nations. As the UN's involvement in regional dispute settlement processes grows, it will be forced to rely even more than it did in the past on the financial and peacekeeping contributions of supportive middle powers. Support for multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts will therefore continue to be the hallmark of the middle powers' contributions to international security.

Notes

1. Countries participating in the multinational force in the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991 were Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Honduras, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, the Soviet Union, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Superpowers and Third World Security

*S. Neil MacFarlane*¹

This chapter assesses the impact of the changing relationship of the superpowers on Third World security.² This presumes some understanding of the historical nature of the superpower relationship in the Third World. The first section of the paper outlines the development of this relationship. The second and third sections examine the extent and ways in which superpower relations have changed recently with respect to the Third World. The final section examines the likely consequences of the evolution of the superpower relationship for the regions of the Third World.

The basic argument of this paper may be summarized as follows. In the Cold War era, 1947–1985, the combination of ideological and geopolitical globalism characteristic of superpower bipolarity dictated a competition in the Third World for political influence, military position, and prestige. This competition had a cyclical character, the principal determinant of which was the perceived degree of activism in Soviet policy.

Changes in the way that the USSR perceives Third World politics and its relationship to global politics and Soviet interests have altered the cyclical bipolar dynamic underlying superpower competition in the Third World so as to narrow the parameters of superpower conflict and broaden the cooperative positive-sum agenda of the United States and the USSR in the Third World. While this may lead to a degree of condominium, this prospect is limited by the rapid collapse of one of its pillars—the Soviet Union. It seems unlikely that the USSR will be capable, over the short and medium term, of a substantial role in matters pertaining to Third World security beyond its immediate periphery. This raises the prospect of US preeminence.

However, the United States too is hardly the power that it was. Its military preponderance on the periphery masks deepening economic weakness. This raises the question not only of whether we should be talking of a two-superpower or one-superpower world, but whether we should be considering as well the possibility of Third World security without any superpowers.

Change in the superpowers' relationship in the Third World—whether the result of their reconsideration of the dynamic of their relations there, or because of the eclipse of one or both of them—may reduce to some extent the destructive aspects of their previous competitive behavior and facilitate conflict management and resolution. The changing character of the superpower relationship in the Third World may also considerably broaden the range of Third World security issues over which the United Nations may act effectively.

Moreover, to the extent that the leverage of specific Third World actors over the superpowers is related to the US-Soviet competition, the attenuation of that competition will affect this leverage; and the increasing capacity of the superpowers to cooperate on issues of mutual interest may reduce the flexibility of Third World states, who have used superpower rivalry to their advantage. In addition, the eclipse of the USSR may enhance the capacity and the propensity of the United States to act unilaterally in pursuit of its own perceived interests. The removal of this check on US unilateralism may further constrain the flexibility of Third World states.

In general, however, given the continuing difficulties of superpower cooperation on many Third World security issues, the growing immalleability of Third World politics, the decreasing salience of Cold War-related considerations motivating Soviet and particularly US behavior in the Third World, and the decreasing capacities of both superpowers, the overarching trend is likely to be toward superpower disengagement from Third World security issues, except where narrowly defined vital interests remain at stake. The result will be a Third World security environment more autonomous from superpower politics, to the extent that such politics remain relevant at all. Such an environment favors those Third World actors with a capacity for autonomous action. In particular, in areas where concrete interests of the United States are not at stake, the capacity of potential regionally dominant powers to seek hegemony will be enhanced. Moreover, the eclipse of superpower competition leaves space for other great powers (e.g., Japan) or groups of great powers (e.g., the European Community) to play a more significant role in Third World politics.

The History of the US-Soviet Relationship in the Third World

What have the superpowers been doing all these years in the Third World? In the first place, both have security interests of their own existing independently of the superpower competition, as we saw for example with US action in Panama in 1990. Whatever the state of the relationship between them, the Soviet Union (or its successors) and United States have been and will remain active participants in the affairs of Third World states along their

periphery (the Middle East and Southwest Asia for the USSR, Central America and the Caribbean Basin for the United States). In addition, the United States in particular has long had important vested interests in the Middle East, associated with its role in the development of the oil industry there in the 1930s and 1940s. This economic interest in the affairs of the region was joined in the aftermath of World War II by a growing political interest in the preservation and health of Israel. The Soviet Union, by contrast, has few extended interests independent of the competition between the superpowers. The intersection of perceived vital interests in the Middle East suggests that potential conflict there will persist even if bipolar superpower competition in general attenuates.

Aside from these geographically limited areas, it is this bipolar competition that dominated the agenda of Soviet and US policy in the Third World. The distribution of power in the international system was such that only the USSR was sufficiently powerful to threaten the United States, and vice versa. Each subscribed, moreover, to a universalizable system of beliefs antithetical to the other. This ideological contradiction strengthened the perceived threat from the other: Each side perceived the foreign policy of the other to be directed not only at the erosion of its own power but at the destruction of its principles of political, economic, and social organization. The freezing of the status quo in Europe—the otherwise logical arena of their competition—focused their attention on the Third World.

In this bipolar context, competition with the adversary gave each an incentive to challenge the other's position in areas close to its borders. Hence proximity to the United States gave the USSR reason for involvement in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. The strategic location of the Middle East and Southwest Asia on the periphery of the USSR added an additional dynamic to US policy in these regions. Such thinking informed US support of the Baghdad Pact and CENTO, and was typified in the Reagan era by the notion of forging a "strategic consensus" directed at the USSR in the region.

In addition to these strategic issues, there was also a more clearly political and perceptual dimension to the bipolar rivalry. Both the Soviet Union and the United States proved deeply sensitive to questions of credibility. In conditions of universal ideological, political, and strategic rivalry, each setback was seen to reflect the current of history. Losses emboldened the adversary while weakening the commitment of allies. As such, every stake, no matter how small, became significant.

The post-World War II competition between the United States and USSR in the Third World may be broken down into four phases. In the first (1947–1953), Soviet involvement in the Third World was minimal—except on the USSR's periphery—owing to deficiencies in capability and the consuming attention devoted by policymakers to the problems of postwar reconstruction and the consolidation of their hold on Eastern Europe.

Cooperation with the regimes of newly independent states was generally inconsistent with Soviet doctrine of the period, which characterized governments dominated by the "national bourgeoisie" as toadies of imperialism, tied to the metropolitan countries in neocolonial relationships (MacFarlane, 1985:169, 178).

The Soviet Union, however, did attempt to take advantage of the presence of its forces in Northern Iran during and after the war to carve out a sphere of influence in that country. It also assisted the Chinese Communists in the last stages of that party's rise to power and the USSR at least appeared to support the decision of the North Koreans to invade South Korea in June 1950. Moreover, although not directly involved, the USSR advocated the kind of armed communist revolt that sprang up throughout Southeast and South Asia from 1948 onwards (MacFarlane, 1989:33).

This combination of activities—in conjunction with the Cold War climate of the period—stimulated the Truman and later the Eisenhower administration into efforts to create a wall of containment along the southern periphery of the USSR, from South Korea in the east via the SEATO alliance system in Southeast Asia to the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East. This "pactomania" was combined with substantial military assistance to the Greek government in its counterinsurgency against the Communist Party of Greece, military intervention to resist the communist takeover of South Korea, the interposition of the Seventh Fleet to prevent the government of mainland China from invading Taiwan, and increasing assistance to the French in Indochina and the Philippine government in their efforts to resist communist insurgencies.

This series of events displays the perceptual dimension of the Cold War rivalry at its inception. It is reasonably clear that Soviet policies or actions were not the major forces behind the communist-dominated insurgencies in Greece and in Southeast Asia. Indeed, in the Greek case (which occasioned the articulation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947), there is evidence that Soviet (as opposed to Yugoslav) material support was minimal, and their political perspective on the insurgency vacillated (see Giannakos, 1990). The major decisions leading to the invasion of South Korea in 1950 were taken by the North Koreans themselves. The Chinese communist victory resulted principally from the strength of the movement and the weakness of its domestic adversary—that is to say, from indigenous rather than external factors. Again, Soviet assistance was late and rather insubstantial. In this sense, the United States was reacting more to leadership perceptions of a global Soviet-dominated communist challenge than to the objective reality of that challenge.³ In any event, by the mid-1950s, in the aftermath of the Korean War, the pace of US material involvement in the Third World had slackened, and the United States was substantially reducing the size of military budgets (see Huntington, 1987:42).

In the second phase, the death of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev gave

new force to Soviet policy in the Third World.⁴ With the problems of reconstruction and the consolidation of Eastern Europe behind them,⁵ buoyed by considerable optimism concerning the trend in the "correlation of forces," and aware of the extent to which the previous proscription of substantial contact with national bourgeois regimes had handicapped Soviet policy, the new Soviet leadership embarked on a rapid expansion of the USSR's competitive activity in the Third World. In the mid-1950s major economic assistance agreements were signed with India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Egypt, among others. As the process of decolonization extended into sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1950s, so too did this aspect of Soviet policy. After the Cuban Revolution, the Soviets took advantage of the deterioration of the relationship between the United States and Cuba to extend their activity into the Western Hemisphere as well (see Kanet, 1974: chapter 2).

Significant expansion in Soviet military involvement, primarily in the form of arms transfers and military advisers, matched the growth of the Soviet economic assistance program. As with economic assistance, arms transfers and officer training programs focused on radical nationalist states with an identifiably anti-Western orientation to their foreign policies. The competition with the West clearly motivated Soviet foreign policy during this period, but it was not the only significant causal factor. The budding conflict with China expressed itself initially largely in a contest for influence over revolutionary movements and radical states in the Third World. By 1961, in response to radicalizing pressure from China, the Soviet Union declared its solidarity with and support for wars of national liberation. There was a significant domestic animus as well. As Khrushchev's internal economic policies went awry, he sought to compensate through success in foreign policy, in part in the Third World. Both of these inputs, however, tended to strengthen the competitive anti-Western dimension of Khrushchev's Third World policies, for it was through anti-imperialism that the USSR could legitimize its leading role in the international communist movement and the "world revolutionary movement." Likewise, it was through success against the West that Khrushchev might approach the issue of domestic legitimation through foreign policy activity, since this most clearly appealed to the nationalist and Marxist-Leninist aspects of the political culture within whose parameters he was constrained to operate.

Perhaps the culmination of Soviet activism in the Third World in the Khrushchev period was the decision to translate the USSR's growing influence in Cuba into a concrete military asset by installing their intermediate- and medium-range missiles to threaten targets in the eastern United States. The intensity of the US response and the ensuing crisis in turn moderated the anti-American component of Soviet policy in the Third World, even where this resulted in gains for the Chinese. In Vietnam, for example, Khrushchev's moderation on the growing war between North and South from

1961–1964 brought gains in influence over the North Vietnamese party and government for the Chinese (Cameron, 1981:86–92).

Khrushchev's activism in the Third World elicited a vigorous response on the part of the Kennedy administration. US military doctrine shifted towards flexible response, in part out of a desire to expand conventional options in the Third World in the face of a perceived expanding communist threat. As Robert Packenham has noted, the perception of a raging Cold War in the Third World also informed to a large extent the decision of the United States to greatly increase its foreign assistance program (Packenham, 1973). The ultimate expressions of anticommunist activism on the part of the United States were the growing US involvement in the Vietnamese conflict and the intervention in the Dominican Republic. The decision to intervene in Vietnam, if not a direct response to Soviet policy,⁶ was influenced strongly by a perception of the threat of communist expansion, particularly given the sensitivity of the Democrats to the charge of being soft on communism.

US competition enhanced both the costs and the risks of Soviet forward policies in the Third World. In the meantime, Soviet analysts and policymakers were coming to question the merits of Khrushchev-era economic assistance to radical states in the Third World (see Valkenier, 1970). They were increasingly concerned about the question of effectiveness and now also return on investment, given the poor performance of the Soviet economy in the early and mid-1960s, this due to dislocation associated with Khrushchev's rather ill-conceived efforts at reform and the gradual exhaustion of the economy's potential for extensive growth.

Moreover, the influence that the Soviets sought to obtain in this fashion proved elusive as many of the targets of Soviet attention disappeared in coups d'état (Nkrumah in 1966, Sukarno and Ben Bella in 1965, Modibo Keita in 1968). Finally, in the mid-1960s, China entered the Cultural Revolution. This dramatically reduced the extent of Chinese involvement in the outside world.

All of these factors contributed to a substantial change in the direction of Soviet policy in the Third World. The comparative weight of economic assistance as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy diminished as a result of doubts about its economic and political effectiveness and in the context of growing resource-allocation problems in the USSR itself. Growing volumes of military assistance took its place, particularly in the early 1970s, when the capacity of oil producers to pay for arms with hard currency expanded drastically (see Kramer, 1989).

Growing doubts about the reliability and stability of Third World nationalist regimes in turn dictated a refocusing of much Soviet effort toward more conservative but strategically substantial and more wealthy Third World states, e.g., Nigeria and Iran (see Simonia, 1966; and Legvold, 1970:223–224, 252–258). This suggested among other things greater pessimism about the capacity of the Third World to achieve the transition to socialism and

about the capacity of the USSR to nurture this transition, and a growing attention instead to more traditional great-power politics.

Yet this was hardly an unambiguous retrenchment. There was no cessation or reduction in assistance to the "socialist states" of the Third World (Cuba and Vietnam). In the Vietnamese case, it was Khrushchev's successors who began significant military assistance to the North Vietnamese and the NLF and associated the USSR unambiguously with the North Vietnamese hard line on talks regarding the Vietnam conflict, taking a manifestly anti-American position. They did so in large part as a result of their competition with the Chinese for the loyalty of the Vietnamese Workers' Party (see Cameron, 1981:92–95).

Moreover, in the Middle East, Soviet support for the Arab position against Israel if anything strengthened in the mid-1960s. The USSR, in its efforts to prop up the Syrian government in 1966–1967, was instrumental in provoking the June 1967 war, and, when its friends got into trouble, the Soviet Union embarked on a thoroughgoing military resupply operation. The policy of support for Arab nationalist regimes seemed immune to the general reorientation away from radical nationalists characteristic of the period and suggests the particular importance of this region in the calculations of Soviet policymakers.

The United States, meanwhile, found itself in increasing difficulty resulting from the decision to intervene in the Vietnam War. Although the US military held its own, and in some respects did rather well in its participation, the US position was handicapped by the weakness and growing unpopularity of their clients. The inevitable association of the South Vietnamese government with foreign intervention into Vietnamese affairs—and the great suffering caused by the war's escalation—did little to enhance its position.

Moreover, the human and material costs of the deployment proved unbearable. The war created divisions in the US body politic that ultimately dictated withdrawal and greatly reduced the US capacity to deploy force in defense of foreign policy assets in the Third World.

The US failure in Vietnam and the consequent reduction in the risks faced by the USSR in the Third World was one factor among several that contributed to a broadening of Soviet activism in the mid and late 1970s. The other relevant contributing factors were:

1. The renewal of competition from China for influence with national liberation movements and established regimes;
2. The advent of détente, which made Soviet claims to continuing status as a revolutionary actor in world politics questionable;
3. The growth of Soviet force-projection capabilities, which served as a permissive condition of a more active Soviet military role in the Third World;

4. The advent of parity, which may have induced the USSR to seek equality of status as a superpower in other spheres of world politics; and
5. The emergence of an array of reasonable attractive opportunities for involvement in the Third World, among them the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, the demise of the Ethiopian imperial regime, the ambiguities of power in Southeast Asia following the US withdrawal from Indochina, and the growing political crisis in Central America.

The Soviet return to activism was characterized by a renewed focus on “radical” regimes in the Third World, but this time with particular stress on self-avowed Marxist-Leninist regimes (see, for example, Kim and Kaufman, 1976; and Ul’Yanovsky, 1971). This reflected a degree of optimism about the prospects for socialist transition in the Third World, and also Soviet doubts (given the record of the 1960s and the subsequent defection of Egypt in 1972–1976) about the previous concentration on non-Marxist Third World nationalist regimes. Soviet policy during this period was characterized on the level of ideology by the propagation of its model of socioeconomic development, and relied strongly on military instruments. In particular, the USSR intervened (or supported Cuban intervention) in civil and/or regional conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, and built reasonably solid relations with these three countries, as well as South Yemen, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea (subsequent to 1978), Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Grenada. This led many in the United States to believe that the USSR was developing a dangerous expansionist momentum in the Third World.

The record of Soviet-US competition in the Third World suggests that although the policies of the two powers in the Third World responded to a multiplicity of factors (the actions of third parties, the emergence of opportunities in the target environment, experience in this environment, and domestic political considerations), they were related to each other and reflected a pattern of asymmetric response. Periods of Soviet activism tended to be followed by a US activist response. These engendered Soviet quiescence, followed by diminished US attention to Third World issues. US inattention or withdrawal in turn initiated a new cycle of Soviet escalation.

The Gorbachev Era

The record of the 1940s to the 1970s would lead us to expect a repetition of the cyclical pattern evident above, and indeed, the US response to Soviet activism in the 1980s was consistent with this expectation. US policymakers came to the conclusion that the USSR was taking advantage of détente to supplant the West and the United States in the Third World. This

conclusion—and the associated disillusionment caused by the Soviet military buildup of the 1970s—led to serious questioning of détente and ultimately to its demise. The Reagan administration brought the US return to Third World activism that the cyclical model outlined above would lead one to expect. This activism took the form principally of the Reagan Doctrine—the conscious challenging of Soviet positions in the Third World through the support of insurgents opposed to Marxist regimes benefiting from Soviet support. The most obvious examples were the support of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, and UNITA in Angola. The example of Grenada suggested that where conditions were favorable, direct US military intervention to depose such regimes was possible.

The similarity of this period to previous US challenges of the USSR in the Third World is obvious, but there were important structural differences. In the first place, US policy primarily took the form of challenges to established regimes through the sponsorship of insurgency, a tactic more usually associated historically with the USSR. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was seeking to stabilize friendly regimes in the face of this threat, a role more often associated with the United States (see Katz, 1986). This reflects the fact that the USSR had in many respects become a status quo power as a result of its earlier acquisitions.

The response of the USSR in the 1980s to US pressure has again been what the model would suggest. Soviet official commentary suggested a diminution in the importance Soviet policymakers placed on the Third World (again, see Katz, 1986). Comment on the significance of Third World struggles in the shifting correlation of forces largely disappeared. Soviet policymakers' statements and diplomatic activity suggested a refocusing of Soviet attention away from the so-called states of socialist orientation and toward more strategically and economically important actors such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India, and the ASEAN states.⁷ Increasing doubts were raised about the utility of force in pursuing Soviet objectives in the Third World (Primakov, 1988). The practical manifestations of this concern were evident in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Vietnamese from Cambodia. The focus in the realm of conflict resolution lay on political settlement through national reconciliation rather than on victory of the "forces of progress" (see Gorbachev, 1986). Far from denying the relevance of Third World conflict to the central relationship between the superpowers, Soviet writers now recognized the problem of linkage and advocated joint superpower action in Third World crises to avoid or to mitigate the effects of disagreement on Third World issues (Dashichev, 1988). In this context, they positively reassessed the role of the United Nations as an organization that may be useful in efforts to manage Third World crises and facilitate conflict resolution.

The Soviets meanwhile evinced growing disillusionment with their socialist-oriented client states, arguing that they were politically

incompetent, that their efforts to socialize their economies and to dissociate their economies from the world capitalist system (at least in part adopted at the behest of earlier Soviet advisers) were premature and destructive, and that the USSR could not and would not pay the economic price for these errors (see, for example, Mirsky, 1987). The watchword of the moment, to borrow Shevardnadze's phrase, was "profitability" and "mutual benefit," rather than the internationalist obligations of the USSR.⁸ In this context, the only way to insure development was through internal reform along lines paralleling those proposed for the USSR itself and deepening ties to the capitalist states and transnational enterprises (Mirsky, 1987; Smimov, 1986). The advocacy of political settlement to civil and regional conflicts involving their allies, and of an enhanced Western role in their economies, suggests that the USSR was willing to contemplate loss of influence and position if this took place in an orderly and uncoerced fashion. That this is not merely a matter of theory is suggested by Soviet support of the electoral process in Nicaragua and their dignified acceptance of a result that consigned the Sandinistas to oblivion.

With regard to new or continuing revolutionary opportunities, the USSR on the whole eschewed direct involvement in support of challenges to the status quo, and instead advised opposition movements to settle their differences with opponents through negotiation and democratic election. Again, such policies were pursued at the risk of loss of influence, to judge from the annoyed reaction of the ANC and the SACP to calls for a negotiated settlement in South Africa (*Africa Confidential*, January 12, 1990).

The conclusion one draws from these revisions of Soviet theory and practice in the Third World is that the objectives of influence and position in the context of struggle against the United States were less important to the USSR than they were in previous periods. This was consistent with the evolution of Soviet perspectives on world politics in the Gorbachev era. Soviet spokesmen and policymakers downplayed the role of ideology—in particular class struggle—as organizing principles and motive forces of Soviet international behavior, stressing instead concrete interests (Shevardnadze, 1988). The Soviet conception of state interest also developed from a rather clearly zero-sum approach to a stress instead on common interests, both at the level of global politics and in the realm of superpower policies in the Third World. In this sense, changing Soviet perspectives and policies in the Third World were part of a broader transition to less confrontational and more cooperative policies, which included far more ambitious strategies of nuclear and conventional arms control, elimination of the bifurcation of Europe, and integration of the USSR into the world economy.

This is not to say that traditional Soviet objectives in the Third World disappeared altogether. The continuation of assistance to several states of socialist orientation in deep military trouble and facing US-sponsored challenges to their stability (as in postsettlement Angola, and postwithdrawal

Afghanistan), and to major allies such as Castro's Cuba and Vietnam suggests: (1) that there was continuing inertia and possibly bureaucratic resistance to change in Soviet policy; and/or (2) that the Soviet Union remained sensitive to issues of credibility while seeking to reduce its competitive profile in the Third World. It did not perceive itself to be pulling out of the Third World or surrendering its claim to a role in Third World politics, and it sought to avoid creating any impression among allies or adversaries that it is willing to disengage under fire, particularly if that fire was directly or indirectly US (MacFarlane, 1990).

This said, as time passed, it became clearer that many of these relationships were not changing along lines that one would expect from the cyclical model. For example, the USSR now intended to convert its subsidized trading relationship with Cuba into one based on hard currency exchange based on world market prices. Elsewhere, the continuation of arms sales for cash into the current period suggested that the Soviet concern about profitability rather than ideology might not entirely be cause for celebration. There was, however, ample awareness in the USSR of the potential inconsistency between Soviet diplomacy of conflict prevention and resolution in the Third World and the continuing flow of arms transfers, and an increasingly critical attitude toward the supposed economic benefits of the arms trade. This suggested that this traditional component of Soviet policy was also now under reexamination. In general, it was undeniable that Soviet theory and practice in the Third World had shifted in a moderate direction so that competitive, assertive behavior had diminished considerably while the Soviet propensity to cooperate on Third World issues had expanded commensurately.

If the past were a reliable indicator, this decline in concern about the Soviet threat in the Third World would have been accompanied by declines in the level of resources the United States committed to its policies in the Third World. One would expect this effect to have been accelerated by the fiscal difficulties facing the US government. Once again, a Soviet deemphasis on the pursuit of the bipolar competition with the United States in the Third World appeared to be bringing a degree of US disengagement from that competition as well.

Before assessing the probable future development of superpower policy in the Third World, it is pertinent to examine the durability of the current phase. The historical record would superficially suggest that a future renewal of the competition is likely, and in particular that US moderation—by reducing costs and risks perceived by the USSR—will eventually engender a return to Soviet activism. However, the cyclical model has broken down for a number of reasons.

First, while superficially the record of Soviet policy seems cyclical, there were important differences between cycles. The Soviets did not tend to repeat the same mistake twice. Hence, Khrushchev's activism focused on

radical nationalist regimes. On the whole these proved unstable (e.g., Indonesia, Ghana, Mali, etc.) and/or unreliable (e.g., Egypt and Somalia). Brezhnev's activism took a new track, stressing instead relations with purportedly Marxist-Leninist national liberation movements and states of socialist orientation. They discovered that this track too was unpromising for reasons discussed above. In the meantime, by Soviet admission, the national liberation revolution against colonialism in its traditional form was largely over. This left open the question of just where the Soviets would go next in their effort to expand the positions of socialism.

Second, as noted earlier, Soviet activism has frequently been a response not just to US policy in the context of bipolarity, but to bipolarity of a different kind within the world-revolutionary and international communist movements. Notably it was a response to the episodic Chinese challenge to the status of the USSR as a revolutionary actor in world politics and its legitimacy as a leader of these movements. It is hard to conceive of a renewal of this Chinese challenge. In the meantime, the international communist movement and its internal competition for leadership has ended. Nor, according to Soviet perceptions quite distinct from those of previous periods, was there acknowledged to be a "world revolutionary movement."

Nor is it obvious that there remained powerful domestic constituencies who might have been tempted to use Soviet moderation in the Third World as ammunition in an attempt to discredit the Soviet leadership. There had been evidence in the middle of 1988—and in particular the scarcely veiled argument between Shevardnadze and Medvedev on the one hand and Ligachev on the other on the significance of class in Soviet foreign policy—that this had continued to be an issue in domestic politics. But Ligachev is now gone, as are all other leading figures who have been known to espouse reservations about the effective abandonment of class struggle in the Third World. The remaining resistance was probably bureaucratic in character, and, as argued above, it seems to be dissipating as well.

Third, how one perceives the durability of Soviet policy in the Third World depends strongly on one's interpretation of its sources. It is probably true (if unverifiable) that US pressure on Third World friends of the USSR was one factor that contributed to the shift in Soviet policy in the Third World. It affected the calculus of cost and benefit in maintaining an activist policy. To the extent that US policy moderates, one might therefore expect a further change in the Soviet calculus of cost and benefit pertaining to Third World activism.

However, this is only part of the story. The domestic economic crisis in the USSR considerably constrained the resources available for the Third World.⁹ To judge from both policymaker and academic comments, there was a growing concern with the burden placed on the Soviet economy by unproductive foreign policies, and there is a desire to cut costs, including—perhaps particularly—costs in the Third World (see Kortunov, 1990).

Moreover, economic difficulties favored a degree of reconciliation with the West, since Western economic assistance was desired for economic recovery, while a decrease in the general level of tension would allow reallocation of scarce resources out of the defense sector to other areas of the economy. There was good reason to believe that there were no short-term solutions to the USSR's economic difficulties. Indeed, there was good reason to expect that resource allocation would deepen as the USSR's leadership became increasingly responsive to domestic mass political pressures in the context of democratization. Moreover, it appeared that, thus far, perestroika had exacerbated the substantial disruption of the Soviet economy, with consequent serious reductions in output. In this sense, although change based on domestic economic needs might have been tactical and instrumental, it was likely to be durable.

As inferred earlier, there is in addition the factor of learning from experience. There had been many successes in Soviet policy in the Third World in the post-Stalin period, but few gains in terms of durable influence or strategic position, arguably the most significant objectives in the bipolar context. Likewise, this experience drew into question the prospects for meaningful transition to socialism and the applicability of the socialist model as the Soviets traditionally understood it to the Third World. The target environment had turned out to be unreliable and frustrating. This realization was reflected in much Gorbachev-era Soviet commentary on the Third World. The conceptual revisions of this period went well beyond anything seen before and drew into question basic aspects of traditional Soviet views on the Third World and its role in world politics. In particular, there was growing acceptance of the relative autonomy of Third World political process from the global struggle between capitalism and socialism, and by extension the immalleability of these processes. Some Soviets went so far as to criticize the Soviet application of Marxism in the Third World as basically Eurocentric and hence inappropriate (Mirsky, 1987; Krylova, 1989).

A final factor deserves mention. The above changes were accompanied by steps to alter the Soviet institutional structure so as to ensure that it was responsive to the new perspectives and needs of the leadership. The autonomy of the International Department of the Central Committee was substantially circumscribed in the effort to render its actions consistent with the principal lines of Soviet foreign policy. Personnel most closely associated with past activism in the Third World (e.g., Ponomarev and Ul'Yanovsky) were replaced by individuals with greater experience in Soviet relations with Europe and the United States. The implementation of foreign policy appeared to reside ever more clearly in the foreign ministry. With the creation of meaningful investigative and review mechanisms in the legislative branch, the flexibility of the leadership to pursue expensive and unpopular adventures was substantially reduced.

The foreign policy process in the USSR was affected not only by the

conscious decision to restructure institutions and to redistribute power among them, but also by the apparently uncontrolled evolution or disintegration of Soviet political relations. Most notably, the authority of the center was eroding rapidly in the face of challenges from the local and republican levels of Soviet politics. At the extreme, this raised the question of whether in the longer term, there will be a USSR for the United States to interact with. Even if the union survives, it is a near certainty that the central government's control over resources will be substantially circumscribed. This too draws into question the capacity of the USSR to return to its old ways.

For all of the above reasons, it seems prudent to expect that the new direction in Soviet foreign policy in the Third World is reasonably durable. The cycle has been broken.¹⁰

The US Response

To the extent that Soviet policy is an important factor determining US activity in the Third World, this transformation in Soviet perspectives and practice in the Third World may be expected to induce considerable change in US behavior as well. Most notably, it removes the competitive global-ideological or power-political dimension. This reduces the general tendency to *reactive* activism characteristic of the postwar period. The growing economic constraints faced by the United States in its commitment to global activism also favor this shift. So too, finally, do the growing immaleability of an increasingly well-armed "target environment," and the accumulated frustration of repeated and costly failure. This expectation is reflected in the growing body of comment in the late 1980s to the effect that the United States had overestimated its interests in the Third World, that trends there had little fundamental impact on the position of the United States in international politics, and that much of what went on there was the result of uncontrollable indigenous factors and was essentially unrelated—both with regard to cause and to effect—to larger issues of world politics (Maynes, 1988; Slater, 1987; Johnson, 1985).

But, as noted earlier, there have always existed concrete US interests in various parts of the Third World (e.g., the Caribbean Basin and the Middle East). It would seem reasonable to assume, therefore, that the general tendency towards disengagement—if indeed there is one—will be accompanied by a reassertion of focus on more concrete traditional interests where they are perceived to exist. Moreover, as the system evolves, traditional interests are being joined by newer ones, such as control of drugs and concern over migration. Indeed, the reduction of risks of confrontation and escalation associated with the Cold War may remove significant constraints on US unilateralism.

In this sense, the end of superpower bipolar competition may merely

pave the way for quasi-hegemonic activism on the part of the United States in areas where it perceives its interests to be at stake. In the Caribbean Basin, for example, the Soviet commitment to Cuba and perhaps to a lesser extent Nicaragua to some extent reduced US flexibility. The reduction or removal of this commitment, by contrast, may increase it.

In this context, the invasion of Panama in January of 1990 is a good indicator of the diminution of the significance of bipolarity in US policy in the Third World. Indeed, it is an ideal example of what Shevardnadze has called for in the superpower relationship—deideologization. The United States acted in Central America not against Marxist-Leninist friends of the USSR, but against a military dictatorship possessing no such ties. It acted not on the basis of Cold War logic, but largely in order to bolster President Bush's image in domestic politics. Bush's susceptibility to the "wimp factor" made General Noriega's provocations intolerable as well as tempting. In addition, the invasion served the purpose of demonstrating seriousness on the drug issue, clearly of fundamental importance in US domestic politics today. From the Latin American perspective, it raised serious concern about the implications of the eclipse of the USSR for regional security.

The Gulf events of 1990 also suggest the possibility that what we are seeing today is the emergence of a single superpower intending to exercise leadership in world affairs, including the affairs of the Third World. Again, the US deployment and ensuing prosecution of the war is certainly so perceived by many in the affected region, and is a matter of particular concern, given the further perception that the United States is dedicated to shoring up outmoded political and social institutions in a misguided pursuit of stability.

Yet there are a number of reasons not to generalize from these two cases. The Panamanian events occurred in that region of the Third World where the United States has traditionally perceived its vital interests to be most strongly at stake. In the case of the Gulf, there is an intense US perception of vital interest in maintaining access to and preventing monolithic control over the region's oil supplies. This contrasts rather starkly with the situation in many other regions. The indifference with which the United States greeted the collapse of government and open civil war with substantial loss of life in Liberia in the summer and autumn of 1990 illustrates the likely pattern for regions where no such interests are at stake.

Moreover, the "single superpower model" also fails to take into account the substantial domestic constraints on US activism in the Third World. Certainly the issue of oil resonates with US elites and mass opinion. But in cases where vital interests are not obviously at stake, the Cold War justification for involvement—traditionally a mainstay of US interventionism in such areas—no longer plays.

Beyond this, as noted above, the United States now faces far stronger

economic constraints in its exercise of "leadership." The problems of debt and deficit greatly inhibit unilateral expensive military ventures. To the extent that the United States has come to depend on economic support from its allies in its policies in the Third World, these allies' perspectives also operate as a constraint on US flexibility.

Implications

Two subjects remain for discussion—the extent to which change in the superpower relationship is likely to devolve to a form of condominium between them in their dealings with the Third World, and the probable implications of such change as has occurred in the superpower relationship for the Third World itself. With regard to the first, there has been much evidence recently that the capacity of the superpowers to cooperate on Third World security issues has expanded considerably. Their joint efforts to produce an agreement on Southern African issues, on Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, and most recently in the Gulf, are illustrative, as is their joint sponsorship of an Arab-Israeli peace conference in October–November 1991.

However, there are considerable limitations on their capacity to construct and impose a duopoly. First, the Soviet Union is no longer more than a marginal player on most regional security issues in the Third World. This was certainly evident in the events in the Gulf of 1990–1991. We are moving into a period in which the USSR, even if it were desirous of playing an active and forward role in Third World security, no longer has the capacity to do so. Where it does count is in multilateral fora such as the United Nations. Here, the Soviet desire for stable and orderly relations with the United States—as well as its reconceptualization of the nature of Third World conflict—is liable to translate into a considerable degree of support for US positions on Third World security issues. Soviet behavior in the Security Council on Gulf issues is a case in point.

Soviet diplomatic behavior in the UN regarding the Gulf, however, illustrates that there remained important differences between the two superpowers on Third World security issues. Most notably, the USSR was less predisposed than the United States to consider the option of force, and more willing to rely on sanctions as a means of bringing Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions on Kuwait. Moreover, the limited utility of the USSR as a military partner of the United States was illustrated by the clear Soviet unwillingness to provide forces for multilateral action against Iraq. Finally, criticism of the Soviet foreign minister during late 1990 debates of the Congress of People's Deputies suggested a degree of unhappiness with Soviet cooperation in US-led initiatives and unhappiness with many aspects of new thinking in foreign policy. The strength of this

domestic factor was unclear, but Shevardnadze's resignation suggested that it should not be taken lightly.

There also remain important differences of perspective on some remaining significant conflicts. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which events in the Arab-Israeli context could conduce to serious conflict between the superpowers. But asymmetries in their commitments continue to limit their capacity for joint action. More profoundly, the USSR retains interests in the Middle East which overlap with those of the United States and potentially conflict with them. The Soviet military's evident discomfort with the prospect of a contingent of US forces settling in for the long haul in the postwar Gulf illustrated not just a Cold War hangover, but the legitimate sensitivity of a state to military affairs in contiguous territory.

Prospects for deepening Soviet-US cooperation on Third World issues are also constrained by a strong US perception that the Soviets are not necessary to the pursuit of US interests. The Soviets do retain residual links to Third World allies that may prove useful in US efforts at crisis management (recent coordinated initiatives on the war in Angola are a case in point). But to the extent that Soviet ties to Third World states are loosened, the utility of the USSR as a partner diminishes. Its weakness and retrenchment make the USSR less relevant to US diplomacy.

It is somewhat premature to speak of the implications of change in the superpower relationship—the diminution of their competition and the rapid weakening of the USSR—for Third World security. Nonetheless, some initial suggestions are appropriate. The end to the universal competition suggests an end to the universality of involvement.

This may have a number of salutary impacts. The competitive provision of arms on concessionary terms has done much to lengthen and increase the intensity and lethality of conflict in the region. To the extent that the availability of arms has allowed decisionmakers to pursue and to sustain military options, this has complicated the prevention of and the search for solutions to regional conflicts. Sustained Soviet military assistance to Somalia from 1969 to 1977 enabled Siad Barre to contemplate a military solution to the Ogaden question. Soviet assistance to Ethiopia permitted the Ethiopian leadership to pursue military options rather than negotiate with the Eritreans on the question of autonomy. A decline in competitive arms-transfer policies may mitigate these unfortunate effects.

Beyond this, competitive superpower policies have frequently distorted civil politics in recipient states. One strong historical reason for US support of Zaire's President Mobutu has been his reputation as a fervent anticommunist and Cold War supporter of the United States. The decreasing relevance of the Cold War in Africa removes this incentive to ignore his "kleptocratic" tendencies and his less than exemplary conduct toward those who do not happen to agree with him. For this reason too, the diminution of globalist superpower interference in such areas may have felicitous results.

On the other hand, it seems improbable that all superpower assistance and involvement has been unambiguously negative. The end of the Cold War leaves few incentives for either the Soviet Union or the United States to bestir themselves to assist in conflict resolution or economic development, or to provide other forms of assistance, except in instances discussed below.

With regard to the regional politics of the Third World, competition of the United States and the USSR had contradictory effects. The capacity of Third World actors to play upon this rivalry in order to acquire economic and military resources—and a degree of deterrent protection—presumably enhanced their flexibility. Without Soviet interest in undermining the US position in the Caribbean Basin, for example, it is unlikely that Cuba could have enjoyed the independence from the United States in foreign policy that it has displayed since 1960.

On the other hand, relying on the superpowers for resources critical to the pursuit of foreign policy created forms of dependency that made clients follow more closely the policies of their patron than they might have without such dependence. Cuba is again a possible case in point. Moreover, the perceived association of major regional powers with one or the other superpower led to balancing behavior on the part of the patron's rival (e.g., US support of Pakistan as a response in part to perceived Soviet influence over India, or US support of the Cambodian opposition in the face of Vietnamese efforts to dominate Indochina). Such intervention in the power politics of specific regions constrained major regional powers in their quest for preeminence.

It seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union will remain particularly active in the security affairs of regions beyond its immediate periphery. The United States—absent the Cold War—will focus its attention on areas where concrete interests are at stake. This suggests that, in discussing the implications of change in the Soviet-US relationship on the security of the Third World, one should distinguish among the various regions on the basis of the perceived post-Cold War interests of the superpowers and the United States in particular.

Regions where the United States retains interests and where the Soviet Union disengages (e.g., Central America) may experience a diminution in the flexibility of local actors vis-à-vis the United States. As inferred above, regions such as the Middle East where both the Soviet Union and the United States retain substantial interests have some potential for continuing superpower conflict, and both superpowers will attempt to contain that potential through close consultation and joint diplomatic action, where possible. The strong interest of the USSR in current circumstances to develop its relations with the West imposes a profound constraint on its capacity for independent pursuit of its interests where these potentially conflict with those of the United States, as does the deepening crisis within

the USSR. These factors strengthen the Soviet tendency to defer to the United States.

Regions where neither superpower perceives significant interests (e.g., Africa south of the Sahara) are likely to experience a degree of neglect. The principal concern of the two superpowers in such areas is likely to be to ensure that events there do not impinge significantly on the orderly development of the Soviet-US relationship.

Assessment of the impact of change in the superpower relationship in such areas depends in part on how the space vacated by the United States and the Soviet Union is filled. In some areas (e.g., Japan in Southeast Asia) there are other external actors who are likely to occupy it. Such involvement may be reasonably benign, or it may encourage the perpetuation of local conflict. The Cold War is not the only conflict waged by proxy in the Third World. In others, local powers may take advantage of the diminution in superpower involvement to assert their own claims to hegemony. The role of Nigeria in encouraging, if not imposing, a regional situation in Liberia is a case in point. Indian aspirations, not just in South Asia, but also in the Indian Ocean Basin, are another. Finally, in some instances, there seems little prospect of the gap being filled. In a number of civil conflicts in Africa (e.g., Somalia or southern Sudan), the propensity of external actors to intervene seems quite low. On the other hand, given the prior proliferation of conventional arms to the region, there seems little prospect of the conflicts burning themselves out. This raises the possibility that such conflicts may continue at comparatively low levels more or less indefinitely, or until some local actor manages to exhaust his adversaries.

The final obvious impact of fading superpower competition that bears mention is its effect on the past emasculation of international institutions in the latter's efforts to manage and resolve conflict. The existence of Soviet and US veto power in the UN Security Council precluded effective UN action in instances where allies or friends of the United States and the USSR were involved in regional conflict. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the attenuation of that competition lies in the enhanced capacity of the United Nations to play a constructive role in the search for settlement of regional conflict, and, more broadly, to respond effectively to such conflicts as do occur. The UN role in the Gulf situation, the Namibia transition, and the evolving definition of the UN role in Cambodia illustrate the point. These cases, however, also display certain limitations on the organization in these new conditions. Although the political obstacles to UN action have diminished radically, there remain substantial financial and organizational ones. Absent substantial increases in funding, and considerable modification of organizational procedures, the capacity of the United Nations to fill the role contemplated for it in the "New World Order" remains substantially circumscribed. Moreover, the UN's and for that matter other external actors'

capacity to contribute to conflict resolution depends importantly on the readiness of the principal parties to a conflict to negotiate in good faith.

A final general remark: Actors in the Third World have always pursued conflicts essentially for their own reasons. The origins of Third World conflicts generally have had little to do with bipolar superpower competition, though such competition has frequently affected the conduct of such conflicts. Just as the pursuit of the Cold War in the Third World by the United States and the USSR is an insufficient explanation for the persistence of Third World conflict, the winding down of the Cold War is an insufficient basis for the stabilization of regional politics in the Third World. Although the nature of the topic of this chapter has dictated a focus on competitive superpower roles, this competition has never been fundamental to the explanation of Third World conflict. Nor is its evaporation likely to have any system-transforming effect on Third World security. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the paradigm of superpower bipolar ideological and power-political competition, once useful to a limited extent in explaining the modalities of conflict in the Third World, is no longer relevant.

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank the University of Virginia's Center for Russian and East European Studies for its support of this research. He is also grateful to his research assistant, Symeon Giannakos.

2. It is somewhat anachronistic to speak holistically of Third World security. The regions of what is commonly referred to as the Third World—Asia apart from the Asian USSR and Japan, Africa, Latin America and the non-US sections of the Caribbean Basin—were never homogeneous in geostrategic or political terms, and have always been differentiated in superpower policy. They did, however, share a perceived heritage of political oppression and economic exploitation by the West which arguably defined a politically significant identity. As decolonization recedes in significance, however, it is questionable to what extent this psychological basis for the category continues to be relevant. In the meantime, economic differentiation and uneven development in these regions draws whatever economic basis there was to the category increasingly into question. Perhaps the essential qualities continuing to tie the states of the Third World into a single analytical category of continuing utility are the incomplete consolidation of state power (see the chapter by Mohammed Ayoob in this volume) and a sense of powerlessness and exclusion from meaningful participation in the northern-dominated global community. This sense, if anything, may become stronger as a result of the changes in superpower relations described in this chapter. On the significance of exclusion, see Sayigh (1990:4–5).

3. The gap between perception and reality was perhaps clearest in the intensity with which US policymakers responded to the radicalization of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in the early 1950s. Dulles's predisposition is evident in comment to the effect that:

Dramatic events expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the interamerican system. . . . The intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. . . . The communists seized on [the Guatemalan Revolution] not as an opportunity for real reforms but as a chance to gain political power. The master plan of international communism is to gain a solid base in this hemisphere which can be used to extend communist penetration. (Blasier, 1976:171)

It is of course possible to interpret the apparent leadership preoccupation with purportedly Soviet-inspired communist expansion in instrumental rather than cognitive terms, since it served to justify the global role of the United States.

4. There is some evidence to suggest that the shift in Soviet perspectives on the Third World described below predates Stalin's death by several months. This suggests that it was a response to factors other than the personality of the leader of the moment. See, for example, Kapur (1968:42).

5. The events of 1953 in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and those of 1956 in Poland and Hungary suggest that the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe was not entirely firm. Nonetheless, the ease with which the USSR dealt with these issues indicates that the Soviet position was quite durable.

6. Indeed, the expansion of the Soviet commitment to North Vietnam appears to have been a response to US escalation in the context of Soviet moderation and Chinese pressure. In this sense, although the specific response of the Soviets in Vietnam was deeper involvement, the impact on Soviet policy overall was such that it discouraged activism.

7. Compare, for example, Brezhnev's treatment of the Third World at the 25th Party Congress in 1976 with that of Gorbachev at the 27th in 1986.

8. As Shevardnadze put it somewhat later: "A sensible foreign policy is a direct contribution to the country's prosperity." "Vneshnyaya Politika i Perestroika," *Pravda* (October 24, 1989).

9. See the reprint of a speech by Yuri Andropov in *Kommunist* No. 9 (1983) for an early indication of this constraint. He noted that the principal responsibility in achieving the transition to socialism in the socialist-oriented states lay with those states themselves, the USSR assisting "to the extent of its capabilities." This formulation is repeated practically verbatim in the party program adopted at the 27th Congress in 1986.

10. This analysis was written prior to the August 1991 coup attempt. The dénouement of the coup further strengthens doubts about the union's capacity to survive as an effective actor in international relations and reaffirms many of the other points in the above analysis concerning the termination of the cycle in US-Soviet relations in the Third World.

References

- Acharya, Amitav (1989a). "The Gulf Cooperation Council and Security: Dilemmas of Dependence, 1981-1988." In *Contemporary Strategic Issues in the Arab Gulf*, No. 2. London: Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies.
- (1989b). *U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution Under the Carter and Reagan Administrations*. London: Routledge.
- (1990). *A Survey of Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN States: Bilateralism Or Alliance*. Toronto, ON: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, York University.
- Africa Confidential* (1990). "South Africa: The Party Faithful." *Africa Confidential* 21:3 (January 1990), pp. 1-4.
- Aguero, Felipe (1984). "Social Effects: Military Autonomy in Developing Countries." *Alternatives* 10, pp. 75-92.
- Allison, Graham T. (1971). *The Essence of Decision*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown Publishing Ltd.
- Anderson, M. (1988). "War as Business: Military Entrepreneurship in Old Regime Europe." *London School of Economics Quarterly* 2:3, pp. 265-285.
- Anderson, Perry (1974). *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: New Left Books.
- Andropov, Yurii (1983). "Rech." *Pravda* June 16, 1983, pp. 1-2.
- Arlinghaus, B. (1984). *Military Development in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Ashley, Richard K., and R. B. J. Walker (1990). "Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile, Dissidence in International Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 34:3.
- Ayoob, Mohammed (1983/1984). "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn." *International Affairs* (London) 60:1, pp. 41-51.
- (1984). "Perspectives from the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional Security." In *Asian Perspectives on International Security*, pp. 92-116. Edited by D. H. McMillen. London: Macmillan.
- (1986). *Regional Security in the Third World*. London: Croom Helm.
- (1989). "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?" *International Studies Quarterly* 33:1, pp. 67-79.
- (1991). "The Security Problematic of the Third World." *World Politics* 43:2, pp. 257-283.
- Ayoob, Mohammed, and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, eds. (1989). *Leadership*

- Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Ayres, Ron (1983). "Arms Production as a Form of Import-Substituting Industrialization: The Turkish Case." *World Development* 11:9, pp. 813–823.
- Azar, Edward E. (1986). "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions." In *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, pp. 28–39. Edited by Edward E. Azar and J. W. Burton. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
- Azar, Edward E., and Chung-in Moon (1984). "Third World National Security: Toward a New Conceptual Framework." *International Interactions* 11:2, pp. 103–135.
- (1988). "Rethinking Third World National Security." In *National Security in the Third World*, pp. 1–13. Edited by Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Baek, Kwang-il, Ronald McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon, eds. (1989). *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Baek, Kwang-il, and Chung-in Moon (1989). "Technology Dependence, Supplier Control, and Strategies for Recipient Autonomy: The Case of South Korea." In *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries*, pp. 153–184. Edited by Baek et al. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Bairoch, Paul (1986). "Historical Roots of Economic Underdevelopment." In *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, pp. 191–216. Edited by W. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel. Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin.
- Baldwin, David A. (1979). "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Traditions Versus Old Tendencies." *World Politics* 31:2, pp. 161–194.
- Ball, Nicole (1988). *Security and Economy in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Balta, P. (1986). "French Policy in North Africa." *The Middle East Journal* 40:2, pp. 238–251.
- Baran, P. (1957). *The Political Economy of Growth*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Barrows, William (1985). "Changing Military Capabilities in Black Africa." In *Arms and the African*, pp. 99–120. Edited by William Foltz and Henry Beinen. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Bates, R. (1987). *The Political Economy of Rural Africa*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bell, Coral (1985/1986). "Managing to Survive." *National Interest* 2, pp. 36–45.
- Ben-Dor, Gabriel (1983). *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State*. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Bennett, A. L. (1984). *International Organizations*, 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Benoit, E. (1973). *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Berki, R. N. (1986). *Security and Society*. London: Dent.
- Blaiser, Cole (1976). *The Hovering Giant: US Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America*. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press.
- Bobrow, Davis B., and Steve Chan (1988). "Simple Labels and Complex Realities." In *National Security in the Third World*, pp. 77–101. Edited by Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Boutin, K. (1989). *Import Substitution or Exports?: The Determinants of Arms Production in Developing Countries*, Master's thesis (unpublished), Toronto, ON: York University.
- Brecher, Michael (1963). "International Relations and Asian Studies: The

- Subordinate State System of Southern Asia." *World Politics* 15:2, pp. 213–235.
- Brown, David (1988). "Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on State and Society." *Third World Quarterly* 11:4, pp. 1–17.
- (1988). "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia." *Pacific Affairs* 61:1, pp. 51–77.
- Brown, L. (1986). "Regional Collaboration in Resolving Third-World Conflicts." *Survival* 28:3, pp. 208–220.
- Brzoska, Michael, and Thomas Ohlson (1987). *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971–1985*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brzoska, Michael, and Thomas Ohlson, eds. (1986). *Arms Production in the Third World*. London: Taylor and Francis.
- Bull, Hedley (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order in International Politics*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Bull, Hedley, and A. Watson, eds. (1984). *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Buzan, Barry (1983a). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- (1983a). "Security Strategies for Dissociation." In *Antimonies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labour*, pp. 369–420. Edited by John Gerard Ruggie. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- (1987). *The Concept of National Security for Developing Countries with Special Reference to Southeast Asia*. Paper presented to the workshop "Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia," Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, September 10–12, 1987.
- (1988a). "Peoples, States and Fear: The National Security Problems in the Third World." In *National Security in the Third World: The Management of External and Internal Threats*, pp. 14–43. Edited by Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- (1988b). "The Southeast Asian Security Complex." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10:1, pp. 1–16.
- (1989a). *Regional Security*, Working Paper No. 28. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
- (1989b). "The Future of Western European Security." In *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation*, pp. 16–45. Edited by Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer. London: Macmillan.
- (1991). *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. 2d ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Buzan, Barry, C. Jones, and R. Little (forthcoming 1992). *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Buzan, Barry, M. Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer, and Ole Wæver (1990). *The European Security Order Recast*. London: Pinter.
- Buzan, Barry, and H. O. Nazareth (1985/1986). "South Africa versus Azania: The Implications of Who Rules." *International Affairs* 62:1, pp. 35–40.
- Buzan, Barry, Gowher Rizvi, et al. (1986). *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers*. London: Macmillan.
- Cameron, Alan, ed. (1981). "The Soviet Union and the Wars in Indochina." In *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, pp. 86–92. New York, NY: Krieger.
- Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (1990). *The Guide to*

- Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution*. Ottawa, Ont.: CIIPS.
- Cantori, Louis J., and Steven L. Spiegel (1970). *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Catrina, Christian (1988). *Arms Transfers and Dependence*. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis.
- Cervenka, Z. (1974). "The Role of the OAU in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes." In *Africa and International Organization*, pp. 48–68. Edited by Y. El-Ayouty and H. C. Brooks. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Chan, H. C. (1982). *Political Stability in Southeast Asia*. Paper presented to the seminar on "Trends and Perspectives in ASEAN," Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, February 1–3, 1982.
- Child, J. (1978). *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System: 1938–1978*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Choucri, Nazli, and Robert North (1975). *Nations in Conflict*. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company.
- Clapham, Christopher (1985). *Third World Politics: An Introduction*. London: Croom Helm.
- Cohen, Youssef, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. Organski (1981). "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order." *American Political Science Review* 75:4, pp. 901–910.
- Collingwood, R. G. (1971). *The New Leviathan: Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism*. New York, NY: Crowell.
- Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Richard Higgott, and Kim M. Nossal (1991). *Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict*. Paper presented to the International Studies Association annual general meeting, Vancouver, BC, March 20–23, 1991.
- Cox, D. (1991). *The Use of Force by the Security Council for Enforcement and Deterrence Purposes: A Conference Report*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.
- Cox, Robert W., and H. K. Jacobsen (1974). *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, A. J. (1982). *Regional Organisation and Order in Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan.
- Dashichev, V. (1989). "The Requirements for Stable Coexistence in Soviet-US Relations." *International Affairs* 65:1, pp. 133–142.
- Dawisha, Adeed (1983). *Islam in Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deger, Saadet (1986). *Military Expenditure in Third World Countries*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Deger, Saadet, and Robert West (1987). "Introduction." In *Defence, Security and Development*, pp. 1–16. Edited by S. Deger and R. West. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Department of National Defence (1991). *Peacekeeping: A Canadian Contribution to the World*. Ottawa, Ont.: DND.
- Deutsch, Karl, et al. (1957). *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dewitt, D., ed. (1987). *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Diehl, Paul F. (1987). "When Peacekeeping Does Not Lead to Peace: Some Notes on Conflict Resolution." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 8:1, pp. 47–53.
- Dowty, A. (1987). *Closed Borders*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Eide, Asbjorn, and Marek Thee (1980). "Introduction." In *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, pp. 9–11. Edited by Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee. London: Croom Helm.
- Epstein, M. A., and D. H. Popper (1986). "Efforts to Resolve the Cyprus Dispute." In *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations*, pp. 99–151. Edited by D. B. Bendahmane and J. W. McDonald, Jr. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Etzioni, M. M. (1970). *The Majority of One: Towards a Theory of Regional Compatibility*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Evans, C. (1986). "Reappraising Third World Arms Production." *Survival* 28, pp. 98–118.
- Evans, Peter (1979). *Dependent Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fain, H. (1987). *Normative Politics and the Community of Nations*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Fidel, Kenneth (1975). "Militarism and Development: An Introduction." In *Militarism in Developing Countries*, pp. 1–32. Edited by Kenneth Fidel. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Fry, M. G. (1988). *The Suez Crisis*, Case No. 126. Pew Program in Case Teaching and Writing in International Affairs. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh.
- Gaddis, John (1987). *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Geertz, Clifford (1963). "The Integrative Revolution." In *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, pp. 105–157. Edited by Clifford Geertz. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Gellar, Sheldon (1973). "State-Building and Nation-Building in West Africa." In *Building States and Nations*, Vol. 2, pp. 384–426. Edited by S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- George, Alexander L. (1980). *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Giannakos, Symeon (1990). "Greek-Soviet Relations Since World War II." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia.
- Giddens, Anthony (1987). *The Nation-State and Violence*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Gillis, John (1989). "Introduction." In *The Militarization of the Western World*, pp. 1–12. Edited by John Gillis. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
- Gilpin, Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1987). *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. (1988). *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gong, G. (1984). *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goonatilake, Susantha (1984). *Aborted Discovery: Science and Creativity in the Third World*. London: Zed Press.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail (1986). "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress." *Pravda* February 26, 1986, pp. 2–10.
- Gordenker, L. (1987). *Refugees in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm.
- Gruhn, I. (1984). "Towards Scientific and Technological Independence?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 22:1, pp. 1–17.

- Guazzone, L. (1988). "Gulf Cooperation Council: The Security Policies." *Survival* 30:2, pp. 134-148.
- Gupta, Sisir (1971). "Great Power Relations and the Third World." In *Super Powers and World Order*, pp. 105-139. Edited by Carsten Holbraad. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
- Haas, E. B. (1987). "The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984." In *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, pp. 3-70. Edited by Martinus Nijhoff. Dordrecht: United Nations Institute for Training and Research.
- Haass, Richard N. (1988). "Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes." *Survival* 30:3, pp. 232-251.
- Halliday, Fred (1987). "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda." *Millennium, Journal of International Studies* 16:2, pp. 215-230.
- Hampson, Fen Osler (1989/1990). "Climate Change: Building Coalitions of the Like-Minded." *International Journal* 45:1, pp. 36-74.
- Harb, O. A. G. (1986). "The Gulf Cooperation Council and Regional Security in the Gulf." In *Regional Security in the Third World*, pp. 235-249. Edited by Mohammed Ayoob. London: Croom Helm.
- Harkavy, Robert E., and Stephanie G. Neuman, eds. (1987). *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World: Comparative Dimensions*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Hassan, Mushirul (1979). *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916-1928*. Delhi: Manohar.
- Herbst, Jeffrey (1989). "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa." *International Organization* 43:4, pp. 673-692.
- Higgott, Richard (1988). "The State and International Politics: of Territorial Boundaries and Intellectual Barriers." In *New Directions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives*, Canberra Studies in World Affairs No. 23, pp. 177-218. Edited by Richard Higgott. Canberra: The Australian National University.
- Higgott, Richard A., and Andrew Fenton Cooper (1990). "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations." *International Organization* 44:4, pp. 589-632.
- Himmelstrand, Ulf (1973). "Tribalism, Regionalism, Nationalism, and Secession in Nigeria." In *Building States and Nations*, Vol. 2, pp. 427-467. Edited by S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1946). *Leviathan*. Edited by Michael Oakeshott. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Hoffmann, Stanley (1978) *Primacy or World Order*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- (1981). "Security in the Age of Turbulence: Means of Response." In *Third World Conflicts and International Security*, Part 2, Adelphi Paper No. 167. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- (1991). "The Price of War." *The New York Review of Books* 38:1/2, pp. 6ff.
- Holbraad, Carsten (1972). *Middle Powers in International Politics*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Holmes, J. (1970). *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart.
- (1976). *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power*. Toronto, Ont.: McClelland and Stewart.
- Holsti, Kal J. (1989). *The States System and War*. The Ford Foundation Lectures

- in *International Relations Studies*. Baroda: Department of Political Science, The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Baroda, India.
- (1990). "L'État et l'État de Guerre." *Études Internationales* 21:4, pp. 705–718.
- (1991). *Peace and War: Armed Contests and International Order, 1648–1989*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- (forthcoming). "Governance Without Government: The Politics of Polyarchy in Nineteenth Century Europe." In *Governance without Government: Change and Order in World Politics*, Edited by James N. Rosenau. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Holsti, Ole R. (1989). "Crisis Decision Making." In *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1, pp. 8–84. Edited by Philip E. Tetlock, et al. Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Hudson, Michael (1977). *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1987). "Patterns of Intervention: America and the Soviets in the Third World." *The National Interest* (Spring 1987) pp. 40–52.
- Hurewitz, J. (1982). *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Huth, Paul (1988). *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of Wars*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett (1988). "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation." *International Studies Quarterly* 32:1, pp. 29–46.
- Hveem, Helge (1983). "Selective Dissociation in the Technology Sector." In *The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labour*, pp. 273–316. Edited by John G. Ruggie. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Hyndman, J. (1989). "A Time for Middle Powers." *The New Federation* 3, pp. 28–34.
- Imobighe, T. A. (1980). "An African High Command: The Search for a Feasible Strategy of Continental Defence." *African Affairs* 79:315, pp. 241–254.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (1988). *Strategic Survey 1987–88*. London: IISS.
- (1990). *The Military Balance, 1990–91*. London: IISS.
- Irvine, D. (1982). "Making Haste Slowly: ASEAN from 1975." In *Understanding ASEAN*, pp. 37–69. Edited by A. Broinowski. London: Macmillan.
- Jackson, Robert H. (1982). "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood." *World Politics* 35:1, pp. 1–24.
- (1987). "Quasi-states, Dual Regimes, and Neo-Classical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World." *International Organization* 41:4, pp. 519–549.
- Jackson, Robert, and Carl Rosberg (1986). "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24:1, pp. 1–31.
- Jenkins, Rhys (1987). *Transnational Corporations and Uneven Development: The Internationalization of Capital and the Third World*. New York, NY: Methuen.
- Jervis, Robert (1978). "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30:2, pp. 167–214.
- (1982). "Security Regimes." *International Organization* 36:2, pp. 357–378.
- Johnson, Robert (Winter 1985/86). "Exaggerating America's Stakes in Third World Conflicts." *International Security* 10:3, pp. 32–68.

- Johnston, Alexander (1991). "Weak States and National Security." *Review of International Studies* 17:2, pp. 146-177.
- Jolly, R., ed. (1978). *Disarmament and World Development*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Jones, R. W., and Hildreth S. A., ed. (1986). *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World*. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnfinn (1975). "Forces of Fragmentation in the International System: The Case of Ethno-Nationalism." *Orbis* 19:2, pp. 652-674.
- Kaldor, Mary (1980). "The Significance of Military Technology." In *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, pp. 226-229. Edited by Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee. London: Croom Helm.
- (1982). "Warfare and Capitalism." In *Exterminism and the Cold War*, pp. 261-288. Edited by E. P. Thompson. London: New Left Books.
- Kanet, Roger, ed. (1974). *The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kapur, Harish (1968). *The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations*. London: M. Joseph.
- Katz, J. (1984). *Arms Production in Developing Countries*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- (1986). *The Implications of Third World Military Industrialization: Sowing the Serpent's Teeth*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Katz, Mark N. (1986). "Anti-Soviet Insurgencies: Growing Trend or Passing Phase." *Orbis* 30:2, pp. 365-392.
- Keashly, L., and R. J. Fisher (1990). "Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict: A Cyprus Illustration." *International Journal* 45:2, pp. 424-453.
- Kechichian, Joseph A. (1985). "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security." *Third World Quarterly* 7:4, pp. 853-881.
- Kegley, C., Jr. (1975). "Measuring the Growth and Decay of Transnational Norms Relevant to the Control of Violence." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 5, pp. 425-439.
- Kelly, M. P. (1985). "Weak States and Captured Patrons." *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* pp. 328-338.
- Kemp, G. (1970). *Some Relationships Between U.S. Military Training in Latin America and Weapons Acquisition Patterns*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1988). "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly* 32:4, pp. 379-396.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1976). *Power and Interdependence*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Kim, G., and Kaufman, A. (1976). "Voprosy teorii natsional 'no-osvoboditel' noi revolyutsii." *Narody Azii i Afriki* No. 3.
- Klare, M., and C. Aronson (1981). *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad*. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies.
- Klare, Michael T. (1980). "Militarism: The Issues Today." In *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, pp. 36-46. Edited by Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee. London: Croom Helm.
- (1983). "The Unnoticed Arms Trade: Exports of Conventional Arms-Making Technology." *International Security* 8:2, pp. 68-90.

- (1990). "War in the 1990s: Growing Firepower in the Third World." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 46:4, pp. 9–13.
- Kohli, Atul, ed. (1986). *The State and Development in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kolodziej, Edward A. (1987). *Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and Its Implications for International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1987). "Re-evaluating Economic and Technological Variables to Explain Global Arms Production and Sales." In *The Economics of Military Expenditures: Military Expenditures, Economic Growth, and Fluctuations*, pp. 304–335. Edited by Christian Schmidt. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Kolodziej, Edward A., and Robert E. Harkavy (1980). "Developing States and the International Security System." *Journal of International Affairs* 34:1, 59–88.
- Kolodziej, Edward A., and Robert E. Harkavy, eds. (1982). *Security Policies of Developing Countries*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Korany, Bahgat (1986). "Strategic Studies and the Third World: A Critical Evaluation." *International Social Science Journal* 38:4, pp. 547–652.
- Kortunov, A. (1989). "Soviet Foreign Aid: Is It Put to Wisest Use." *Moscow News* 49 (December 3, 1989), p. 3.
- Kothari, Rajni (1988). *State Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance*. Delhi: Ajanta Publications.
- Kramer, Mark (1989). "Soviet Arms Transfers and Aid to the Third World." In *Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas*, pp. 66–109. Edited by Kurt Campbell and S. Neil MacFarlane. London: Routledge.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- (1988). "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 21:1, pp. 66–94.
- Krause, Keith (1991). "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 35:3, pp. 313–336.
- (1992). *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesberg, L. (1989). "Transforming Conflicts in the Middle East and Central Europe." In *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation*, pp. 109–131. Edited by L. Kriesberg, T. A. Northrup, and S. J. Thorson. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Krylova, G. (1989). "Natsional no-demokraticheskay revolyutsia v szete novogo politicheskogo myshlenia." *Narody Azii i Afriki* No. 1, pp. 42–53.
- Lake, David (1987). *The Expansion of Sovereignty: Imperialism, Decolonization, and the Constitutive Principle of International Relations*. Paper presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
- Landgren-Backstrom, S. (1983). "The Transfer of Military Technology to Third World Countries." In *Militarization and Arms Production*, pp. 193–204. Edited by Helena Tuomi and Raimo Väyrynen. London: Croom Helm.
- Legvold, Robert (1970). *Soviet Policy in West Africa*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Leifer, M. (1978). "The Paradox of ASEAN: A Security Organization Without the Structure of an Alliance." *The Round Table* 68:271, pp. 261–268.

- (1980). *Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia*, Adelphi Paper No. 162. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Levy, Jack S. (1982). "Historical Trends in Great Power War, 1495–1975." *International Studies Quarterly* 26:2, pp. 278–300.
- (1983). *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.
- (1988). "Domestic Politics and War: A Review of Theories and Evidence." In *Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1, pp. 209–233. Edited by Philip Tetlock et al. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- (1989). "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence." In *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. I, pp. 209–333. Edited by Philip E. Tetlock. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Little, Walter (1987). "International Conflict in Latin America." *International Affairs* 63:4, pp. 593–594.
- Litwak, Robert S., and Samuel F. Wells (1988). *Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
- Lock, P. (1986). "Brazil: Arms for Export." In *Arms Production in the Third World*, pp. 79–104. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis.
- Lock, Peter, and Herbert Wulf (1979). "The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-Oriented Technology." In *The World Military Order: The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World*, pp. 210–231. Edited by Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Edie. New York, NY: MacMillan.
- Looney, R. (1988). *Third-World Military Expenditure and Arms Production*. London: Macmillan.
- Louscher, David, and M. Salomone (1987). *Technology Transfer and U.S. Security Assistance*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Louscher, David, and Anne Schwarz (1989). "Patterns of Third World Military Technology Acquisition." In *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries*, pp. 33–56. Edited by Baek et al. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Luxemborg, Rosa (1954). *The Accumulation of Capital*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- MacFarlane, S. Neil (1985). *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- (1989). "The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movements." In *The Soviet Union*, pp. 21–51. Edited by Carol Saivetz. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- (1990). "Superpower rivalry in the 1990's." *Third World Quarterly* 12:1, pp. 1–25.
- McLaurin, Ronald (1989). "Technology Acquisition: A Case Study of the Supply Side." In *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries*, pp. 57–100. Edited by Kwang-il Baek et al. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- McNamara, Frank T. (1989). *France in Black Africa*. Washington, DC: National Defense University.
- McNeill, W. H. (1963). *The Rise of the West*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Mandelbaum, Michael (1988). *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Manger, W. (1953). "Regional Collective Security in the Americas." *Social Science* October, pp. 199–204.

- Mann, Michael (1984). "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 25.
- Maoz, Zeev (1982). *Paths to Conflict: International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Mason, T. David, and Dale T. Krane (1989). "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror." *International Studies Quarterly* 33:2, pp. 175-198.
- Mathews, Jessica (1989). "Redefining Security." *Foreign Affairs* 68:2, pp. 162-177.
- Matthews, R. O. (1990). "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Prerequisites of a Settlement." *International Journal* 45:2, pp. 292-333.
- Maynes, Charles (1988). "America's Third World Hang-ups." *Foreign Policy* 71, pp. 117-140.
- Mazrui, Ali (1967). *Towards a Pax Africana*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- (1986). "The Triple Heritage of the State in Africa." In *The State in Global Perspective*, pp. 107-118. Edited by Ali Kazancigil. Aldershot, UK: Gower.
- Mearsheimer, John (1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War." *International Security* 15:1, pp. 5-56.
- Medvedev, V. (1988). "An Up-to-Date Conception of Socialism." *Pravda* October 5, 1988, p. 4.
- Mehta, J. (1985). "Third World Militarization: A Challenge to Third World Diplomacy." In *Third World Militarization: A Challenge to Third World Diplomacy*, pp. 3-28. Edited by J. Mehta. Austin, TX: University of Texas.
- Melson, Robert, and Howard Wolpe (1970). "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 64:4, pp. 1112-1130.
- Menon, R. (1986). *Soviet Power and the Third World*. London: Yale University Press.
- Meyers, B. D. (1974). "International Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity." *International Organization* 28:3, pp. 345-373.
- Migdal, Joel S. (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Millan, V. (1986). "Argentina: Schemes for Glory." In *Arms Production in the Third World*, pp. 35-54. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis.
- Miller, L. H. (1973). "The Prospect for Order Through Regional Security." In *Regional Politics and World Order*, pp. 50-76. Edited by R. A. Falk and S. H. Mendlovitz. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company.
- Mirsky, Georgii (1987). "K voprosu o vybore putu orientatsii razvivayushchikjsya stran." *Mironvaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia* No. 5, pp. 70-81.
- Mitchell, C. R. (1988). "The Motives for Mediation." In *New Approaches to International Mediation*, pp. 29-51. Edited by C.R. Mitchell and K. Webb. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
- Modelski, George (1978). "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20:2, pp. 214-235.
- Molot, Maureen Appel (1990). "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature." *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 1:2, pp. 77-96.

- Monroe, Elizabeth (1963). *Britain's Moment in the Middle East*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Moodie, Michael (1979). *Sovereignty, Security and Arms*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Moran, Theodore (1990). "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence." *International Security* 15:1, pp. 57-99.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948). *Politics Among Nations*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- (1985). *Politics Among Nations*, 6th ed. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mueller, John (1988). "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons." *International Security* 13:2, pp. 55-79.
- National Defense University (September, 1987). *U.S. Industrial Base Dependence and Vulnerability*, Study No.7.
- Neuman, Stephanie G. (1980). "Arms Transfers and Economic Development: Some Research and Policy Issues." In *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, pp. 219-245. Edited by Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy. New York, NY: Praeger.
- , ed. (1984a). *Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized States*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- (1984b). "International Stratification and Third World Military Industries." *International Organization* 38:1, pp. 167-197.
- New York Times*, "Arms Makers Gird for Peace." *New York Times*, December 17, 1989.
- New York Times*, "Peace Unhealthy for Brazilian Arms Industry." *New York Times*, February 25, 1990.
- Nolan, Janne E. (1991). *Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (1971). *Peace in Part: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- (1990). *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Oakeshott, Michael (1975). *Hobbes on Civil Association*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Ohlson, Thomas (1988). "Introduction." In *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security*, pp. 1-13. Edited by Thomas Ohlson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Onuf, Nicholas (1989). *World of Our Own Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Organski, A. F. K. (1958). *World Politics*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Packenham, Robert (1973). *Liberal America and the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Page, David (1982). *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the System of Control, 1920-1932*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Palmer, R. D., and T. J. Reckford (1987). *Building ASEAN: 20 Years of Southeast Asian Cooperation*, Washington Papers, No. 127. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Paribatra, S., and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1986). "Internal Dimensions of Security in Southeast Asia." In *Regional Security in the Third World*, pp. 57-91. Edited by Mohammed Ayoob. London: Croom Helm.
- Park, H., and K. Park (1988). "Ideology and Security: Self-reliance in China and Korea." In *National Security in the Third World*, pp. 102-135. Edited by Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

- Peleg, Ilan (1980). "Military Production in Third World Countries." In *Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy*, pp. 209–230. Edited by Patrick McGowan and Charles Kegley. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Pennock, R. Roland (1966). "Political Development, Political Systems and Political Goods." *World Politics* 18:3, pp. 420–427.
- Peres, Shimon (1970). *David's Sling*. London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Perez de Cuellar, H. E. (1988). Keynote address presented in "The Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution, Peace-keeping and Global Security: Report of the Annual Conference of the Department of Public Information for Non-Governmental Organizations," New York, NY: United Nations, September, 1988.
- Piro, T. J. (1987) "France." In *The Powers in the Middle East: The Ultimate Strategic Arena*, pp. 226–266. Edited by B. Reich. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Polk, William R. (1980). *The Arab World*, 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Potter, Pitman B. (1943). "Universalism Versus Regionalism in International Organization." *American Political Science Review* 37:5, pp. 850–861.
- Primakov, Y. (1988). "USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts." *International Affairs* 64:6, pp. 3–9.
- Puchala, D. J., and R. A. Coate (1989). *The Challenge of Relevance: The United Nations in a Changing World Environment*. New York, NY: Academic Council of the United Nations System.
- Quandt, W. B. (1986). *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Refson, J. (1970). *U.S. Military Training and Advice: Implications for Arms Transfer Policies*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Reid, Escott (1985). *Hungary and Suez, 1956: The View from New Delhi*. Oakville, ON: Mosaic Press.
- Report of the Secretary-General (1989). *Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping Operations in All Aspects*, A/AC.121/36 and Addendum, A/AC.121/36/Add.1. New York, NY: United Nations General Assembly, March 21 and April 4.
- Rikhye, I., and S. Sjelsback (1990). *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations, and Prospects*. London: Macmillan.
- Rizvi, Gowher (1985). "Riding the Tiger: Institutionalizing the Military Regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh." In *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, pp. 201–236. Edited by C. Clapham and G. Philip. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books.
- Ross, Andrew (1981). *Arms Production in Developing Countries: The Continuing Proliferation of Conventional Weapons*. RAND Report N-1615-AF. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- (1987). "Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World." *Armed Forces and Society* 13, pp. 561–578.
- (1988). "Arms Acquisition and National Security: The Irony of Military Strength." In *National Security in the Third World*, pp. 152–187. Edited by Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- (1989). "Full Circle: Conventional Proliferation, the International Arms Trade, and Third World Arms Exports." In *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries*, pp. 1–32. Edited by Kwang-il Baek et al. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rothstein, Robert L. (1986). "The 'Security Dilemma' and the 'Poverty Trap' in

- the Third World." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 8:4, pp. 1–38.
- (1987). "National Security, Domestic Resource Constraints and Elite Choices in the Third World." In *Defence, Security and Development*, pp. 140–158. Edited by S. Deger and R. West. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Rubin, B. (1983). "Iran's Revolution and Persian Gulf Instability." In *The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts*, pp. 126–145. Edited by S. Tahir-Kheli and S. Ayubi. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Rudner, Martin (1991). "Canada, the Gulf Crisis and Collective Security." In *After the Cold War: Canada Among Nations 1990–91*, pp. 241–248. Edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule. Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University Press.
- Ruggie, John Gerard (1983). "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis." *World Politics* 35:2, pp. 261–285.
- Rummel, Rudolph (1968). "National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior." In *Quantitative International Politics*, pp. 187–214. Edited by J. D. Singer. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Russett, Bruce (1967). *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
- Rustow, Dankwart (1967). *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Sabrosky, A. N., ed. (1985). *Polarity and War*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Said, M. E. S. (1986). "The Arab League: Between Regime Security and National Liberation." In *Regional Security in the Third World*, pp. 254–276. Edited by Mohammed Ayoob. London: Croom Helm.
- Sampson, Anthony (1977). *The Arms Bazaar*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Sarkesian, S. (1978). "A Political Perspective on Military Power in Developing Areas." In *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts*, pp. 3–13. Edited by S. Simon. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Saunders, H. H. (1985). *The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Schmitter, P., ed. (1973). *Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences and Perspectives*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Senghaas, D. (1985). *The European Experience: A Historical Critique of Development Theory*. Dover: Berg Publishers.
- Seth, D. L. (1989). "State, Nation and Ethnicity: The Experience of Third World Countries." *International University of Japan, IUJ Review* 6, pp. 27–51.
- Shafie, M. G. (1982). "Confrontation Leads to ASEAN." *Asian Defence Journal* February, pp. 30–35.
- Shevardnadze, Edvard (1988). *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannukh Del SSSR*. August 1988, pp. 27–46.
- Sick, G. (1985a). *All Fall Down*. New York, NY: Random House.
- (1985b). "The Partial Negotiator: Algeria and the U.S. Hostages in Iran." In *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, pp. 21–66. Edited by Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sigler, J. (1982). *International Peacekeeping in the Eighties: Global Outlook and Canadian Priorities*. Ottawa, Ont.: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.
- Simmons, David A. (1985). "The Militarization of the Caribbean: Concerns for National and Regional Security." *International Journal* 40:2, pp. 348–376.
- Simon, S. (1978). "The ASEAN States: Obstacles to Security Cooperation." *Orbis* 22:2, pp. 415–434.

- Simonia, N. K. (1966). "O kharatere natsional 'no-osvoboditel' noi revolyutsii." *Narody Azii i Afriki* No. 6, pp. 6–16.
- Singer, J. David (1970). "From A Study of War to Peace Research: Some Criteria and Strategies." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14:4, pp. 527–542.
- Sivard, Ruth Leger (1989a). *World Military and Social Expenditure 1987–1988*, 13th ed. Washington, DC: World Priorities.
- (1989b). *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989*. Washington, DC: World Priorities.
- (1991). *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*. Washington, DC: World Priorities.
- Skoçpol, Theda (1985). "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research." In *Bringing the State Back In*, pp. 3–43. Edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skoçpol. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Slater, Jerome (1987). "Dominoes in Central America: Will They Fall? Does it Matter?" *International Security* 12:2, pp. 105–134.
- Small, Melvin, and David Singer, eds., (1982). *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980*, 2d ed. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Smirnov, G. (1986). "Osobennosti vosproizvodstvennykh prossessov V osvobodivshikhsya stranakh Afriki." *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia* No. 7, pp. 125–132.
- Smith, Hugh (1990). "The Womb of War: Clausewitz and International Politics." *Review of International Studies* 16, pp. 39–58.
- Smith, Tony (1985). "Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies?" *World Politics* 37:4, pp. 532–561.
- Snider, Lewis (1989). "Supplier Control and Recipient Autonomy: Problems and Prospects." In *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries*, pp. 231–270. Edited by Kwang-il Baek et al. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Snitwongse, K. (1983). "Internal Problems of the ASEAN States: The Dilemmas of Nation-Building." In *International Security in the Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Regions*, pp. 144–166. Edited by T. B. Millar. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Snyder, Jack (1990). "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe." *International Security* 14:4, pp. 5–41.
- Spector, Leonard S. (1990). *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Stein, J. G. (1989). "Getting to the Table: Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Pre-negotiation." *International Journal* 44:2, pp. 475–504.
- Steinberg, Gerald (1986a). "Indigenous Arms Industry and Dependence: The Case of Israel." *Defense Analysis* 2:4, pp. 291–305.
- (1986b). "Israel: High-Technology Roulette." In *Arms Production in the Third World*, pp. 163–192. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson. New York, NY: SIPRI.
- (1989). "Technological Transfer and the Future of the Center-Periphery System: A Realist Perspective." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 11:2, pp. 96–117.
- Stewart, F. (1977). *Technology and Underdevelopment*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1990). *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1990*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stoessinger, John (1978). *Why Nations Go to War*, 2d ed. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Stohl, Michael, and R. D. Duvall (1983). "Governance by Terror." In *The Politics*

- of *Terrorism*, 2d ed. Edited by Michael Stohl. New York, NY: M. Dekker, Inc.
- Stohl, Michael, and George A. Lopez, eds. (1986). *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
- Stork, J., and J. Paul (1983). "Arms Sales and the Militarization of the Middle East." *MERIP Reports* 112, pp. 5–15.
- Strayer, Joseph R. (1970). *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Streeten, Paul (1984). "Technology Gaps Between Rich and Poor Countries." In *Technology Policy and Development: A Third World Perspective*, pp. 7–26. Edited by P. Ghosh. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Sundhaussen, U. (1984). "Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility." *Armed Forces and Society* 10, pp. 543–562.
- Thee, M. (1980). "Militarism and Militarisation in Contemporary International Relations." In *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, pp. 15–35. Edited by Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee. London: Croom Helm.
- Thomas, Caroline (1987). *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- (1989). "Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts: On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce." In *The State and Instability in the South*, pp. 174–192. Edited by Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Thompson, William R. (1988). *Global War*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Thornton, T. P. (1989). "The Regional Influentials: Perception and Reality." *SAIS Review* 9:2, pp. 247–260.
- Tilly, Charles, ed. (1975). *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1985). "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, pp. 165–191. Edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Touval, Saadia (1982). *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Touval Saadia, and I. William Zartman, eds. (1985). *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Troxler, Nancy C. (1987). "The Gulf Cooperation Council: The Emergence of an Institution." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16:1, pp. 1–19.
- Tuomi, Helena, and Raimo Väyrynen (1982). *Transnational Corporations, Armaments and Development*. Aldershot, UK: Gower Publishing.
- Ullman, Richard (1991). *Securing Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1983). "Redefining Security." *International Security* 8:1, pp. 129–153.
- Ul'Yanovsky, R. (1971). "Nekotorye voprosy nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiia." *Kommunist* 4, pp. 3–24.
- United Nations (1982). *The Relationship Between Disarmament and Development*. New York, NY: United Nations.
- United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1988). *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*. Washington, DC: ACDA.
- (1990). *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*. Washington, DC: ACDA.
- United States, Defense Security Assistance Agency (1984). *Foreign Military*

- Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense.
- United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (1976). *US Military Sales to Iran*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- (1982). *Proposed Sale of F-16s to Venezuela*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Vagts, A. (1957). *A History of Militarism*, revised edition. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Vaitsos, Constantine (1989). "Radical Technological Changes and the New 'Order' in the World Economy." *European Journal of Development Research* 1:1, pp. 60–84.
- Valkenier, Elizabeth (1970). "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World." *World Politics* 22:3, pp. 415–432.
- Van Evera, Steven (1990/91). "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War." *International Security* 15:3, pp. 7–57.
- Varas, Augusto (1985). *Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Varas, Augusto, and F. Bustamente (1983). "The Effect of R&D on the Transfer of Military Technology to the Third World." *International Social Science Journal* 35:1, pp. 141–162.
- Väyrynen, Raimo (1978). "International Patenting as a Means of Technological Dominance." *International Social Science Journal* 30:2, pp. 315–337.
- (1983). "Semiperipheral Countries in the Global Economic and Military Order." In *Militarization and Arms Production*, pp. 163–192. Edited by Helena Toumi and Raimo Väyrynen. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- (1984). "Regional Conflict Formations: An Intractable Problem of International Relations." *Journal of Peace Research* 21:4, pp. 337–359.
- (1985a). "East-West Rivalry and Regional Conflicts in the Third World: Cause and Consequence," (unpublished conference paper). United Nations University: Stadt Schläining.
- (1985b). "The United Nations and the Resolution of International Conflicts." *Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics* 20:3, pp. 141–171.
- (1988). "Domestic Stability, State Terrorism, and Regional Integration in the ASEAN and the GCC." In *Terrible Beyond Endurance*, pp. 194–197. Edited by Michael Stohl and George Lopez. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
- Väyrynen, Raimo, and Thomas Ohlson (1986). "Egypt: Arms Production in the Transnational Context." In *Arms Production in the Third World*, pp. 105–124. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis.
- Waever, Ole (1987). *The Interplay of Some Regional and Subregional Dynamics of Security*. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
- Walker, R. B. J. (1988). *One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- (1990). "The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory." Unpublished paper.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979). "Dependence in an Interdependent World." In his *The Capitalist World-Economy*, pp. 66–94. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Walt, Stephen (1991). "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 35:2, pp. 211–240.
- Waltz, Kenneth M. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

- Wanandi, J. (1984). "Security Issues in the ASEAN Region." In *ASEAN Security and Economic Development*, pp. 297-308. Edited by K. D. Jackson and M. H. Soesastro. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Press.
- Warren, B. (1980). *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*. London: Verso Books.
- Watson, Adam (1990). "Systems of States." *Review of International Studies* 16:1, pp. 99-110.
- Weinstein, F. B. (1978). "The Meaning of National Security in Southeast Asia." *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 34:9, pp. 20-28.
- Weltman, John J. (1980). "Nuclear Devolution and World Order." *World Politics* 32:2, pp. 169-193.
- Wendt, Alexander (1987). "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." *International Organization* 41:3, pp. 335-370.
- (1989). "The States System and Global Militarization." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota.
- (1992). "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46(2).
- Wendt, Alexander, and Michael Barnett (1990). "The International System and Third World Militarization." Paper presented at the 1991 meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, Canada.
- Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (1983). *Soviet Arms Trade with the Non-Communist Third World in the 1970s and 1980s*. Washington, DC: Wharton.
- Whyne, D. (1979). *The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure*. London: Macmillan.
- Wiarda, Howard J. (1986). "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model." In *Political System and Change*, pp. 3-25. Edited by Ikuo Kabashima and Lynn T. White III. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wight, Martin (1966). "Why Is There No International Theory?" In *Diplomatic Investigations*, pp. 17-34. Edited by H. Butterfield and Martin Wight. London: Allen and Unwin.
- (1978). *Power Politics*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- (1986). *Power Politics*. Edited by Hedley Bull and C. Holbraad. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.
- Wilcox, Francis O. (1965). "Regionalism and the United Nations." *International Organization* 19:3, pp. 789-811.
- Wiseman, H. (1984). "The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution." In *The OAU After Twenty Years*, pp. 123-153. Edited by Y. El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Wolfe, J. H. (1986). "A Historical Review of the Dispute." In *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations*, pp. 105-122. Edited by D. B. Bendahmane and J. W. McDonald, Jr. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Wolfers, Arnold (1965). *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wolpin, M. (1986). *Militarization, Internal Repression and Social Welfare in the Third World*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Wood, B. (1988). *Middle Powers in the International System*, Working Paper No. 1. Ottawa, Ont.: North-South Institute.
- (1990). *World Order and Double Standards 1990-91*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.
- World Bank (1989). *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*.

- Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- Wulf, Herbert (1979). "Dependent Militarism in the Periphery and Possible Alternative Concepts." In *Arms Transfers in the Modern World*, pp. 246–263. Edited by Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy. New York, NY: Praeger.
- (1983). "Developing Countries." In *The Structure of the Defense Industry*, pp. 310–343. Edited by N. Ball and M. Leitenberg. London: Croom Helm.
- (1987). "Arms Production in Third World Countries: Effects on Industrialisation." In *The Economics of Military Expenditures*, pp. 357–384. Edited by Christian Schmidt. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Wurfel, David, and Bruce Burton, eds. (1990). *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan.
- Yalem, R. (1979). "Regional Security Communities." In *The Yearbook on International Affairs*, pp. 217–223. Edited by George W. Keeton and George Scharzenberger. London: Stevens and Sons.
- Yearly, Steven (1989). "Colonial Science and Dependent Development: The Case of the Irish Experience." *The Sociological Review* 37:2, pp. 308–331.
- Zacher, Mark W. (1977). *International Conflicts and Collective Security: 1946–1977*. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Zartman, I. William (1973). "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations." In *Regional Politics and World Order*, pp. 384–398. Edited by R. A. Falk and S. H. Mendlovitz. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company.
- (1985). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- (1986). "The Conflict in Chad." In *Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives*. Edited by A. R. Day and M. W. Doyle. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- (1987). "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation." In *Perspectives on Negotiation*, pp. 205–225. Edited by Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, US Dept. of State.
- (1989). "Pre-negotiation: Phases and Functions." *International Journal* 44:2, pp. 237–253.
- Zartman, I. William, and M. R. Berman (1982). *The Practical Negotiator*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

About the Contributors

Amitav Acharya is assistant professor of political science at the University of Singapore. His research interests cover regional security studies, international relations theory, and Middle East security issues. His publications on the subject include *U.S. Military Strategy in the Persian Gulf* and *Security and Regionalism in the Third World*. He has contributed articles to *International Defence Review* and the *Canadian Journal of Peace Studies*.

Mohammed Ayoob is associate professor of international relations, James Madison College, Michigan State University. His recent publications include *India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies*; two edited volumes, *Regional Security in the Third World* and *Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience*; and articles in *Foreign Policy*, *Asian Survey*, *International Affairs*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *World Politics*, and *Alternatives*. His current work focuses on the security problematic of Third World states.

Michael Barnett is assistant professor in political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is the author of *Warmaking and the Restructuring of State-society Relations: Israel and Egypt in Comparative Perspective*. His research interests include the state in the Third World, the role of the military in society, and foreign policies of the Third World states. He is the author of articles in *International Organization* and *World Politics*.

Barry Buzan is professor of international studies at the University of Warwick. He has written on the conceptual aspects of national and international security and on regional security problems in Europe and Asia. He has recently published the second edition of his book *People, States and Fear*. Other works of his include: *An Introduction to Security Studies: Military Technology and International Relations* and (with Morten Kelstrup, et al.) *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*.

Fen Osler Hampson is associate professor of political science at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. He has published in the areas of international security, arms control, regional conflict, and the environment. He is the editor of *Canada Among Nations*, an annual review volume; his most recent book is *Unguided Missiles: How America Buys Its Weapons*.

K. J. Holsti is professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. He has written widely in the field of international relations, and is the author of *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*; *Why Nations Re-Align: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World*; and *Peace and War: Issues, Armed Contests, and International Order*.

Robert Jackson is professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. He has authored works on African politics, including *Politics and Government of African States*, and more recently on the international relations of Third World states with articles in *World Politics* and *International Organization*. His most recent book is *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*.

Brian L. Job is professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. His research has dealt with international alliances, international crises, the use of force in international relations, and more recently US foreign policy decision making, US policy toward Central America, and great-power intervention. Journals in which his articles have been published include *The American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and *International Studies Quarterly*.

Keith Krause is associate professor of political science at York University. His major research has been in the area of arms production and arms trade involving the Third World. He has written for the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the *International Journal* on this subject. His most recent book is entitled *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade in Historical Perspective*.

S. Neil MacFarlane is professor of political science at Queens University. He has written widely on the subject of Soviet foreign policy and the Third World, with articles in *The Adelphi Papers*, *International Affairs*, *Problems of Communism*, *World Politics*, and other journals. His books include *Soviet Intervention in Third World Conflict* and *Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas*, coedited with Kurt Campbell.

Alexander Wendt is assistant professor of political science at Yale University. He has published several articles on structure, agency, and order in international relations theory appearing, among other places, in *International Organization*. He is currently working on a book entitled *Identity-Formation in World Politics*.

Index

- Ali, Muhammad, 107
- Arab League. *See* Regime security; Regional security complexes
- Armed conflict. *See* Conflict; War
- Arms: transfer and production of, 4–5, 121–123, 140–142; motives for and limits on production of, 135–140
- Arms trade, 123–124; dysfunctional militarization and, 124–130; motive forces in, 130–135
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 150–152, 163 n. 2; regime values and domestic vulnerabilities in, 152–154; regional insurrection and, 155–156; regime survival as an objective of, 157–159. *See also* Regime security; Regional security complexes
- Ball, Nicole, 74, 112, 134
- Berki, R. N., 83, 86, 94
- Buzan, Barry: *People, States, and Fear*, 12, 34 n. 3, 188 n. 1; definition of weak states by, 20–23
- Capitalist world-economy and dependent militarization, 105–114
- Collective security. *See* Middle powers
- Colonialism and the Third World state, 69–71
- Conflict: nature and incidence of, in the Third World, 11–12
- Correlates of War project, 60 n. 1
- Domestic insecurity. *See* External security; National security
- Economies of scale and militarization, 112–114
- Economy. *See* Capitalist world-economy and dependent militarization
- External security, 3–4; domestic insecurity and, in sub-Saharan Africa, 91–92. *See also* National security
- Gilpin, Robert, 42, 58, 75; *War and Change in World Politics*, 39
- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 150–152, 163–164 n. 2; regime values and domestic vulnerabilities in, 154–155; regional insurrections and, 156–157; regime survival as an objective of, 159–161. *See also* Regime security
- Hegemony and war, 57–58
- Hobbesian model of security, 82–86, 93–94
- Hoffmann, Stanley, 188, 197
- Industrialization and militarization, 105–109, 118 n. 11
- Insecurity dilemma: security dilemma vs., 2; defined, 14, 17–19
- Insurrection and regime security, 155–157
- Internal security, 4. *See also* National security; Regime security

- International security system, 31–34.
See also Middle powers; Regional security complexes; Superpowers; War
- International system of states and Third World security, 73–78. *See also* Middle powers; Regional security complexes; Superpowers; War
- Ismail (Khedive of Egypt), 107
- Jackson, Robert, 104, 118 n. 10
- Krushchev, Nikita, 212–215, 219
- Lee Kuan Yew, 155–156
- Marcos, Ferdinand, 153
- Mazrui, Ali, 66, 70, 89
- Mediation; “ripeness” in, 198–200; characteristics of mediators in, 201; rewards and risks of, 203–204. *See also* Middle powers; United Nations
- Middle powers: in international system, 191–192, 207–208; defined, 192–194; historical role of, 195; collective security and, 196–198; international mediation and, 198; in multilateral diplomacy and peacekeeping missions, 204–207. *See also* Mediation
- Migdal, Joel, 21–22, 28, 35 n. 7
- Militarization, 4; international relations scholarship and, 97–99, 118 n. 16; dependent, 100–102, 114–117; systemic determinants of dependent, 102–114, 118–119 n. 17. *See also* Arms; Arms trade; Security strategies
- Mitchell, C. R., 203–204
- National building. *See* State making
- National security: war and, 3, 50–51; ambivalence of, in Africa, 81–82; logic and language of, 82–85; the state and, 85–86; domain of, 86–87; in sub-Saharan Africa, 87–90; domestic insecurity and, in sub-Saharan Africa, 90–92; future scenarios of, in sub-Saharan Africa, 92–93; theoretical implications of domestic insecurity and, 93–94. *See also* Regime security; State making
- Nations and states, 15–16
- Neuman, Stephanie, 98, 137, 138
- Norms of international behavior and Third World security, 76–78
- Organization of African Unity (OAU), 88. *See also* Regime security; Regional security complexes
- Organization of American States (OAS). *See* Regime security; Regional security complexes
- Regime security, 143–147, 161–163; conceptual linkages of, to weak states’ regionalism, 147–150. *See also* Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Gulf Cooperation Council
- Regimes and states, 15
- Regional security complexes, 5–6; defined, 167–176; in historical perspective, 176–180; decolonization and the Third World pattern of, 180–186; system structure and, 186–188
- Regionalism, 5; middle powers and, 6. *See also* Middle powers; Regime security
- Rosberg, Carl, 104, 118 n. 10
- Rothstein, Robert, 23, 121, 123
- Science, technology, and militarization, 109–112
- Security, 2; concept of, 14–17. *See also* International security system; National security; Regime security; Regional security complexes; State making
- Security strategies, 27–31. *See also* Militarization
- Shafie, Mohammed Ghazalie, 152
- Shevardnadze, Edvard, 218, 220, 225, 229 n. 8
- Sovereignty and dependent militarization, 103–105, 118 n. 10
- Soviet Union’s Third World policy, 216–222. *See also* Superpowers
- State making, 3, 13, 24–27, 78–79; in Europe and the Third World, 52–55, 67–69; development and dependency theories and, 63–64; security and, 64–66; colonial inheritance and, 69–71; postcolonial societal demands and,

- 71–73; Third World security and, in the international system, 73–76; Third World security, international norms, and 76–78
- States: contexts of, 15; territory and, in Europe and the Third World, 55–57; security and, 85–86. *See also* State making; Systems of states and war; Weak states
- Superpowers, 6–7; relationship of, 13; Third World security and, 209–210; history of relations between, in the Third World, 210–216; implications of changed relations between, 224–228. *See also* International security system; Soviet Union's Third World policy; United States' Third World policy
- Systems of states and war, 57–59
- Technology transfer, defined, 118 n. 13
- Third World, mapping and typologies of, 23–24
- Thomas, Caroline, 20, 22
- Tilly, Charles, 67–68, 79 n. 3, 80 n. 5
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). *See* Soviet Union's Third World policy; Superpowers
- United Nations: African national security and, 88; *Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development*, 130; middle powers, collective security, and, 196–198. *See also* Middle powers
- United States' Third World policy, 222–224. *See also* Superpowers
- Waltz, Kenneth, 40, 42, 44, 51, 58, 177
- War: characteristics of, since 1945, 37–39; causes of, 39–40; actors in, 40–42; great powers and, 42–43; international structures and, 43–44; balance of power and, 44–46; national attributes and, 46; decisionmaking and, 47; purpose and outcomes of, in Eurocentric theory and Third World practice, 47–50; deterrence and, 50; national security and, 50–51; state making and, 51–55; territory and, 55–57; state systems and, 57–59. *See also* Conflict
- Weak states; model of, 12; defined, 19–27. *See also* Regime security; Security strategies
- Weapons systems. *See* Arms; Arms trade

About the Book

Positing an "insecurity dilemma," in which national security, defined as regime security by state authorities, becomes pitted against the incompatible demands of ethnic, social, and religious forces, this book addresses the problems and prospects for security in the Third World in the 1990s.

The authors advance four lines of argument: First, there is a need to rethink the traditional realist notions of states, national security, territorial threat, and war. Second, the security dilemmas of Third World regimes are bound up in the process of state building and in the practical implications of political development. Third, the repressive strategies that many Third World regimes have adopted reflect an underlying logic associated with the regime holders' interest in their short-term survival prospects. And finally, radically altered relationships and conditions in the international system mean that the security interests of Third World regimes and peoples will be viewed differently in the future by both superpowers and middle powers; and the consequences may well be that traditional regional powers will attempt to (re)assert their security priorities and claims to dominance.

